The Menace of the Herd

OR

Procrustes at Large



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
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SCIENCE AND CULTURE SERIES

JOSEPH HUSSLEIN, S.J., PH.D., GENERAL EDITOR

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Εἰκότως τοίνυν οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης πολιτείας τυραννὶς καθίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας. — ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ.

La démocratie a done deux excès á éviter: L'esprit d'inégalité, qui la mène à l'aristocratie où au gouvernement d'un seul; et l'esprit d'égalité extrême, qui la conduit au despotisme d'un seul. Montesquieu, *L'Esprit des Lois*, VIII, 2.

FRANCIS STUART CAMPBELL

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This book is dedicated to all those who defend our freedom in all five continents of this earth, with the sword, not the pen.

PRO-CRUS’TES (prō-krŭs’tēz) (Gr. Antiq.) A celebrated legendary highwayman of Attica who tied his victims upon an iron bed, and, as the case required, either stretched or cut off their legs to adapt them to its length — whence the metaphorical phrase, *the bed of Procrustes.* — *Webster’s International Dictionary*, 1902, p. 1142.

PREFACE BY THE GENERAL EDITOR

VIGOROUSLY written and profoundly concerned with problems of the hour, this book will come as a challenge to many.

For an undertaking of this nature world contacts are needed, and these the author possesses in an unusual degree. His continued travels have made of him a citizen of the world, with international sympathies and close familiarity with a score of languages.

His pictures, therefore, of the European scene are not pieced together out of other people's books. They are derived from personal observation of the character and traditions of the various nations considered. Particularly important, too, is his knowledge of the geographic conformation of the different countries in which the numerous types of European society have developed side by side through the centuries.

As for America, the writer has set foot within each state of the Union, keenly observant always, and no less keenly appraising all that he saw. If at times he criticizes severely certain aspects of American life, it is only because he loves America and admires it, and so would wish the false ore to be cleansed away where it mingles with the gold. Thus, referring to the problems that today confront the country, he says:

"America may be far quicker in understanding these issues than the outsider is ready to believe. It is of little importance that America at present has less of a *visible* tradition than Europe and a smaller intellectual aristocracy, but in no country in the world is there such a furious hunger for culture and intellectual values, such craving for true personality, such wonderful seeking for the beautiful things of life. America will understand."

The author's breadth of view is accounted for, no doubt, still further by the fact that his graduate studies were made in America, England, and continental Europe. Yet it is not the popular cause which he espouses at any cost. Rather, like a Roland come to the Dark Tower, he winds his horn and

blows his blast in defense of true liberty and genuine culture, as he honestly conceives of them.

His attitude toward democracy is essentially that of the Founding Fathers, as indicated in his important first chapter, “What of Democracy?”

Without anticipating his views here it may be stressed that in its use of the word *democracy* the world has run mad in our day. America itself has in this regard come perilously near to the ancient Babel, with just the difference that each man now believes he understands his neighbor, while in reality their concepts are leagues apart.

“Heaven high, hell deep” is a phrase borrowed from Browning that may be none too strong to describe the divergence possibly existing in the minds of two chance persons who in the same crowded hall applaud together the same blessed word *democracy* as it bursts in a climax of oratory from the speaker’s platform.

To one it signifies no less than a Gospel concept of the ideal human relations that should exist within a commonwealth. To the other it definitely imports the opiate Marxian dream, to be ushered in by the red dawn of the communist World Revolution. And between these two extremes — could we but visualize for ourselves the minds of the audience — we might find a complete spectrum of diversified meanings for this one single word, from the ultraviolet of the confirmed optimist to the ultrared of the thoroughgoing Bolshevist.

Communism, in fact, has practically dropped its own label for what it declares to be its perfect synonym, democracy.

“You are a Fascist or a Democrat,” runs the argument addressed to the crowd, “and if a Democrat you must be a Communist, for communism is the only genuine democracy.” To make such arguments effective constant repetition suffices, according to the tactics expressly set forth by Adolf Hitler, past master in the art. Thus communist funds have been known to swell to a high tide with the money gathered from the newly gained “friends of democracy.”

Here, then, is a matter for serious consideration. Closely allied with it is the question of equality.

To understand the statement of the Founding Fathers that all men are “created equal” we must look at it in the light of their own daily practice, which was worlds removed from the equality postulated by the French

Revolution. They were as a body, believing men. Human equality consisted for them in the creation of all men by God, their equal redemption and final judgment, together with the consequent dignity of the human person and the rights assured to individuals and families by the natural law. But as for human society itself, they frankly recognized it as composed of unequal elements and sought their political solution in a Representative Republic. It is that form of government which still remains to us, despite the persistent efforts of those who have been carrying on the termite work of weakening its wisely planned and powerful supports. Under such circumstances there is need of watchfulness and enlightened patriotism.

Lastly, no little space is here devoted to the explanation of developments that led up to World War I, and to the considerations which the author believes will be imperative when representatives of the belligerent nations in this war at length foregather around the peace table. It is in this connection that he pleads for an intelligent understanding of the long traditions of the nations concerned, of their historic background, of the political institutions most different from our own that are perhaps needed on their part to stabilize the future peace. Then it is that mercy and truth must meet, that charity and justice must rule, and that God may not be disregarded. All other peace would only be a second dismal failure, another willful defiance flung in the face of high heaven. America cannot stand for that!

J. H.

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WHAT OF DEMOCRACY?

(An explanatory note.)

TO PUT in its right light and scientific context the technical word *democracy* is naturally our first task. Representative government as established in the United States is not synonymous with democracy. The Founding Fathers established a republic (*res publica, politéia*), not a democracy. And many of the Founders of the Constitution of this country have repeatedly emphasized this fact in so many words. Some of the best American minds have again and again called attention to this important fact and have protested loudly against the use of the term *democracy* for the fundamental laws of their country, which they respect and by which they abide.*

It is outside the scope of this book to investigate here the history of the popularization of the term *democracy* for the American Constitution or American ideals. We will merely consider it as a fact that there is not *one*, but that there are *dozens* of modern, popular interpretations of this expression. As a matter of fact, the vast majority of the population of the United States uses it to denote anything at random with which they agree in the realm of politics, social life, and economics. We will only quote a few examples:

Mr. Green, the millionaire, shakes hands with workers. He is "democratic." (He is, as a matter of fact, *demophil*, but not democratic which latter word is derived from *demos*, the [common] people, and *krátos*, power.)

Mr. Gray protests against censorship as undemocratic. (Censorship may be illiberal — against freedom — but not necessarily against the majority.)

Mr. Black is against Negro lynching, denouncing it as undemocratic. (As soon as the *majority* of a township wants to hang a Negro this action is un-Christian, illegal, but certainly very democratic.)

Mr. Red extols the icebox and the shower as the pillar of our "democratic life." (This is plain nonsense but of frequent occurrence.)

Finally one and the same thing can be considered to be democratic and undemocratic at the same time: for instance, the New Deal, Tuxedo Club, Presidential acts, prices of fur coats, British accents, China, Russia, England — all according to individual likes and dislikes. Communists call their creed "streamlined democracy" or "Twentieth-Century Americanism."

We see, then, from the plurality of present-day connotations of democracy that it would be thoroughly unjustified to use the term "democracy" *in any other sense than in the classical and universal one*.* We may well agree that the mischief started by uneducated popularizers has already reached such proportions that a Hercules is needed to clean this Augian stable of popular misconceptions, false labels, and mispresented ideologies. Even some of the more intelligent writers have become a prey to popular pressure, and as modern intellectuals do not lead the masses any more, but follow them and subordinate their ideas and language to the demands of the market, the confusion has now reached its climax.

Before offering any further reasons regarding the deeper implications of the use and misuse of the term *democracy* we shall give some views on the American Constitution as expressed by the Founding Fathers and by distinguished modern writers. It will be seen that the classical and scientific meaning of that word remained unchanged *for 2300 years*, notwithstanding the scandalous ignorance displayed by editors, teachers, college professors, stump orators, and other irresponsible persons who are prominent in the public eye.

Thus the *trend* toward democracy in the modern age is deplored by Harry F. Atwood in his book *Back to the Republic* where he writes:

> We have drifted from the republic toward democracy: from statesmanship to demagogism; from excellent to inferior service. It is an age of retrogressive tendencies.

J. Hampden Doherty in the *Electoral System in the United States* confirms similarly our opinion when he writes:

> The tendency in this democratic age is to overlook the fact that the Fathers of the Constitution were not believers in the rule of the people, and it was not until after 1800 that manhood suffrage was adopted in any of the States.

Dealing with the current criticism of the Constitution at his time, Madison, in the *Federalist*, says:

It seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these two forms was also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the people exercise the government in person: in a republic they administer it by their representatives (No. 14).

Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia, in his booklet *Why Should We Change Our Form of Government?* (New York, 1912), writes:

Aristotle has pointed out that democracy has many points of resemblance with tyranny. It was he who first told us how a democracy as well as a tyranny, may become a despotism.

It is just as easy for a majority to become a despot as for a monarch to become a tyrant. Even a tyrant may be benevolent, even a democratic despotism may be malevolent (pp. 29 and 30).

Hamilton, who held at the beginning certain monarchical views in order to exchange them later for aristocratic opinions, opposed the *republic*. Gouverneur Morris shrewdly said:

". . . he confounded it with democratical government." Morris, though he shared Hamilton's dislike of democracy, thus early saw the confusion of republicanism with democracy that so long existed in men's mind. — (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 7, 1937, p. 183.)

Today democracy is confused with liberalism,* freedom, and prosperity alike.

About the *truly* liberal-whiggish Fathers Ralph Adams Cram writes in his *The End of Democracy* (Boston, 1937, p. 20):

I apologize to the revered memory of Washington, Adams, Madison, Gerry, and all their fellows for attributing to them any intellectual commerce with democracy, for if they feared anything it was precisely this; whereby their prevision was highly justified. As Mr. Nock says: "One sometimes wonders how our Revolutionary forefathers would take it if they could hear some flatulent political thimblerigger charge them with having

founded ‘the great and glorious democracy of the West.’” Of course, as we know now, they never intended to do anything of that sort.

And later he adds:

The Constitution of 1787 was, then, what may be called an aristocratic republican form of organic law with no salient democratic features.

Alexander Hamilton attacked democracy violently in his speeches on June 21, 1788, “On the Compromise of Constitution,” and in the Federal Convention on June 26, 1787. Democracy, so-called “Jeffersonian democracy,” was assailed in poetical form by such anonymous writers as Dr. Christopher Caustic in his “Democracy Unveiled or Tyranny Stripped of the Garb of Patriotism” (Boston, 1805). Yet Jefferson was no democrat in the current sense; he believed in the rule of the best, not in the rule of the masses. This is evident when he writes:

The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature, for the instruction, the trusts and government of society. And indeed, it would have been inconsistent in creation to have formed men for the social state, and not to have provided virtue and wisdom enough to manage the concerns of society. May we not even say that that form of government is the best which provides most effectually for a pure selection of these natural *aristoi* into the offices of government? — (*Letter to John Adams*, Oct. 28, 1814).

This belief in an elite is not very “democratic.” Sometimes Jefferson’s vocabulary was rather unfitting for “progressive” ears; this seems apparent when he deals with the possibility of a large urban proletariat in America which by destroying the agricultural character of the country would make even representative government unworkable. He wrote in the same letter quoted above:

Every one by his property, or by his satisfactory situation, is interested in the support of law and order. And such men may safely and advantageously reserve to themselves wholesome control over their public affairs, and a degree of freedom, which in the hands of the *canaille* of the cities of Europe, would be instantly perverted to the demolition and destruction of everything public.

This view is supplemented by a fear of an industrial development in the United States. He wrote on December 20, 1787, to Madison:

I think that our governments will remain virtuous for many centuries; as long as they are chiefly agricultural: and this will be as long as there are vacant lands in any part of America. When they get piled upon one another as in the large cities of Europe, they will become corrupt as in Europe. — (Both letters quoted from J. T. Adams *Jeffersonian Principles and Hamiltonian Principles*, Boston, 1932.)

His hatred against the urban masses can also be seen in other letters and essays:

The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body. — (Volume I, p. 403, *Writings of Jefferson*, Washington edition.)

and:

I consider the class of artificers as the panderers of vice, and the instruments by which the liberties of a country are generally overturned. — (Volume I, p. 403.)

These are views which few medieval writers would have expressed with such crudity. They are certainly not the author's and they are only quoted in order to exhort the reader to exercise greater discretion in alluding to the problem of Jeffersonian "democracy."

Another author stressing the strictly nondemocratic character of the Constitution (and of historic America) is E. M. Burns who writes in his volume *James Madison, Philosopher of the Constitution* (New Brunswick, 1938):

Instead of defending the absolute sovereignty of the majority, Madison detested it so strongly that he sought in almost every conceivable way to prevent its exercise (page 63).

A good analysis of the American Constitution is also given by Andrew Cunningham MacLaughlin in the *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society* (New Series, Volume 22) under the title: "Democracy and Constitution." As to the definitions he writes:

In any examination concerning the popular character of institutions we need to recognize the value and significance of words, and there is no more carelessly used [word] in the language than "democratic." Democracy, as we use the word, may mean individualism, that is freedom from restraint, opportunity to do what one will without governmental encroachment or restriction; and, where individualism exists, the spirit of individualism and of individual self-reliance is apt to exist. But democracy may mean equality, and the spirit of equality may be quite contrary to the spirit of individualism, though it is possible that the two may go hand in hand. Again democracy may mean the right of the authority of the masses of the people to manage their own affairs and to make use of the government for their own interests. Democracy in this latter sense may be in absolute and complete conflict with individualism or even with equality. There is no reason for the coexistence of any two of these three principles which we commonly cover by the convenient word democracy or democratic (p. 296).

"Excusing" the Founding Fathers for their lack of what is scientific democracy he writes:

Just that kind of government [i.e., democracy] was *not* in accord with popular desire in 1787, the stirring watchword of American life was *Liberty* (p. 310).

And further he again states plainly:

It cannot be said that the Constitution of the United States has retarded the growth of democracy, but in the interest of historical accuracy it needs to be said that it did not establish democracy.

The conflict between democracy and liberty to which A. C. MacLaughlin alluded was also well known by Calhoun who wrote in his famous *Disquisition on Government* (New York, 1853):

There is another error, not less great and dangerous, usually associated with the one which just has been considered. I refer to the opinion, that liberty and equality are so intrinsically united, that liberty cannot be perfect without perfect equality (p. 56).

and his attack against democratic majoritism becomes more concrete when he writes:

Liberty is little more than a mere name under all governments of the absolute form, including that of the numerical majority, and can only have a secure and durable existence under those of the concurrent or constitutional form (p. 60).

Returning to an earlier period we want to quote the opinions of John Adams, second president of the United States. In his famous work, *A Defense of the Constitution of the United States of America* (Volume III, new edition, London, 1794), he asserts that the following propositions can be proved to be true:

1. No democracy ever did or can exist.
2. If, however, it were admitted, for argument sake, that a democracy ever did or can exist, no such passion as a love of democracy stronger than self-love . . . ever did, or ever can, prevail in the minds of the citizens in general.
3. That if the citizens . . . preferred the public to his private interest . . . it would not be from . . . love of the democracy, but from reason, conscience, etc.
4. That no love of equality, at least since Adam's fall, ever existed.
5. That no love of frugality ever existed as a passion, but always as a virtue.
6. That therefore the democracies of Montesquieu . . . are all mere fragments of his brain, and delusive imaginations.
7. That his passion of love of the democracy would be, in the members of the majority only a love of the majority. . . .
8. That his love of equality would not even be pretended toward the members of the minority but the semblance of it would only be kept up among the members of the majority. . . .
9. That in reality the word democracy signifies nothing more or less than a nation or people without any government at all. . . .
10. That every attentive reader may perceive that the notions of Montesquieu, concerning a democracy, are imaginations of his own derived from the contemplation of the reveries of Xenophon and of Plato, concerning equality of goods and community of wives and children, in their delirious ideas of a perfect commonwealth (pp. 493–495).

"Democracy" as an ideal of the Founding Fathers is equally denied by W. H. Hamilton and D. Adair in *The Power to Govern* (New York, 1937, p. 158). It must also be borne in mind that the *protest* against calling the Constitution democratic comes from historians of *all* groups, yet while Rightists praise lack of "democracy" in the Constitution, "Leftists" like Charles Beard* and H. Rugg are prone to condemn it outright.

We have already once cautioned the reader against the concept of "Jeffersonian democracy." Thomas Jefferson never called himself a democrat and the word *democrat* is only mentioned once in the Monticello edition — as an accusation leveled against him by Hamilton. In his letter addressed to Washington on May 17, 1792, he called himself a "Republican Federalist," and in his first inaugural address as President he said: "We are all Federalists, we are all Republicans." When Andrew Jackson ran against John Q. Adams for the presidency in 1828 he was called by some of his followers (as both candidates were Republican) a "democratic-republican." Van Buren called himself a Republican and the unfortunate label "democratic" was used again by F. Pierce in 1852. Since that time it became increasingly popular with some people. Others protested and go on protesting.

We have said before that it is difficult to find the exact reasons for the growing popularity of the word *democracy* and *democratic* taken from a dead language which is thoroughly nonunderstandable to 999 out of 1000 Americans. The decline of classical education in favor of progressive "self-realization" has favored the increased use of wrong labels. It is deplorable that even Catholics have become victims of this chaos in verbiage. They have naturally "their" democracy, the Leftists have "another one,"* and even Conservatives indulge in the worship of a thing called "democracy" with a thoroughly different content. *The only way out would be to discard the label completely*, restore it brutally to its pristine meaning, and to call the things hitherto covered by the label with their proper names.

There is something pathetic in seeing Americans almost daily besmirching unconsciously their ideals and their traditions — all thanks to a faulty education. The Founding Fathers would turn in their graves if they could hear themselves called "Democrats"; America indeed was never a democracy, and never will be . . . unless we make "democracy work," and replace, within the framework of a "pure democracy," our legislation by the

Gallup Poll. Those who have been taught the wrong interpretation may ask their money back from the schools where they have wasted their adolescence. And the textbooks which preach a spurious democracy may still provide us with fuel in cold days to come.

This protest against the use of the word *democracy* is not a mere pedantic fight against a technical term. "Democracy" should be discarded as quickly as possible from our vocabulary; it should only be used in its classical connotation. The reason for such a reform lies in the world-wide implications of technical terms. America is not a democracy. We are not fighting for democracy. We fight for liberty. America not only fights for its own survival, for its own liberty, but also for liberty abroad. Human dignity can never be preserved without liberty. Liberty is therefore a real good, a precious good worth while to be redeemed by blood.

Yet by calling this great struggle a fight for democracy, we are implying a fight for a political ideal which is not ours and which even in some of its journalistic-popular connotations is shared by only a tiny minority of our allies. Russia may be a democracy according to St. Thomas, but it is no democracy according to popular conception (confounding it with liberal popular representation). Perhaps it matters little in the case of Russia which momentarily is our military, not our ideological ally. But India, China, Greece, Serbia, Austria . . . are these "democracies," in the popular or classical sense? Does Europe nourish a nostalgia for either form of democracy? Or is there not rather the world over a desperate craving for liberty, personal liberty, group liberty, national liberty, religious liberty? Are we not rather going to win the world over to our side by appealing to the unquenched thirst of liberty without which, as we have said, there can be no realization of human dignity and personality?

One must be very blind not to be aware that the term "democratic" is very sparingly used in the great enunciations of our time. It appears sometimes in proclamations and speeches of the President calculated for home consumption, as a concession to the mass mind, but in the great, programmatic speeches, in the Atlantic Charter, in the outlines of the Four Freedoms, "democracy" figures nowhere — and rightly so. The Wilsonian blunders will not be repeated. The crime to proclaim that the world should be made safe for democracy against which the Founding Fathers had violently protested will not take place again. The artificial fostering of

allegedly American ideas belongs to the past. America of today and tomorrow will help other nations to live, to breathe, to be themselves again, to find their own forms and their own destinies free from the fetters of foreign occupation, of demagogues and mystagogues, of quislings and paid traitors. *E pluribus unum*, the constructive principle of federation, *In God We Trust*, the recognition of God's limitless fatherhood — these two watchwords, together with that of *Liberty*, should be our creed, not that spurious label democracy which our American forebears despised and execrated.

Yet in spite of all these considerations, in order not to increase the already existing chaos, we have made a compromise with the existing misuse and abuse of the word *democracy*. The issue is furthermore complicated by the fact that a large political party in the United States calls itself "Democratic."

In order to denote the classical interpretation of democracy as well as its cultural concomitant we have chosen to use the word *ochlocracy* and — as its adjective — *ochlocratic.** The Greeks used this expression strictly in the sense of mob rule, regardless whether these mobs created majorities or minorities. The selection is not a very happy one, and the reader is reminded that we understand under "mob" not the "lower classes," but just the vast masses of inferior people which can be found everywhere; these products of a soulless culture and civilization who in their terrifying mediocrity are neither fish nor flesh, have neither face nor expression, neither wisdom nor knowledge, piety nor enthusiasm, faith nor charity, hatred nor love, those who go neither with the angels nor the devils and because of their lukewarmness will be spat out by our Lord on the day of reckoning.

A few times we have used for the cultural and sociological phenomena of democracy the word *democratism*. This expression puts stress on the totalitarian (all-embracing, all-controlling) tendencies of democracy as an *ism*. The reason we did not stick more closely to that term lies in the fact that its adjective form, "democratic," is highly unaesthetic from a phonetic point of view.

(The Museum of Modern Art of New York presented, in a photographic exhibition in 1941, a picture of a crowded beach on Long Island during a

summer holiday. Its title was significantly enough "democratism.")

With the word *"democracy"* and *"democratic"* we will ironically denote one or the other of the current popular misconceptions styled *democracy* by its advocates.

Valid ideals, on the other hand, which are used under the misnomer democracy can easily be called with some other, more fitting, name. Some of the so-called "democratic" institutions are just plainly republican, Catholic, Christian, decent, traditional, American, fair, conventional.

In the linguistic usage of the Left, "democratic" denotes much more frequently highly *negative values*. Everybody is acquainted with the real meaning of such expressions as "making democracy work in the classroom" which just stands for lack of discipline, or "democratizing literature" which means plain trash. "Democracy in the factory" may mean either striking or strike breaking, according to the advocate.

Catholics are unfortunately inclined to speak of "democracy as we mean it," yet there are in America about a hundred different types of "democracy," each held to be *"real* democracy, democracy as it was meant by the Founding Fathers, democracy as we *all* (?) understand it." But the Founding Fathers, although they had very clear and concise ideas, wanted personally no democracy, and the only way out of the chaos is to go back like good children to the giants of the past, be they theologians like St. Thomas, philosophers like Plato, or statesmen like the authors of the *Federalist*. Confusion of words and meanings leads to the confusion of minds, and the confusion of minds breeds upheavals and revolution, as a well-known American once rightly pointed out.

Europe which alone has produced great democratic upheavals (the French, Russian, and German revolutions) is today in a far more immediate danger to fall a victim to mass-madness than America ever was. Not in vain has the knife of the guillotine glittered in Paris and not in in Philadelphia. Naturally there are also democratic tendencies in America but these are not by their very nature American. America always stood for liberty and personal worth, ideals incompatible with classical and scientific democracy and democratism.

It is almost in the strictly classical sense of the Greek word *ochlocracy*, to which reference has just been made, that the United States Army *Military*

*Manual** defines *democracy* in Section IX, Lesson 9, on "Representative Government." Having first described *autocracy* as resulting in "arbitrariness, tyranny, and oppression," it goes on to what it considers the opposite extreme:

Democracy:
A government of the masses.
Authority derived through mass meetings or any other form of "direct" expression.
Results in mobocracy.
Attitude toward property is communistic — negating property rights.
Attitude toward law is that the will of the majority shall regulate, whether it be based upon deliberation or government by passion, prejudice, and impulse, without restraint or regard to consequences.
Results in demagogism, license, agitation, discontent, anarchy (p. 91).

In the passage that follows, the United States Army *Military Manual* strongly contrasts the three forms of government: autocracy, democracy, and "representative government — the American experiment," describing the last named as "the golden mean between autocracy and democracy." It reads:

Autocracy declares the divine right of kings; its authority cannot be questioned; its powers are arbitrarily or unjustly administered.
Democracy is the "direct" rule of the people and has been repeatedly tried without success.
Our Constitutional fathers, familiar with the strength and weakness of both autocracy and democracy, with fixed principles definitely in mind, defined a representative republican form of government. They "made a very marked distinction between a republic and a democracy . . . and said repeatedly and emphatically that they had founded a republic."
Madison, in the *Federalist*, emphasized the fact that this government was a republic and not a democracy, the Constitution makers having considered both an autocracy and a democracy as undesirable forms of government while "a republic . . . promises the cure for which we are seeking" (p. 92).

While many may consider the government established by the Founding Fathers as a constitutional democracy, it is clear that no such idea entered

into the mind of those from whom Americans derive their form of government, nor did these men give coloring to such an interpretation by their own actions.*

As a test of the sincerity of their attitude toward human liberty, the question of slavery naturally enters into consideration here. The disestablishment of it was not accomplished at once, but was definitely aimed at by the Founding Fathers, and steps in that direction were taken progressively. Charles Carroll led the way by actually introducing into the Maryland Legislature a motion for its complete abolition, but this was premature. George Washington at his death freed all his slaves, as did also others of the Founding Fathers. Nothing, however, could be more convincing than the Constitutional clause demanding that after twenty years (in 1808) the slave trade was to be abolished. In the northern colonies this took place at an early date. Such measures, of course, in no way implied a desire for any other form of government than that of a Representative Republic.

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* See the letter of Mr. William S. Bennet, prominently displayed in the *New York Times*, Apr. 5, 1942.

* Apart from the fact that we rather borrow our terminology from the Fathers of the Constitution than from radio commentators or the speakers at women's clubs.

* About its confusion with liberty see the text concerning liberalism.

* Charles A. and Mary R. Beard wrote: "As was said afterwards, the founders of the Republic in general, whether Federalist or Republican, feared democracy more than they feared original sin." (*America in Midpassage*, New York, 1939, Vol. III, p. 922.) About the use of the word *democratic* between 1865 and the close of the century, see p. 923 of the same book.

* Mob democracy is, needless to say, nearest to the concepts of St. Thomas. Thus by a play of circumstances their terminology is more accurate than that of some lowbrow Catholics.

* The expression *democracy* in the notes, Appendix I, as used by American and foreign authorities, has its *classical, standard meaning* and is equivalent to the term *ochlocracy* in the text.

* *Military Manual* published in 1928 and in use for the succeeding four years. (TM 2000–25)

* Cf. Stringfellow Barr's article "Ourselves Again" in *Tomorrow*, Oct., 1942. Condensed reprint in the *Catholic Digest*, Nov., 1942. This essay of the president of St. John's, Annapolis, not only evaluates democracy correctly, but also gives an outline of Hitler's democratic background.

PART I

THE CULT OF SAMENESS

"We are not a Christian civilization; democracy is not a Christian invention." — Freda Kirchwey in *The Nation*, November 3, 1940.

"I say that democracy can never prove itself beyond cavil, until it founds and luxuriantly grows its own forms of art, poems, schools, theology, displacing all that exists, or that has been produced in the past, under opposite influences." — Walt Whitman, *Democratic Vistas*.

I

IDENTITY VERSUS DIVERSITY

"It is surprising to observe how constantly we find all our political questions complicated with theology." —
Proudhon.

IN ORDER to understand history in general and the issues of our troubled times in particular we must bear well in mind that political movements, political forms and establishments, are always based on instincts, sentiments, conceptions, and tendencies deeply seated in our souls. Even those who would like to see the word *soul* substituted by the term "glands" will have to admit that successful political ideas must have an appeal somewhere deep in our personalities. They can hardly be based on sheer intellectual suppositions.

Great stress has been put in the past on facts related to character, such as introversion and extroversion, individualism and collectivism — aspects which do not lack a certain inner connection. Yet they should be supplemented by another pair of mutually antagonistic human trends which have been hitherto neglected by political psychologists. One of these trends stands for *identity* and uniformity, while its counterpart expresses the yearning for *diversity*.

The former is an *animalistic instinct* which we have in common with all gregarious animals. It urges us to seek the company of our "equals," to move in the society of people of our own social status, of our tastes, our

likes and dislikes, our race and political conviction, our cultural background, our financial strength, and perhaps even of our sex.

Aristotle says that man is a "political animal," but this trait of our character is not necessarily a consequence of the fact that we are created in the image of God. God is not a "social animal," yet sheep, wolves, and monkeys undoubtedly are, and so also in the insect world locusts, bees, ants, and termites function as a group. The more "primitive" man is (in the characteriological not anthropological sense) the more he is guided and directed by the *herd instinct*, which prompts him to seek "congenial" company and to obey scrupulously the written or unwritten commands of the group.

The true "herdist" will carefully avoid acting or thinking originally, in order not to destroy the uniformity which is so dear to him, and he is also ready to rise immediately against anybody who dares to act independently and thus destroy the sacred unity of the uniform group to which he belongs. The loyal herdist will not rise alone against the sacrilegious offender; he will have the support of the rest of the circumscribed society and thus a mass action of collective protest will take place, forcing the "lonely individual" to conform or to withdraw. It must be fully borne in mind that no one of us is completely free from the influence of the herdist instinct and even the noblest among us yield to its dark appeal in one form or the other.

The herdist instinct is furthermore not only personal, in the sense that it clamors for a personal collectivism; it creates also a longing and desire for the visual or acoustic contemplation of identitarian or uniformistic phenomena. The true *herdist*, the man truly dominated by that inferior instinct, will not only rejoice in marching amongst twenty thousand uniformly clad soldiers, all stepping rhythmically in one direction, but he will find an almost equal gratification in contemplating the show from a balcony. He will not only be happy in sitting amidst two hundred other bespectacled businessmen, drinking beer and humming one chant in unison, but the aspect of a skyscraper with a thousand identical windows will probably impress him more than a picture by Botticelli or Zurbarán.

The herdist is the born enemy of all personal hierarchies as well as of most hierarchies of value. The modern political philosophies and the Industrial Revolution have strengthened the herdist element in all civilized countries; a *Parteitag* in Nuremberg, the beach of Brighton during a bank

holiday, a military parade on the Red Square in Moscow or a subway train during the rush hours in New York afford voluntary or involuntary manifestations of the herdist spirit or the herdist order of our days. It is needless to emphasize that the herdist is a convinced egalitarian, that he has an inveterate suspicion regarding everything original or unique, a hatred for everything beyond his comprehension, a hostile uneasiness for things which are "low" or organically natural. The peasant with his strong personality is no less a target for his contempt and scorn than the "stuffed shirt," the "high-hatted" aristocrat, or the "high-brow" intellectual.

The ideal dwelling place for the herdist is the city, the megalopolis with its apartment houses, clubs, cinemas, theaters, offices, factories, and restaurants. Here the herdist has ample opportunity to live the life of the masses, to lead an impersonal and lonely existence in a truly dehumanized ant heap, to love and like nobody but himself and perhaps those similar to him.

This loneliness, this solitude amongst the many, is usually not even mitigated by an awareness of the presence of God.[1] The herdist who tends in the political sphere to be a Leftist — i.e., a national or an international collectivist — feels little attracted by the idea of God's existence who after all is "different" and represents the top of the pyramid of a hierarchic system which the herdist, disbelieving in souls, is unable to accept.[2] The herdist is truly the *homme médiocre* whom Ernest Hello has described so aptly;[3] he is simply forced to stand for mediocrity because it has as the "medium" (the "fifty-fifty"), the best chance to become the rallying point and the focus for the mass movement, the mass sentiment, or the mass norm.

The antagonist of the herdist, on the other hand, the "romantic" man, is not moved by identity and uniformity but by diversity. We must be careful not to confound the true "romantic" with the "rugged individualist" who puts up a desperate and losing struggle against an impending collectivism, or with the mentally unbalanced egotist who is extravagant in order to draw general attention. One hardly finds the latter type in a rural or "backward" surrounding. Gustave de Nerval promenaded his tame lobster in the streets of Paris and not in the loneliness of the Dauphiné.

Yet there is nothing freakish in a man who longs for people different from himself, different in sex, in race, in convictions. The ideal antiherdist longs for God and to be with Him. He may long for countries far away, for travel, adventure, and a life full of variety in externals *or* internals. The romantic is not moved by an element of fear as the herdist who is hiding his person in an anonymous collective, but he seeks the fullness of life with all its diverse aspects. At its loftiest, his aspiration is for the fuller life of the spirit. The Germans speak of *das romantische Lebensgefühl* and one might therefore name the moving power in the antiherdist, the romantic spirit, a label which might well serve its purpose.

But while using this label we have to bear in mind that we do not imply a basic affinity between its meaning and the historic literary romanticism of Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century (and even far less so of French romanticism of almost the same period). Irving Babbitt in his brilliant *Rousseau and Romanticism* has very aptly characterized the spirit of the Romantic Movement in Europe and little can be added to his genial analysis of this disorganized outbreak of desperate vitality between arid classicism and deadly industrialism. The Pseudo-Romanticism of our days showed such mad outbursts as weird Californian sects, blue fingernails, tree sitting, and "jitterbug" dancing. The advent of national socialism and communism was marked by a curious and sudden increase of all kinds of extravagant fads even in the religious sphere of which the hysteria in connection with Rasputin and the cheese-eating Weissenberg sect were the most conspicuous.

It should not be forgotten that none of us lacks the herd instinct completely and that there is scarcely a human being who is totally devoid of the romantic spirit. But while the herd instinct of those "who want to march through life together, along the collective path, shoulder to shoulder, wool rubbing wool and the head down" (José Ortega y Gasset) — is of the animalistic order, the romantic spirit is purely human, divine.* The plenitude of life so eagerly sought by the Romantic, as here conceived, is inaccessible to the animal. The terrifying diversity of the total cosmos (visible as well as invisible) has no meaning for the termite or the herdist with their limited existences in their limited buildings.

The great achievements — sanctity, heroism, holy wisdom, the beatific vision — are not eagerly sought for by the herdist who like the beasts of the field longs to be a "secure" animal (to use an expression of Peter Wust) instead of being proud to remain an "insecure" animal, which man is by nature and in the order of things. Hostile to *adventure*, which after all was one of the great magnetic powers of the Middle Ages, the herdist moves cautiously in the broad stream of the mediocre masses avoiding all extremes except those in a frenzied mass hysteria. Yet Christianity is an extreme. The yoke of Christ is not a lesser menace to his meager and miserable personality than the iron postulates of the Cross — of the same Cross which is a flat denial of his shining rule of the "fifty-fifty," and disturbing to all his cautious calculations and plannings. Only the select can be closely confronted with the Absolute without taking flight. Only the saints, but not the "commonsensical" herd, can and will surrender to the "Holy Folly of the Cross." For this reason we have such hatred on the part of the mediocre man, who hates any sort of hierarchy, whether of the saints or of sanctity itself. Sanctity is not only an extraordinary condition but also an adventure. And adventure belongs to the domain of the "Romantic." Adventure is a solitary enterprise, like sanctity, and therefore not congenial to the herd and the herdist.[4] The herdist in turn is bent upon "imitation" (not in the sense of an *Imitatio*, a following, but of mere *copying*), and his imitation is partly the result of his lack of originality, his lack of creative power and his inner weakness which must be covered up by some sort of protective coloring, a mimicry which makes it difficult to distinguish him from the rest and from the "norm."[5]

One should, in that connection, certainly not forget the "greatest" adventure of the herdist, his banal excursions into the animalistic aspects of sex. Here he hopes to drown the despair over his loneliness in the herd. The Romantic may be alone, but he is never lonely, and that because of his knowledge of the presence of God. (Certainly, also, there is more loneliness in an apartment house or in a crammed subway than in a village with widely dispersed cottages.) Yet the restriction of adventure to the sexual sphere is the reason why our urban culture and civilization is so terribly oversexed. The great thirst does not go for "women" or "men" but for sex alone, sex for sex' sake. It is not the attraction of the other sex, but sex as a

drug and escape. It thus stands in the same category as the movies. Modern man, having abandoned the supernatural, here seeks for perhaps a last consolation, in order not to be completely overpowered by machine and monotony.

It should not be denied that the ugliness and the deadly routine of traditionless urban civilizations engendered often a nostalgic thirst in man for beauty and romance, and this may be the reason for the enormous power of Eros in the technicized world. In the shadow of soul-murdering offices and workshops, of desolate railway yards and "main streets," without character and expression, love becomes the only emotional experience and woman the only living memory of nature and a paradise lost.

Yet natural love between the sexes is not the real fulfillment of emotional herdism. Homoeroticism is anything but rare among leading Leftists of the nationalistic or the international brand.* It is a well-known fact that the latter have openly fought for decades against laws prohibiting not only this vice but have defended even more bestial practices.** This inclination is frequently promoted (never *conditioned*) by specific cultural ideas and concepts.[6] Identitarian cultures and groups favoured the growth of this vice in all ages.

Sex is, as Dr. Allers emphasizes it, a *means* of expressing love and not an original cause as well as a final end, as Freud seems to imply. Genuine love is never love of one's self but love of another "person." The greatest love is the love of God and the lasting "marital" love between the sexes overbridging the immense psychological abyss between man and woman is not unrelated to the love of God; it is basically the love for one of His children. The very delight in the otherness of the beloved person is a tacit, loving recognition of God's all-embracing greatness. True love between man and woman accepts the mysterious variety of God's creation whose harmony even original sin did not entirely destroy.

The intrinsic immorality of perverted love lies in its being fundamentally egocentric. It is the rejection of the *grandeur* and the mysterious diversity of this God-made world; it is love of one's own person in the same sex and therefore nothing else but sexualized egoism.*** And herein lies also the ethical inferiority of herdism. The true herdist (who certainly is not always a pervert) is nothing but an egoist who cannot tolerate anybody differing

from himself. John Doe, the identitarian, wants a nation, a world, a universe peopled by millions of John Does. He cannot sympathize nor like anybody at variance with John Doe. No wonder that his wishful dream is a humanity of John Does without God or Devil. The herdist is by necessity a *humanitarian*.

Humanitarianism had always a great difficulty in seeking to stabilize its position. The denial of God and soul created an anthropocentrism which by a trend of its own tended to identify humanity with "nature." Humanitarianism, which started with the most sentimental premise (man is God), ended therefore finally with the acceptance of the law of the jungle. The Leftist mentality of today is hardly characterized by a loving mildness. Irving Babbitt in his *Rousseau and Romanticism* has pointed out that the early "romantic" theatrical productions attacked primarily the lachrymose glands of the spectators. Profuse weeping and crying took place even on the stage itself. What a contradiction to the latest phase of humanitarianism and anthropocentrism! The young National Socialist is not less tearless than the young Communist. Ilya Ehrenburg wrote a novel called *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears*, and indeed it does not. And so the old dictum of Grillparzer holds true:

Der Weg der neuen Bildung geht	(The way of the new culture goes
Von Humanität	From Humanitarianism
Durch Nationalität	Through Nationalism
Zur Bestialität. — (1849)	To Beastliness.)

This was probably little understood during the poet's own lifetime, but has received a bitter and clear meaning in our days. It has ceased to be paradoxical and shows the fatal evolution of godless group feeling and *déraciné* collectivism.

The masses and their leaders who pay such fervent homage to herdist ideologies are, as E. v. Kuehnelt-Leddihn emphasized it, of an extreme blood-thirstiness and the *circenses* offered to the antique and modern masses were and are spectacularly sanguinary displays. The indignation of the American masses in the first six months of World War II about the delay of the great carnage was boundless. The lack of terrifying headlines cost the Allies many sympathies. (We still remember the outcry about the "phony war.")

The individual courage of the herdist may be limited, but attacking *with* the herd he can become an easy victim of a true mass psychosis and perform "wonders." The Soviet films dealing with revolution and civil war have always emphasized the success of mass frenzy. The herdist's lack of true humanity even makes him predisposed for sadistic acts such as we have witnessed during the Spanish Civil War or in many a concentration camp.

We must furthermore always bear in mind that equality presupposes the perpetual application of *force;* equality after all is an *unnatural* condition — it is just as unnatural as a completely straight line, a geometrical plain, a perfect circle, distilled water, etc. It needs the intervention of human agencies who have to curtail and to stem the natural growth and development sometimes in the most brutal and cynical way.[7] Docteur Guillotin, Procrustes, the mythological Hellenic bandit, and the magistrate of Strasbourg who decided during the French Revolution to demolish the tower of the medieval cathedral because it was higher than the surrounding houses, belong all to the same category.[8] Dostoyevski, in his *Possessed*, has predicted accurately how an egalitarian superdemocracy would function.[9] The Soviets have fulfilled this prophecy to the letter.

At this phase of our analysis it would be advantageous to draw up a chart which summarizes the elements and conditions of herdism and romanticism. This tabulation does not express the desire to support or to confirm any sort of modern environmentalism which tries to use the natural *influence* of environment as basis for a new materialistic determinism. This new environmental determinism (as, for instance, preached by John Dewey and his behaviorist forerunners) is an even more evil invention than Calvin's doctrine concerning predestination. Environment is merely a factor, an influence exercised on the human free will, but not a fatal and coercive power.

The Herdist Instinct	*The Romantic Sentiment*
The plain	The mountains
The city, the megalopolis	The village, the chalet, the rural community, the peasant house

Equality	Liberty
Identity	Diversity and hierarchy
Democracy	Monarchy or aristocracy
Determinism	Free will
Security, safety	Adventure
Nationalism, internationalism	Supranationalism
The soldier, militarism	The knight, the warrior
Industrialism	Craftsmanship
Individualism and collectivism	Personalism
The apartment house, the hotel	The castle, the farm, the hut
Anthropocentrism	Theocentrism
Homogeneity of masses	Mosaic of families
Monotony	Harmony
Centralism	Federalism (in the European sense)
Horizontal order	Vertical order
Contractual society	Service, patriarchal authority
Private or state capitalism	Anticapitalism
Anonymity and impersonalism	Personal responsibility
Subjection to the demands of time	Timelessness, conservatism
Worship of the new fashion, worship of youth	Worship of the old, of age
Feeling of the finite, fear of death	Sense of immortality

As a result of this last item:

Exaggerated worship of health	Indifference to health
The "hectic life"	The contemplative life
Doctor worship ("Men in White")	Worship of saints
Speed (Auto as expression of our mortality)	Slowness, procrastination
Cowardice	Courage
Cautiousness	Carelessness
Escapism	Facing of issues

Such a list contains naturally many sweeping generalizations and it could without doubt be continued *ad nauseam*. It represents a very superficial

effort to bring the issues into a system and only one of the items has been analyzed as to some of its final logical deductions. It is nevertheless obvious that all these separate aspects are closely interrelated, interconnected, and interdependent.* True herdism, elevated from the status of a low and contemptible instinct to the supreme level of an ideology, of a *Weltanschauung*, has become a tremendous force in our modern culture and civilization. The herdist ideologies, based on that powerful animal instinct, have attacked and transformed most spheres of human activities including love, sex, and politics. The different "democratic"** (and superdemocratic totalitarian) parties of the twentieth century have continued and fostered this process of dehumanization of our Christian culture to a degree hitherto unknown in the annals of human existence.

The confusion about the alleged harmony between modern ochlocracy and Catholicism is largely due to a great deal of wishful thinking, misunderstood patriotism, and *the ambiguous elasticity of certain technical terms*. Let us take, for instance, the word *equality*. How frequently do we hear responsible Catholics talking glibly about the equality of human beings! Maritain has warned all about the indiscriminate use of this term and he proposed to use the expression *Unité du genre humain*.[10] Gustave Thibon has not only taken egalitarianism severely to task but he has also pointed out that the efforts to create equality have engendered at the same time the most violent inequalities. All those who by their free will or their disposition are unable to conform to the prescribed standards of equality — and there will always be such a minority — will after the efforts of leveling stand out more distinctly than in a nonuniform society.[11] These are then usually the "traitors" who do not "play the game" and must be executed, exiled, or weeded out like the *aristos* under Robespierre, the *burzhuys* under Lenin, or the Jews under Adolf Hitler.

It must furthermore be borne in mind that equality stands for monotony and not for harmony. A harmonious melody can only be established by different unidentical musical tones. These tones must be assembled and have to follow in a certain sequence; otherwise they will result in chaos and not in melody.[12] Human society presupposes such an inequality *and* unity.

Thibon has seen very clearly this issue which can only be solved in the sign of love.

"It consists in purifying and organizing the inequalities from the point of view of a deeper equality, or, to put it more precisely, in making inequality serve unity. But this unity, what else is it but love and what is love without God."[13]

This clarification is quite necessary because many a good Christian — and that holds true for most of those living in the Western Hemisphere — has an unclear notion about human equality.[14] The American Declaration of Independence mentions the fact that the human beings are "created equal."* This is true in the theological sense, and in the theological sense only. Two newly born babes are equal before God whether their parents are white or colored, American or foreign, registered in the Virginia Blue Book or in the rogues gallery. This theological equality continues until the time comes when they commit morally responsible acts. Judas Iscariot and St. John the Evangelist were equally conceived in original sin and free from personal sin, but how different their end! Heaven and hell are not identical. It is actually the privilege of our environmental determinists to discard the terms "saint" and "sinner" and to supplant them by pragmatic expressions like "social-unsocial" or "adapted-unadapted." Dostoyevski prophesied this moral relativism in his chapter on the Grand Inquisitor (*Brothers Karamazov*), where he sees humanity declaring through the mouth of its science that there are no trespasses and no sinners but only "hungry people."

From a purely *human* and *material* point of view we are utterly unequal — unequal in the eyes of our fellow men (which matters less) but also unequal from an absolute material standard. From that point of view we are not even born equal; the syphilitic babe and the healthy newcomer in this world are different in material quality. The stupid and the intelligent man or woman, the physically strong and the physically weak, the learned and the unlearned — they are all humanly unequal from the aspects compared. And of course there is also a hierarchy of characteristics. The Theist will give precedence to spiritual qualities over intellectual qualities, and most people will value intellect higher than mere bodily strength.

Apparently a great deal of misinterpretation is floating about concerning the interpretation of the American Declaration of Independence. The signers would certainly have been the worst hypocrites had they given to their document the same interpretation that so many give to it today.[15] We can understand their attitude only if we remember the fact that the basis of the American Republic is an aristocratic whiggish one, which largely lacked that deeper "democratic" element in social relations as we find it in southern and eastern Europe, and perhaps in South America.

The word *"democratic,"* in connection with the Catholic (or schismatic) world, is, as we have pointed out at the beginning, not a happy one. In these countries, whether they have a highly hierarchic social structure or not, we find a certain "demophil" sentiment. De Tocqueville remarks in his *De la Démocratie en Amérique* that Americans are often astonished and even shocked about the familiarity between masters and servants in France. The insolence of Sancho Pansa also fits perfectly into this picture. Such Catholic pseudo-egalitarian sentiment can obviously not spring from the acceptance of a human equality, which does not exist, but from the aforementioned fact that the most important human value — the degree of sinfulness or sanctity — is hidden to our eye and only revealed in its completeness to God. The nonchalantly polite but nevertheless free interclass manners in the Catholic world are the natural consequence of a conventional (nonideological) egalitarianism, based on the profound knowledge that our final status — on the other side of the grave — will be basically different from our present one. Further more, because of the human fact that we are all images of God and potential saints (not excluding sinners like the young Augustine or Maria Magdalena), it follows that Catholics, grown up in a Catholic culture, pay reverence to everybody regardless of his color, class, and publicly manifested morality. *The attacks against human dignity on the other hand are attacks against God's dignity*. There is only a pragmatic but not a basic difference between a Nazi and a Bolshevist concentration camp on one side, and the looting and desecration of a Church in Catalonia on the other,

"He who has never looked through man's outward condition to the naked soul," says Channing, "and there seen God's image commanding reverence is a stranger to the distinctive love of Christianity."

The great struggle of our time is the twofold assault to which Christian doctrine is exposed from both groups of identitarian herdists. There are first of all the universal herdists clamoring for the absolute equality of all human beings, provided they accept "proletarian" standards of wealth, behavior, and morals, which Communists insist upon. This involves logically the denial of the existence of morals and the acceptance of a determinism* as preached by Teachers College, Columbia, and now gradually conquering the youth of the United States.

Needless to say that every successful attack against the concept of free will results in an almost total degradation of human dignity.' It puts us beyond good and evil and fosters a fantastic quietism or an even more fantastic irresponsibility. It is nevertheless amusing to see determinists of all heretical denominations — Calvinists, Marxists, Behaviorists — flocking to clubs and leagues defending civil liberties. Liberties to be enjoyed without free will! One sees how far the prostitution of logic has led many of us. This great confusion is also apparent in the standing phrase that "democracy stands for equality before the law," whereas the law is largely interested in iniquities and inequalities.[16] There is, of course, one great excuse for these confused minds and that is that they all have continued in the bottom of their hearts to believe in free will. Determinism is too inhuman and suicidal to be generally and sincerely accepted and the charge which remains is largely that of hypocrisy.[17]

The second attack against integral Christendom, gaining momentum right now, comes from the nonuniversal herdists. They put the human beings into watertight hierarchic categories frequently of a racial nature. This new racial determinism, creating racial aristocracies, responsible to a collective "race" but not to a personal God, and racial proletariats with no hope of an earthly salvation, is not less a danger than the classic panherdism. The desire for racial purity in order to achieve the perfectly uniform herd leads to brutal persecution and finally to the strictest imaginable uniformism. The Germanies without the Jews will be an even more monotonous place than the Germanies with persecuted Jews. We will experience in Central Europe the integral boredom which Myerezhkovski considers to be the fatal characteristic of the Realm of the Antichrist.[18]

If we look at the historical record of herdist ideologies in relation to the largest Christian Church then we see a great amount of mutual suspicion, strife, and condemnation. European ochlocracy in the political and cultural sense of the nineteenth century (i.e., "liberal democracy") took root in a rather dechristianized society where the Church was purely on the defensive (1789–1919). We have on the other hand no right to doubt the sincerity of many Catholics — European or American — in their positive acceptance not only of political ochlocracy but even of some of the more elusive tenets related to its underlying philosophy of a herdist pattern.

We should always bear in mind that the Church and ochlocracy cooperated badly in Europe, that the forces inimical to the Church always fostered ochlocratic tendencies. One cannot dismiss the latter fact as purely accidental. Of course there is no incompatibility on dogmatic grounds. The question moves on a plain where *in dubiis libertas* is written in flaming letters: "In doubtful matters, liberty." Yet the atmosphere, the *parfum* of the Church and that of "democracy," when blended in the political and cultural sphere, emits a bad stench. A parallel reading of the works of our authoritative "democratic" essayists, poets, and other creative writers (from the *Leaves of Grass* to the *City of Man*) with the encyclicals of Gregory XVI and Pius IX would give a mortal shock to many "progressive" Catholics who think that the Church ought to come to terms with the spirit of our time . . .[19] (which may, overnight, become the spirit of yesterday). These encyclicals at least express the spirit and policy of the Church in unmistakable directness and clearness.

Efforts have never been wanting to bring Catholicism and ochlocracy under the same denominator, and these efforts can easily be traced back to two specific sources: (1) wishful thinking influenced by the desire to meet certain situations, and (2) wishful thinking due to environmental and personal circumstances.

In the first category we find a few theorists who saw (rightly) a danger in the autocratic aspirations of monarchs of the type of James I, rulers who displayed caesaropapistic tendencies (the "Divine Rights of Kings"), tendencies which unfortunately were not entirely confined to Protestant rulers although the latter fell an easier prey to such temptations. In order to counteract these aspirations. St. Robert Bellarmine and other of his fellow

Jesuits proposed a mixed form of government in which aristocratic and democratic elements were called to check a proclivity which Protestantism so eagerly pretended to oppose — idol worship, this time in the form of the worship of a single human being.

In the second category we find Catholic thinkers and political theorists who grew up in a non-Catholic cultural atmosphere pregnant with ochlocratic ideas; these were usually guided by the desire to find a justification for the political ideas of their surroundings and to provide ochlocracy and democratism* with a background of Catholic thought. The representatives of this category are often brilliant Catholic philosophers, theologians, or controversialists, but they frequently lack the understanding for Catholic mentality and Catholic tradition. They are sometimes Jewish or Protestant converts or (as in most cases) members of the Catholic dispersion.

Their task does not lack a certain irony. A non-Catholic civilization provided them with a finished product in a political atmosphere tense with ochlocratic propaganda and powerful ochlocratic elements in their culture. As a result they feel they have to write an *a posteriori* defense of something which they have hardly helped to bring into existence. They are engaged in an effort to baptize with greater or less success a form of government and civilization which their spiritual forefathers looked upon with hatred and suspicion. Frequently in their enthusiasm they impute to ochlocracy intentions and characteristics which are alien to its actual form and tradition.

Naturally they are intelligent enough to be aware of the fact that the justifications for the "democratic" order given by their countrymen or even coreligionists are not "watertight" from a Catholic point of view, and that the Rousseauan influence on the usual concept of "democracy" is extremely strong. They construe therefore very cleverly, and with good logical arguments, a case for a non-Rousseauan democracy which is at one and the same time a theorem and a "program." Dr. Mortimer Adler is a radical example of this school of thought, radical because he goes to the extreme of calling democracy the *"only* good and morally justifiable form of government." But here we are more interested with the less radical group which sees in ochlocracy ("democracy") *one of the good* forms of government or perhaps the *best of the good* forms of government which as

we know was never advocated by the Founding Fathers and has even less chance to succeed the present constitution, the representative republic.

Yet their programmatic "democracy," purified from the pagan conceptions of Rousseau, has little hope for success in the Catholic world because the average (and sometimes even the outstanding) Catholic hardly takes himself as seriously, from a secular point of view, as does the Protestant or atheist. Our great Catholic democratists, who are such excellent logicians, lack frequently the insight into the Catholic mentality of the rank and file in Catholic countries. The "typical" Catholic of the *Mundus Catholicus* is certainly not a communitarian. While not hostile to a personal attachment, he resents excessive legal ties at the same time. Neither is he free of a healthy cynicism and worldly pessimism, which traits are rare in the (more naïve) Protestant. If medieval man would have been told that he could "appoint" his kings or superiors, he might have become quite interested in the proposition. Yet on discovering that his vote was scheduled to be drowned in an ocean of millions of other votes his reaction would have been that of a man whose leg had been pulled successfully.*

The Catholic of the Catholic tradition is (without being necessarily an egoist) a man whose outlook starts with the "I" and not the "We." Every political or cultural ochlocracy is based on the "We," which makes it so unacceptable to men deeply personalistic and alien to the Protestant concepts of "individualism" or the eastern enthusiasm for collectivism. While all modern non-Catholics (in culture) begin their philosophies with the preamble that men (or specific groups of men) are more "like" than "different,"* the reaction of the average Catholic (in the Catholic world) would be utter astonishment if not disapproval.

If there were nothing else than the final and inevitable development of political ochlocracy into the modern party dictatorships[20] it ought to be enough to make the Catholics more skeptical toward this governmental tendency and its ultimate consequences. (We refer here also to the demand of "more democracy!") It is not a good counterargument to state that everything is evil in a state of exaggeration. Herdism is essentially a "low" sentiment. As nucleus and carrying power of a philosophy of earthly existence it becomes definitely an evil. A real good on the other hand can never be exaggerated enough. There can never be, in human society, enough

of the acceptance of the Cross and of charity, never enough loving differentiation and hierarchy, never enough of the spirit of Maundy Thursday when our Lord, the pope, the emperors, kings, and bishops knelt down to wash the feet of twelve Apostles or of twelve beggars. Nor is the custom discontinued in our day. This is hierarchy and charity, order and love.

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* Irving Babbitt in his *Rousseau and Romanticism* speaks of the high inner qualities of imitation. Yet he speaks distinctly of the imitation of "superiors" (the *Imitatio Christi*, for instance) and not of the imitation of "equals," which alone fosters the coming into existence of the uniform herd. It must again be emphasized that our text regards the label "romantic" as devoid of its historical connotations.

* It is not mere coincidence that the great bard of democratism in its most herdist and antipersonalist connotation was an extremely repulsive homosexual—Walt Whitman. It is also significant that Thomas Mann in a public speech in the defense of the Weimar Republic cited Walt Whitman as supreme witness for the new democratic sentiment of comradeship, *alluding even to his psychological aberration*. Hans Blüher, an outstanding pro-Nazi German writer, on the other hand accused the Jews of treating this perversion with ridicule and contempt although "it serves as basis for political cooperation." (Cf. his *"Die Erhebung Israels gegen die christlichen Güter,"* Hamburg, 1931.)

** This is a *logical* philosophical development once man has denied the existence of a spiritual soul which primarily differentiates man from the brute.

*** A terrible conglomeration of egoism, self-love, and vanity is apparent in the letters of the unfortunate Oscar Wilde to Lord Alfred Douglas.

* See Appendix II.

** The reader is here reminded of our explanation of this term in the explanatory note: "What of Democracy."

* See Irving Brant's *James Madison* (New York, 1941) on the different efforts to clarify Jefferson's formulation in the Constitution of Virginia. George Mason, for instance, proposed ". . . that all men are created equally free and independent," which gives to this proclamation a libertinarian, and more manifestly nonegalitarian sense.

* Herein lies the great dilemma for the Communist Party. A revolutionary movement accepting determinism and denying free will cannot expect much revolutionary *élan* and little responsibility in action. The anarchists who had never accepted the Marxian fatalism of "inevitable developments" developed a greater dynamism and believed in the "propaganda of the deed." They were a more sanguinary but less sordid class than their Marxian fellow revolutionaries.

* I.e., the philosophy of the "democratic way of life."

* This lack of political interest is a problem in every representative government in large countries where the principle of "one man — one vote" has been introduced. About one fourth of all Americans do not go regularly to the polls. *Educational*, not property qualifications for the franchise, would be less democratic, but politically justified. Also qualifications of civic (and military) merits should be considered.

* This question can be *argued* either way; we are here only interested in the psychological reaction caused by this statement.

II

OCHLOCRACY AND DEMOCRATISM

"Dix millions d'ignorances ne font pas un savoir."

"DEMOCRACY" in ancient Greece, and especially in Athens, could almost be compared to an exclusive club of gentlemen who were distinct from slaves, resident aliens and other "inferior" individuals. There was a similar conception of democracy widely spread in the South of the United States. The Hansa towns and the Italian maritime republics were also strongly aristocratic. The only true "democracy" at the end of the Middle Ages in Europe was Switzerland, or to be more precise, the Alpine parts of Switzerland. The population of the original *Eidgenossenschaft* was almost entirely of peasant stock and lacked practically any social distinctions, yet the situation in Bern, Geneva, Fribourg, and Basle was quite different. At the time of the battle of Sempach there was no pretender for a nonexistent Swiss throne, and the public affairs of the Original Cantons were so simple that no officialdom of a bureaucratic pattern was necessary to cope with them; the result was the growth of a democratic republic. Some of the more ancient cantons have still preserved their original, direct democracy where the citizens appear in person at the diet to determine the state of affairs of their small political unit. The small size of these diets was not instrumental in favoring the rise of ochlocratic mass movements or a depersonalized ochlocratic mass culture.

Yet the great impulse for our *modern* ochlocracy and democratism comes from France. The French Revolutionaries have tried to copy antique

forerunners, but they were not very lucky in their efforts.[21] There is a certain Swiss influence connected with this revolution, yet this element has nothing to do with the democratic peasant spirit of the Original Cantons. It emanates from the eighteenth-century enlightenment which has a strong Swiss, or rather *Genevan* background. This French town, acquired by the Swiss at a later period of their existence, had already produced its famous two Johns: Jehan Cauvin (from Noyon) and Jean Jacques Rousseau. M. Dunan's humanitarian Red Cross, the assassination of Empress Elizabeth, the League of Nations, and the socialism of M. Nicole were scheduled to follow.

Whatever the conceptions of Enlightenment toward God might have been, whether they pictured Him as nonexistent, or as a pale being without personality, sunk in sleep, or at least disinterested toward the fate of the individual, that period took a negative attitude toward the next world. Enlightenment was antimetaphysical and geocentrical. In the framework of such a philosophy, devoid of otherworldliness, the human beings and their existence assumed automatically a different significance. The meaning of life, human happiness, and all the other basic values were projected into this world and that change brought an enormous thirst for "justice," earthly justice, of course, which in turn was nothing else but an initially veiled and finally open demand for absolute equality.

This pagan geocentrism has changed the very content of our culture. The "happy end" of the cheap, popular novels and the films is nothing but the outcome of the supposition that the human drama finds its ultimate conclusion here on earth. The Calvinists in their materialism took a similar attitude.[22] The more subtle Atheist, of greater experience, has contempt for the "happy end" and substitutes for it a stubborn heroical pessimism which comes pretty near to integral despair. The modern Catholic French writers like Mauriac and Bernanos avoid the happy end in relation to this life. Paul Claudel, in *L'Ôtage*, expresses his disbelief in earthly justice by punishing the people of good will and rewarding the villains in the last scene of this play. For the Christian the earth is essentially a "vale of tears."

It has frequently been emphasized that the French Revolution aided at least the cause of reason and reasoning. One remembers the worship of

reason on the Champs de Mars; yet it was a very one-sided form of reasoning which made such headway during the French Revolution, a reasoning without that deeper understanding which Peter Wust calls *Vernunft* in juxtaposition to *Verstand*. It was a distorted and rather Cartesian *Verstand* which became the measure of all things, and thus made possible the smooth evolution from theocentrism, over anthropocentrism, to geocentrism. Due to the elimination of the firm belief in another world the point of gravity was shifted to our earthly existence, and the happenings and events of this life became automatically "weighty," final, irrevocable, unbearable. Humor died a lingering death. The transcendental levity of Christian culture was gone; there was no final consolation, no otherworldly relativity but only gray, inescapable fate. A hunchback was now all through his existence a hunchback, a man born blind all through his existence a blind man, a proletarian all through his existence a stepchild of life, whereas in the framework of Christian belief these shortcomings would last only for the earthly decades of a person's existence, i.e., until his death. Things would change radically afterward. But with this truth lost to sight, life became a terrible load.

It is important to remember that Christianity had not abolished slavery. Neither had the Church ever praised this institution, like Calhoun, because the whole relationship of master to slave was not important enough in the light of a life eternal to be combated with furious indignation apart from the fact that even a slave had every protection in a truly Christian society.[23] But now the servant was an "eternal" servant, the master an "eternal" master, and the rich man possibly all through his assumed existence a rich man; thus the hatred of the lower classes now became wide awake. The employees had during the Middle Ages a knowing smile for those in the higher stations of life; they knew it could easily happen that a rich prince might suffer agonies in hell while a leprous beggar sat in the immediate nearness of God's throne.

This is also the reason why such great stress was laid on the "democratic" aspects of death during the Middle Ages. It can still be witnessed in many a mystery play, especially in *Everyman*. The *Totentanz*, "Death Dance," was a very popular motif in song as well as in art. The most famous of all these representations is probably Albrecht Dürer's conception depicting death

carrying away beggar, merchant, burgher, emperor and pope. One would really love to see in our democratic age the result of a Russian etcher's artistic activity representing Stalin as fetched away by death, or the moral indignation of the progressive mob should somebody portray the President of the United States in similar circumstances.* Neither can one imagine Adolf Hitler washing the feet of twelve poor inmates of the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. The reason for this change is that we are living in an age of "equality" and it is only surprising that our common descent from an assumed powerful King-Kong, instead of God, has not rendered us more charitable to each other.

This change from the fatherhood of God to the fatherhood of the *pithecanthropus erectus*, Dubois' "Walking Ape-Man," has destroyed a good deal of genuine human pride. Once everybody was proud of his own class or station in life. But now there is everywhere an unquenchable thirst for identity and equality. Nobody wants to serve, nobody wants to be subjected because service in a nonhierarchical society means going *under* the level of equality.

That state of affairs is also largely the reason why there is such a dearth of servants in England, Holland, and in America under normal conditions, and also why we find, for instance, in the United States, the desperate dread of cleaning shoes or boots on the part of servants. In spite of the large amount of unemployment in the United Kingdom after the World War I, we saw there the number of foreign maids and cooks swelling up to 15,000 in 1937. The efforts to get volunteers for the armed forces in England was, prior to Munich, a similar failure. Yet it was interesting to observe that the percentage of Catholics in the British army was 14 per cent in spite of the fact that the national average was only 6 per cent. They evidently shared less in that terrible neurosis of prestige which made itself felt all over Europe.

Yet the genuine pride which people used to feel for their station in life, vanished: the aristocratic pride, the craftsman's pride, the burgher's pride and honor. Everybody wanted to get quickly to the top of the ochlocratic sand heap of equal gains. The feeling of inequality begins now to be a burning pain, snobism lifts its ugly head, the element of general human competition gains headway in every phase of life.

People used to arrange their lives after the precepts of God; they felt that they were continuously observed by God and they were eager (in varying degrees) to please God; but now they compare themselves with their neighbors and their ambition becomes limitless. Dr. Leverett S. Lyon, vice-president of the Brookings Institution, thinks that the tendency to "keep up with the Joneses" is one of the strongest driving powers in American criminality. Yet even the nobility acquires in this new framework a new value and a new magnetism, and in an age of Social Registers it is difficult to understand how it was possible that the great merchants of Moscow considered it a shame when their daughters married mere princes. The class pride of the middle and lower classes not seldom underwent, in the "democratic" period of our history, a change into methodical snobism. The waning of class distinctions engendered a general "race" toward the higher strata which brought triumph to a few and grief to many.*

There is little doubt that atheism, agnosticism, and the denial of the other world are partially responsible for the rapid technical development which gave us, apart from exquisite instruments for mass destruction, various means to bridge time and space. We had the heading, "Speed," in our chart of the herdist instinct and the romantic sentiment. Ortega y Gasset, in his *Rebelión de las masas*, points out very adroitly the fact that the automobile is the very expression of our present acute feeling of mortality. Endless progress in madly increased comforts and in technical developments is the goal of the age. On this basis, if we were bodily immortal we would feel no such need for technical gadgets saving time by conquering space.

Yet the conquest of time and space is only partially a final aim and ultimate goal of a herdist society. Every ideology visualizes a certain end and ochlocracy is no exception of the rule; the end is not as clearly formulated as in communism and one can say that it has been agreed upon by some sort of general consent. But even in spite of the fact that this ultimate aim is not of such a teleological nature as that of the proletarian Millennium of Karl Marx,** it is nonetheless chiliastic; the democratic middle class of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries always believed in some sort of "endless progress."[24] *"Progress" is for the convinced*

ochlocrats a consoling Utopia of madly increased comfort and technicism.[25] *This charming but dull vision was always the pseudo-religious consolation of millions of ecstatic believers in ochlocracy and in the relative perfection and wisdom of Mr. and Mrs. Averageman Utopias in general are surrogates for heaven; they give a meager solace to the individual that his sufferings and endeavors may enable future generations to enter the chiliastic paradise. Communism works in a similar way. Its millennium is almost the same as that of ochlocracy. The Millennium of Lenin, the Millennium of Bellamy, the Millennium as represented in H. G. Wells's, "Of Things to Come," the Millennium of Adolf Hitler and Henry Ford — they are all basically the same; they often differ in their means to attain it but they all agree in the point of technical perfection and the classless or at least totally homogeneous society without grudge or envy. This identity of teleological outlooks explains the mutual admiration of certain déraciné Americans and Soviet-Russians for their respective fatherlands.**

There is little doubt that this millennium is one of civilization and not of culture because it is a millennium of comfort, free from effort and pain.**

These expressions — "culture" and "civilization" — have to be used in their Continental sense to make the point clear. "Culture" is the sum of all products which represent a personal manifestation, like painting, poetry, religion, philosophy, and the humanities. "Civilization" is non-personal. It is the sum total of all efforts which contribute to the increase of comfort or "usefulness" in the practical sense. Bathtubs, dentists' tools, railways, and traffic regulations are products of civilization. These easily transcend national and racial borders. It would be difficult, no doubt, to assign here the proper place for such phenomena as manners or laws. They are on the border line of culture and civilization because they are partly manifestations and personal expressions of specific national groups in specific ages and partly lubricants of social life or guarantees of peaceful social coexistence. A document like the *Sachsenspiegel* is more or less a true mirror of medieval German culture, while the Swiss laws transplanted to Turkey by Atatürk have to be rated as efforts of civilization.

Yet while civilization is basically lack of friction, smoothness, comfort, and material enjoyment we have to look at traditional Christianity — with

its violent opposition to euthanasia, abortion, contraception, pacifism, and individualism — as being something "uncomfortable." Christianity is after all the only great religion which does not content itself with preaching indifference toward suffering, like the Stoa or Buddhism, but actually sees in suffering, sustained in the right spirit, a positive value. And just because Christianity in general, and Catholicism in particular, are neither keen on mere "beauty" or "comfort" but stand for magnificence (*Grandeur, Grossartigkeit*) they reject naked aestheticism or civilization if not in the letter at least in the spirit.[26] It is difficult to project into the frame of a comfortistic civilization* the picture of Christ, hanging on the cross with a body convulsed by pain, the palms torn to shreds by the heavy nails, the hairs glued to the scalp by sweat and coagulated blood. It ought to be repeated again that culture is always "magnificent." Pure, uprooted *l'art pour l'art* civilization, on the other side, is always practical and utilitarian and thus is bound to enter into conflict with integral Christianity and every true culture, because neither culture nor the Church are ever "practical"; they are — in a bourgeois, not a cosmic sense — highly unpractical. No wonder therefore that integral Christianity is more at home in those parts of the world where culture is predominant and civilization at a low ebb. Southern India is thus a more favorable soil for the Church than Pittsburgh or Detroit. Civilization is geocentric comfort. But culture, which must be bought by bitter suffering (there is neither art nor sanctity without suffering), points always toward heaven. And the ochlocratic millennium hell bent upon avoiding suffering will turn its back toward heaven.

These questions had to be cleared up first before the political aspects of ochlocracy could be analyzed. The ochlocratic movements do not thrive on air, they need a specific soil, a specific culture and civilization with the preponderance of the latter. Some readers may still consider it unreasonable to see ochlocracy accused in the preceding as well as in the following pages for numerous shortcomings in modern culture and civilization. Yet it cannot be emphasized with sufficient candor that there is a deep inner connection between all manifestations of cultural existence, and that it is indeed difficult to place the individual cultural phenomena in any graded sequence as to their temporal precedence, causality, primariness, etc. The complexity

of culture, thought, tradition is such that we frequently face a maze of manifestations which influence each other mutually and thus engender new variations. It is all very nice to draw up a long pedigree of national socialism, starting with Descartes and then leading, through Kant and Hegel, on to the incestuous *liaison* of Marx and Treitschke. There are hundreds of other factors which made the thoughts and ideas of these thinkers acceptable and brought them to maladive virulence. And these men in turn were influenced by the things they saw and heard, by architectural styles, living conditions, conversations, etc. The ochlocratic tendencies influenced modern times, and the modern spirit modeled and remodeled democratism. It is a process of mutuality.

The main argument of this book could have been built up either by leaving the political aspects of our culture for the end, or else by placing them at the very beginning. Yet the reason why the political argumentation, centered in the ochlocratic ideologies (we have to speak in the plural), takes so much space is simply due to the fact that political ideologies lend themselves better to argumentation and discussion than art, literature, externals of worship, cuisine, architecture, or sartorial fashions. In the latter, the principle of *de gustibus non est disputandum*, coupled with the inevitability of great variations in individual interpretation, makes a fruitful discussion difficult if not impossible.

One must remember, on the other hand, that the tendency toward homogeneity and totality, apparent in *every* culture, does not permit the substitution of individual values without far-reaching consequences. To all practical purposes these two trends are not interchangeable without intimately affecting the whole or being mutually destroyed. If, for instance, in a thoroughly "democratized" state (one that is ochlocratic in politics and democratistic in purely cultural matters) family life, male superiority, and the prerogatives of the paterfamilias would suddenly increase out of proportion thanks to some magic interference, this change would inevitably affect not only the social structure of the country but even its political form. (The rule of two parents over four children is clearly "undemocratic")

It is difficult to fear death if one is very pious. It is difficult not to worship health if one fears death. It is difficult to enforce general health without large-scale state intervention and it is equally difficult to imagine increased state intervention without a loss of liberties. This totality of

human culture, society, politics and religion, was always well understood by the Church which always disagreed with the Marxian, neo-Protestant and demoliberal view that "Religion is a private matter."* Such an atomistic view blurs every comprehensive vista. None of our actions, thoughts, or products leads an existence *in vacuo*.

And now, after a cursory discussion of the claims and the position of political ochlocracy, a return to the analysis of the general aspects will make it possible to amplify our statements.

We all agree that people who form a political unit have a right to determine their collective fate. But before one continues to reason along these lines it will be necessary to define the very nature of a "political people," or a "nation." It would be a great mistake to consider a nation, or for that matter every organic community, as a mere arithmetic sum of so-and-so-many noses. Every organism has a hierarchy of its parts. To overlook this fact is a perversion which usually results in a terrific loss of energies, such as might lead to national death and political disaster.

The brain, for instance, is a more important part of the body than the muscles of the arm, and the heart has functions which the liver could never arrogate for itself. The loss of a limb may be quantitatively larger than that of the lungs, yet no being is able to survive the destruction of that valuable inner organ. One can argue that an animal would die in the long run if it would lose all its extremities because it would be unable to find or catch its food, yet there is definitely a hierarchy of the parts of the organism, and while certain aspects of this hierarchy may be subject to debate it is self-evident that these parts have functions which can rarely be interchanged. One cannot hear with the eyeballs or digest with the kidneys; one might walk on one's hands but this is an art which many may admire but only few will accomplish. *There is hierarchy as well as function in every organism*. One man may be more important than another just as the eye is more important than the finger. Yet we may not forget in this connection that this discussion is clearly *not* moving on a theological plane. It would be sinful to destroy willfully an eye as it is sinful to cut off a finger, and so, too, it is sinful to murder a gravedigger, an idiot, or a babe, even as it is sinful to assassinate a king or a president.

If one denies the organic character of the political nations and considers them as sand heaps, it would be difficult to continue this argument. It

should not be denied that there are great differences between a national and an animal organism; a national organism is far more flexible and its parts are able to change their functions and their hierarchical values. The person-within-the-nation (the individual citizen) is able to combine several functions of different importance, to lose or to acquire new skills, to take over new and to abandon old tasks. Conservatives must always bear in mind that political nations are made up of persons; of beings who are *per se*, i.e., exist by themselves. The cells and parts of the animal or of the human body are not *per se operans* or *per se existens*. And yet it is a well-known fact that the more primitive the political nation (the tribe, the society) or the animal body the less apparent will be this functional and hierarchical difference of the parts.

Specialization is a characteristic of development and specialization is nothing else but another aspect of functionalism. There is naturally a far greater functional diversity in the human body than in the physical structure of an amoeba; there is equally more specialization and diverted function in Chinese or European society than among the Patagonians or the Central African Pygmees. This in spite of the fact that even primitive societies have a rough outline of function and hierarchy, because they are, more or less, built upon the principle of the family which is functional as well as hierarchical. De la Tour du Pin has pointed out very rightly that democratism (and democracy) is only feasible in either very primitive societies (with a minimum of stratification) or in old and decaying societies who like old people are again reverting to the forms of childhood. The United States obviously belongs to neither of these groups.*

The functions of individual parts have importance for the whole and teleologically their functions may be "equal," but to all practical purposes their hierarchy is evident. A chimney sweep is a valuable as well as necessary member of society, but his function in earthly relation is to sweep chimneys, to beget children, to pay taxes, to lead with charity and authority his family as well as his apprentices, and to raise his voice in these few public matters which by his education, knowledge, and wisdom he is able to judge. His function is not to operate upon cancer patients, to drive locomotives, or to direct the foreign policy of the country. All these functional divisions are matters of reason and prudence. If we need new clothes we will go to a tailor, if we have a bodily ailment we will call upon

a doctor, if the country needs a military or a budgetary reform it is reasonable and prudent to enlist the aid of a military or financial expert for this purpose; it would certainly be sheer nonsense to ask a tailor or a doctor to remedy such situations.

Yet ochlocrats who never tired of accusing conservatives and Catholics of superstition, illogical traditionalism, and "unscientific" procedure make an act of faith in the inner illumination of the individual and the infallibility of numerical majorities. Phrases like "forty million Frenchmen can't be wrong" display, nevertheless, a gross misunderstanding of logic; never in history has there been a more farcical and insipid amalgamation of Lutheran and Rousseauan confusion than in the interpretations underlying elections and the general franchise.[27] Luther already was certain that everybody ought to be his own Pope by making use of his own wits in a private interpretation of the bible after dispensing with expert theological judgment; every interpretation was more or less right and had to be tolerated provided it did not conflict with the general line of the Reformers' intention, and provided — last not least — that it did not lead back to Rome. The ochlocratic "liberal" is indeed in a difficult position toward the followers of terroristic heresies and his belief that "truth stands by itself" has often proved to be suicidal. He is therefore inclined to abandon his liberalism and to turn ochlocracy into a brutal totalitarianism. Luther with his ducal and baronial disciples was followed by terrorists of the type of Calvin, Thomas Münzer or Jan van Leyden, just as Robespierre succeeded Mirabeau and Noailles.

Rousseau, though holding views diametrically opposed to Luther's as to the *character* of man, finally strengthened his hand by his estimate of man's mind. Luther believed in the utter moral wretchedness of man, but Rousseau believed not only in man's goodness on the plane of character but he also was convinced (like Luther) that man is by nature intelligent. The "democrats" of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries deducted from Luther's and Rousseau's joint declaration that man is intelligent (either by nature or by an inner light) the further conclusion that the sum total of all minds must be perfection itself. Catholicism, on the other hand, never accepted Luther's theories about the catastrophical consequences of Original Sin, yet the Church never got rid of the impression although not

dogmatizing about it that the average man *can* be obsessed by an almost limitless stupidity. The Church is in this matter fortunately or rather unfortunately right — depending upon the merits one is willing to attribute either to heart or head.

Happily enough we find that even the most fanatic ochlocrats seldom try to carry out their quantitarian collectivism and egalitarianism and to reduce them to absurdities. There are still some inequalities of a biological order which they must respect; the franchise has not yet been extended to the children — if we do not take into account the efforts to "make democracy work" in certain schools where boys and girls determine what they would like to hear from their teachers and how much work they will condescend to do.

But still, the political franchise is not given to minors and there is little doubt that by this fact the democratic principles are already violated. The Utopia runs into troubled waters. If neither knowledge, nor work, experience, sex, or taxes make any difference, why then, we ask ourselves, should age be taken so seriously? One could imagine that a European university student at the age of nineteen is more intelligent than a street cleaner at the age of thirty, or that a wounded young soldier at the age of twenty has merited more of his country than a prostitute at the age of forty-five. Even if one lowers the age limit there will always be some who are younger and who will complain that they are tyrannized over by a gerontocracy, a rule of old men.* *Pure "democracy"* is for *this and other reasons a political impossiblity and we have to ask ourselves whether it is prudent to adopt such a form of political existence which defies all efforts to make it work without a tremendous amount of alloys. Utopias never mature over a certain transitory stage in which they insure their survival by endless compromising.*[28] *"Democracy" under present conditions is bound to compromise with political elements taken from aristocratic and monarchical forms of government. A parliament is always a compromise with the former and a president a compromise with the latter political ideology. Aristocracy and monarchy — both taken in a literal, not a traditional sense — are essential and indispensable political elements;* there is even "government" in the case of the population being entirely

passive. We have to face the bitter fact that the (inner) consent of those governed is under modern conditions rather an accidental than an essential of government. There may be even a good government without popularity and a bad government enthusiastically supported by the "howling mob." Not even the moral question is solved by the presence or absence of support, and there will be few political casuists who will argue that the people have an inherent right to wickedness which may be enforced against a good but unpopular government.*

It is certain that worship of quantity is one of the most important characteristics of modern democratism,[29] a characteristic which finds its living expression in the increasing interest for the comparison of physical units in the form of statistics. This ochlocratic quantitativism fosters also the belief that the mathematically larger part of the nation has the right to transform its theories into practice. There is nevertheless another element which ought not be overlooked; the element of compromise. The voter in every country has first to make a compromise between his own views and those of the local candidate, who in turn has to compromise with his party.[30] In countries without the two-party system the compromise is extended to one between the parties for the sake of coalitions. The coalitions in their turn compromise with "reality."

Thus it is the outcome of the election which finally decides whether the individual voter belonged to the ruling or the ruled group. Parliamentary governments are now unfortunately always governments of numeric majorities; a supporter of the Conservative Party in Sweden has no more opportunity to influence the destinies of his country than a Russian or an Italian citizen in spite of the fact that Sweden is a "democracy" and the other two countries dictatorships. There is at present as much chance for the Swedish Conservatives to gain a majority as there is hope for the Constitutional Democrats in the Russian emigration to be readmitted to a reopened Imperial Duma. This is a shortcoming of modern Representative Government which should be remedied.

Yet the question may be raised whether "democratic" states are not far more conscious of civil liberties as regards private or public opinion. It must be remembered in that connection that liberty and democracy are not

synonymous in spite of the fact that these two terms are frequently confounded in "democracies" with an aristocratic-liberal historical background. *Numerical majorities are not necessarily keen to preserve civil liberties;*[31] *the demand for civil liberties (and privileges) always arose from select minorities. Genuinely "democratic" societies can be brutally cruel to those who dare to be "different" in an unconventional way*.[32]

If we look now at the individual from a political point of view in a "democratic" setup, we can consider him as entirely "lost" in an ocean of votes and voters. There are, for instance, in the United States millions of voters who out of a feeling of disgust, laziness, or hopeless despair refuse to go to the polls. There are thousands in every country boasting of a popular representation who do not even faintly agree with any of the existing political parties. These people are to all practical purposes deprived of any participation in government. Whereas almost everybody was excluded in the times of absolute monarchies from having a share in the government, the Parliamentarian Monarchies and Republics invited eagerly everybody to take a hand in the shaping of the political destiny of his country. Yet the effort contributed by the individual in America or in prewar France will only be, respectively, one seventy millionth or one twelve millionth of the sum total of the popular "decision." If one would compare the total of all possible votes in the United States with the height of the Empire State building in New York, the individual vote would be in proportion roughly 5 μ, i.e., the five-thousandth part of an inch; thus the importance of the individual is practically nil. He is only important as an atom in a mass. And Modern Constitutionalism prided itself that it attaches *importance* to the individual who in his turn embraced Parliamentarianism to be important. This farce becomes more apparent when we remember with what pitying contempt the citizens of "great democracies" looked down at the "subjects" of European monarchies as mere chattel, forgetful of their submicroscopic importance in their own political system.*

Of course, there are people in countries run by representative governments — some voting, some not — who try to influence the policy of their government in the traditional way. By dining out with a cabinet minister or with the secretary of the premier, by chatting with the President or submitting to his collaborators a memorandum, they have a far greater

influence than by casting a mere vote. There is little doubt that men like Metternich, the Cecils, Araktcheyev, Colbert, Grotius, Ximénez, Brühl, and Talleyrand (some of them of humble origin) influenced the destinies of their States under absolute monarchs more than millions of voters today. The thought that a vote has only a value if it is cast *together* with millions of others should have for thinking persons something rather depressing than uplifting. Yet the defenders of general franchise subconsciously take into consideration that thinking human beings form only a tiny minority in the herdist ocean.

One might object that anybody is free in a liberal and "democratic" state to start a new party of his own. But to start a new party money is needed. It is true to a certain extent that money may be substituted by wild, irresponsible demagogy which necessitates a total prostitution of the leader and his ideals before the masses. The history of the National-Socialist Party — the greatest success story of a party within the framework of democracy — shows that it is wise to combine both elements; empty oratory "intelligible" to everybody as well as hard cash. A party, furthermore, with high and lofty aims which could not be properly understood by the uneducated and semieducated masses, would not have a dog's chance to succeed in an ochlocratic atmosphere and there are a few things more depressing than to study official party programs. Parties, however just and noble though they may be in their ultimate goal, have always to keep within the "spirit of the time" of which the masses, and in democratic cultures the "intellectuals," also, are the most docile slaves. To keep the large variety of political opinions within large nations in the fold of only two parties may be rather depressing from an intellectual point of view but the establishment of third and fourth parties in the two-party countries of today would mean in all probability the death knell to liberal "democracy." (One must not forget that under present conditions the sole beneficiaries of such an action would be the nonliberal democrats of the totalitarian brand in Berlin, Moscow, and Rome.)

Certain ideas and ideologies can never be successfully represented by parties. We know the history of the endless failures of conservative parties. It was Spengler who first pointed out that there is no such thing as a successful conservative party. A party is a political body built specially for the purpose of fitting into the structure of a nineteenth century

parliament.[33] A conservative "party" is just as miserable as a third "estate."[34]

Integral ochlocracy of course favored the one-man one-vote system because it hoped to crush a surviving oligarchical rule by the weight of sheer numbers. Marxism started more or less as a revolutionary movement, but it retained its revolutionary character only in countries with slow industrial development where the laboring classes remained a minority. The Second International in western Europe allied itself eagerly with the "democratic" forces thus hoping to repeat the *attaqueen-masse* of the bourgeois democrats by bloodless, constitutional means.

We have represented in the last paragraph ochlocracy in juxtaposition to monarchy; we must not forget in that connection that the intimate alliance between monarchy, aristocracy, and clergy was unknown prior to the French Revolution. Only second-rate historians would consider the coalition between throne, altar, and nobility a standard phenomenon. These elements formed usually a triangle of opposing forces. The bourgeoisie largely benefited from the tension between these three powers. Kings and emperors usually received support from the urban elements in their struggle against the powerful aristocratic oligarchs, and in some religious rebellions we see similarly a coalition between the First and Third Estate against the Second. It is perfectly true that the aristocracy was usually the bitterest enemy of monarchical power, but on the other hand there is equally little doubt that no class contributed more to the cause of freedom than the First Estate, the Nobility, which fought every centralism with determination and everywhere laid the foundation stones for constitutional government. This is specially true of the English, French, Hungarian, Polish, Spanish, and Baltic nobility.

If we look at France prior to the outbreak of the Revolution we must bear in mind that the larger part of the French aristocracy was toward the end of the eighteenth century an aulic nobility, an agglomeration of moons who received their light from the monarchical sun. A Henri IV, a James II, an Ivan the Terrible, or the Portuguese Monarchs of the fifteenth century had still endless troubles with the representatives of the First Estate. The better part of the French aristocracy was inebriated by a feeling of liberty when Louis XIV died.* The Polish kings after 1572 were the mere heads of a

republic (*Rzeczpospolita*) of noblemen, and the relations of kings of Hungary with the native aristocracy were characterized, on account of the Golden Bull and the right of armed resistance, by numerous frictions, risings, and rebellions. The Hungarian "Golden Bull," issued in 1222, only seven years after the *Magna Charta Libertatum*, is together with this great English document of privileged power, one of the most important pillars of antidemocratism in Europe. The Whigs in England were, till the beginning of the nineteenth century, an aristocratic party having unfortunately slightly too intimate relationships with the moneybags of the city; yet they may readily have been a more genuinely *independent* aristocratic party than the Tories who represented the aristocracy of the court, consisting sometimes of titled people who had risen as scribes from the ranks of the lower bourgeoisie, together with that part of the landed aristocracy which put loyalty before liberty.

The older Arragonese or Castilian aristocracy showed hardly a lesser spirit of independence than the Spanish cities which were so proud of their ancient privileges, the *fueros*.[35] The rigid absolutism encouraged by the Reformation infected finally even the rulers of the Iberic Peninsula and the Basque privileges were the only ones that survived till the Carlist wars and after.

Neither is the spectacle of noblemen embracing the cause of Republicanism rare. There were numerous noblemen fighting in the American Revolution and a fair amount of Polish as well as Russian aristocrats who were fiery republicans and even anarchists. The larger part of the Hungarian nobility dropped their titles in 1848–49. Pactically all the leaders of the nationalist rising against Austria belonged to the gentry or the aristocracy. Kossuth, Damjanich, Klapka, Batthány, Teleki, Leiningen-Westerburg are just a few names of many. It was a Count Károlyi who proclaimed Hungary a republic in 1918. Yet the reason for the failure of the national revolution in 1848 has to be found in the circumstance that the broad masses did not cooperate in spite of many democratic concessions. The same thing was true of the Polish risings in 1830 and 1863. The Polish gentry finally learned that a *levée en masse* can only be successful with the cooperation of the lower classes. There was a turn to socialism, and Józef

Pilsudski was such a socialist with a gentry background who helped to found the last Polish Republic.

There is no doubt that a republic is the ideal form of government for an aristocracy. An aristocracy which wants to *rule directly* (instead of *serving* a ruler) has practically only the choice between an ephemeral monarchy of the English type or a downright republic after the pattern of Venice, Genoa, or early Florence. Monarchy was historically always the best protection against any sort of obligarchical rule and it was the historic role of monarchs to side with the lower classes against the nobility.[36] (This "system" had the unfortunate consequence, of weakening federalism* and of strengthening centralism, with its ultimate herdist excesses.) The existence of a powerful Second Estate completed the quadrangle of heterogeneous factors which made a balance of powers and a mutual check possible which was the very foundation of medieval liberty.

Every vigorous and independent aristocracy is "republican"; only a weakened and degenerate, or a very wise aristocracy stands for Monarchy. The American whiggish aristocracy of 1774 belongs to the first category, the vigorous and independent type. Needless to say that there were many squires who had a stronger sense for loyalty than love for independence. The clash between Whigs and Tories on American soil was a clash between the two noble passions — freedom and loyalty.

The great merit of aristocracy in the past was the jealous preservation of their privileges. Privileges were and are "liberties," if not for any other reason then certainly for their anti-egalitarian character. It makes good sense that the coins of the United States display the word *liberty*, but not the word *equality. Liberty* is the ideal of aristocracy, just as *equality* stands for the bourgeoisie and *fraternity* for the peasantry.** *One can combine liberty with fraternity but neither of them with equality*.

It must be stated again in all candor that equality presupposes *force* on account of its unnaturalness. Force is the end of liberty as well as of fraternity. In order to level a landscape full of mountains and valleys one needs dynamite, tractors, picks, and shovels. By filling the valleys with the mountaintops a level with a uniform altitude could be established. Thus there is only liberty *or* equality.[37] The fact that the ochlocratic utopia of the year A.D. 3000 contains both elements is hardly able to contradict this

truism effectively. Yet the more sinister aspect of the problem lies in the circumstance that democratism and its allied herd movements, while remaining loyal to the principle of equality and identity, will never hesitate to sacrifice liberty.*

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* In our pagan civilization it is "indelicate" to speak of the death of a person, death being for the atheist an *irreparable catastrophe*.

* "Democratic societies respect nothing more than nobility of birth."—Anatole France, *Penguin Island*, I.

** Read the excellent analysis of E. W. F. Tomlinson in Vol. LXVI of the *Criterion*. This is one of the best exposures of the inner contradiction of Marxian dialectics in relation to the final Marxian goal.

* An early number of *Colosseum* had a cover printed all over with the words: "Utopias are opium for the people. Utopias are opium for the people. Utopias are opium for the people. . . ."

** There seems to be, though, a conflict between the never completely extinguished thirst for adventure and the coming millennium of miraculous inventions (and comfort); one has only to study the comics displaying pictures of semiarmored Martians and half-naked inhabitants of Venus shooting each other with magic rays, to see the projection of a cocktail of death and refrigerators into a half apocalyptic, half-millenarian future.

* There is an excellent attack on "Comfortism" in Werner Sombart's *Der deutsche Sozialismus* (1934). An English translation of this valuable book has been published under the title *A New Social Philosophy*, by the Princeton University Press (Trans. Carl S. Geiser).

* This does not imply that it is therefore subject to state interference.

*That the United States is not an ochlocracy, i.e., consists neither of savages nor of degenerate Sybarites the reader will readily agree. Our *genuine* Ochlocrats (most of them Leftists) would like to combine savagery with decadence.

* Democratic rights for school children have been postulated by the disciples of John Dewey, while David Lloyd George demanded in all earnestness plebiscites for the Central African jungles (in a public speech on Jan. 5, 1918).

* About the problem of *"democracy"* in relation to the popular representation in the United States. See pp. 247–248.

* While man living in the old, traditional form of culture is a dreamer, modern, ochlocratic man is frequently the victim of illusions.

The *dreamer*, or the man of phantasy, creates his own world. He is creative. The *illusionist* believes in a statement or a formula which he does not analyze critically or put to a test. He is a victim of exogen influences and shares these influences with others. There are mass illusions but no mass dreams. Dreams are personal and supra-rational. Illusions belong usually to the "rational" order and their acceptance is due to mental laziness. If a man believes that he is in a democracy not only a citizen but also a "ruler" he must be clearly unaware of the fact that his alternative is either to be ruled by *millions* of his fellow citizens in the person of *their* choice (a very totalitarian control indeed) or merely to *share* as a microscopic agent in the election of his own choice. The *person* in a political system based on masses or numbers is *always* the loser.

We find a thundering condemnation of the idea of ochlocratic elections in a contribution of René Schwob, the well-known Jewish convert, in F. Mauriac's and Eugenio d'Ors's symposium *"L'Homme et le péché"* (Paris, 1938, pp. 121–122).

"The electoral hypocrisy," he writes, "is for me the very symbol of the hypocrisy of all times. Its gravity depends on the fact that it is directed at naïve masses which are easily flattered. All our personal hypocrisies are derived from this central form of imposture. At least this is true of France. . . . The hypocrisy which surrounds us is the imposture of number and quantity. It subjects us to the least human forces and powers."

Not in vain has a noted Austrian thinker called the nineteenth century the century of illusion and the present age the century of lie. This change corresponds to the transformation of democracy to party dictatorship; illusion enforced *is* lie.

* Cf. Bernard Fay's excellent *Freemasonry and Revolution*. (Boston, 1935.)

* By federalism we clearly understand a tendency which is the very opposite of federalism in the American sense. We have to distinguish between centralism, federalism, and separatism; centralism wants the whole concentration of power in a single body, federalism demands a division of power with a marked influence of local administration, separatism recognizes local power *only* and stands thus clearly for the dissolution of the state into independent parts.

** This idea has been well developed in Josef Leo Seifert's brilliant work *Die Weltrevolutionäre* (Von Bogumil über Hus zu Lenin), Vienna, 1930. This work is based on P. Wilhelm Schmidt's and Gräbner's *Kulturkreislehre*. It is also symptomatic that the leaders of the republican movements of Italy, Hungary, and Austria are all titled; Count Sforza, Count Ferdinand Czernin and Count Michael Károlyi. A scion of the princely family Löwenstein represents German republicanism in the United States. (The reader is warned that the terms "First Estate" and "Second Estate" for the Nobility and Clergy are interchangeable as they are not really historical. Only the term "Third Estate" is unequivocal.)

* Montesquieu expressed in his *De l'espirit des lots* (Livre XI, Ch. IV) the belief that neither the aristocratic nor the democratic form of government are "free" by nature. See also the criticisms of Vilfredo Pareto in his *The Mind and Society*, §§ 1608, 1609, New York, 1935. The urge for uniformity in his *Trattato Della Sociologia* is discussed, §§1115–1130.

III

THE BOURGEOIS AND CAPITALISM

"The true nature of the Reformation is not found in its intention but in its result. Modern democracy is the child of the Reformation and not of the reformers. Of the latter, inconsistency is the chief characteristic." — G. P. Gooch, *English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century*.

THERE was, of course, a bourgeoisie all through the greater part of the Middle Ages, yet in spite of the urban forms of life egalitarianism hardly made itself felt. The personal pride was still strong; *Bürgerstolz* and *Bürgerehre* prevailed, and the religious atmosphere, in a concentrated form, rendered an earthly craving for equality and identity superfluous and ridiculous. The bourgeoisie and the nobility lived practically each in another world. They had their sanguinary fights and their bitter intrigues, yet they seldom saw each other face to face. But an increased sense of ambition, the coming into existence of an urban, aulic nobility, and the decay of religious life added to the friction and the desire to be "equal." Egalitarianism starts from a feeling of inferiority, and the hatred against the urban aristocracy played a certain role in the fostering of this sentiment. An even more potent agent in this increase of envy was the mounting grudge against the Second Estate, the clergy.[38]

The antimonarchical feelings are only the latest phase of this movement against hierarchical forms. Even Diderot, the French encyclopedist,

harbored royalist feelings. Once he saw during a visit in Copenhagen the King of Denmark throwing his hat into the air. One of his subjects caught it. "How happy this man must have been!" our famous liberal wrote with a sigh, "to get hold, even for a moment, of the headgear of his beloved monarch." Yet the hatred against the *aristos* was already strong and grew even stronger once the bourgeoisie was mixing in the salons with the Parisian nobility. Nearness does not always create love. The Prussians are loathed in Bavaria and the Bavarians are liked in Prussia because there are Prussian tourists in Bavaria but no Bavarian tourists in Prussia.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century the back of the bourgeoisie was stiffened sufficiently by its increase in wealth. The decades preceding the French Revolution are characterized by financial worries of the government but it would be wrong to reach therefore unfavorable conclusions as to the financial status of the middle classes. There was general well-being and the number of *nouxeaux riches* had increased considerably.*

During the Middle Ages only the Jews were permitted to take interest. St. Thomas Aquinas agreed with Aristotle that taking of interest was usury and the Church acted accordingly. The lender, however, was permitted to take compensation for the gain he would forego, the loss he would encounter, the risk he would run, or whatever other *external* title their might be. But the Reformers, who either thought that they had to liberate a suffering humanity from the shackles of a terrorizing Church or believed that they had to give some compensations in return for their own brutal regimentation, permitted the charging of interest; thus the formation of modern capitalism was promoted.

Luther was naturally more successful if we measure the damage he has done by mere numbers, but Jean Cauvin was undoubtedly the more radical fighter who left the marks of his ideas all over the world. His theocratic city state of Geneva had still a few aristocratic traits, but its soul was already essentially ochlocratic and bourgeois. At the time of his death we find a highly developed middle-class civilization and culture of a capitalistic and semirepublican character in the countries of the Rhine valley — in Switzerland, in the Palatinate, in Alsace, in Holland — but a similar process under the same accelerating influence can also be observed in districts further away: in southern France, in the British Isles, and in eastern Hungary. Apart from a few poets we see these followers of Calvin

contributing very little to the arts and letters. They lacked painters, musicians, architects of originality; hilarity was for them suspect and their humor was limited. In their political activities they displayed strange and disquieting tendencies; in North America they brought the Indians, with the help of bullets, whisky, and infected blankets, almost to a vanishing point. In England they led the first great attack against the institution of monarchy in Christian history, in Ireland they displayed their homicidal talents in the most brutal type of warfare, in South Africa they established republics in which the institution of slavery survived till the threshold of the twentieth century, in Hungary they allied themselves with the pagan Turks and in Japan with the Shintoists against the Catholics.* Two hundred years after their first appearance they controlled, together with the Lutherans, almost all of Europe's *new* civilization with the exception of France where the Huguenot leaven had already done its work. The Lutherans remained superior in number, but as semirevolutionaries they remained in the shadow of the disciples of Calvin. And last not least, it is Calvinistic theology which finds its clear expression in the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. It would be fatally erroneous to be misled in the psychological evaluation of the British State Churches by the aesthetic proclivities of its pseudo-Catholic ritualism.

The Calvinists (like the early Jews under the Old Dispensation) considered the increase of material wealth a sign of divine favor. Methodically they built up great fortunes, thus establishing a visible sign of God's approving attitude toward them; Jehovah obviously rewarding the just and righteous with success and hard cash.[39] Praise was bestowed upon hard work and disdain upon all earthly pleasures. Consequently one should not be surprised to see the Catholic South at the beginning of the nineteenth century being already surpassed by the industrious North in matters of material welfare. Spain, Portugal, and Italy were considered by Northerners to be countries of mere archeological interest full of loafing monks, romantic ruins, and lovers playing the guitar. For the tourists coming from England, Holland, or the Baltic countries, the Mediterranean parts of Europe were nothing else but large agglomerations of illiterate beggars, bravos, and unshaven toreros. The other Catholic countries were considered to be tainted similarly by the stigma of inferiority; Austria-Hungary, which

enjoyed Gladstone's special wrath, figured as a deplorable survival from the Middle Ages and France was only respected in so far as she harbored atheistic elements. The fate of Poland, the decay of the clergy in Hungary and Mexico, the drunkenness of the Irish and the *pronunciamentos* in South America — they all served to complete the picture of a rotten and "backward" Catholicism. Belfast prospered while Dublin was just dear, dirty Dublin. It was pointed out that the French Protestants — hardly a million people — possessed a full eighth of the French national wealth. One had only to compare the Protestants of Western Latvia with the Catholic Latgalians or Lithuanians to see all the difference between Wittenberg-Geneva and Rome, between today and yesterday.

These comparisons, so unfavorable for those who adhered to the traditional religious form of Europe, were pragmatically fair. It took the Catholics with their lack of ambition and their frankly quixotic character a good long time to wake up and to realize that they were in a new and non-Christian world where the stock exchange, the gun factory, and the technological institute counted more than singing, painting, praying, and daydreaming. And when it was found out that mineral wealth, having become of paramount importance after the Industrial Revolution, was largely under the control of Protestant nations, it seemed that Calvin's God had rewarded liberally the industrious disciples of the Old Testament.

The Catholic nations, ill adjusted to modern conditions, were furthermore hampered in their development by a bitter fight between darkest reaction and dirtiest anticlericalism, while there was nothing but harmony, cooperation, and understanding between state, religion, science, philosophy, and society in the Protestant world. Religion was a loyal servant of the state, the "national" churches in turn were controlled by benevolent kings or princes, and religion made every possible and impossible concession to "scientific" innovations or social tendencies. The Protestant-democratic principle of compromise and the lack of an all-comprising philosophy (a *Weltanschauung*, the Germans would say) relieved almost every tension; a British peer, a German *Geheimrat*, a Swedish officer, or a Danish editor could be freemasons, members of conservative parties, Protestant church patrons, Darwinian evolutionists, militarists, and monarchists in one and the same person. The Scandinavian kings were almost without exception

freemasons; ministers denied the divinity of Christ, "conservatives" admired Voltaire.*

In Catholic countries the situation was entirely different and the issues stood out in brutal clearness. The cry *Écrasez l'Infame!* was never forgotten or dead; the Camorra and the Carbonari, the *Los-von-Rom* movement, the Galilei circles of the Hungarian universities, and the Grand Orient of Paris worked in full blast; the names of Combes, Waldeck-Rousseau, Weckerle, Renan, Mazzini, Briand, Schönerer, and Ferrer were in the ears of everybody. The Lutherans and Calvinists besieged the Church from the outside, the Eastern Schism sent its Pan-Slav cavalry into attack, and the most diverse enemies of the Church burrowed from the inside. Even the exterior front line against the Church was made up from the most heterogeneous elements. Not only Dostoyevski and Clémenceau, Briand and Renan could be found in the opposite trenches, but also Albert Pike and the Russian Emperor, Bebel, and the Archbishop of Uppsala, Jewish intellectuals and Prussian army officers. For the Nationalists the Church was an organization of international conspirators, for the Marxists, opium for the people based on metaphysical superstition, for certain "conservatives," an inimical foreign power *ultra monies*, for the neo-Liberals an enemy of *progress*, for the Pravoslavs a materialistic heresy. There were capitalists who considered the Church to be an agent of socialism, thanks to the encyclicals of Leo XIII, and Socialists who visualized her as a protagonist of some sort of capitalist feudalism. One must make the concession that this common hatred against the Church had also a positive aspect; it united the Occident in a common goal and thus it created a focal point which the West had not possessed since the Reformation.

Money was certainly a means of the ochlocratic middle classes to fight their victorious battles against the First and Second Estates, and this is one of the reasons why democratism and capitalism had such a fine tradition of intimate cooperation in the past. In spite of its hideous excesses and its fundamental amorality, there is a certain debt of gratitude we owe to capitalism. Due to its Manchesterian background and its anarchic tendencies it created a diverting chaos which saved a certain amount of liberty for the nineteenth century. On account of the intellectual muddle

caused by the forerunners and epigones of the French Revolution we see capitalism infecting even ochlocracy with its liberalistic conceptions. In spite of the ominous beginning with the guillotine and such blood curdling performances as could be rendered in print by "private" publications only,* humanity had the rare privilege of witnessing the development of ochlocracy and capitalism tempered and mellowed by the dying beams of the setting sun of liberalism.

Ochlocracy in the nineteenth century was indeed sweet and persuasive and capitalism helped it to spread its ideology by advertising and propaganda. Freedom, menaced by such honest radicals as Robespierre and eighty years later by La Cecilia, seemed to be restored forever. The masses in their naive enthusiasm and optimism were still far from seeing the demoniacal qualities inherent in either majoritarianism or in the rule of the machines. Capitalism and "democracy" shared the technics of the art of persuasion; they are both essentially anthropocentric in this pretentious going to the public, as well as in their undignified, megaphonical appeal to the herd. Yet there is more than just accidental coincidence in the sharing of the methodical approach between ochlocracy and the two forms of capitalism; "liberal" private capitalism and socialist state capitalism.

In the remote background there can clearly be seen Johann Gutenberg, father of mechanical writing, the innocent promoter of the "intellectual," or rather semieducated masses, grandfather of the press. The blind, awe-filled worship of the printed word was to be initiated a century after Gutenberg by Protestantism with its bibliolatry. The printed word is highly honored in all Protestant countries and the "Book of Books," the Bible, ranges there as a *primus inter pares* inspiring respect before its lesser cousins. It is therefore in the Protestant countries that we see the worship of the printed word which developed into the "science" of advertising, and the religious veneration of the daily press by the masses.[40] If we compare the South German with the North German, for instance, we will see all the difference; the former remained always skeptical toward anything printed and expresses his distrust in the current phrase: "He lies like print."*

It is, of course, in a way more human to believe the wildest rumors as long as they go from mouth to mouth and are told "into the face" than to trust a printed, usually anonymous piece of information. It is therefore

natural, even if amazing, to see in Anglo-Saxon countries a tremendous amount of money spent on advertised articles which are only worth a fraction of the price asked for them. The wretched customer simply forgets that he has to pay for the millions spent on advertisements covering houses, streetcars, newspapers, magazines, and highways.** Needless to say it is only in print-believing Protestant countries that people fall under the spell of advertising campaigns; the manufacturer or seller who would spend a proportionally equal sum for advertising the same merchandise in France, Italy, or Poland as in England or America would simply waste his money. *This truly arch-ochlocratic way of influencing and hypnotizing people*, who often fall victims to gigantic frauds, *does not only require print-believing beings for victims but also an ochlocratically inclined culture—a homogeneous sand heap—in which the necessarily uniform appeal reaches mentally uniform human beings*.[41]

This leads us to another ochlocratic problem: the bourgeois origin of ochlocracy in relation to an integral political *and* cultural egalitarianism.[42] The "democratic" formula of an all-human equality was invented in order to fight the First and Second Estates with "ethical" arguments. There was, without having been publicly recognized, always a Fourth and even a Fifth Estate. The capitalistic bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century (mainly if we consider the upper-middle classes) stood for an election system which excluded the lower classes even from indirect influence in the government. The middle-class "democrat" frequently dreads the manual laborer, who often sided with the aristocrat,*** and he usually hates the peasant politically, partly on account of the ingrained loathing of the agrarian elements against the city, partly on account of the conservative-patriarchal structure and tendencies of the farming population. The "democrats" for a long time have been reluctant to grant universal suffrage in view of such alarming manifestations as the peasant-aristocratic rising in the Vendée against the bourgeois revolution in Paris, the rebellion of the Scottish Highlanders against the mammonistic House of Hanover, the formation of Catholic parties in Central Europe largely recruited from priests and peasants. Only in the twentieth century, through constant pressure from the socialists, has the demand for income brackets and educational standards in connection with suffrage been dropped.

The opposition against universal suffrage in a country stands in inverse ratio to the strength of the middle class. Yet the bourgeois does not mind extending the franchise in case there is a tendency on the part of the peasant to become an agrarian bourgeois (a "farmer") or of the worker to reach middle-class standards with the help of higher wages. The bourgeois wants to "increase" his class. As a matter of fact he stands ideally for the one-class state like the Communist; the only difference is that the orthodox ("continental") Communist in his more apocalyptic craving wants to level everybody to zero whereas the *middle* class ochlocrats dream of making the average man the iron norm. Thus the terror of mediocrity comes into conflict with the terror of inferiority.

The more moderate socialists (the bourgeoisized Marxist) contributed nevertheless more to the establishment of universal suffrage on the European continent than the "democrats" themselves. The larger the proletariat in a given country, the more probable the chance that it could reach its goal within the framework of democratic parliamentarianism through its sheer weight of numbers. *But the larger the proletariat, the more it became infected with bourgeois political ideas. The smaller a proletariat, the less hope it had to gain power through universal suffrage and the more radical it became*. This is the reason we saw communist revolutions in Russia, Hungary, and Bavaria but not in England or Belgium.

We have seen that the "democrats" are not very dogmatic about their ideas and that they revise their principles according to circumstances. They found special pleasure in withdrawing in certain European countries the right to vote from the military forces, the secular clergy, and the religious orders.[43] Naturally the ochlocratic and egalitarian principle also demands female suffrage, but certain leftist groups had their doubts and scruples about the application of their dogmas. This is mainly true of the Latin countries where women, with the exception of a small, but extremely rabid minority, profess strong conservative and religious views, and therefore the principle of universal suffrage was quietly dropped in countries like republican France, Spain, and Portugal.

There is another point of contact between democratism and industrial capitalism and that is the superstitious belief in "progress." The essence of

modern capitalism is not slavery of the antique pattern but the possession of the expensive tools of production by a small plutocratic group which controls frequently also the tools of persuasion. The technical development is more responsible than anything else for the depreciation of individual labor (the "hands") and the enormous increase of the importance of tools. Modern ochlocracy needs "crowds" and the old hierarchic and personal societies were hammered into shapeless masses by the two great products of "progress" — the megalopolis and the factory. "Progress" is (*a*) a collectivistic and (*b*) a purely urban ideal which evolutionism tried in a certain sense to apply to nature.

"Progress" is intrinsically connected with the time element, yet medieval man (like every deeply religious man) was eschatologically static. To him time was a relative conception because his center — God — stood at the same distance to the year 1300 B.C. as to the year A.D. 1300.

A further common sphere between modern democratism and the technological-financial systems of mass production lies in the aforementioned collectivism. There used to be once the dominating idea of "Christendom," but this was far from being collectivistic in character as it contained two hierarchic principles: the visible one from beggar to Pope and the invisible one from sinner to saint. "Humanity" as such scarcely existed as a living principle in the Middle Ages because man had in regard to eternity no collective existence. Individuals sacrificed themselves for their families, their manorial lords, kings, cities, rights, privileges, religion, their beloved Church or the woman they loved, in fact, for everything or anybody to which or to whom they had a *personal* relationship. The anonymous sand-heap "humanity" was unknown to medieval man and even the concept of the "nation" was not equivalent to a gray mass of unilingual citizens but was looked upon as a hierarchy of complicated structure. Sanctity as well as heroism were problems of the *individual*. And in the end brother Death broke each soul from its earthly connections and presented it naked, sinful, and entirely alone to the Eternal Judge. The collective singular "humanity" was only created after the Reformation as a living unit. The relationship between personalism on the one hand, and individualism and collectivism on the other, takes roughly the following form.



Personalism has naturally an inner affinity with culture, while individualism and collectivism are inwardly akin to civilization. Culture is practically always personal; with the exception of the cinema and the ballet there is no collective art, no collective original creation. A sculpture, a picture may be the expression of somebody's personality, a dynamo may represent the outcome of thought or intellectual effort, but it never is the manifestation of that greater complexity — the soul.

And while personalism and creative diversity is essentially human, the animals can appreciate the products of civilization. A cat will never be able to distinguish (in the artistic sense) two different paintings or sculptures, but a room provided with central heating, or a frankfurter, will have a definite meaning for her. The trend from personalism to individualism and collectivism is in more than one way a decline, a lowering to the mere physical existence of the beast.

Deism[44] finally gave rise to a conception of God in which He, after having created the Universe, retired and left mankind entirely to itself. Pantheism had also its share in this destructive process; it deified the collective soul of mankind, which by now expected from God neither mercy nor grace, and thus the pagan anthropocentrism of our times had a blueprint for its philosophical foundations. Human beings started, on account of their anthropocentrism, to be shortsighted in the metaphysical sense of the word; they "saw" no longer God but only themselves.

Democratistic culture and civilization lowered them to the unhierarchic sand heap but, paradoxically, did not bring them any nearer to each other. The thought of a common creator and a common origin can alone unite human beings and it is possible to see the practical application of this truth in any religious and patriarchal (or patriarchally religious) society. In the

hierarchic Tyrol, people are much nearer to each other than in "democratic" New York, and even the Albanian practising his vendetta is more good neighborly than the inhabitant of modern Berlin or Stockholm. The elevation of "mankind" to an eschatological end simply resulted in an incoherent atomism which means loneliness-in-the-mass. And that is exactly the democratistic destiny or destiny in the megalopolis which is essentially and teletically the same thing.

The democratistic principles of "massification" (*Vermassung*) and of anthropocentrism are seemingly contradicted by the early "democratic" and capitalistic principle of competition. Here we must remember again that early democracy and a dying liberalism (aristocratic as well as commercial) overlapped each other in time.[45]

Commercial liberalism (liberalism of the Manchesterian type) was already deeply influenced by deistic, pantheistic, and anthropocentric thought. The conception of life fostered by this economic *Weltanschauung* was accordingly not a struggle toward God, but a very earthly race with critical, anxious glances at the neighbors. Material ambition is extolled and praised; there is hardly a man more representative of its advocates than Benjamin Franklin, contemporary of Jefferson[46] and forerunner of Andrew Jackson.

It is logical that racing has gained such popularity in all countries tainted with the mass spirit. America and England prefer horses and greyhounds; France, bicycles; Scandinavia, men. A Persian shah, representant of a more medieval world than ours, once was taken to the races in a place near Vienna by Emperor Francis Joseph. He asked for an explanation of the rules, but when this was given to him he remarked in deep illusionment: "Well, one of the horses must be the first!"

The enthusiasm of certain Americans and Germans for statistics springs from the same source. The spirit of competition between individuals is still a survival from the good, old days when the middle classes raced against the First and Second Estates. Their ancient weapon, money, later becomes the bone of contention between individuals. Capitalism has a stake in this growing envy, for material goods and money becomes thus the stimulant of all early bourgeois and ochlocratic civilization made up not of human

beings but of *homines oeconomici*, "customers." This envy, directed toward money, is naturally an envy for quantity and not for quality. (The essence of technological capitalism is after all mass production and not craftsmanship.) It is needless to emphasize that this new materialistic, ochlocratic envy is more formidable in its vehemence and bitterness than anything witnessed before. There is also envy in a hierarchical society, envy between the sections of society as well as envy between men in identical stations of life, but the principle of equality puts everybody in a state of egalitarian expectation. To be inferior to anybody else implies almost an elementary insufficiency. The egalitarian can simply not accept or consent to such a situation and his only possible answer is a chain of desperate efforts to overcome the inferiority. If these efforts meet with failure the despair may grow into suicide or revolt.

The bourgeois contribution to democratism overshadows the share of any other class. There were a few aristocrats of the late liberal period who unwittingly or even purposely fostered democratism and ochlocracy. Some of them were "penitent noblemen" *à la* Tolstoy, some others believed themselves to be guided by wisdom when they cooperated with the rising class, still others felt the obligation to continue to serve.[47] They became "clercs" in the sense Julien Benda uses this term. (Cf. *La trahison des clercs.*)

Yet even peasants and workers have cooperated with the middle classes in the advancement of ochlocratic ideas if the culture of their country happened to be essentially bourgeois. We find the bourgeois peasant in some Protestant-Calvinistic cultures, as, for instance, in Switzerland, Holland, England, and in the greater part of the United States. It is symptomatic that there is little peasant pride and peasant consciousness in Hungary which has a large Calvinistic minority; here the peasant considers it almost an insult to be called by his real name, preferring *kisgazda* (small economist) to *paraszt* (peasant). We are here faced with the same phenomenon as in England and in the United States, but one has to add in all fairness that the Anglo-American farmer is definitely not a peasant. In England he is a middle-class proletarian tenant, who seldom dwells on his own ground. The English farmer became a landless pauper during the unlimited rule of money in the eighteenth century and he has never

recovered his old free position. His American colleague is frequently an estate speculator whose "village" is not in the least a village, but, as Spengler says, a scattered bit of "fragmentary megalopolis." There was a large number of farmers in the West who planted and tilled a certain land, used it to the point of exhaustion, cut all the timber, and afterward sold the valueless soil.

The genuine European peasant never thinks about increasing his wealth; he is deeply rooted in the soil and timeless. Just like the proletarian he works in order to live and not the other way round. He stands nearer to nature than the bourgeois, but he is neither an animist, nor a pantheist, and least of all a deist. None of these philosophies attract him because he is near to nature. He fells trees and knows that they are not animated by any spirits, he moves the corn and is well aware that it is the wind whispering in the stalks and not the souls of the dead. In spite of the fact that his strong imagination is focused on his inner world, he is realistic and dry cut. All natural things are near to him — they are to him undemoniacal and transparent. Birth, death, love, illness, and sex are to him the fundamental facts of life. But the dweller of the cities uprooted from his usual artificial surroundings gets drunk like Rousseau when left alone with the forces of nature, the *Urgewalten der Natur*, which remind him of eternity and his finiteness.

The worker, usually of peasant stock, resembles in some respects the peasant. He is usually blind to the demoniacal aspects of modern technique because he is the builder of the machines. He may, like Heinrich Lersch and Alphons Petzoldt, develop a religious poetry with the machine as a background but he will never worship dynamos after the fashion of a déraciné bourgeoisie in the days of early Bolshevism.* Worship of nature or machines are typical for urban middle-class groups, who profess the tendency to substitute these for God; the peasant or worker will rarely fall for such aberrations. Yet all this does not exclude the danger that the machine overpowers the worker in a physical or characteriological sense.

The worker is nevertheless, like the peasant, at least in Europe, *not* a member of a *dynamic* class. As long as he has not been permeated by the spirit of the middle classes he demands nothing more than the life minimum and above that he shows little hunger for possession. The peasant usually wants only land for land's sake but not as a means of a higher standard of

living. *The worker can therefore only be aroused to revolt by the ambitious bourgeois or if his living standard is pressed below the minimum*. If this is the case, the physical side of man dominates the scene. We shall not forget that sanctity cannot be achieved without bodily existence, that spiritual love alone does not create progeny, that St. Thomas Aquinas not only justified "stealing" in case of extreme need but almost orders it, for it is then no longer "theft." It is the exercise of a prior right. Exceeding this natural affirmation of material, ontological existence, the dynamite of a poeticized and intellectualized philosophy of life has to intervene in order to intoxicate the workers and to send them to the barricades.

The modern bourgeois is dynamic *per se* and the totalitarian leaders of the twentieth century were shrewd enough to switch his personal restlessness and his individualist spirit of competition to the collectivistic, nationalistic plane. Today we can witness the equally disgusting and even more poisonous struggle of urbanized nations struggling desperately for "equal standards of living" amongst themselves.

Before we analyze the natural habitat of the bourgeois it should be borne in mind that the English and American aristocratic background attaches to this word a derogatory sense which it does not possess in French. Even the word *middle class* has a stigma which is conspicuously absent in either German (*Mittelstand*), French (*Classe moyenne*), Dutch, Hungarian, or Italian. Only in Russian do we find a slight disdain and contempt attached to this term.[48] Yet neither should one become a victim of the general trend to identify rigorously persons with their standard social, national, or geographical environment. Not every member of the middle class is imbued with the bourgeois spirit, neither is every Dane characteriologically a Dane and every mountaineer a highlander. We all make the mistake of identifying the spirit too much with the material form of existence, race, or class. Personality evades often mysteriously the laws of probability.

Cradle and home of the bourgeois spirit is nevertheless the town, the city, and more than anything else the megalopolis. Yet how can we define the "city"? And what is a village? And where is the dividing line between a city and a village? The number of the inhabitants is certainly not the criterion,

for we know of villages in Hungary with forty, fifty, and even sixty thousand inhabitants. To a large extent it is therefore the occupation of its residents which causally determines the character of a settlement. The village lives in closest contact with the land, the inhabitants are mostly peasants who work on their fields, meadows, pastures, and woods; homework is only supplementary. Except for the looms and dairies, the village has no collective working places, no factories, and no offices. It lacks a proletariat (apart from a few paupers) and an intelligentsia, with a few necessary exceptions such as the priest, doctor, and teacher.

The villager meets nature intimately in the settlement; nature with all her laws and seasons determines the life, rhythm, and breathing of the village. The villager-peasant is a child of the stars, the winds, the clouds, the earth, the rivers. All these are for him concrete and important realities. Yet the essence of the city is pneumatic ghostliness. The factual and pragmatic occupations gradually vanished in the cities; factories replaced shoemakers, carpenters, tailors, blacksmiths, locksmiths, dyers, and painters. The artisan who could concentrate all his personal taste and talent into a door lock or a pointed shoe had to make room for a mechanically creating industrial proletarian, who day after day at certain intervals presses a certain handle or places consecutively five thousand screws on a running board in deadly monotony. The proletarianized factory worker is a comparatively new appearance (or rather: reappearance) in the picture of the city. In the superindustrialized modern world he is, in spite of his concrete work, no longer a realist — as, for instance, a mechanic in a repair shop — but a daydreamer, a sentimentalist, with nerves often weakened by the torture of monotonous routine, and therefore he “explodes” from time to time under external influences. He no longer masters his tools — the machines — but is mastered by them.

The men who truly carry on the tradition of the inventive manual laborer, the craftsmen, are the different “repairers” and “menders” who have hitherto escaped the domination of machinery and monotony. Among these we find not only the cobbler or the glass repairer, the watch “maker” or the garage mechanic, but also the surgeon. They have to work, it is true, on a basic material which may be fabricated, but they have nevertheless to face individual “damages” and they have to use their analytical as well as synthetic mind in order to cope with individually different situations.

Tailors and *chefs de cuisine* occupy an even higher level of independence and *personal* work; they belong actually to that tiny aristocracy of people still privileged by fate to exercise in connection with their daily work the finest human faculty — creativeness. They are thus still permitted to share, in a feeble, human way, in the great divine process of *personal creation* whose eternal source is God himself.*

The large masses of white-collar workers occupy themselves almost exclusively with paper. Gold vanishes, the merchandise remains out of sight, trains are codified in timetables, countries are transformed into maps, human lives are transfigured into biographies, trade as well as morality is represented by statistics and numbers. Thus we arrive at our present-day urban civilization which is nothing but an agglomeration of files, checks, letters of credit, books of law, receipts, affidavits, stamps, balance sheets, and mortgage deeds. And this mountain of paper in turn is served by clerks, accountants, lawyers, civil servants, magistrates, diplomats, stenotypists, brokers, cashiers, and notaries. Today we already know of employees in the big naphtha-syndicates who never so much as saw a gallon of crude oil, who never dipped their fingers into that soft, sweetish-smelling product of Mother Earth; we have also men in the great agricultural companies who would not know the difference between a rye field and a wheat field. The expression *déraciné* is only too adequate for the urban middle class.

The painter makes room for the photographer, the stage director for the film producer. *Everything is imitation and multiplication*. A phantomlike, colorless, two-dimensional picture of Greta Garbo is seen in 300 editions over five continents on the same evening; a single human voice resounds from millions of radio sets, and another one, chained to a black rubber record, is forced out of thousands of gramophones. It is always quantity and not quality to which importance is attached, and there is the desperate tendency to make everything available to everybody. Nobody should have the right to pride himself on being the sole possessor of a specific thing. “Democracy” in its first stages is intrinsically a struggle against privileges and later democratism continues this bitter, depersonalizing struggle against everybody and anybody with the help of the demoniacal magic of technique. One single female being can rouse the yearnings of millions of men, smiling at them from 5000 screens, “belonging” to them all, and the car, designed by a small group of engineers and built by thousands of

workers, spreads over all the world in millions of identical copies. Everything for everybody! This clearly shows that the demands of communism (or rather "commonism") can already be found in its nuclear form in ochlocratic technicism.

With the decline of the influence of monks, peasants, aristocrats, and craftsmen the mystic gown of Europe falls and the bourgeois civilization of "common sense" and "sober-mindedness" begins its sinister triumph. A great outcry for general and public education can be heard and instead of sticking to the hierarchic principle in the most aristocratic of all domains — intellectual education — a whole corollary of compromises with the mass spirit were made in this field; education became thus finally nothing but another factor of leveling applanation side by side with industrialism. *Ochlocracy needs* (as we shall see later on) *a most mediocre general education adjusted to the majority of intellectual capacities; an ochlocratic education should be just intensive enough to turn man into a civilized creature without giving him any special values or sublimate him into a bearer of culture*. It is necessary that the *citizens* are intelligent enough to understand the constitution of their country; they must look up to it in awe and respect. A strong spirit of analytical criticism in a thorough ochlocracy might finally endanger the very existence of this written basic document through a series of amendments or plebiscites. *Subjects* on the other side can indulge in an extreme criticism which after all hardly affects the state of affairs of an absolute or a patriarchal monarchy. This is also the reason that there were numerous professors in Austrian state universities under Francis Joseph or in Spanish state-universities under Alphons XIII who from every possible point of view opposed the existing order violently.

It shall be borne in mind that ochlocratic control was fairly strong in the European universities of the nineteenth century; while ochlocracy made a special point of eliminating illiterates, they put their *clercs* into the universities which rapidly lost their former influence. The original thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, whether fallacious or not in their doctrines, rarely were university professors; neither Nietzsche nor de Tocqueville, Schopenhauer, Bernhart, Spengler or Hello, Kierkegaard, von Hügel or de Maistre were ever honored with a chair, and Kant had to be content with a teaching position in a girls' high school.

Yet the true pillars of democratism and socialism we find in the elementary school and in its semieducated teachers inclining frequently toward Marxian socialism.[49] Even in France, where the Académie Française had become a stronghold of Catholic thought, the mass of teachers remains in the clutches of the *fin-de-siècle*. It is, of course, equally true that the function of the teacher in an elementary or secondary school is extremely important in an ochlocratic society. *We must not forget that the extinction of illiteracy remains one of the capital tasks of the democratists, because they feel the need of a public which masters the three "R's" and is therefore able to mark the right name on the election papers; to read cheap novels and pulp magazines, leaflets, pamphlets, and advertisements; the need of a public which solves crossword puzzles, understands warning signs on the road and in the factories, and swallows "enlightening" writings without possessing the faculties to analyze them critically*. It is the specific tragedy of the average urbanite to have lost his ancestral, rural gift of *wisdom* without having even the prospect of acquiring a thorough *knowledge* which is able to replace wisdom to a certain extent.

Another point is the modern type of education which gives precedence to the sciences that deal only with means, over philosophy and religion that deal with ends. Today the differentiation between these two categories is more and more acknowledged and this not only in purely Catholic circles.[50] The cognition that most great issues of our time are moral and *not* material is gaining ground and the dawn of the worship of exact sciences in the upper intellectual stratas seems to be nearer than ever before.[51]

There were few people in Europe or in America who understood this issue so clearly as the late Hungarian Minister of Education Count Kuno Klebelsberg, who unfortunately died at a relatively early age. Allowed a rather moderate budget he was faced with the decision either to eliminate the remaining nine per cent of illiterates in his country *or* to create an intellectual as well as spiritual *élite* by establishing Hungarian colleges in Vienna, Berlin, and Rome. He decided in favor of the latter proposal. The Hungarian press attacked him violently but he remained firm, very well aware that in our democratistic civilization millions learn to read and to write without ever making *positive* use of their knowledge.*

The superstitious belief that rudimentary knowledge of a few truths enables the average individual to understand intuitively the major problems around us seduced the ochlocrats the world over to spend huge sums for mass education. This intellectual optimism of the ochlocrats has ended in a spending orgy in educational matters without parallel; nobody after all would be worse off if the whole lot of detective novels, sex stories, tepid magazines, spicy reviews, and sport pages remained unread. A reading-writing education *as such* has benefited nobody, has elated nobody spiritually or culturally. There is no need to go to the other extreme and to believe that the knowledge of the three R's is basically destructive, but nothing is more stupid or irrealistic than to judge the level of other countries by the number of illiterates. Accepting such standards one has to put Latvia higher than France, or the Germanies of 1890 higher than the German World of 1810. Imperial Russia had a far larger percentage of illiterates than the American Middle West yet she produced such men as Dostoyevski, Myerezhkovski, Vyereshtshagin, Tolstoy, Tshaykovski, Solovyov, Pushkin, Rimsky-Korsakov, Turgenyev, Skryabin, Mendeleyev, and Mussorgsky.

Novelists have already often compared the civilized with the cultured man. If we analyze the activities of an illiterate Serbian peasant, of a drugstore owner in Cincinnati, and of a delicatessen merchant in Norrköping, it would not be difficult to tell who is civilized and who is cultured. The son of an ochlocratic (and Protestant)[52] civilization will know more about bookkeeping, engines, cocktails, or national government than the native of the Balkans, but he will master no national dances, he will hardly be able to play an instrument, he will be unable to improvise songs or to invent fairy tales, to paint icons or to carve wooden statues. Reading and writing remain, after all, accomplishments which are to serve higher purposes. There seems to be ample evidence that the art of letters was used in earliest times primarily by priests and only later by chroniclers and historians. Men with a positive inner urge for knowledge, who grew up in so-called backward countries without numerous elementary schools, always managed to find ways and means to achieve these accomplishments, as we see in the course of history. Yet for the true ochlocrat reading and

writing, because of the element of applanation and despiritualization that is connected with them, is a *conditio sine qua non*.

The peasant is hated or idolized by the bourgeois; the worker, on whom he equally depends is more often venerated than despised (as Spengler points out in his *Hour of Decision*), the aristocrat is made a semigod or dragged through the filth by the penny press, the priest encounters either servility from petty, clerical parties, or volleys of hatred from the pulpits of Universities and the rostrum of Parliaments. The military *of old* was specially hated as an agglomeration of proletarians in rags and aristocrats, and the episcopal palaces where the sons of counts and peasants resided in turns were hardly more popular with the half-educated bourgeois.

It must also be kept in mind that the class most antagonistic to the Church has been during the past centuries the middle class, or the bourgeoisie.* It is the middle class in France, Austria, Germany, Bohemia, and Moravia which shows the greatest percentage of Protestants and it is very difficult to believe that it is sheer accident that so few saints come from the ranks of bankers, insurance agents, reporters, manufacturers, and businessmen and so many from the aristocracy, peasantry, army, navy, and the proletariat.[53]

Yet there is little doubt that no layer of the population has less enthusiasm about itself than the middle class. With the exception of the patrician and the bureaucrat, the bourgeois is singularly centrifugal toward his own social stratum.[54] On account of his "encircled" position between the different layers of society, and because he has to stand a strong pressure from at least two fronts, he is constantly losing members of his class.** The great inner dissatisfaction which Modern Man feels about himself can be partially led back to the intrinsic failure of bourgeois civilization and this disillusionment caused a gradual lowering of the magnetism of the middle class as a unit. The self-analytical spirit of the bourgeois has laid bare the soul of his group and this Great Nakedness brought forward the end of the bourgeois mystery and the bourgeois myth.

The *personal* mystery of medieval man has been largely destroyed by capitalistic technicism and bourgeois scientism. There was always something mystical in personal creation as well as a "secret" in manual, artistic skills; convents and monasteries jealously kept the secret of their

liquors; craftsmen had their secrets and so had doctors, alchemists, astrologers, and pharmacists in their more or less dark trades. Mystics, hermits, midwives, cooks, and violin builders harbored their secrets. Nature was full of unpenetrable mysteries and strange events; the scarcity of written documents furthered the growth of sagas, folklore, and legends. But not only man, nature, and life had their mysteries; even today we speak of the mysteries of the Rosary, of the Mass. In the Armenian Rite of the Catholic Church a veil is spread between the altar and audience during the Consecration of the Host. These mysteries on the other hand, personal as they might be, were far from creating walls between human beings who were by them not less magnetically attracted than by distance. Bodies are mutually attracted by nearness, knowledge, and pleasure but souls by distance, mystery, and suffering.

Democratism has always been hostile toward mysteries, and in its technical as well as personal definition it is based entirely on "publicity." The wonderful, great distances are made cheap in relation to time, money, and effort; liners, planes, and sightseeing buses explore them pitilessly. The reporters, these retrievers of the press, have their noses wherever anything dark, unexplained, or unknown is left; professors cut up animals, human beings, plants, and minerals into microscopic slices; nudism spreads, telescopes pierce the sky, X rays lay open our insides, magazines of popular science inundate the countryside, and writers as well as psychiatrists specialize in "souls." Along comes the Salvation Army, Moral Rearmament, and "Domestic Courts" on the radio with public confessions; autobiographies fill the bookstores, films for sexual enlightenment show the act of birth — everything should be known to everybody. In the end everybody really does know *something* about everything, but this half-knowledge is neither wisdom nor knowledge. It has only an inflating effect, like undigested bread, and gives pains in the stomach. It makes people vain, irreverent, and self-content.

One might add that bourgeois civilization also has its "secrets," but these *mystères bourgeoises* seem to be detached from quality, they are entirely subordinated to the principle of quantity. This mystery of size and number is not mystical but magical, not angelic but demoniacal. We have to remember the first Great City and its citizens — Babylon and its horrible tower, this dreadful pagan attempt to penetrate the Secret of God with the

help of accumulated material.* On the other side of this civilization we see paper. Its essence is quantitative agglomeration and paper ghostliness and in its geocentric fatality it has no other ultimate goal but to dominate the masses, to bind them, to suspend their judgment, to hold them, to charm, to depersonalize, to mystify them. Instead of mysteries we have mystagogy. Instead of the substance, the long, menacing shadows provided by the last rays of a setting sun.

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* Thanks to the Commercial treaty of 1788 (the Eden-Act) imports and exports reached an all time high in the 12 months before the revolution — a record which could only be broken in the nineteenth century.

* It ought never to be forgotten that the Turks in their desperate onslaughts against the Austrians were usually supported by Magyar Calvinist auxiliary troops led by Transylvanian officers. Emmeric Thököly headed a large contingent of Calvinists at the last Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683. Had Vienna fallen Europe might have become Mohammedan. The two great fatalistic religions of the Prophets of Geneva and Mecca seemed to have attracted each other.

The Dutch intrigues against the Jesuits in Japan were not less significant; their suggestions to the Shōgun that the Catholics in general and Jesuits in particular were outlawed "all over the world" on account of their hostility toward organized government, resulted in an atrocious persecution. The Catholics finally made their last stand in the fortress of Shimabara where 10,000 of them — men, women, and children — defended themselves with heroic courage. The Shōgun, unable to take the stronghold had to apply for help to the Dutch who lent him their guns which alone were able to destroy the walls. The inhabitants were all massacred but the sons of Calvin in return for their service received a monopoly in trade.

* France frequently had Protestant presidents or prime ministers. Imperial Russia permitted only Schismatics and Protestants in the higher ranks of the army and the civil service. The head of the Protestant (Lutheran) Church in Russia was the Russian Emperor himself. Catholics belonged to an intrinsically "unpatriotic" religion; in spite of the greater theological affinities between Catholicism and Pravoslavism, no Catholic could get a rank higher than that of a colonel (and the corresponding one in state officialdom).

Similar discriminations are still enforced in such "democracies" as, for instance, Sweden, where no Catholic can become a State Minister. This attitude should be compared with that of Italy which frequently had non-Catholics in high offices. (Sidney Sonnino, for instance, was a Jew, son of a Levantine Jew and an English mother.) Rome had for many years, in the person of Signor Nathan, a Jewish mayor.

* See Cabanès and Nass: *La Névrose Révolutionnaire*. Paris, 1924, p. 85 ff.

* *Er lügt wie gedruckt*.

** It is interesting to note that many people attacked the textbooks of Professor Rugg of Teachers' College as "subversive" because they contain a total condemnation of advertising. (See numerous letters sent to the *New York Journal and American* by its readers during the years 1939–1940.)

*** The *old* German Center Party consisted largely of Catholic trade-unionists led by aristocrats.

* Cf. René Fülöp-Miller's *Führer, Schwärmer und Rebellen*, München, 1934, pp. 343–345.

* Most large factories have an infinitesimally small aristocracy of privileged men who are still allowed to work with their phantasy and their intellect like the designers of engines or automobile bodies. There is a slightly larger gentry of toolmakers and managers. The middle class layer of white-collar workers and salesman can boast of little creative opportunity while the large mass of "proletarians" see truly in the propagation of the race — and not in their daily monotonous service to machinery — their only (though steadily shrinking) *creative* activity.

* It is interesting to note that *compulsory* education was introduced in most European states when the liberal tradition was still comparatively strong. It must be said in praise of England that education was only made compulsory in the nineties, at a time when basically most conservative countries (with less liberal traditions) had already yielded to the ochlocratic-terroristic poison.

Arbitrary compulsory education is after all a flagrant curtailment of parental rights and at least as "totalitarian" as conscription. Yet practically nobody dared to contradict the sacrifices made to the idol of "education" and few people sensed that compulsory elementary education was a great step in the direction of totalitarianism which in time intervened in every region of human existence. True, the father's right is not violated by compulsory education in so far as a certain degree of education is reasonably deemed necessary by the State for citizenship, to be administered in the school of the father's choice, provided that school is not subversive in its nature. But the supreme rule is that the child belongs to the parent and not to the State.

* A pertinent article on this subject had been written by Erik v. Kuehnelt-Leddihn in *Colosseum* (June, 1935) under the title: "Catholicism and the Bourgeois."

** The official and full name of the National-Socialist Party in Germany is *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* — National Socialist German *Workers* Party . . . all that in spite of its typical bourgeois structure and following. Yet in the word *Arbeiterpartei* was a good deal of the magnetism which carried this party from victory to victory. People were simply tired and disgusted to belong to the middle class. In the public meetings the men are usually still addressed: *Arbeiter der Stirne und der Faust* — "Workers of the forehead and the fist" (white-collar and manual workers). There seem to be few poetical aspects connected with the middle class. It must not be forgotten that the red flag of the National Socialists is nothing but another concession to the morbid fancies of the bourgeois who aspires to be a "simple proletarian."

* It shall be remembered that the first to be mentioned in the Sacred Scriptures as a builder of cities was at the same time the first murderer — Cain. (Gen. 4:17.)

IV

OCHLOCRATIC CULTURE

"There are only three respectable human beings: the priest, the warrior, and the poet. To know, to kill, to create." — Baudelaire.

BEFORE we proceed in our general analysis we must remember that the great medieval homogeneity of the three decisive ideals — the ideal man from the separate points of view of either Church, State, or Society — has been almost irretrievably lost. The *saint*, the *good citizen*, and the *hero* could be represented by one and the same person; the laws, precepts, recommendation and tastes of Church, state, and society very seldom contradicted each other and their present antithesis is only a further sign of the atomization and inner decay of our modern life. St. Louis was not only an ornament of the Church, but also the first and best Frenchman and a hero on the battlefield. Saints were "popular," citizens fulfilled religiously their political duties, heroes prayed. But the ideals of Church, state, and society have ceased to be identical today and the *"gentleman"* (the modern social ideal), the *saint* and the *good citizen* have lost every trace of synonymity. Neither the pagan state nor the pagan society would protest against a man having twenty mistresses; neither Church nor society would anathematize a modest gambler; the Church would indict a grownup as well as a child for disrespect for his or her parents, but the state mindful of the legal twenty-one year limit would only condemn the latter while society nowadays would take little interest in such a recurrent phenomenon. Human activities

thus receive a totally different judgment from these three agents; one can remain a "gentleman" while paying an unjust wage (by Church standards clearly a "sin crying to heaven for vengeance" which is put on the same level as murder and sodomy).

The divergence between these attitudes toward man in his categories of existence creates actually a deep unrest in western society. National socialism as well as communism have desperately but not honestly striven to solve this cardinal problem by eliminating the Church ideal completely and amalgamating the good citizen with the hero into a single unit. It is interesting to see that they make a perverted use of the innate thirst for sanctity by permitting certain traits of the saints (certainly not the supernatural or ecclesiastical ones) to reappear in their dreary, new synthesis. The young Communist or young National Socialist is ascetic, yet his asceticism is offered up to entirely worldly purposes. And in the case of war (one of the deeper, psychological reasons for Nazi and Soviet militarism) he has at last an occasion to manifest his qualities of a secular sanctity which are so apt to be displayed *in umbra mortis*. Thus we may be tempted to see in the modern totalitarian establishments a synthesis of all the three elements *provided* we are willing to consider *their* concept of sanctity to be an *Ersatz*, or a travesty of the living original. Communist and National Socialist tyranny is thus partially also due to the pressure which must be exerted in order to weld these two (or three) concepts together. What we witness east of the Rhine is not an organic reconstruction but an enforced "reaction," a brutal effort to re-establish a harmonious past by force and terror. The French Revolution, the great overture of continental "democracy," had been engaged in a similar effort.

The radio seems to be the last word in the possibilities of a uniformistic appeal, but it was the uniform, the military uniform closely followed by the civil uniform, that marked the beginning of the bourgeois age. In the nineteenth century we see the "gentleman" making his bow to the bourgeois, herdist ideas in sartorial matters — the dinner jacket, and tails, and other dull formal suits confirm this fact. Neither was the new uniformity restricted to male apparel. This new tendency was in essence totalitarian and encroached upon all human matters.

The gentleman of the nineteenth century had broken, once Victorianism loomed on the horizon, with the wild and liberalistic vagaries of his forefathers. His background was frequently middle class and in England it was the influence of the Low Church which molded his type. He was deadly afraid to be different. On the Continent it was compulsory military service and in England the public school which fostered the herd instinct. To be different was treason and indecency. The religious principles of old were replaced by taboos. The return to primitive society had begun.

The British public school with its latent suspicion for brilliancy and originality is largely responsible for the depersonalization of the English upper class. (The Scottish mountain dwellers fared definitely better.) The public school had fostered a team spirit and a small herd *esprit de corps* which is neither aristocratic nor of great value to the state by its tendency to create reliable mediocrities. One is inclined to like the gentleman of a Byronic pattern rather than the one standardized by the old school tie, and to prefer an aristocracy with a knightly tradition to one crushed in the years of adolescence by a vaguely homoerotic group spirit and the industrial idea of "cooperation."[55] Boarding schools, preparatory schools, and public schools are far more hostile to the ideals of liberty than the much maligned family, and this is the reason why these actually play into the hands of democratism.

It is perfectly true that ochlocrats and democratists of all countries emphasize the necessity of "democratic" states to be composed of "free men" with the best possible education. This is not only true of our American ochlocrat but also of his more radical colleague in Berlin, Moscow, and Rome. The clamor for this ideal citizen fills the press, radio lectures, and textbooks of America as well as Sweden, Germany, and Russia. But the bitter truth is to be found in the fact that modern ochlocratic societies are intrinsically urban and that the city dweller is practically never free.* Extraordinary people, i.e., those who are "different" and refuse to bow to the furious demand of the masses to become "regular," have no place in an identitarian society. Often they have to choose nowadays between the concentration camp of the superdemocracies, the social ostracism of the old-fashioned "democracies" or an eremitical existence far

away from the pulsating regimented life of the great social and political centers.

A hierarchic state or society on the other hand can always find some useful job for the outsider (the *uncommon* man) because everybody is *expected* to differ not less from those whom he serves than from those whom he rules. He has to be unique and not "regular." Neither must we forget that everybody in the vertical or hierarchic structure is "important"; everybody serves and rules; everybody has responsibilities toward those under him and duties toward those above him. People in such a society not only feel important (as in ochlocracies) but they actually are important. *Everybody can leave a crowd without much ado but the collapse of a man standing somewhere in a living pyramid of acrobats can easily be a catastrophe*[*]

The ochlocratic state on the other side needs human sheep who become party members. *We must bear in mind that a two-party system in which the parties are not divided by philosophical differences is the only meager guarantee of a survival of political democracy.*[**] The plurality of philosophical antagonistic parties dug the grave of political democracy in Germany, France, Austria, Spain, and Italy. In order to save and preserve the uniformity of the political philosophy which not only dominates the intellectual scene of a country but also constitutes the common denominator of the two parties, strong social and educational sanctions are necessary; only an open or silent agreement between all the opinion-forming agencies (press, radio, school, cinema, publishing, advertising) can keep this rigid uniformity. The full cooperation of society, which possesses after all the most potent sanctions, is an indispensable prerequisite. Education, in the new totalitarian democracies, must also have necessarily a low standard in order to prevent a development of the critical faculties of the individual. Traveling abroad, which automatically widens the intellectual horizon, evokes comparisons, and stimulates thinking, is discouraged if not actually prohibited. The more old-fashioned "democracies" could trust these tasks safely to society which needed little organizing effort to carry out their supervision.

The existence of strong and original personalities are equally a menace to ochlocracy and democratism, provided they become active in politics or in administration. Usually they cause a good deal of trouble in the political

parties. Yet even outside the political sphere they are not very desirable because they do not belong to the "average." The uneducated but wise and shrewd peasant is no less a menace to democratism than the truly great thinkers.[56]

On the other side we find also a curious uneasiness toward the true intellectual. The British public school dislike for the "clever boy" (the "swot") is always awake in most "democracies." While reverence is paid to the sciences because they are useful the philosopher is rather looked upon as a joke. He ranks almost as low as the theologian. This attitude is thoroughly justified when we bear in mind that the scientist who only deals with means* can hardly become a menace to the *ochlocratic "way of life"* like the philosopher or the theologian who deals with the ends of our existence. This attitude is also the reason for the curious perversion of values and the efforts to mold our behavior as well as our personal philosophy (*Weltanschauung*) after bio-chemo-physical patterns. The mischief of interviewing engineers as authorities on religion, of inventors as experts on afterlife, of mechanics on foreign policy, and of doctors on the moral justification of euthanasia has clearly the same source. The times, on the other hand, when bishops will expound their views on the molecular theory in tabloids, and Jesuit provincials write books about airplane motors and new ways to make synthetic rubber are still far ahead. (And this despite the ochlocratic reverence for lay opinion.)

But the fact remains that democrats are suspicious of the abstract thinker, and that they prefer their nations to be led by businessmen and engineers. The United States only once had a professor in the White House and this experiment ended with disaster. It must be admitted though that these prejudices are well founded. The high educational standards of continental Europe created an intellectual aristocracy, and *aristoi* are always by nature proud. After having passed through the most rigid examinations this highly selective small group refused, whatever its social origins may have been, to be put on the same level with the rest of the population. Differentiation remained as pronounced as in the feudal age. Yet there was even another, more dangerous element in that educational system than mere differentiation and selection. The classical and humanistic training of the *Lycée* and the *Gymnasium* with their severe standards** kept the

philosophical element in the political parties alive. This extensive and intensive and nevertheless, in every sense of the word, "liberal" education fostered a plurality of philosophies which in turn made a plurality of parties necessary. These parties were divided by ideological abysses which could not be overbridged. Once the two-party system became obsolete on account of the plurality of opinions the result was a "House divided against itself" by metaphysical oppositions. These conflicts could only be ended by the artificial silence imposed through the firing squad or the concentration camp. The abysses dividing the philosophical parties could not be spanned — least of all in countries without the ochlocratic-protestant tradition of compromise; their dogmas made them mutually exclusive. Thus we should not be in the least surprised to see "democracies" dying a form of death which was considered since the days of Plato and Aristotle to be the natural form of their demise — their transition into tyranny, the absolute rule of a former party leader.

It must be recalled in this connection that the liberal Rousseauan spirit pervading the more old-fashioned democratism was instrumental in dispelling the fear from such a ghastly and undignified end; it was repeatedly emphasized that no establishment based on force was able to last. Liberal optimism, conceiving man as a courageous being without original sin endowed with an inordinate thirst for liberty and justice, showed little interest for our megalopolitan straphanger and viewed humanity predominantly as an agglomeration of *bons sauvages*. Yet the white race consists largely not of human beings but of employees. Facing the choice of cash or liberty they will always choose the former because it spells safety.

The idea that justice always triumphs and that "Truth can take care of itself"[57] is very consoling but highly unrealistic.[58] "The blood of martyrs is the seed of Christians" is a quite different proposition. The Catholic believes that not only does martyrdom draw down God's graces, but that the martyr or the saint can himself intercede in heaven for his Church. On the other hand it is difficult for us to imagine a deceased Republican intervening for the primary elections in Nassau County.

If now we turn our attention again toward the age-old problem of liberty, great care must be taken in order not to confuse the different aspects and issues. Liberty can be menaced from the outside as well as from the "inside" of the individual person. An inward menace of the exercise of free will is for instance madness or psychological inhibitions. Outward elements which may be instrumental in the suppression of human liberty are the state, society, the organization of labor, etc. The problem of *external* liberty must clearly be viewed from the angle of historical record and mechanistic probability. Every society, every state, every organization imposes limitations on the individual and the question is merely where to find the greatest and the least of the freedom-suppressing efforts and effects.

There is clearly always a deeper connection between society and state. The latter usually mirrors the mind and the inclinations of the former, but there is always the possibility of *change*. Society may undergo a development which alienates it from its own political institutions, which then subjectively or objectively become "obsolete." A small, determined minority sometimes "conquers" the state machinery and "re-educates" society, molding it through the agencies of a new state into a new society, Such a process may become extremely painful. It is usually connected with a total loss of liberties.

England, for instance, has a society which is originally liberty loving and aristocratic. But the terrific identitarianism of the nineteenth century, fostered locally by the rise of a nonconformist bourgeoisie, has affected English society sufficiently to rob it of the elasticity and the freedom it possessed in the eighteenth century. We have mentioned the public schools before. They became bourgeois in spirit about one hundred years ago. Yet the eighteenth century was deeply liberal and the brutal persecution of Catholics and Jacobites was due to the preconceived idea that Catholicism and absolutism are related evils, intrinsically connected with a basic dislike for freedom. But the rise of the middle class created an atmosphere which drove many unusual people from the British Isles and thus we see in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the shores of Lake Geneva, in Florence, on the Côte d'Azure, in Paris, Baden-Baden, Capri, and in the other high spots along the beaten track not only fugitives from the Russian autocracy like Bakunin, Kropotkin, Herzen, Trotzki, Tshaadayev, and Gorki, but also a long list of voluntarily involuntarily exiled Englishmen

like Oscar Wilde, D. H. Lawrence, Shelley, Byron, Beardsley.[59] The decrease of *social* liberty was not so spectacular in England as in many parts of the United States, but we must not forget that the Englishman is extremely sensitive (and mainly so to public judgment).

The control of society over the individual can be more perfect and efficient than that of many a secret police organization east of the Rhine. In England we have more or less the "control" of *society*,* in imperial Russia we had the control of the *state*. Provided that the Germanies can really produce a National Socialist and the Russians a Bolshevik society — and we have to face the possibility that both might ultimately succeed — then life in these countries must become more intolerable than it is at present. Japan, for instance, was most successful in combining the totalitarian supervision of the police with the totalitarian supervision of society as well as of organized religion. Enforced idealism is always fateful and homogeneity must grow organically. A society sanctioning wholeheartedly all state laws is a questionable asset from a libertinarian point of view. Such a society has frequently the inclination to practice the most "democratic" form of rendering justice and that is lynching.

This sort of punishment is after all based upon direct ochlocratic consent within definite groups or sections. It must be most inspiring for a true "democrat" to see "We, the people" taking the law in its own hands and thus dispensing with a judge who might disregard the most sacred declaration of mankind, the "voice of the people." The victory of the numbers under these circumstances is complete; no pleading is possible because it is also superfluous. It would be very "undemocratic" if the reasoning or the appeals of a single human being (in this case the victim) could override the general will which in its inscrutable wisdom has already decided to roast a Negro slowly to death with blowtorches applied to the most intimate parts of his body.

Treitschke did not exaggerate very much when he stated about *seventy years ago* that the total amount of liberties was probably greater in Prussia than in Switzerland. Neither would it be an overstatement to affirm that a shepherd in the absolute monarchy of King Zog ten years ago enjoyed a

freer life than one of those miserable straphangers working in a Wall-Street law firm.

There is no modern democratism without a city civilization.* We have already mentioned the fact that the illusion of progress is the driving motor of modern democratism, but "progress" becomes only evident in a megalopolitan civilization.** Countries with few cities and a rustic uncommercial culture are *relatively* immune from democratism. The non-Protestant countries of eastern Europe are almost exclusively agrarian. One finds there tendencies toward agrarian socialism, yet the ideas of the "Green International" (or what the Hungarians call the *csizmás diktatura* — peasant-boot dictatorship) are not democratic. The Mediterranean countries, too, show little inclination to embrace modern, ochlocratic ideas. There are, of course, smaller and medium-sized cities in the Mediterranean area, but they seldom have a technical megalopolitan character (with the exception of Catalonia) and they have preserved the hierarchical structure of bygone times; their population is only in the process of becoming a shifting mob. These cities are frequently still dominated by a Church, a castle, or a monastery — both in the architectural as well as in the psychological sense. The Norwegian village is seldom an agrarian unit; it is usually only a harbor and fishing center. On account of the large seagoing population it is considerably *déraciné.***

The village unity is still of the natural order. The common affairs are regulated in a sentiment of mutual interdependence, and no artificial clubs or leagues are necessary to strengthen the social ties; the biological relationship of the villagers makes them feel like a large family with branches of different importance and precedence. In the small American *town*, with its six to seven hundred inhabitants, which has practically sprung into existence overnight, the inhabitants do not know each other, as they come from various parts of the country and frequently even from European states. There is no blood relationship. The families have no common history or historical memories with the town itself; and this lack of *organic* connection is in itself a conditioning basis of ochlocratic mentality which has a natural affinity toward everything artificial, atomistic, and impersonal.[60]

The stranger is always welcome in the city, and swift growth always tickles the vanity of a city. Posters exclaiming: "Watch Mechanicsville grow!" are remindful of this fact. The worship of size and number is an old ochlocratic as well as materialistic trend as opposed to the Christian traditional love for quality.[61] It is "bigger and better" and not "better and bigger" which inspires our democratists with their competitive and recordistic tendencies.

The stranger in the big, progressive,[62] and growing city is in the light of statistics even a necessity; in three or four generations the large city dies out completely. This unorganic accumulation of "immigrants" without common ties is unable to continue the political discussions of the village pub; a soulless megalopolitan bureaucracy which permits only an indirect and anonymous influence of the populace on their activities steps into the place of the old order. The complicated technological structure of the modern city demands an endless number of laws, regulations, restrictions, and controls which often cut deeply into the private life of the individual. Policemen have to regulate the traffic; the health service has to supervise factories, bakeries, and the welfare institutions. All these registration and immatriculation offices, the complicated machinery of finance which finds its practical expression in the savings banks, trust companies, and exchanges, the tax departments and tax collections, the fire regulations, broadcast regulations, driving regulations with their "dont's," the police with all their branches and ramifications, the whole army of detectives, morality squads, chartered accountants, vehicle testers, building, and elevator inspectors — they all constitute a pagoda of slavery, of control, of supervision, and regimentation.

These controls and checks may be perfectly necessary. Yet they are the price we are paying for the illusion of "progress" because the capitalistic technological development carries in itself the germ of complete anarchy which calls for an even more terrific counterbalance of enforced "order."[63] Everybody who had the necessary cash five hundred years ago could buy a sword or a spear but today in all "civilized" countries one has the most formidable difficulties to get a permit for a revolver. In superdemocratic Italy even the carrying of knives with a fixed blade is prohibited. England, which is still flying the banner of liberty, makes it a bureaucratic adventure

to buy bullets for a target rifle, and one of the most difficult things to purchase in London are chocolates filled with liqueur. Everything is nowadays controlled. Once it was possible to mount a buggy and to drive in Europe over land as far as one wanted. To accomplish the same feat in peacetime by motorcar it is necessary to comply with driving tests, driving licenses, license numbers, motor vehicle inspections, compulsory third party risk insurances, speed limits, parking prohibitions, triptyques and custom declarations, passports, visas, money export permits, gasoline taxes, registration permits, etc.*

The limitation of our liberty caused by the technological development is probably still in its initial stage. H. L. Mencken in a fit of deplorable naïveté once told us that every invention means the elimination of a priest. This can be revised by saying that every new invention calls for an additional policeman. What we experience in the realm of government control in "progressive" countries is nothing but the first clouds heralding a bigger storm. We have all the prospects of a total aerial war with bacilli, gas, and high-grade explosives and there is a possibility that mankind may unloose dark powers over which they will finally lose control like Goethe's *sorcerers' apprentice*. Today it is already evident that small or agrarian countries are completely dependent on the equilibrium between the larger nations. They live in the very shadow of slavery and the ochlocratic law that the numerically larger groups take precedence over those numerically weak is now fully applied to them.

When the decline of our total liberties is mentioned one frequently hears the counterargument voiced that the Middle Ages were characterized by the institution of serfdom, an institution by no means as universal as the layman is wont to believe. Yet the essence of the legal relationship between the serf and his overlord consisted in the fact that the former was tied to a soil which enjoyed "protection" from the latter. For this protection the serf was forced to work one, two, or sometimes even three days a week for the knightly racketeer. Negligence or unwillingness to work could be punished by a score of fines or castigations, yet it was *impossible to turn the serf from his land*. He could neither be "fired" nor dispossessed. Modern man in the city is from that point of view even worse off than the serf. In eighty out of a hundred cases he does not own a home but lives in literal serfdom. Provided he earns four checks of fifty dollars each in a month he can retain

three of those, but the fourth he has to turn in to his *landlord*. That means — to all practical purposes — that the individual tenant works one and a half days each week for the landlord. His refusal to do so would end more disastrously than the ancient serf's because he would be turned out from his home and his meager possessions be removed to the street. Thus to talk about modern freedom is mere cant when we exalt it in juxtaposition to medieval freedom.

Yet there is still another tyrannical aspect of technicism and progressivism, one even more oppressive and psychologically more subtle. Ernst Jünger hinted at it in *Der Arbeiter.** This other menace lies in the fact that man is made more and more dependent, more and more "vulnerable" and helpless in emergencies, thanks to the collective, summary, and synthetic, and communitarian character of our technical institutions. There is no doubt that a peasant dependent on a tractor (i.e., on engineers, factories, mechanics, oil fields overseas, refineries, rubber plants, etc.), is less "free" than another one using a horse-drawn plough. Every electrical installation, communal sewer, and gas pipe involves a decrease of independence. The specialization of knowledge makes the very conception of life outside of well-organized and up-to-date communities for modern man, spoiled by the gadgets and amenities of "progress," unattractive. It would be sheer hypocrisy if we would deny that for us the idea of living beyond the reach of a dentist is almost terrifying. There is no doubt that *skills* have always a liberating effect, but knowledge, contrary to general belief, does not always make men free. Psychologically it has frequently a depressing and enslaving effect. An ignorant savage facing an attack of appendicitis in a jungle feels "freer" than an explorer under the same circumstances (because the latter interprets the symptoms correctly — but his knowledge only makes him in his helplessness certain of his doom). And in spite of our ridiculous pride in the finely woven net of urban and progressive dependencies (dainty meshes which enslave us completely) we have retained full admiration of the truly independent man, of Robinson Crusoe. The debacle of civilizations is frequently due to mechanical destructions and disruptions of the communitarian machineries by external or internal forces. If man, at the time of such a minor catastrophe, has already been reduced to the status of a pure *animal sociale*, lacking all forms of independent existence, then the damage may be so great, and

appear to all concerned so irreparable, that all hopes, all will for resistance and recuperation, yield to blank despair and lead thus to complete disintegration.

Crime also profits largely by new technical inventions. One can say without exaggeration that almost every new technical invention harbors the potentiality of the most demoniacal misuse. We have to ask ourselves honestly whether the invention of the Wright brothers — made in best faith — will not bring much more sorrow than joy to mankind before this present war is over. The answer is obvious. Orville Wright was convinced that the airplane would deal a dashing blow to militarism, eliminating the element of surprise in warfare. Instead it made the enslavement of numerous countries possible and destroyed the finest historical landmarks of London. One feels definitely less sure that a few old-fashioned cardinals and higher ecclesiastics who declared in the seventeenth century that machinery may be the work of Satan, were totally incorrect. Some day we may witness death rays, X-ray eyes, and similar inventions enabling civil and political criminals to indulge in more nefarious activities than we dare now to dream.[64] Then, of course, it will have become evident even to the compilers of college textbooks *that the great problems of our existence are of a moral and not of a technical or medical nature*. Today the clearness of this issue is still obscured by the drugstore claptrap of "progressivists."[65]

To all these horrors of technicism one must add the scourge of monotony and the tyranny of time. Cities like London, New York, Berlin, Paris, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Detroit, or Glasgow are high spots of slavery in comparison to Albania, Bulgaria, or even Central Africa. The slavery of the watch and clock, the bourgeois, anthropocentric slavery of material prestige and successful competition (to slave in order to keep up standards), the wage slavery of the proletarian, the school slavery of the children, the conscription slavery of the adolescents, the road slavery, the factory slavery, the barrack slavery, the party slavery, the office slavery, the parlor slavery of manners and conventions — all these slaveries make political "freedom" appear a bitter joke.

The microscopic importance of a single vote has been discussed in a previous chapter. But to think logically and clearly in proportion ratios can

hardly be expected from the desperate gray masses of straphangers with their starved personalities craving to attribute a material importance however small to their miserable egos.* What else is their life but an endless streaming and "commuting," six days out of seven, over the same beaten track in trolley cars, railways, subways, "els," taxis, and buses from the suburbs to the centers of the cities where the clocks turn their hands menacingly, as the galley wardens used to swing and to crack their whips in the days of old. The person in these dehumanized beehives is entirely subjected to a collective whole, to his work, to machinery, to the commercial product, to the process of trade. We have to ask ourselves in all candor whether a free Negro in Mozambique has not more independence than — let us say — a British tax official or a Dutch white-collar worker. The free Negro only works in order to feed and nourish his family (and a little more if he wants to). If he prefers he can work during the night and sleep during the day. He can interrupt his work as often as he likes. He can choose freely between different methods to carry out his work. But our progressive white-collar worker has no choice. In fact he lives in a trembling fear of dismissal, unemployment, disease, and death. "Lack of independence" is written on his face which has lost the defiant expression of freedom so typical of the "backward" mountain peasant. Whatever he needs he has to buy. He cannot produce anything for himself besides money — paper signed by some government. He is only a miserable link in a long chain.

Once Europe could boast of a large class of craftsmen — free people with the opportunity for artistic creation; but now everything is manufactured by mass production and the result is an incredible shrinkage in the variety of forms due to standardization. There is probably a greater variety of goods in Timbuctoo or in the Sooks of Marrakesh than in Frankfort or Los Angeles. The artifacts are thus "democratized." (Mr. Gray and Mr. Green get an identical product for an identical price.) The buyer has also to make a compromise between the actual merchandise and his taste, but the "democrat" has the consolation that the idea of compromise is very democratical. Finally we see under the impact of the countless compromises a degeneration of taste and the various industries make desperate efforts to standardize taste in order to produce more cheaply; people buy only

"nationally advertised brands" and in the end we have the mass taste or rather the mass lack of taste.

The defenders of mass production emphasize the fact that modern manufacture makes more goods accessible to a greater number. They are not aware psychologically that the gain is nil. It is true that a book used to cost during the Middle Ages the equivalent of two to five hundred dollars whereas *Gone With the Wind* can be bought in editions of $1.49 and even less. Libraries were the privileges of a very few. But on the other side people enjoyed books far more, and the purchase of a book was a greater event in life than today the acquisition of a Cadillac. Nowadays one walks nonchalantly into a bookstore, pushes two and a half dollars over a counter, reads the book and forgets it sometimes in the suburban train.

It is also in the very nature of democratic technology that the person endowed with a unique soul and personality ceases to produce something *alone*. The person is replaced by or subordinated to the factory and the individual has only the privilege to serve, to help the machinery in its activity.[66] Some of the workers have the gift to make themselves independent from their manual activities in a psychological sense and to become daydreamers, but the huge majority loses all dignity and sensibility and vegetates in a complete subservience toward machinery, only interrupted from time to time by divertisement which he "enjoys" uncritically in a state of semicollapse.[67]

The decline from the heights of the Middle Ages is evident; occidental man previously dominated by spiritual and ethical conceptions indulged in an intellectualism which became more and more sterile and *déraciné;* the brain was finally supplanted by the *muscle*. The *fundamental* explorations and inventions have largely been made by now and they multiply in geometrical progression. The communistic roots of this scheme are obvious; *the tendency to have equally educated (or equally uneducated) people doing equal manipulations which result in equal articles costing the same and looking alike, is insofar intrinsically bolshevistic*. The ensuing process of applanation is of devastating force.

Let us now visualize a man in Little Rock, Arkansas, stepping out of his car. It would be pretty hard to judge his "character" (his profession) from

his exterior. He will have one of the myriads of Ford cars, one of thousands of ready-made suits, and shoes like most of his fellow citizens. Neither the tailor, nor the motor engineer, nor the shoemaker have known him personally because they all work for the anonymous mass. The decline becomes apparent if we compare clothing styles from the centuries before and after the industrial revolution. Yet the same sordid comparison can be made between letters and diaries from these periods. Our great-grandparents manifested all their personality in the written word while modern man in his depersonalized mediocrity prefers to send telegrams or nondescript, unorthographic notes dictated to a secretary through a phonograph. In the eighteenth century western Europe had about 70 per cent illiterates and eastern Europe almost 90 per cent, but from the bourgeoisie upward everybody was able to express himself (or herself) in writing. This alone almost justifies a limited, selective education from an ethical as well as from a practical point of view.* Anybody who goes to school in order to be able to send telegrams and read the sporting news wastes his time and the money of the taxpayers. Mr. Averageman will rarely read a book; such an activity by itself would already be too personal. He rather sticks to magazines. Books have editions of several thousands; magazines go into millions. Magazines are "broader"; they satisfy the great mass.

But let us return to Mr. Z, the worthy "prominent" citizen from Little Rock. His prominence is largely due to the fact that his bank account of five figures dazzles the masses who consider him perhaps also to be a "civic leader." He is bald and has a pince-nez. He drives his car around the city. He may also drive over roads, but to walk for over two hours over the pathless prairie would almost kill him. He is a city dweller and the car is practically his feet. The *homo rusticus*, too, has his limitations but only in a horizontal sense; he cannot expand indiscriminately in this direction. He therefore has to live more in a vertical sense, which has a material as well as a spiritual side to it. He can farm his fields more intensively, plough deeper, fertilize it, and the effect of his hard work goes deep into the soil and rises high above the surface of the earth in the form of the stalks of wheat. Beneath him is the soil and above him are the rain-bringing clouds, the wind, and the sun and — "way above," there is God. Mr. Z has the Greens living above him, the Whites and the Blacks. The Jones and the

Jenkins live next door. Nobody, on the other hand, looks into the windows of the farmer or peasant.

Yet the Z family is utterly anthropocentric — it is surrounded on all sides by other human beings. Mr. Z is independent from the wind, the clouds, and the seasons, yet he is dependent upon his boss, his timetable, and the social contacts of his wife. Besides he is a man of horizontal dimensions. He has no ties to the soil, but rushes over the surface of the globe with the help of technical contraptions.

Two very characteristic representants of the "vertical" and the "horizontal" man are the sailor and the mountaineer. The former's characteristics have been discussed before. The mountaineer, on the other hand, lives not only in a truly vertical world but also in a well-organized, noncollective landscape; no group has a stronger personality than his. His universe — the valley — is infinitesimally small. So are his villages, so his estate. Yet he always loves liberty, and while climbing among the rocks he feels that there is nothing between him, the rope, and God. He is politically indomitable and he always enjoyed the greatest political privileges, as we saw it in the Tyrol, the Caucasus, Montenegro, Transylvania, Croatia, Navarre, Daghestan, the Basque provinces, the N.W. Frontier of India, Savoy, and Albania. The names of Andreas Hofer, Tomás Zumalacárregui, Montrose, Shamyl, Todor Alexandrov of Macedonia, Georgios Kastriota Skanderbeg, Abd-el-Krim, Sertorius, Arnold Winkelried, and the Montenegrinian leaders will never be forgotten in political or military history. The Vatican as well as the Bourbons had Swiss guards; the imperial palace in Vienna had a Bosnian watch; Albanian and Kurds guarded the Sultan; Rif-Kabyles, General Franco; Sikhs, Punjabis and Gurkhas, the viceroy of India.

It is only natural that democratistic civilization should be *horizontal*. It is always the city in the modern world which represents the expansionist, i.e., "imperialistic" element. The peasant is "local" but the commercialized urban middle class with its national herdism, its quantitativism, and its desire for new markets and resources stands for the "bigger and better."* More citizens means more customers. As all modern wars since the French Revolution have to be "holy wars" on account of their mass characters the

cities with their vague emotionalism and materialism have become the very cradles of industrialized warfare.[68]

Modern, urban man thinks in different "categories" than the traditional (rural) man. The "streamlined" inhabitant of the United States will first of all be an "American" and at second thought a citizen of the United States. The European "liberal" was similarly a European first, then a German, etc. The Nazi "begins" at the second category — and ends there denying hotly differences between the individual German states or tribes. Medieval man, on the other hand, was first of all the member or head of a family which (in some cases) like a state had its flag and arms. Then he was the dweller of a village or city. (St. Moritz in the Grisons, for instance.) The following step was that he lived in the Upper Engadine and only in the next category of self-cognizance was he conscious of being a Grisonian. To think of himself as a Swiss was almost a mythical afterthought, as of belonging to a subcontinental unit.

It is not only the improvement of transportation which changed this outlook. Human beings are weary of being "persons" (*per se*). They feel weak, helpless, and crushed. They have given up the effort to have their personal *identity;* and in order to safeguard their *existence* they seek forgetfulness and depersonalization in the largest possible collective unit.

The mass products of modern technicism, the hostility toward any sort of hierarchy, the arithmetic attitude toward elections, uniformism, and technicism — all these things will not permit the product of a democratistic civilization to accept a vertical point of view. This urban horizontalism also explains to us partly the pantheistic, deistic, and atheistic tendencies in our ochlocratic world. The horizontalist is tied down and cannot rise above himself. In his antagonism toward all hierarchy he even finally opposes the idea of God as a superior to himself, as a Supreme Being, and therefore also the conceptual images of Popes, emperors, kings, and fathers. The mountaineer is usually more pious than the mercantile seafarer, the trader, or the circus acrobat, and there is nothing surprising in the fact that alpinism has largely been inaugurated by priests and enterprising Englishmen of devout convictions.

It must be borne in mind that democratism and leftism in Europe have two distinct branches, one in Catholic countries and one in Protestant countries. This is the reason why communistic tendencies in the Protestant world are a *direct outcome* of mammonistic democratism with the background of a terrorizing society, while in Catholic and schismatic countries they are largely a *reaction* of anarchical liberalism. In the latter countries they smack often of undiluted and undisguised satanism. In Russia they may also be a reaction against the Manichaean tradition of the Eastern Church.* The frequency of parlor pinks in the large democratic domains of the Protestant world indicates the origins of communism from an ultramammonistic and ultramaterialistic mentality.[69]

This is also no doubt the reason why socialism and the more violent forms of ochlocracy and superdemocracy — Fascism — have to blaze their trails into the Catholic world by revolts, revolutions, and assassinations. The deep antagonism between "backward" Catholicism and these new "progressive" philosophies make a compromise impossible.

This can be easily illustrated and demonstrated by the manifold examples of revolutionary socialism in Spain and Portugal, from the so-called "Communists" of Andalusia and Catalonia in 1835 to the FAI, CGT, UGT, and POUM, the revolutionary socialism of Italy which reached its zenith in 1921, the revolutionary social democracy of Vienna with its two risings in 1927 and 1934, the sanguinary revolutions in Budapest (1919), in Munich (1919 and 1923), Paris (1792, 1830, 1848, 1871, 1934), and Baden (1848). We also find strongly revolutionary forms of socialism in the domains of the Eastern Church (Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greek Macedonia, and Thrace) as well as in Catholic Poland and Lithuania. In the Protestant countries on the other side we find socialism usually tame, *bourgeois*, and parlor pinkish. Only Berlin and Hamburg knew, apart from the central German industrial area, the meaning of revolutionary socialism, whereas the tributary parties of the II International in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Latvia, the United States, and Canada were all imbued by a nice sedentary bourgeois spirit.* In Catholic Mexico on the other hand we see socialism closely connected with violence and terror.[70]

If Catholicism would not have an inner abhorrence for revolutionary practices one could probably see a long list of Catholic revolutionary

movements in the Protestant ochlocratic zone. The case of Gil Robles, who let the right moment for a decisive blow in Spain pass by, is a typical example of Catholic revolutionary inertia. Of course there is Guy Fawkes (probably prompted to his deed by Burleigh's agents), the Swiss *Sonderbundskrieg* in 1847, and the Irish revolutionary war against England from 1916 till 1921. Yet the list is meager and the Catholics can find consolation in the fact that Catholicism is the *only* conscious negation of our ailing and perverted modern world, and therefore (spiritually and intellectually at least) the *only* revolutionary movement. *All other political philosophies — Leftist "Democrats," National Socialists, Continental Liberals, Communists, and Technocrats — agree on the coming earthly millennium of equality, plumbing, hygiene, and statistical increases in the material sphere. Their fight against each other is so bitter only because it is in its essence fratricidical*. They all believe in a more or less identical Utopia yet they differ about the means to achieve it. In this respect they resemble the unfortunate masons trying to build the Tower of Babel but who failed to achieve their goal because the confusion of languages prevented them from mutual understanding and common planning; the man who could translate their thoughts would indeed be antichrist.

It is symptomatic that the stronger their disbelief in God, the greater their haste and the more accentuated their terroristic methods. While the continental liberal, with his deistic tradition and his superstition regarding the absolute goodness of human nature, prefers to lie pat and to hope for the best, the Communist with his neurotic impatience is determined to speed up development by systematic mass murder. His attitude is surprising if we remember the Marxian stand about the *inevitability* of the historical process which leads directly to the establishment of a dictatorship and finally a classless society of the proletariat, after which the historical and sociological development comes to a miraculous standstill. Yet godless man, shocked and tortured about the finality of death cannot wait; for his own sake he has to accelerate the historical process and in order to catch up with the time element he has to wade through oceans of blood. Thus José Ortega y Gasset's parable of the automobile and our mortality lies at the very root of all our materialism.

* Cf. Ralph Adam Cram's excellently written pamphlet *What Is a Free Man?* containing a lecture delivered at the Catholic Rural Life Conference in Richmond, 1937.

* Modern man is not only depressed by the expectation of his physical death but also by the fact that his demise will leave no considerable gap. The death of a worker on the assembly line (a "hand") will merely shorten the bread line. ("No man is indispensable" is a highly ochlocratic slogan.)

** This opinion is also vigorously and convincingly defended in Harold Laski's *Parliamentary Government in England*. (New York, 1938.)

* Papers affirming the existence of a hierarchy in relation to science, philosophy, and religion were read by M. Jacques Maritain and Dr. Mortimer Adler at the "Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion" in New York City, September, 1940. Both philosophers affirmed that science deals only with means while philosophy and religion with the ends. Philosophy is therefore superior to science while religion as a divinely revealed knowledge is superior to philosophy. The reaction amongst the scientists and some philosophers present at the lecture was as one could expect; as high priests of a secularized century they saw in these affirmations a direct challenge against their generally recognized status.

** These highly selective schools last seven to nine years and follow immediately the fourth or fifth grade of the elementary school. They admit only a tiny fraction of the boys after the age of ten and require an entrance examination which ends frequently in the turning down of as many as seventy-five per cent of all candidates. Of all those pupils entering the school as many as eighty per cent are often eliminated during the laborious years.

These schools incorporate the equivalent of American upper grades of elementary schools, high school, *and* college. The B.A. or B.S. is given at the age of eighteen or nineteen after a leaving examination. This certificate enables the young man (or girl) to go to a university. Universities on the European Continent are *always* graduate schools.

The standards of these *gymnasia* and *lycées* are very rigorous. Bad spelling after the fourteenth year of age would be disastrous. Spelling bees between universities are naturally unheard of. Yet the idea to make childhood and adolescence a hard time is basically sound. There is no day more beautiful in the European life than the last one in "school." Life can offer no more horrors after the grim battles of the examinations. And it is reasonable that one begins life by eating the soup and terminates it with the sweets — not the other way round.

* The English language has the richest variety of expressions to cover the judgment of public opinion and circumscribe the different taboos. These cautious understatements have all behind their façade of terse primness a menacing undertone.

Yet every pressure incites rebellion. There are few countries with more eccentrics than England. Yet the English eccentric (unlike his Russian confrere) is usually asocial.

* See the criticism of the commercial city by St. Thomas Aquinas in his *De Regimine Principum*, II, 3.

** Switzerland, for instance, is in spite of her alpine background a typical polis state or rather an agglomeration of polis states. Most of the *"cantons"* bear the name of their most important city, and they are often nothing else but the economic *Lebensraum* of their capital. The exceptions are the southern large *cantons* like Vaud, Grisons, Valais, Ticino.

** The genuine seaman is frequently a vagrant proletarian. It is nevertheless difficult to place him in a social category. He lives certainly under extraordinary circumstances and the psychological and physical conditions of his existence are very problematic.

The severe discipline creates usually a radically leftish political tendency among the lower strata of the seagoing population in Europe while the upper layers indulge in a sort of rightism which is

frequently nothing else but dark reaction.

The navy and the merchant marine have always played an important part in "red" revolutions; one has to remember the Russian fleet in 1905 ("Knyaz Patyomkin"), 1917 and 1921, the Austrian navy in 1917, the German Navy in 1918, the Spanish navy in 1936. Not only Portugal, the Netherlands, and Greece but even England had certain difficulties with their navies in the past twenty years. The only group in England seriously affected by the French Revolution was the Navy which staged large-scale mutinies at Spithead and at the Nore. Sailors and officers from the Navy are often the most brutal elements in political upheavals.

* The only European country which enforced a speed limit till about ten years ago was Switzerland which was literally covered with speed traps. Yet this system was abolished when tourists refused to drive their cars over the controlled roads of this ancient democracy.

Coercive laws in the realm of diet were similarly only in force in different "democracies" and superdemocracies. The most outstanding countries prohibiting their citizens to imitate our Lord by drinking wine were the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Soviet Hungary, and Finland. Antialcoholic legislation is also strict in Sweden, Norway, Ontario, and some American states. It is symptomatic that these prohibitive laws are typical only for "democratic," Protestant, or communistic countries. Many Protestant countries suffer also from blue laws. The province of Ontario, for instance, has a combination of Blue Laws and antialcoholic legislation.

* Hamburg, 1932, p. 160.

* Every human being is extremely important, thanks to the fact that he has an immortal soul. "One human thought is more valuable than the whole visible world," says San Juan de la Cruz. But the tragedy of modern man lies in his tendency to deny the existence of his soul and to try desperately to be "important" in the realm of material values. "Success" or "failure" is nowadays frequently measured in these terms. When we maintain that "Mr. Smith made good" we hardly imply that we see in him a spiritual rival of St. Francis of Assisi or St. Vincent de Paul.

Yet, *materially*, everybody is sooner or later a failure because death finally terminates every career. The great pagan sadness of modern man is largely due to his premonition of ultimate disaster.

* Limited to the ἄριστοι and not to the wealthy or "wellborn."

* I like to emphasize here again that environment is not fate nor (theologically speaking) excuse. Even religiousness or irreligiosity does not necessarily condition moral goodness or badness. The knowing about God is a great help and a great advantage but it involves also greater obligations and duties.

* Erik R. v. Kuehnelt-Leddihn's, *Jesuiten, Spiesser, Bolschewiken* (German Edition, Salzburg, 1933), 53–54.

*It is interesting to note that the Austrian Social Democratic Party used the red flag as their party banner, a practice which was genuinely abhorred by their German colleagues who stuck to the colors of the Weimar Republic—black, red, and gold.

V

WOMAN TODAY

"It is life one loves in woman." — Jacques Chardonne,
in *Aimer c'est plus que l'amour*.

IT IS self-evident that an integral horizontalism and collectivism demands a mechanistic identification of man and woman. (This school of thought comes finally to the "logical" conclusion that there should be no difference between human beings and beasts.)[71] Absolute equality and identification of man and woman carried to the extreme has very far-reaching consequences not only in the realm of politics but also in the sphere of culture and biopsychology.[72]

The term "equality" in this connection is used neither in the metaphysical nor in the legal sense. We use "equality" here rather with a meaning of *functional identity* — which may have *some* connection with the legal term but lacks practically every metaphysical aspect.

This functional identity — the Germans would use the term *Gleichsetzung* — following a large-scale emancipation of women never necessarily increases the influence of women on culture, civilization, or even politics. Owing to the wrong use made of the best female talents, we see rather a diminution of feminine influence ensuing from such a process. The historical, cultural, or religious role of a Pompadour, Maintenon, du Barry, a Catherine II, Elizabeth of England, a Jeanne d'Arc, Catherine de Medici, Teresa of Ávila, Hroswitha, Isabel of Spain, Mary Stuart, or Catherine of Siena is known to all of us. Their influence, independently of

the circumstance where it was of a positive or negative nature, was hardly ever matched by women of the ochlocratic or communistic world in *individual* cases. *Collectively*, women now might have more influence in Denmark than in Portugal, but our analytical interest is centered on woman and not on women.

Of course there is a competing list. But just as we cannot compare Miss Sylvia Pankhurst with Maria Theresa, it is an equally hopeless enterprise to draw the parallel between Comrade Alexandra Kollontay and Catherine of Russia (a worthy comparison in one sense at least), or between Ellen Key and St. Teresa of Ávila. To compare Miss Margaret Sanger or Miss Mary Stopes with St. Hildegard of Bingen, or Aimée Semple MacPherson with Christina of Sweden is almost blasphemy.

A "high" anonymous average supplanted these extraordinary women in the "progressive" Northwest of Europe. Even the history of American democratism is written practically without the names of women, and there are no new *outstanding* female leaders in the ranks of the Russian Communists. All we have is the fading memory of the old revolutionaries — of Dora Kaplan, Vera Figner, Angelika Balabanov, the Krupskaya, and Mademoiselle Zassúlitch who fired at the Prefect of St. Petersburg with impunity.* These violent female Leftists who lived in the shadow of the imperial double-headed eagle are now supplanted by a completely anonymous herd of average women.**

Still it cannot be denied that the influential women organizations the world over have a tendency to favor ochlocratic and Leftist ideals. Here it must be borne in mind that the great criterion in the old hierarchic world was sanctity, intellect, courage, and, perhaps, birth. Nobody objected in the fourteenth century to a woman bearing twelve children or writing books or achieving sanctity. All true virtues were not less admired in women than in men. Women had, therefore, in the Middle Ages, contrary to general belief, the fundamental human "careers" open to them. Yet ochlocratic society, suspicious of medieval ideals (if not openly hostile to them), sees in a human being primarily a citizen, a voter, and a contributor to the phantasmagory of progress, i.e., a money-maker (and in the political sense a taxpayer).[73] These concepts gave rise amongst certain women to that weird craze for "equality" which increases in strength the further to the left their

ideology stands. The ultimate logical conclusion is the desire to share in the *levée en masse* for collective killing in uniforms, and to serve in the army as we have witnessed it in Finland (the Red woman regiment of Tampere, 1917), under Kerensky, in the USSR, and in Spain. Yet it is depressing to witness the rapid decline of *extraordinary* achievements of women in Western Civilization after their emancipation.

One very frequently has opportunity to hear an argument in favor of identitarianism between the sexes which lacks every sound biological basis. This argument runs shortly as follows: "In the early stages of mankind it was only physical power which counted. The men were therefore in the position to 'enslave' women. Today we are so enlightened that we understand this mistake of the dark past. Women given equal education and equal opportunity will be equal to men. Yet they cannot catch up from one generation to the other. The injustices of thousands of years have left their mark on them. It may take a couple of generations until they recover completely."

It is needless to emphasize that this argument lacks also every anthropological justification. Matriarchal cultures are exceptional but certainly not rare amongst primitive races. In most European countries women have been admitted during the past one, two, or even three generations to universities and yet their record is meager because even if properly educated their functional placement in life is usually made on egalitarian principles. Women lack, finally, certain intellectual abilities which men frequently possess. This has nothing to do with inheritance. Every man has a "clever" father and a "suppressed" mother; the girls are in the same boat and it is totally unscientific to believe in anything like "idento-sexual heredity." The chances to inherit under equal circumstances specific traits from either parent are equal for *every* child of *either* sex. Yet the legend of the female handicap by centuries of suppression still goes on.

All this does not imply a female inferiority. But there is a very marked difference between man and woman, and that not alone in the physical and biological sense. Man is not "superior" to woman but he is *primary*. There are almost no human institutions, inventions, ideas, formations which have not a male origin. There are many functions which man and woman have in common, there are others still which have greater affinities with one sex

than with the other and, finally, there are things which are the exclusive privilege of either man or woman. The reason for the decline of female influence is largely to be found in the disregard of these proclivities, as we have already said before. This should not be misconstrued in order to support national-socialist views on women. The three K's for women — *Küche, Kinder, Kirche* (Cooking, Children, Church) — are part of the unofficial program of the party. Yet this attitude is only seemingly "antidemocratic." It is superdemocratic in a chronological sense.

National socialism, as superdemocracy, is past the illusions of early democracy. The Nazis have not shut their eyes to the experience that woman is ordinarily inferior to man as an ochlocratic citizen, i.e., as a political "animal" and as money-maker. Here her relegation to kitchen and nursery is actually a punishment because she did not make good as a voter or worker. Women in the Third Reich are in a certain sense "in exile." Theoretically they may return when they promise to "make good."* In the meantime we must consider the Third Reich to be, in a deeper sense, homoerotic. The monolithic state and the monolithic society should consist of only one single sex. A truly Catholic society on the other side always relied on thinking, praying, and loving women.

But the process of assimilation in the democratic and identitarian world is not confined only to voting and working. The radical feminists always wanted in their frantic identitarianism to eliminate the difference between the sexes. Somehow they tended to deny or to hide the whole biological status of women.** There were certain aspects of feminine life which this weird horde of furies and ancient spinsters wanted to abolish; they wanted the elimination of female suffering and therefore also of female *dignity*.

Dignity is naturally an "aristocratic" virtue, best demonstrated in adverse circumstances, in bearing of suffering, in facing death, childbirth, or the guillotine. Dignity as an attitude is also something personal and not collective. Democratism never liked dignity. Nothing infuriates the howling mob more than dignity, and it is rather interesting to compare the attitude of the political prisoners on the scaffold during the French Revolution with the "Trotzkyist conspirators and wreckers" at the time of the Moscow trials, 1936–1938. Yet it must be admitted that this comparison is perhaps not fair. The Red torturers of 1938 are far more "progressive" people who studied anatomy and psychology more thoroughly than their Parisian forerunners.

It was also symptomatic that after the great victory of democratism in 1918 the fashions showed marked masculine elements in female dress and feminine elements in the sartorial make-up of men. Women wore male cut clothing and bobbed their hair and the men donned Oxford trousers. We entered in 1919 a "practical" and "pragmatical" age. Comfortism made itself felt. The universities were half empty and the polytechnics overcrowded. Young men wanted to become dancers, engineers, and bankers.

There were movements all over Europe to abolish the humanistic middle school, the *Gymnasium*, the *lycée*. It seemed that Wall Street, the M. I. T., and Watson's Behaviorism had won the war. In Germany the *Neue Sachlichkeit*, a rather dull and pragmatic new style of life, came into being. The palaces decayed and two-room apartments with bathrooms and kitchenettes came into fashion. It was an age of youth, skeptical sobriety, equality, utility, comfort, and proficiency. All these factors together created what people called in 1925 the "new female type," that quaint creature with shingled hair who fought against the penal laws directed against abortion; this "new woman," that instead of ruling the house and home, now dominated the streets in mass-produced clothes and crowded meetings, controlling them by sheer weight of numbers. There is nothing worse than anonymous masses of women; the man in a crowd subjected to mass hysteria is bad enough but his female counterpart is even more dangerous and degraded.*

The reason for this may be that the male stands for the abstract, the woman for the concrete.[74] The concrete submerged in an anonymous mass seems to be the greater trespass against the spirit.[75]

There is a small group of women that is extremely successful in mercantile or technical enterprises. There are a few excellent female architects, engineers, importers, doctors of medicine, and directors of department stores; the world would probably not even collapse if women would replace men in commercial life. But there are no outstanding female theologians and philosophers; almost no painters or musical composers. Woman, quite able *sometimes* to acquire skills and technical knowledge, is too much earth bound and essentially of soulful nature (*beseelte Natur*). This does not exclude the *passive* enjoyment of the abstract. But while

female creativeness is largely biological and physical, man's creative ability is predominantly a matter of ideas.

Even in the more materialistic professions one often witnesses women sacrificing their specific female strength for some chimeric earthly "equality"; so in America or in the USSR, women on the whole count only as a *collective* power of mediocrity. Even in these two afore-mentioned countries one finds them ordinarily only in *average* positions. They try to find their personal happiness, their luck, and their advancement as lawyers, doctors, and managers without very great success. As mothers, courtesans, or saints they might achieve far more. They know that their real strength does not lie in their personalities but in their number; countries menaced by ochlocracy and "progressivism" will therefore abound in female *organizations. Yet only human beings who for one reason or the other feel weak or have grievances crowd into mass organizations.** Thus we see progressive womanhood engulfed almost entirely in anonymity and their meagerly blossoming personalities either completely crushed or sacrificed at the altar of a club or a group.[76]

Socialism, so nearly related to democratism, has a magnetic attraction for certain women. Werner Sombart explains the socialistic tendencies of women by their *ressentiment* of belonging to what he calls the biologically "inferior" sex. This *ressentiment* which creates, in his opinion, strong sympathies toward socialism and socialistic ideologies he considers to be based on an inferiority complex arising in specific cases from diseases, bodily deformations, poverty, the belongings to a despised race *or the "inferior" sex*. He mentions as typical example for his theory Rosa Luxemburg, the hysterical German Communist who was poor, a woman, and a hunchback.

Yet the enthusiasm of some women for democratism lies deeper than all that. It is highly probable that most aspects of democratism have some inner connection with the *negative* sides of the female character. Snobism,[77] the dislike for fixed, philosophical views, the tendency toward anonymity, collectivism, comfortism, geocentrism, and the easy acceptance of compromises, the efforts to gain material security, the strong anthropocentrism, the advocacy of "gentleman" ideals, and the inclination

toward a chronical envy (one of the main factors of communism) all belong in the same category.

It could be argued that normal life is after all nothing but a chain of clever compromises. The man who understands how to live well, the *Lebenskünstler* as the Germans call him, is nothing but a *virtuoso* in compromises. The hero and the saint, on the other hand, are "clumsy," quixotic, and maladroit. They have nothing of the *Lebenskünstler* and cannot help inflicting upon themselves wound after wound. The *virtuoso* of life, no less than the *bonvivant*, is a thoroughly feminine as well as effeminate product.[78]

Women have played a leading role in surprisingly destructive movements —before and after the march of the *Dames des Halles* to Versailles. It is also probably true that negative traits in the character or the mind of women are far more conspicuous than in men. One need not be a Latin to be more distressed at finding a godless woman than a godless man. A woman is far nearer to the source of life and her detachment from the Creator is something terrifying, bordering on blasphemy.

The horror of death so typical of modern man is probably another feminine aspect of our time.[79] *"Mediā vitā in morte sumus"* is the hymn of a male and hierarchic age. The great thing in the life of the male is death just as love is the keynote of a female life. "Man is the glory of God, but woman is the glory of man," says St. Paul. The man finds his final reunion with God through the gate of death, but the woman gets the foreboding of such a reunion in her love to a man. Men also love women as children of God but, while this remains an indirect approach to Him, death always remains the shortest route to the Father. This is also the reason why there is such a deep metaphysical relation between love and death.

Yet death is more than love. Viewed from such a male angle, life should be a terrible duel, an *agonía* in Unamuno's sense between God and devil, a struggle in alliance with one group of passions against the other passions. Life in itself is a risk which we have to face bravely; all its horrors have a deeper value — war with all its ordeals, hunger, destruction, death, and the inhuman curse of labor and work.

Yes, the *curse of labor*. So it is written in the Bible and its truth reechoes in the hearts of most men. The male is by nature lazy and unambitious. The

industrious man is a truly feminine phenomenon. In male cultures men only work in order to live, but in nations where women domineer, men show ambition, zeal for labor, and they frequently work themselves to death firmly believing that they live in order to work.* On account of the fact that ambition is a female characteristic, women are always going to be outraged at the sight of potential energies which are not transformed into kinetic energies. The mobile life is urban and female. *Haste* is not only unmanly, but — as Ortega has demonstrated it — also the very negation of our immortality. The Middle Ages was a period without haste, it was male and timeless.

The true man is attracted by an adventurous life while woman stands for security, concerned for the safety of her home and her family.[80] The desperate craving for safety is always the surest sign of the effemination of a culture or nation. The replacement of Trust in divine Providence by efficient insurance companies** is always a danger signal which should not be ignored.

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*Vera Zassulitch was acquitted by the jury for the attempted assassination of General Tryepov. With all its inefficiencies and brutalities Imperial Russia always retained a great amount of generosity and social "democracy." Even in matters of criminal jurisdiction Russia was far more humane than many West Europeans suspect. *Exile* (not imprisonment in) to Siberia was not a terrible punishment and the death penalty could only be inflicted on persons who had cooperated in the assassination of a member of the imperial family.

**Needless to say that the statistics (even genuine ones) can "prove" that the position of woman is today far stronger than in the days when Dostoyevski and Turgenyev described in their novels so many inspiring female heroines.

*Yet it would be very erroneous to think that National Socialism receives no support from German womanhood. The *Führer* has a tremendous appeal for many women and National-Socialistic ideas and ideals attract the female character in many ways. Mass spirit, cruelty, political emotionalism are not the noblest feminine characteristics but they must be taken into consideration. The strength of National Socialism is on the emotional and not on the intellectual side.

**There is also a masculine tendency in National-Socialist womanhood. General Ludendorff's second wife dressed frequently in trousers and was an enthusiastic apostle of female equality. To be a man is also the great dream of many an enthusiastic Hitler girl. It is significant that some female labor camps tried to do away with certain aspects of female physiology—an experiment which ended rather disastrously.

*The club woman is even in the United States an object of ridicule. The whole emptiness and shallowness of modern woman *au delà de l'amour* is brilliantly portrayed by the caricatures of Helen Hokinson in the *New Yorker*.

*We understand under this term large collective bodies who pool their interests for common protection (and aggression).

*See the amusing account of Geoffrey Moss in *The Siege of the Alcázar* about the Spaniard who voluntarily raised the salaries in his workshop. The result was that his employees preferred to work shorter hours with the old wage thus preferring liberty to cash.

**The classic and most natural "old-age insurance" was, needless to say, a numerous and devoted progeny.

PART II

IDENTITARIANISM IN TIME AND SPACE

"I desire that one govern by the light and with the light, provided one looks for light where it is, namely, outside the masses, the instincts and the prejudices of the mob; I want the examination made clear from above, the discussion tempered by belief, liberty held in check by duty." — *Montalembert*.

I

MONARCHY

"The absolute ruler may be a Nero, but he is sometimes a Titus or Marc Aurelius; the people is often Nero, but never Marc Aurelius." — Rivarol.

IT IS probable that "democracy" is the most original form of "organized" society.[81] One could well imagine that if seven out of ten cavemen wanted to do a thing collectively in one way and the three others decided differently, the majority of these cavemen (assuming that they are of about equal bodily strength) could force the rest to accept their decision. The rule of majorities, in combination with the employment of brutal force, is likely to be the most primitive form of government in the development of mankind.[82]

As soon as society valued expediency, justice, and reason more than the momentary whims of mere majorities, a crystallization of leadership probably came about. This later form was probably a compromise between majority rule and the monarchical idea. The lack of an efficient executive still made the consent of the large bulk of the people a necessity and a council often acted as an intermediary; frequently the council was the primary organ and the "leader" (chieftain, ruler) only emerged as a *primus inter pares* of the oligarchic council. The only practical and workable form of "democracy" today has most of these features. The deputies form a vague sort of aristocracy or oligarchy, and the presidents and prime ministers are often nothing else but kinglets with a time limit. There has

been practically no major attempt to return to direct democracy in large states; only a few cranks would like to restore this archaic order with the help of modern, technical devices. They dream of an endless chain of plebiscites; the questions would be put to the citizens by radio and the answer would be given by pushing a white button for "ayes" and a black one for "no" a couple of hours after the questioning. Adding machines in the capital would then give a clear picture of the general will at a certain moment. Some people consider Dr. Gallup's Institute for Public Opinion to be such a forerunner of tomorrow's Integral Direct Democracy, yet there is little likelihood that there will ever come such a *reductio ad absurdum* of democracy. The political development goes clearly in the opposite direction.

We must not forget that political ochlocracy has no scientific basis and that its defenders in the past one hundred years came forward with far more sentimental reasons than the most enthusiastic adherents of monarchy.[83] Berdyaev in his *Christianity and Class-War* emphasizes this point very strongly. There are many superstitions which we find expressed or implied in connection with the rhapsodies of unthinking exponents of democratism, while some of these tenets are not seldom more seriously espoused by saner minds. For argument's sake we might enumerate just a few of these superstitious concepts:

1. All human beings are equal.
2. One human being can err, the majority of a group never.
3. Everybody is able to judge every political question.
4. The representatives in the Parliament are necessarily the best heads.
5. All intelligent and honest men are popular.
6. The functional value of the ignorant and the learned are the same.
7. Both sexes have the same abilities and functions.
8. Masses have an unerring instinct.
9. Majorities have an inate sense of justice.
10. No human being is indispensable.
11. Majorities are the better part of the whole.
12. Truth can stand by itself. The lie never prevails.
13. More progress means more happiness.

14. A majority suppressing a minority is a lesser evil than a minority dominating a majority.*

15. More ochlocracy means more liberty.

16. The masses value liberty more than everything else.

17. Liberty, progress, "democracy," peace, and social justice are thoroughly interconnected.

One could go on with this list endlessly. Today some of these points are viewed with skeptical despair by many "democrats" but they nevertheless cling to their faith with bitter tenacity, although they have given up its basic tenets — a situation remindful of Roman-Greek paganism in the third century. The façade still stands but the interiors are moth eaten and decayed and the very foundations are crumbling underneath. It is only the lack of hurricanes, thunderstorms, and earthquakes which still prevents the final disaster.

It is also remarkable that ochlocracy never had brilliant advocates like monarchy, aristocracy, or socialism. There is nobody in the "democratic" camp who can be compared for brilliancy — I do not say orthodoxy in each case — to de Tocqueville, Marx, Maurras, de Reynold, Trotzky, Spengler, Proudhon, Plato, Bainville, Aristotle, Ortega, and St. Thomas. Democracy never had, and probably never will have, an appeal for the man of original genius.*

In Europe monarchy usually sprang from some sort of "democracy" through open consent or through tyranny which became consolidated and gained a certain amount of popularity. The first monarchs, the *founders* of the European dynasties, were all outstanding people who excelled either through their wisdom, virtue, bravery, sanctity, or at least through their shrewdness, diplomacy, brutality, or daredevil courage. None of them was insignificant. The families of these rulers constantly intermarried; even back in the early Middle Ages the tendency was clearly one of intermarriage between the royal and imperial houses with the result that we find at the end of this epoch in the Christian Occident *one* large family of rulers with many different branches, united by the common faith as well as by the ties of common ancestors, of common tombs, of common blood.

There is little wonder that the constant crossbreeding of the progeny of "excellent" people created a superior strain. The steady intermarriage of children begotten and born by parents engaged in administration, rule, jurisdiction, and military affairs created a class of men and women with a special capacity for this task. The study of heredity and practical biology teaches us that there is definitely such a thing as inheritance of certain intellectual capacities and trends; we have only to observe the small gypsy boys with their violins, or six- and seven-year-old children of watchmakers in the Swiss Jura whose ancestors have made clocks and watches for generations; their dexterity in handling watches would astound every outsider.

The crossbreeding of the royal and imperial families of Europe has also resulted in a large amount of inbreeding, which in itself is not *necessarily* an evil. The characteristics of the common near ancestor will be overemphasized in the progeny and cousins who have a grandfather with a congenital defect of his eyesight will have to fear an even greater ocular ailment in their children. Yet positive characteristics are increased in a similar way. If we make a survey of the royal breed of the past hundred years (when parliaments already overshadowed monarchical power) we still find an astounding number of highly gifted men and women.[84] Few of them were specialized in one direction or the other, but most of them had a great many talents and abilities. The Prince Consort, Albert of Coburg-Gotha, was far above the average, just as his wife, Queen Victoria, his son, Edward VII, and his daughter, "Empress Frederick." William II,* in spite of certain political mistakes, was a good painter, a first-rate archaeologist, a fair military expert, a fine amateur gardener, a master of many languages, and a man of very great general knowledge. High above the average, too, was the murdered Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the best shot of Europe, a man of great character and piety, an architect, military expert, reorganizer of the navy, one of the greatest and most educated art collectors, an original Austrian and foreseeing statesman.** King Ferdinand of Bulgaria had abilities which ranked from engine driving to political plotting and ornithology.*** Among the great alpinists we find the late King Albert of the Belgians as well as his son. Most Scandinavian kings, the queen of the Netherlands, the late king of Saxony, the last emperor of Brazil were and

are people above the average. Alexander I and Alexander II of Russia belong in the same category. Even a madman like Louis II of Bavaria or a Louis I with his easygoing morals were culturally a great asset. The "tyranny" of a George III, measured by modern standards, smacks of charity.

The Comte de Paris, pretender to the French throne, would compare very favorably with most existing presidents.* Francis Joseph of Austria was a ruler of remarkable integrity and had a sense of duty, although lacking imagination. His grandnephew, Charles I, last emperor of Austria, was a saintly man. All these rulers were, naturally, on account of the curtailing influence of their constitutions, less "spectacular" than those of the past — Philip II, Charles V, Charlemagne, Mathias Corvinus, Peter the Great, Maria Theresa, St. Louis, Frederick II, or Louis XIV.[85]

The superficial student of history stands under the impression that Europe before the nineteenth century was torn asunder by endless wars and disagreements, yet there was far more inner unity in spite of the lack of airliners and superhighways. The interrelationship between the European monarchs also had the practical effect that totalitarian wars were not waged and that between A.D. 900 and 1866 no European monarchy was wiped off the map with the exception of Poland and the temporary grabs of the French Revolution. There is also little doubt that the absence of the modern means of war contributed to the relative mildness of medieval warfare.** Yet the fact that all rulers were related was of greater importance and it acted as a break during peace negotiations; playing bridge against one's cousin or brother-in-law, one is glad to gain small sums but never intends to *ruin* the opponent. Wars during the Middle Ages were collective duels and to a certain extent even a privilege of the nobility and their kinsmen. The introduction of mercenaries— soldiers receiving a *solde* —lowered the moral level of warfare. The towns, defending themselves against a decadent, robbing knighthood, hired professional soldiers. These, thanks to the invention of gunpowder, were able to destroy the castles of the marauding or rebelling nobility. Thus went down what once had been, in the days of its true service, the finest symbol of European liberty.[86]

The idea of the mercenary springs from the same mentality as the one expressed by the two Chinese watching a couple of Europeans playing

tennis under the hot sun of Shanghai. As they seemed rather exhausted, one of the sons of the Celestial Empire remarked to the other: “It’s odd. This club has only well-to-do members. They easily could afford coolies to play in their stead.” Yet the institution of mercenary armies still did not mark the nadir of war methods in Europe. It was at least not a return to the laws of the jungle, of primitive tribes, where every male capable of bearing arms has to join in. The officers had still the background of warriors;[87] they were frequently second or third sons of noble families out for adventures, but nevertheless educated in the habits of chivalry. The average mercenary, on the other hand, was usually a ne’er-do-well, maybe the son of the henchman; he belonged to the scum of the cities or the village and he was often nothing else than a courageous jailbird.

These mercenary armies had many advantages over the modern system. On the whole they fought without hatred. It was true that the discipline was inadequate, measured by our standards, but no brutality could keep the liberty-loving men of the sixteenth century in bounds. The mercenary also liked fighting for its own sake; he had volunteered for this job and he needed no propaganda to instill him with hatred for his enemy. The loss of his life on the battlefield was certainly not an irreparable one; from a social point of view it meant just one dissolute element less in the state, while his final suffering was often an expiation for a wild, cruel, and disorderly life. Prison camps were rare. Captured officers often gave their word of honor not to fight in the present war any more and were allowed to retire to their estates, while soldiers, made prisoners of war, often enlisted in the “enemy” armies. Ministries of propaganda and information who might stir up the feelings of the population did not exist, nor was any need felt for such an institution. The decent burgher stayed at home, far from the scene of war, and rarely did he see anything of the fighting or the fighting forces except when an army happened to pass his town. The rape of Magdeburg, or even the Sacco di Roma, was hardly as thorough as the destruction of Ypres in 1914–1918 or of Warsaw and Rotterdam in the present war. Neither was it easy to take a well-fortified town; the burghers had a good chance to defend themselves behind the walls until relief came; the menace of a passing army was far greater to the open village. A heavier war taxation only came into use when the patriarchal monarchy switched over to more absolutistic

forms after Protestant political theories had penetrated all European countries. Before the advent of absolutism, monarchs were often in dire financial straits which could only be alleviated by borrowing and not by taxation. Taxes were more or less voluntary contributions by cities and estates.*

Traditional monarchy enjoyed an added advantage over modern states inasmuch as it could not only boast of a juridical continuity but also of the possibility of following a planned national and foreign policy. We have the example of the "political testaments" of numerous monarchs which not seldom served as *Leitmotiv* for the policy of generations or centuries. We do not claim that the policies of the preconstitutional monarchies adhered necessarily to a blueprint, but it must be emphasized that planned action (planned for a long time to come) was feasible. The term "perfidious Albion," on the other hand, was the result of parliamentarian instability; if the Whigs agreed to a certain course then little doubt was left that their replacement by Tories would force the country into a course diametrically opposed to the one supported by the Whigs. Ochlocracy (even more so than aristocracy) is based upon change and instability; ochlocracy is revolution in permanence. A constructive foreign policy in the ochlocratic world is therefore well-nigh impossible. The continuous change of plans in the ochlocratic setup is nevertheless a minor evil of that system, although it is true that a bad plan is better than none. The catastrophical aspect of "democratic" international politics lies in the almost total absence of mutual confidence without which a lasting peace is unthinkable.[88]

As for the peace treaties, they were concluded after shorter or longer negotiations, conducted usually by noblemen or ecclesiastics. Social events brought the delegates nearer to each other personally and the very last peace congress dealing with "Pan-European" affairs — the Congress of Vienna — was one of the greatest social events in Europe. (The Congress of Berlin in 1878 falls into a similar category.) Nobody was more lionized than Prince de Talleyrand, representative of the defeated power which had menaced the rest of Europe for decades. Popular sentiment happily played no role in these negotiations.

Yet Talleyrand carried great strength in Vienna because he was the representative of a legitimate monarch and not of a makeshift revolutionary

power without European responsibilities. A dynasty belonged and belongs, so to say, to the "natural features" of a country, like the mountains, the rivers, the flora, and the historical monuments. The continuation of a dynasty was procured by the "sweet process of nature" (to use the words of Bossuet) and the heir to the throne was the product of the conjugal love between the monarch and the (foreign) queen who had not only espoused a man but also a country. (This international character of monarchy finds its expression in the fact that the death of a Christian ruler resulted and still results in an official mourning of *all* European courts.) A king could be forced to abdicate or persuaded to lay down his crown, but the dynasties who were parts of the countries (almost in the geographical sense) as well as states (in the political sense) were everybody's property, i.e., *res publica*. The royal cross consisted largely in the fact that the royal families had no personal and private lives in the sense the other classes enjoyed it. A royal marriage was not less *res publica* than a royal pregnancy (officially announced) or a royal birth.

The question as to which are the intrinsic qualities of monarchy as compared with other forms of government has not been raised yet. St. Thomas Aquinas considers monarchy to be the best of the three good forms of state, the other two being aristocracy and polity, while he calls democracy the mildest of the three evil forms tyranny and oligarchy being the others. "There is only one queen among the bees and in the whole universe one God, Creator and director of all," writes the Angelic Doctor in his treatise *De Regimine Principum*. Natural law is, to a great extent, the basis of St. Thomas' philosophy, and his point of view can justly be called "cosmic." One might raise the objection that monarchy is a wicked system of government because it attempts to imitate the great *monarcha* of the cosmos and therefore contains a certain element of blasphemy. Yet the very cell of human society, the family, in its natural form is also a patriarchal monarchy guided by the same natural-cosmic principle. This close resemblance between patriarchal monarchy and the family has already been recognized by Abel Bonnard in his excellent book *Les Modérés*.[89]

The traditional European of the prereformation period lived and believed in the patriarchal principle which was one of authority based on love. Medieval man had not only a physical father, but also a Father in Heaven, a

Holy Father in Rome,[90] the Monarch (the *Pater Patriae*), the godfathers, and a "Father" in the person of his confessor. It was his physical father who had brought him into being, cooperating with the Divine Power of Creation. The physical father was truly regarded to be the *auctor* (in a similar, not identical sense, as God is *creator mundi*) and human beings looked upon themselves to be existing *ex voluntate viri*. Woman was merely in the position (physically as well as psychologically) to accede to man's will, to reject it or to influence man's free will through her power of attraction.

St. Thomas has only one doubt in regard to monarchy, and that is the possibility of its development into a tyranny, whereas Plato in his *Republic* (Books 8–9)[91] sees "tyranny" as a natural development,[92] a "final stage" of democracy. In this respect he is more "modern" than the great Aquinate.[93]

The only advantage St. Thomas thinks "democracy" has over tyranny is the fact that "democracy" at least seems agreeable to the many while tyranny only benefits one person. Yet tyranny as well as monarchy in his eyes are more "effective" — in the good or bad sense — because power is more effective when centralized than when spread out or divided: *virtus unita magis est efficax ad effectum inducendum, quam dispersa vel divisa*. This in his opinion is the reason as well why these two forms are also extremes in both moral directions.[94] St. Thomas also sees the advantage of an expert central power over the vague opinions of the lay people.[95] Yet he has doubts about the value of the element of heredity in the established monarchy. Some elements of primitive democracy and aristocracy then still clung to the institution of kingship and the royal strain was not yet the homogeneous unit it came to be in the later Middle Ages. The Popes at first were elected by the acclamation of the Roman people and then later by the cardinals. Their secular defenders, the Holy Roman Emperors, received their office through a mixture of election and heredity.* The dangers of such elections were clearly seen by St. Thomas; in his opinion they were likely to divide the people into hostile fractions — the beginning of party rule and party system was always looked upon with suspicion by the Church. We must keep in mind that the corporate system of "orders,"

ordines, as favored by Pius XI, is strictly nonpolitical and not based on party rule. The Fascist corporate state is a mere caricature of the Catholic blueprint. There is no insistence on a corporate *state* in the *Quadragesimo Anno*, but of a state that favors and aids the nonpolitical corporate system.

Patriarchal monarchy unfortunately gave sway at a later period to absolute monarchy, which became entangled in nationalist etatistic movements, a process which finally led to a suicide of the monarchical form of government, which saw its Golden Age *after* the decline of feudalism and *before* the rise of absolutism.*

The theory of the Divine Rights of Kings, as we see it under debate in the seventeenth-century England, is naturally *not* a part of Catholic theology. It was Cranmer who advanced this doctrine during the reign of Edward VI and it was artificially revived by James I. It received due attention by Catholic theologians like Suarez and St. Robert Bellarmine who condemned it in explicit terms. The formula "We, so and so, by the grace of God, king of this and that country," used by Christian rulers, is no affirmation of an absurd claim; whatever we are, we are by the grace of God and stating this fact nobody usurps a title to a divine prerogative.[96]

During the Middle Ages nationalism was extremely weak.** It did not exist in the modern, linguistic sense of the nineteenth or in the racial sense of the twentieth century. Nationalism, as far as we are justified to use this term in relation to the centuries preceding the discovery of the Western Hemisphere, was merely an exaggerated loyalty to the people considered to be one's conationals, people of the same language and custom. "Statism" was a slightly greater danger and the idea of the sovereignty of the state was alive in different forms centuries before Hugo Grotius. It was only too natural that statism, however inarticulate it was, had to collide with the Church. Marsilius (Marsiglio) of Padua, who preached the priority of the state over the Church, exalted at the same time the monarchical prerogatives. His *Defensor Minor* expressed a view on the relationship between state and Church which had similarities with ideas professed on the same subject by Louis XIV, Joseph II, Napoleon, Hitler, and Peter the Great.

There is little doubt that the works of Marsilius were well known to John Wycliffe, the first and probably most original of the "reformers." In his

book *De Eucharistia* he denies transubstantiation and thus deprives the priest of his supernatural power. In *De officio regis* he declares the king to be second only to God. All Popes after Sylvester, who had received the *Patrimonium Petri* from Constantine, were, according to Wycliffe, representatives of antichrist, because they had yielded to the materialistic temptation of temporal power. His "poor preachers" soon infested the country and his idea of a Church devoid of all earthly possessions and without any visible organization first attracted the nobility who hoped to enjoy the spoils from the liquidation of the Catholic Church in England. Yet Wycliffe's insistence on the supremacy of royal power displeased them and the rise of Lollhardy after his death gave them no further encouragement to support his heresy.

Wycliffe actually dreamed of a national Church headed by the king, a Church wholly independent from Rome. Apart from the fact that this would have paved the way to an absolute monarchy[97] — the *reductio ad absurdum* of every monarchy — without any interference from the side of the Church, it would have given an enormous impetus to Nationalism. National messianism is one of the most subtle and therefore most dangerous forms of nationalism. If the central teaching authority is eliminated, the "national" Churches, living a life of their own, soon grow into dogmatically and culturally widely diverging units and form, as a matter of course, different religions.

If nation A has the religion X and the the nation B follows the religion Y, the already existing national-cultural-linguistic abyss will be widened by religious antagonism. The members of the nation A are now thoroughly insistent that their religion X is the right and true faith and that other nations are therefore not only different but also basically wrong in their beliefs. This causes a fatal increase in national pride which now assumes a religious aspect. The A's persist in considering themselves (*solely* endowed with the true religion) as chosen by God, not only chosen to understand truth and be rewarded with eternal bliss but also chosen to "save" the world. (This "salvation" is best achieved by *rule.*)

This present-day national messianism is not only typical of the Jews, but also of the British, North Germans, Russians, and North Americans. Catholic nations never have it, neither is it typical of the oriental religions

like supranational Mohammedanism and Buddhism. The strongly insular Japanese Shintō and Hinduism are the exceptions. Nationalism within the framework of Mohammedanism is merely due to European influence. The basically Christian attitude of Mohammedans toward other anthropological races puts many followers of Christ to shame. Yet the local heresies of Europe and America possess this national messianism to an astounding degree; British Israelitism, the Ku Klux Klaners, the National Socialists and their numerous forerunners and last but not least the Russian Messianists of both denominations— the consciously messianistic Schismatics not less than the subconsciously messianistic Bolsheviks — illustrate this truism rather well. The heresies, on account of their intrinsic lack of Catholicity, always were the protagonists of a suicidal parochialism in time and space. Their rise means the decline of Europe.

The *étatisme* (statism) of the later heresies such as North Teutonic Lutheranism, Scotch Dutch Calvinism, Czech Hussitism, Anglicanism, and the Eastern Schism have exalted the separatistic and state-omnipotential tendencies of the herdists who always clamored for their little, uniformistic homesteads. Yet the real mother of Caesaro-Papism and at the same time the source of all great heretical trends in early Christendom is Byzantium and her representative in the modern world — Moscow, the Third Rome.[98]

The truth that all power is derived from God was thus perverted.[99] The victory of Lutheranism in northern Europe was largely due to the treachery and shortsightedness of the rulers and the aristocracy. Absolute monarchy could not maintain a couple of centuries later its position once the hierarchic structure of Europe was badly damaged. The weakening of the Church resulted in the impairing of the most efficient control against royal tyrants. The pendulum which had swung too far on one side was soon to swing to the other extreme. The mass wars under a “religious” slogan of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were already foreshadowed by the Thirty Years’ War, a large scale massacre embittered by ideological antagonisms.

The phenomenon of absolute monarchy based on Protestant governmental theories was thus only a comparatively short-lived straw fire which lit the way for a new and even more dangerous movement — the rule of the masses. Luther, who taught that human beings morally are utterly

wretched and hopelessly corrupted through original sin, invoked the establishment of a severe, efficient, and vindicative authority (*Obrigkeit*). Thus the decline of Europe started with heresy which begot personal absolutism, absolutism begot the reaction of the masses, finally the masses sought their personification in an absolutist "leader."

We witness in the eighteenth century the preparation of the French Revolution by *individualism* and the degeneration of the old "liberal" trends into economical liberalism of the deterministic Manchesterian pattern. Egalitarianism only appears in strongly collectivistic societies where strong exogenous powers try to shape *persons* into "individuals," deprived of their original character. The "individual" is merely the last indivisible unit of the "mass," and individualism the last, grotesque, and hopeless fight of depersonalized man within the ocean of collectivism to withstand the encroachment of the masses. Charles V had a personality but Gustave de Nerval, who promenaded a tamed lobster in the streets of Paris, was a mere individualist.[100]

Collectivism implies egalitarianism. An ideal *mass* is homogenous and consists therefore of equal atoms. Egalitarianism as well as collectivism are thus incompatible with liberty.[101] Force must not only be used for the leveling process in the initial stage — it becomes necessarily a permanent factor in order to maintain the unorganic "symmetrical order." This brutal force is necessary for *any and every* egalitarian effort. It is even more necessary in the case of a frantic identitarianism. The desire for more equality and identity becomes finally a mania and the use of more force a sadistic delight. Gynaecocracy and pedocracy, so familiar to ochlocratic cultures, become a part of the great program and even the animals rise to the level of human equality.[102] From there it is only a short step to a terroristic pantheism bordering on madness.*

Yet even in the urban life a truly inhuman equality can be achieved only by sheer force and the more logical a people will be by nature, the more brutally will this equality be realized. A comparison between America, England, France, Germany, Russia, and Spain demonstrate to us the various methods of handling the problem of equality. French egalitarianism was comparatively mild — yet it was far more ferocious than for instance American egalitarianism. But for modern ochlocracies at least fictional

equality is essential; *as a tendency it is basic for the creation of mere masses. Masses or mobs consist necessarily of identical or similar atoms in order to function as great irresistible units which, confident in their homogeneity and quantity, are not only able to smother all obstacles but also to transmit in the shortest time emotional and "electric" shocks to the remotest parts of the whole*. The French philosophers had prepared the advent of the "individual" and the French Revolution completed their work. *"The philosophy of the French Revolution,"* quotes Stapleton in his *Life of Canning, "reduced the nation to individuals so as to, later on, congregate them into mobs."* And these mobs on account of their strong inferiority complex shouted loudly for equality and demanded the elimination of everybody who dared to be different. The proposition of the elders of Strasbourg was actually carried out with human beings who defied the iron law of similarity and identity; they were shortened — beheaded by the progressive medical machinery of *Docteur* Guillotin.

Equality, identity, and uniformity have since been the backbone of every ochlocratic movement and the only liberty compatible with the true spirit of ochlocracy is the *collective liberty — the liberty of a class or a nation state*. The element of equality has never succeeded in getting a foothold in international politics — not even in the League of Nations, where the position of the Great Powers was legally different from that of the smaller states.[103] Modern nationalism appealed less to the "democratic" demand of equality than to the worship of majorities which is not less in the ochlocratic tradition. It does not recognize the fact, that each nation is an entity in itself, having its own life and its intransferable destiny, and, independently of its size, an inalienable right for existence.* This conception would resemble too much a personalistic, medieval point of view. Modern nationalism prefers to count the noses of the inhabitants by national groups in a given geographical sector and then let the majority rule. A German Empire in Central Europe with eighty million Germans and 79,999,999 non-Germans is a thoroughly "democratic" proposition in the new style of 1942.

The reader will now understand why "democracy" and democratism are totally different from liberalism. We clearly mean here liberalism before it became an *ism*, when it was still aristocratic liberality and generosity

coupled with the natural thirst for liberty and independence. Continental liberalism was never genuine nor honest; it was totalitarian like all other parties.[104] In early times it found its political expression in England, Hungary, Spain, and southern France and it existed at the same time, though not so articulate and formulated, in the more mountainous parts of Europe. The seventeenth century in England witnesses a restatement of these liberal principles and it is this second and secondary English liberalism and whiggism which, finally based on economic cognitions and theories, nonconformist sentiments and bourgeois principles, influenced the French Revolution, and later even the rest of Europe. Modern liberal sentiment in England is something rather complex and it is difficult to tell where the primary aristocratic (whiggish) liberalism ends and the economic, intellectual liberalism of Manchester begins.

A certain symbiosis between liberalism and ochlocracy is a frequent phenomenon in the nineteenth and even in the twentieth century. In the case of cooperation of these two ideologies liberalism is ordinarily of the nonaristocratic, Manchesterian type which shows a remarkable parallel with communism. Both, bolshevism and modern, bourgeois liberalism, started as economic theories and became *Weltanschauungen*, world philosophies. *It is only in Anglo-Saxon America that the cry for "democracy" is tempered by liberalism of the more aristocratic type. The amenities of American life are due to the British-Whiggish tradition of the signers of the Declaration of Independence — most of them "gentlemen" — and not to the desperate appeal for equality of the poor immigrants of the Fin de Siècle who had nothing to lose and everything to gain.*[105]

Liberty was quickly trampled on by the French Revolution, which hastened to get rid of its aristocratic or intellectual supporters. Lavoisier, the famous mathematician and astronomer, was condemned to death with the characteristic remark "The Republic has no use for savants," and the Noailles, Mirabeaus, and Lafayettes were relegated to the background. Total identitarianism grew in all spheres of life. The revolution in the Vendee, where peasants and noblemen had risen against the identitarian terrorists of Paris, was crushed and soon the *levée en masse* was well under way. As each citizen had the same rights he also had the same duties.[106] The return to the military tradition of Central Africa, where every male has to join up

in tribal warfare, was perfect.[107] Militarism could start its career and soon a military dictator was due to appear at the head of a gigantic army of conscripts, which made the Prussian army of Frederick II seem like a kindergarten in comparison.

Militarism as a nationality accepted idea and norm is feasible only in a "democratic," i.e., politically conscious nation, where each "individual" is imbued with his great importance as acting and directing part of the whole —otherwise the militaristic mass sentiment remains a dead letter. There is no militarism without active enthusiasm. It is either a real *movement* or just the sum of governmental regulations, and in that case it can hardly be regarded as an *ism*.[108]

Yet ochlocracy itself was and is not a sufficient basis for militarism. The identitarian façade of identical military clothes — "uniforms" — which had come into fashion a few decades ago, was not enough. Within the borders of an ochlocratic country the stressing of equality between the different classes and groups gratified the herdist instincts; in contact with the enemy another collective sameness had to be emphasized in opposition to the mass identity of the enemy. *Nationalism*, already nourished by the reformers reached a new height of intensity; the French republicans not only were ochlocrats but also "patriots" (yet in reality *nationalists*). This "patriotism," which had nothing to do with the natural love for the soil, culture, tradition, and habits of the country, first became a parochial movement of cleverly disguised anti-Europeanism and later on a violent herdist sentiment, attacking in and outside the country all those who dared to belong to a "different" culture and linguistic unit, until it finally degenerated into racialism, demanding identity even in the color of hair and eyes, index of the skull, pigmentation of the skin and structure of the bones.

The nationalistic "patriots" were necessarily antimonarchical, because monarchy in Europe is (as we have pointed out before) *a basically international institution*. The wrath of the nationalists in the French Revolution was mainly directed against the foreign-born queen, and her trial, a worthy forerunner of the staged trials of the Bolsheviks,* goes down as one of the greatest villainies of all times.

It is characteristic that it is practically always the queen or empress who has to bear the whole brunt of revolutionary hatred. This is largely due to

the strict marriage laws of most continental dynasties which force the princes to marry into *foreign* ruling families. The alien origin of the ruler's wife acts upon the nationalistic herdist like a red fabric on a bull. We see the same attitude of the masses toward the last empress of Russia, toward Empress Zita of Austria, Marie Antoinette, Queen Elena of Spain, Queen Henrietta Maria, and others.

The masses were little aware of the fact that rulers almost had to be "foreigners" in order to rule wisely and objectively. Apart from the fact that intranational marriages of rulers prevented the total war, their inner detachment from the nation for which they had to care, served as a real advantage. In order to read a printed text, we have to hold it at a certain distance from our eyes.[109] Not only were the different queens "aliens," but most European dynasties (with the exception of the French Bourbons and the Serb Karagjorgjevic) were outlandish in their origin. Even most of the dictators are and were foreigners. *Nemo propheta in patria* means logically that all prophets are foreigners. Even herdism can hardly change that dictum entirely.*

Yet the Bourbons were, to a certain extent, coresponsible for what happened.[110] The successfully aggressive policy of the Bourbons against the Holy Roman Empire, which resulted in German disunity, and the constant aid they had given to the Protestants, had also impaired Europe's well-being. The leaders of the French Revolution continued the centralism of Louis XIV, which had merely served as a means for the absolutism of the *Roi Soleil*. The old historic provinces were broken up into nondescript small departments, bearing the names of rivers or mountains; these reduced and depersonalized units, similar even in the size of territory and population, soon were to become helpless administrative objects under the control of a central government in Paris. The city was supreme over the countryside and instead of the proud names of Artois, Picardie, Poitou, Gascogne, and Bretagne we had until recently such designations as Indre-et-Loire, Loire-et-Cher, Aube, Eure, Meurthe, Seine-et-Oise. . . .**

Standardization was the keynote of the French Revolution and in spite of the fact that these standardizations, as, for instance, the introduction of the metric system, had their practical advantages, the general effect upon Europe was disastrous.[111] Nationalism, so necessary for every aggressive

mass army, soon swept all over Europe and brought havoc to those parts of the Old Continent where, owing to the intimate symbiosis of different race nations, not only in the geographic proximity of near-by communities but also in the layer structure of race classes, the damage could never be repaired. In the former case local antagonisms flared up, in the latter the "class struggle" received an unexpected impetus.*

The greatest suffering was reserved not only to the national-linguistic *minorities* in particular but to all minorities in general. People, who in one way or the other belonged to a minority group, had to pay the penalty to the majority rule of the "general will." Whoever opposed the general will (the general whim, the general language, the general opinion) was automatically a "traitor" and severest punishment was inflicted upon him.[112] The more "democratic" Europe became, the worse was the fate of minorities. The years 1918–1919 and 1933 heralded the darkest periods for European minorities.

Plato in his *Republic* (Books 7–8–9) explains painstakingly the way in which democracies inevitably evolve into tyrannies. Tyrannies or dictatorships had in antiquity the tendency to become well-established monarchies, and thus the circle of governmental evolutions was closed. The transition from tyranny to monarchy is today extremely rare. After a millennium of settled monarchical tradition we have a dynasty on the throne or in exile for each country, and the coronation of a successful politician or party leader would only tend to make him ridiculous in the eyes of his followers and enemies alike. One must add that the idea of a *Christian* monarchy is quite distinct from the monarchical idea of antiquity, not only on account of the concept of legitimacy but also due to certain qualities which are intrinsic characteristics of a Christian monarchy.

The last *major* effort to transform a tyrant, a military leader as well as a politician, into a monarch was made in the case of Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon I became a sort of republican president— "consul" — first for a limited number of years, then for lifetime, and finally his power was extended, after the proclamation of France as an imperial monarchy, to his son and heir. Shortly, he became a monarch. Napoleon III and Achmed Zogu (Zog I) had similar careers. A crown had also been offered to Oliver

Cromwell and Dr. Voldemaras of Lithuania, to Yüan-Shi-Kai, and Iturbide.[113]

Napoleon, in spite of his imperial title, lacked the most vital characteristics of a European monarch; he neither possessed a great dynastic name, nor was he a relative of any of the other ruling dynasties. His father was an Italian lawyer of doubtful nobility in Ajaccio,* the capital of the most disrespectable island in the Mediterranean, famous for its bandits, cutthroats, and the practice of the *vendetta*. Napoleon could not "relax" as a Habsburg, a Bourbon, or even a Medici. He had to engrave his name in the great book of history and this dictatorial pastime of engraving is usually only accomplished with blood and tears. Neither respected nor respectable on account of his revolutionary background, he was forced to impress his fellow rulers and neighboring nations with triumphal successes; if they couldn't respect him at least they learned to fear him.

He had to wage the total war of Jacobine tradition based on the *levée-en-masse*. Not being related to the large family of European monarchs, he also continued the practices of the First French Republic by annexing neighboring countries *en bloc* and incorporating them into his empire or degrading them to vassal states and filling their vacant thrones with obedient relatives. These wholesale annexations as well as the continuation of total warfare — war in earnest — indicated that he was not willing to play the game. The European rulers soon were in utter confusion because such a breach of rules and usages had not happened since the days of Genghis-Khan and Tamerlane. Dictated peace treaties were a novelty and we have mentioned the fact before that between A.D. 900 and the advent of Napoleon no European monarchy had been wiped off the map, no European dynasty had become homeless on account of a foreign invasion.

There is still the case of Poland. Poland vanished owing to successive armed interventions and due to the fact that this country had committed the folly of becoming an aristocratic republic whose king was elected by the Diet. Thus the Polish kings had frequently no connections with the other ruling families of Europe and this is also the reason why the neighboring countries — Prussia, Austria, Russia — did not have the slightest hesitation to carve up this unfortunate country which had always prided itself to be a *Rzeczpospolita*, a "republic."* The history of the decline of Poland begins

soon after the moment when this country had left the path of hereditary monarchy. We see a short-lived renaissance under Jan III Sobieski, but the introduction of the *liberum "veto"* marks the end of Polish glory and independence.**

This does not imply that republican tendencies and downright republicanism are necessarily degenerate forms of government. *It is nevertheless true that no country ever became a republic because it was too wealthy, too healthy, too happy, or too strong*. All European republics originated either as a result of a movement for national independence and the acceptance of a republican form of government was then due to the lack of a pretender, *or*, the fall of monarchy was due to despair, hunger, bankruptcy, military defeat, corruption, invasion. *Europe's rise is written in the terms of Christianity and Monarchy, Europe's decay in the terms of Republicanism, "Progressivism," and Godlessness*.

The European monarchs, who never loved nor liked the Corsican usurper, decided finally, in order to save their skins, that Napoleon had to be "appeased." The presence of a crowned tyrant in Europe put an almost intolerable strain on every country, a strain not only material but also moral on account of the necessary imitation of French revolutionary methods. Every totalitarian regime since has forced most if not all the European countries to take countermeasures which led to a disastrous multiplication of totalitarian counterideas. If one part of the European body is diseased all the rest will suffer; and sometimes it may be the antitoxin which is more fatal than the poison itself.***

The only way out was to transform the tyrant into a real king, i.e., to make him a relative of his royal colleagues. And this is exactly what happened. The daughter of the Austrian Emperor (a few years ago still Holy Roman Emperor) was married to the usurper. But the monarchs soon became aware of the fact that they had become the victims of miscalculation. Napoleon did not reform. He carried the war as far as the Sarmatian plains, destroyed myriads of human lives and so still yielded to his insatiable ambitions. It was evident by now that he would never become a genuine monarch. A new coalition between the Continental rulers and the British moneyed aristocracy first deprived him of his Empire. After a renewed attempt on his part to behave like an irresponsible politician and

general, the powers of the coalition stopped treating him as a monarch and interned him on an African island. Thus ended one of the most sanguinary episodes in European history.

The Napoleonic wars were concluded by the Congress of Vienna. The French delegates were treated as friends, colleagues, and gentlemen. All thrones were restored to their former owners (with the exception of the temporal powers of the German Archbishops) and France was given new borders which left her slightly larger than before the beginning of the outbreak of the Revolution.* The blame for the terrific bloodshed fell neither on the French people nor on the legitimate dynasty; the twenty-three years of terrible wars were looked upon as a series of acts of folly, as deplorable aberrations which one had better forget and forgive. This was the same spirit as expressed in the preamble of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) which concluded the Thirty Years' War and runs as follows:

"The hostilities that have taken place from the beginning of the late disturbances in any place of whatsoever kind, by one side or the other, shall be forgotten and forgiven, so that neither party shall cherish enmity or hatred against, nor molest or injure the other for any cause whatsoever."

Obviously the progressive twentieth century was still some way off.

But the spirit of nationalism and ochlocracy, of militarism and uniformism unfortunately survived. The French *levée-en-masse* was answered by a Prussian *levée-en-masse* and the government of Berlin showed little inclination to get rid of that evil institution. The Conservatives (like Metternich) persecuted the nationalist movement bitterly, but without success. The bourgeoisie on the Continent had not yet reached the full victory. It was not yet a dominating class and therefore nobody dreamed of considering nationalism as a movement of the "Right." There was the closest cooperation in the common fight of "democratic" nationalists and nationalistic "democrats" against the supranational Church and the institution of international monarchy.

On the surface there was a strong monarchical, rightist, and "medievalist" reaction to be felt all over Europe; Châteaubriand, de Maistre, de Bonald, Schlegel, E. T. A. Hoffmann, Zacharias Werner, Clemens Brentano, the brothers Stolberg and Manzoni wrote their great works within this movement. Romanticism east of the Rhine was truly diversitarian and romantic. A wave of conversions swept over the Continent

and the Tractarian movement in England was not far off. The Church seemed to regain her old influence. Yet, under the surface, the nationalists of the herdist pattern would render all efforts of the spiritual-intellectual élite illusory. The vast masses of Slav inhabitants of the East European plains began to raise their voices in favor of a union. And from the northwestern plains and islands another monster raised its head, another phenomenon bound to change the face of the earth — the Industrial Revolution. While Kaspar David Friedrich and Kriehuber painted mountain scenes and Schwind and Ludwig Richter dwelt on the subtle lore of small German towns, tall chimneys and great machines, heralding the advent of another scourge, made their appearance; while poets, painters, and princes spoke in glowing terms of the coming New Middle Ages a German of Jewish descent, horrified and bewildered by the spectacle of British industrialism, first conceived the ideas which a few years later led to the publication of the "Communist Manifesto." The inexorable march of events could not be stopped by a few *bien pensants;* it took another one hundred years to teach mankind the appreciation of the proverb that God's mills grind slowly but with firmness and precision. The *reductio ad absurdum* alone could bring about the showdown of the ideas of the Great Revolt of the herdists.

We have gone "out of our way" in order to defend monarchy merely because we think that this form of government had either been unnecessarily abused in America or often been linked to its very opposite: plebiscitarian dictatorship. We are convinced that christian, monarchical forms of government belong, like the republic, to the *good* forms of government. Monarchies may not only survive the present cataclysm but may even increase in number and it is therefore *necessary* that Americans have an inner understanding for that political system (which does certainly not imply that they should copy it). European, Catholic monarchists profess this political conviction for very similar reasons as American Catholics voice their preference for the Republic; both Catholic camps see in these systems a (relative) guarantee for personal liberty, for the security of the Church, for legitimacy and justice (juridical and social), for international understanding.

It is naturally, also equally necessary that Europeans in general and European Catholics in particular arrive at a greater and better understanding of the principles and foundations of the American Republic. As long as many Americans view monarchy from the angle of S. Oglow's humorous "Little King" and Europeans have a vision of the United States as "another Soviet-Union" with a stock exchange instead of a Kremlin, no real mutual understanding and affection is possible. And "affection," not just interest mixed with curiosity, is an iron necessity for every peace. *Pax est amor*.

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*A Christian will consider a tyrannical person bossing a city brutally a lesser evil than a whole city lynching one man. In the first case there is one sinner and thousands of sufferers, in the latter case thousands of sinners and one sufferer. The materialist will look at the problem the other way round. He is never interested in sin, but as a humanitarian only in suffering. His final logical conclusion is euthanasia and the sacrifice of individuals to the whim of the masses.

*It would be difficult to classify a man like Jacques Maritain. He exalts a "democratic" concept which is *not* a living reality and attacks existing democracy (Rousseau's democracy, as he calls it) violently. Henri Bergson also seemed to approve vaguely of "democratic" principles. (See: *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion.*) Maritain's sympathies seem to be on the whole with a representative government, with many checks and balances. (Cf. also J. P. Mayer, *Political Thought*, London, 1939, p. 273.)

*Cf. the mémoires by Bruce Lockhart and the fine monograph by J. Daniel Chamier.

**Cf. The biography by Dr. Viktor Eisenmenger, Kristóffy's "Magyarország kálváriája. Az összeomlás útján." Also "Apis und Este" by Bruno Brehm, and the biography by Theodor von Sosnosky.

***Cf. the excellent biography by Hans Roger Madol.

*It is also true that future monarchs ordinarily had the advantage over president or prime ministers in having been educated for their task from earliest childhood on.

**Inventors of poison gas, tanks, pursuit planes, bombers, floating mines, etc., might have run the usually decried risk of getting into trouble with the ecclesiastic authorities. They might have been possibly accused of being in league with the devil—an accusation probably not without foundation.

*Japanese militarism is largely ascribed by Ernst O. Hauser, in his brilliant articles and books, to the pseudo-aristocratic "emancipation" of the middle classes since the end of the shogunate. The Japanese monarchy varies totally from the European monarchy in its lack of international blood ties and of Christian tradition, but the aggressive element in Nippon is nevertheless a military caste, with a bourgeois background, and not the crown or the nobility. (Cf. also the articles of Joseph Newman in the *New York Herald-Tribune*, Dec. 28, 1941, and Hugh Byas's *Government by Assassination*, New York, 1942.)

*St. Thomas recommended a *mixed* form of government in his *Summa*, I–II, 105, I in C.

*See Donoso Cortès, *Oeuvres*, Paris, 1858, Vol. II, pp. 256–257.

**We have clearly to distinguish between *statism (étatisme*), which is an enthusiasm directed toward the state as a legal and bureaucratic unit, *nationalism*, a herdist feeling of identity toward the ethnic people (*Volk*) with the same language and habit (inside and outside the state), *racialism*, a

morbid frenzy for human beings of the same biological stock, *patriotism*, an enthusiasm for the natural features of the fatherland, and *imperialism* which seeks territorial expansion of the country (frequently under nationalistic or racialistic pretexts). Citizenship—a legal status; nationality—a cultural status; and race, as a biological status and condition, underlies the first three "isms." It is deplorable that common usages not less than newspapers and even dictionaries have helped to create a total chaos in these technical terms; nationalism is most frequently confounded with either imperialism or statism and the concepts of race and nation are used as synonymous. (The "German race," "French nationalism in the seventeenth century," "Patriots rally against foreign language newspaper" are just a few contributions to the general confusion.)

*See the description of "facticism" in Erik and Christiane von Kuehnelt-Leddihn's, *Moscow, 1979*, New York, 1940.

*Small European states outraged only too often the sense of proportion of American tourists. They may be monstrosities from a commercial point of view, but liberty and personality demand sacrifices in blood . . . and cash.

*Stage trials are a helpful prerequisite for influencing public opinion and therefore a current phenomenon in totalitarian ochlocracies.

*The reader will understand that we do not believe that monarchy is everywhere and anywhere superior to representative republics. But we believe that on account of Europe's diversity this supranational form of government has a greater *raison d'être* than the more "national" representative republic, which in its turn harmonizes more with the American tradition and American needs.

**The revival of the old Provinces by Maréchal Pétain, whatever his other merits or demerits are, was certainly a step in the right direction.

*It very frequently happens in Central and Eastern Europe that "class" means to all practical purposes "national character" just as it may mean "racial character" in the American South where the upper classes are white and the lower classes predominantly colored (apart from the "poor white trash"). The antagonism between a Hungarian burgher and a Slovakian peasant in northern Hungary or that of a Polish squire and a Ukranian servant could now not only be exploited by the socialist agitator but also by the nationalistic malcontent.

*See Chateaubriand's *Mémoirs d'Outretombe*, who is very much convinced of Napoleon's aristocratic background.

*Rather typical is the Polish proverb: "Cudzych królów gromić, a grozić swojemu"—"Subjugate foreign kings and defy your own!" It breathes a thoroughly "whiggish" spirit.

**Frederick II of Prussia refers to Poland in his *Political Testament* (1768) as a *République*.

***The years 1917, 1922, 1923 mark the last stages of this drama.

*Guglielmo Ferrero in his *The Reconstruction of Europe*, New York, 1941, makes a very strong point of this fact.

II

THE AGE OF PARLIAMENTARIANISM AND REPUBLICANISM

"Europe has become the apostle of her own apostasy."
— Douglas Jerrold, *England*.

THE headway which egalitarianism and identitarianism made after the revolution of 1830 and 1848 is intimately connected with the rapid increase in importance of two geographical-social units. Europe of the nineteenth and the beginning twentieth century is a continent ruled by money, and money comes from the rich *plains* (regardless whether they are industrial or agricultural) and the *cities*.

To most Americans mountains are an "exceptional" geographic formation, but a look at the physical map of Europe will show them that this is not so on the old continent. There is only one large plain spreading from northern France across the Low Countries, northern Germany and Poland to Russia, a plain which is hardly interrupted by the low Ural mountains and which only ends at the Hindukush and the hilly lands behind Lake Baikal. Historical Europe on the other hand is mountainous. The Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians, Greeks, Turks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Croatians, Serbs, Slovenes, the Slovaks the Scots and the Welsh, half the Rumanians and Ruthenians, the Turks, the South Germans, the Sudeten Germans and the South French are either living in mountains or at least in very hilly countries. Many people see the "real" Europeans in these moutaineers. In these parts of the world traditions have been better preserved;

patriarchalism, piety, loyalty, altruism — all the truly "romantic" virtues are here more at home than in the progressive plains. Other manifestations, such as the blood feud, also exist. Of course, the mountains are poor and bravery alone does not secure collective political influence. Thanks to the greater resources of the plains the mountaineers were always defeated in the long run but they regularly revenged themselves by producing a proportionately large number of political and military leaders.*

Mountain culture is not "advanced." It is nevertheless aristocratic and "democratic" (demophil) at the same time. It is patriarchal by nature and we have mentioned the fact before, that serfdom practically never existed among the mountaineers. The mountains were essentially free. "Freedom thrives in the mountains," Schiller exclaims justly. Yet it is also interesting to see how violently the mountain peasant was attacked by the urban writers of the second half of the nineteenth century, attacked and vilified for his loyalty to traditions. Having no social grievances (lack of large estates) he was the very despair of urban, leftist agitators.

The thwarted intellectuals, slaving in the gigantic cities under heaviest pressure, developed often an almost sinister grudge against the mountains and the snow-covered peaks; he at least considered himself to be a "modern" while the mountaineer dwelt in darkest superstition.** Yet the mountaineer always despised the people from the plains and the large cities and regarded them as miserable wretches, as proletarians and collectivized rabble, with an utter lack of personality.[115]

The age of the rule of the plains and the cities, which put an end to the rule of the mountains and castles, was indeed the beginning of the decline of Europe. *The association of Berlin with Moscow, of nationalism with socialism, was, even in a geographical sense, a league of monotony against diversity*.

It must be admitted though that there is a great strength in the collective onslaught of the people of the plains — from a military, political, and economic point of view. The first half of the nineteenth century produced the most spectacular victories of the French arms, the second half the victories of Prussia and of the Germanies led by Prussia. The great soldiers of the sixteenth and seventeenth century were the Spaniards and the Swiss, but technical civilization and industrial progress necessitated a soldier with

a minimum of personal initiative and a maximum of obedience, cooperative spirit and lack of originality. The virtues of the sixteenth-century soldier are still necessary prerequisites of alpine warfare, but for the war in the plains — "total" wars and not "little wars" (*guerrilla*) — fight, to think, to decide. In the plains officers used to ride at the head of their troops and directed the solidly advancing carrés with stentorial commands. Nothing of that kind is possible in the mountains where personal initiative is of greater importance than mere discipline and drill;* even modern warfare in these parts is still individualized and numbers play a less important role than in the Lowlands.

Today it seems that European culture and civilization, once conceived and born in the craggy hills of Crete, Greece, and the Apennines, will be drowned in the monotonous, muddy plains between Paris and Moscow.

The second half of the nineteenth century sees an acceleration in the process of democratization, nationalization, centralization, and uniformization in all regions of Europe. The demand for a general ochlocratic franchise comes to the fore as the synthesis of Luther's superstitious belief in the perspicacity and intelligence of the average man (reading his Bible) and Rousseau's assertion that man is by nature good. It was impossible to resist the demands for political control on the part of the masses, who consisted admittedly of virtuous master minds.

The *risorgimento* in the political sense was probably a boon to Italy, but from a cultural point of view it was fatal because it extinguished the many little suns which, in preceding centuries, had given to Italy her great variety of cultural expressions so essential to the grandeur of the Italian past. Something similar happened also in the Germanies, but this process in the other half of the former Holy Roman Empire will be treated separately.

Uniformism had created the demand that all people with an identical or similar literary language should draw together in common political units.[116] Yet literary languages are usually artificial creations, coined by certain masters at a given moment in history and accepted by the upper classes. The English-speaking reader should bear in mind that the literary languages of the European continent are not of aristocratic or royal mark. "The King's English" has no equivalent either in the Germanic countries nor in the Mediterranean area. It usually is the upper bourgeoisie who

speaks the literary, i.e., the artificially standardized language, with the greatest perfection, while there is often a "low-class" dialectical strain in the idiom of the nobility and even royalty.* The Empress Maria Theresa spoke broadest Viennese, and this local dialect continued to be used by the Emperors of Austria until 1848.** The late King of Saxony repeatedly used the Saxonian dialect, and argot expressions are far more widespread in aristocratic circles around Paris and Budapest than in the *haute bourgeoisie*, which always prided itself on a strongly standardized language, which is nothing else but an *intranational Esperanto* (understood and spoken everywhere *inside* the nation).***

Artificial languages are far more collective — they comprise more people — than local dialects. But the artificial language often lacks character and originality. It is the urban, commercial spirit of the middle classes which demands uniformity for business purposes and has already killed many a truly living *language* in order to supplant it by an international (or rather intertribal) jargon. Hebrew was displaced about 300 years before the birth of our Lord by the Aramaic slang of Syrian traders, spoken between Alexandria and Babylon.

The nineteenth or twentieth century nationalist of either the "democratic" or socialist pattern would have hardly consented to the exhortation of St. Stephen, King of Hungary, who said to his sons: "Unius linguae uniusque moris regnum imbecille et fragile est."* It is the urban middle class which became the protagonist for the national state with one languge, one law, one independent church and left its deadly centralism all over the Old World between Calais and Vladivostok.

This is the reason why the middle-class revolutions of 1848 in Berlin, Italy, Vienna, Baden, Prague, Munich, and Pesth had not only an ochlocratic but also a strongly nationalistic character. Pan-Italism, Pan-Germanism and the weirdest growth of all, Pan-Slavism, revolted against the supranational monarchy. The endless, monotonous plains of eastern Europe had accepted with almost Asiatic fervor the gospel of a gigantic unification preached for the first time by Jan Kollár, a Lutheran Slovak minister in Magyar-German Pesth. Pan-Slavism differed from the two other isms inasmuch as it wanted to unite not one nation, but a whole family of nations, who show as many differences as the Icelanders from the Tyroleans or the English from the East Prussians. Pan-Latinism or Pan-Teutonism have not yet made their

appearance on the political stage and they probably never will. Yet what the disciples of these Panisms wanted was a vastly simplified Europe, consisting of three or four states, all uniform, all "democratically" governed, a bad imitation of the American Middle West, with about 150 million "customers" each, run by lawyers, journalists, businessmen, and teachers of gymnastics.

Gymnastic teachers were not unimportant; the gymnastic leagues of central and eastern Europe wielded great political power. Supported by the bourgeoisie (and even the lower classes) they were the main carriers of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism. Their performances in mass drill, their semimilitary maneuvers, their worship of health, discipline, and co-ordination, and finally their anticlericalism of varying degree, made them heralds as well as executors of a mass age.** The *Sokol* ("Falcon") and *Orel* ("Eagle") organizations among the Slavs, the numerous gymnastic leagues among the Teutons — mainly the Austrian, Moravian, and Bohemian Germans — are typical for these various movements with parallel goals. Nevertheless their purpose was not primarily a military one. Their main objective was rather of a psychological nature. The spectacular collective displays organized on a scale only surpassed by the parades of the National Socialists in Nuremberg, served the feeling of collective might and a "belonging together." The numerous men's glee clubs, so widespread among German and Slav nationalists, had a similar purpose. Community singing was also one of the strongest magnetic features of the Lutheran Reformation.* It is not surprising that these gymnastic leagues featuring a definite *Weltanschauung* had a deep political influence mainly on the lower middle class. They started out featuring certain liberal tendencies. This liberalism is still apparent in the writing of the *Turnvater* Jahn, the founder of the German Gymnastic Leagues. In the thirties of this century their Austrian groups (*Deutscher Turnverein*, featuring an emblem remarkably like the Swastika) became violently national socialistic and dropped the liberal ideas. It is no exaggeration to say that while the Slav gymnastic leagues (the "Sokols")** were partly responsible for the breaking up of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the *Deutscher Turnverein* (German Gymnastic League) had a lion share in the annexation of Austria.

Both *risorgimentos* — the Italian and the German — were accompanied by two strange and disquieting phenomena. Neither movement was carried primarily by a royal or imperial house. Two great parliamentarian and one popular leader — Bismarck, Cavour, and Garibaldi — were the men who really did the job, not their royal masters. On account of these two large scale unifications we behold many rulers deprived of their thrones, either by sheer force or due to the revolutionary cooperation of their subjects. The Kings of Hanover and the Two Sicilies, the grand dukes of Tuscany and Hesse-Nassau had to flee from their countries just as in Napoleonic times.

Prussia again played with the idea of incorporating Saxony, yet this German kingdom escaped its fate the second time since the Congress of Vienna, as by a miracle.

But the fact that other legitimate European rulers were accessories to these actions, so alien to their own as well as to the Christian European tradition, indicates the beginning of the end for the very institution of supranational monarchy in the Eastern Hemisphere. Once the respect for rights and laws was broken nature took its course. Seventy years ago the ignorant mob howled triumphantly when the dukes and kings packed their bags and fled from their homelands; today it is the burgher, the peasant, the worker who is driven out by the conquerors and is not even permitted to take his tools or his savings with him as in the case of vanquished Poland. The nations of Europe will have ample opportunity to think with nostalgia of the days when monarch fought against monarch and not nation against nation, and yet it is without doubt the monarchs who were the accessories of nationalistic mass sentiment, who dug their own graves and maybe even those of their subjects.

There is also another aspect of nineteenth-century nationalism of greater importance and gravity. The national collectivism of that period, with a steadily increasing statism lurking around the corner, persuaded the forlorn and helpless *individual* that he is merely the part of a whole. Seventeenth-century pantheism already had affirmed that we and the universe are a "part" of God. Spinoza no less than Calvin with his predestination and denial of free will had blazed the trail leading to an integral depreciation of person and personality. Now we see the urban slave depressed by his inferiority, partly real and partly imaginary, clamoring for a God or some "divine corporation" whose part he could be and whose divine essence he

could share. People begin now to be primarily *members* of a nation, a class, a political party, and many organized their lives accordingly. We see no longer men and women giving solemn oaths of loyalty to a ruler, an order, a spiritual head, as in the days of old. They cease to serve according to their own free will and choice because they are now under the pressure of a powerful collective, horizontal, or vertical stratification of society which forces them to a blind, instinctive, and often unreasonable homage to a group interest. Whosoever will not submit to the group discipline, does not yield to the group authority or dares to separate himself from the "group soul," is considered a traitor.

In the Middle Ages people were born and baptized into the Church. But the Church was the *corpus mysticum* and it depended upon one's own free will whether one wanted to be a living or a dead member of the Mystical Body of Christ. The cry "traitor" was only raised against those who broke the solemn oath of allegiance, not those who chose to go ways different from their status of birth. The Connêtable Charles de Bourbon who served with Charles V, or Marshal Moritz of Saxony, the great general under Louis XV were hardly considered to be traitors. Soldiers picked out the countries they wanted to serve. Prospective monks chose their orders. There were no "traitors to the proletariat" or "traitors to democracy." *Today we live in an age of increased predestination and decreased free will, where Calvin, Freud, Marx, Luther, Darwin, Dewey, and the host of racial biologists have layed down the inexorable laws of anthropological, religious, psychological, environmental, and sociological determinism with no hope for escape*[117] *We are merely exhorted to make a virtue out of necessity and to be loyal to our prison and prisoners. Every attempt from our side to escape the artificial shell or to use our dormant remainders of free will to destroy the chains is branded as treason and punished accordingly by State or Society or even by both*.

Thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century we see the crowned heads of Europe, who should have been inspired to work for the *summum bonum* of their respective nations, merely executing the will of the Herd like the last, sordid politician in an ochlocracy, fawning for popularity. We know only too well that the General Will and the General Good are not the same, that there is sometimes even between the seemingly obvious general

good and the eternal principles of justice and equity an abyss that cannot be overbridged; and cleavages between the local good and the general good are equally frequent. But true ochlocracy, based on genuine majority rule, will always put the general good before the local one. ("Happiness for the *greatest number*.") The principle *Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz*, engraved on the German coins, sounds very altruistic, but carried to the last, logical consequence it leads to the adoration of the ant heap and the contempt for the person.

Socialism,* largely an answer to the sins of "liberal" capitalism, belongs to the same category of herdist collectivism, this time on a social rather than geographical basis.[118] (There is a third herdism *in biologicis* and numerous combinations between the three fundamental manifestations.)**

Yet it must be clearly understood that there is no real enmity between capitalism and socialism, which after all is only a capitalism of the étatistic brand. The normal tendency in the development of capitalism is toward socialism. Real socialism merely wants to speed up the life process of capitalism which is the concentration of wealth and means of production in fewer and fewer hands, until finally every cent in the country is controlled by a single person. Elections in that theoretical capitalistic "democracy" of the final stage merely mean that all employees of Mr. XY, the final capitalist, the only employer, go to the polls. Mr. XY is by that time already the invisible dictator of the country in question, and State and "Society" are one. Mr. XY, without personally disposing all the time or all his money, controls nevertheless every penny, and probably derives as much satisfaction from his illimited power as (let us say) the secretary of the Communist Party in the Communist State, or perhaps as may be the case with even more benevolent "leaders" of the Soviet State of tomorrow. Different forces as well as "misguided" socialist tendencies act as breaks against the real socialist interest of bigger and better capitalism. *Once all financial power is in the hands of one person and this person assumes the highest political office, the Socialist State stands already in its final form; it only needs a little repainting but no transforming*. Under such circumstances—as in every totalitarian state—money and power, power and money become one and the same thing.*** If the monopolistic capitalist wants to eat in a restaurant he can do so without paying because the

restaurant is his. The totalitarian, communist dictator can feed equally without paying cash in his monolithic state where money, power, belief, society, government have been unified at the expense of the individual personality. Thus we see capitalism *and* socialism advocating the ant-heap State (or Society) in an unholy union with equal fervor.

But often we see socialistic party organizations assuming a comparatively medieval attitude by doing everything in their power to thwart the centralizing efforts of monopolistic capitalism. Socialists frequently advocated *distribution* of wealth by increased taxation and antitrust laws. This, for their unorthodox attitude, can only be explained by their desire to protect their political organizations (*for which they care more than for abstract ideas*) against the combined attack of State plus Money, a combination they call for reasons unknown "Fascism."* *We have therefore to see in the struggle between socialism and capitalism* (i.e., between state capitalism and private capitalism) *statism and capitalism, nationalism and herdist democratism, socialism and statism, nazism and bolshevism, nationalism and socialism, a whole series of bogus issues which are fought with a bitterness worthy of a better cause. Yet the hatred and the ferocity in this struggle is natural and characteristic for every fratricidal warfare*. In such a strife no pardon can be given because the different sides consider each other to be "traitors" in the sacred race for identity and the construction of the universal ant heap. Their common enemy was the past, the great tradition, the Church with her aspects of hierarchy and otherworldliness, her subtle affinities with patriarchalism and monarchy, her spirituality and deeply seated skepticism toward the modern world. There was to all practical purposes no "new-fangled" modern idea from labor conditions to conscription,** from militarism to socialism, from continental liberalism to religious modernism which the Popes had not criticized in sharp, uncompromising terms.***

At the height of the socialist agitation there arose a doctrine which seemingly erected a materialist barrier against herdism; the theory of evolution.[119]

Evolution itself, as well as the broader interest for biology which ensued from it, led to the tentative establishment of racialist theories. These were first of all welcomed in aristocratic quarters that are always keen on

genealogy, thankful for every vindication of their hard-pressed caste, and overjoyous at a defense based not on sentimental but on "scientific" grounds. The fact that the French aristocracy considers itself to be largely of Frankish, i.e., Nordic, origin led Count Gobineau to his *apologia* of the Nordic Race which caused such havoc in many a Germanic, British, and American brain from Atlanta, Georgia, to Riga, Livonia.

The theory of Evolution brought only temporary relief to the badly harassed aristocracy of Europe. It is more important to remember that it gave a new impetus to materialism, and that while weakening the Christian tradition even further in the minds of many it gave birth to a new type of group consciousness, thus increasing the already virulent herd spirit. The worship of the sciences became more intensive and the mobs waited eagerly for new gospels to emerge from the laboratories. The new "scientific" discoveries were preached with furor and fervor and soon there was a veritable persecution of true Christians going on in intellectual as well as popular circles.[120]

The effect of Evolutionism upon the European mind was not homogeneous. Racialism became only strong and violent in the twentieth century; herdism of that type was brought in relation to small, identical biological groups with *common* characteristics. The herdists of the nineteenth century made a different use of this theory; they *enlarged* humanity by including the animals and Darwin's assertion that the brain of an ant is the most wonderful particle of the world, more wonderful perhaps than the human brain, is characteristic for the trend of the time.[121] The ants had their eulogy written in the early twentieth century by Maurice Maeterlinck, and Waldemar Bonsels delighted in sentimental tales about the life of the bees (*Die Biene Maja*). But great *savants* like Father Wasmann, S.J., exploded the myth of the "intelligence" of these extremely uniformistic insects who live in strict, unvarying discipline.[122]

The theory of evolution was also a powerful attack against free will and a further step toward determinism which marks so strongly the progressive ideas of western civilization with their false and deceptive outcry for "liberty."[123]

Modern slavery indeed reached its zenith in the modern city[124] which is so hostile to true personality.[125] The earning of a livelihood under most humiliating and monotonous conditions, often under the dictatorship of technology, the tyranny of the watch, the increased control by the state, which in the urban areas is far more effective and efficient than in rural areas, resulted in the slow and painful birth of a new man who was a most ideal material for politicians, generals, dictators,[126] newspaper editors, and traffic cops. Yet his full maturity for the job of total servitude was not reached before the First Great War, one of the most sanguinary blunders in modern history.[127]

Nietzsche foresaw this development when he wrote in his *Der Wille zur Macht* hoping at least for a benevolent and worthy, not a malicious and ochlocratic tyrant:

> A man who has preserved a strong will combined with wide knowledge has now greater chances than ever. Servile obedience (*Dressierbarkeit*) has enormously increased in democratic Europe; human beings who adapt themselves easily and are submissive constitute the rule; the result is an animal of the herd, even if quite intelligent. Whoever is able to rule finds a great mass of those who are ready to serve.
>
> "Wide knowledge," being the survival of an intellectual and aristocratic age, could easily be dispensed with. Volcanic emotion is all that is necessary for the mob master's sordid role.

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*Of the better known political and military leaders of the past 400 years the following came from the mountains: Stalin, Mussolini, Napoleon, Nicholas Horthy, Dollfuss, Henry IV of Navarre, the Counts of Habsburg and of Savoy, General Franco, Mustapha Kemal, Salazar, Metaxas, Kondylis, Maniu, Lloyd-George, Ramsay MacDonald, Foch, Joffre, Count Bethlen, Venizelos, and others.

**Yet we can observe from time to time the typical bourgeois veneration and adoration of the peasant and mainly of the mountaineer. The Austrian and South German city dweller will don a peasant costume when he spends his summer vacation in the mountains. In the past ten to twenty years a growing feeling of helplessness, despair, and inferiority can be observed among the urbanites which resulted in different movements promoting the return to the land. Today the cities (exposed to bombings, famines, diseases, etc.) are already in a retrograde development which is often symbolically expressed by a "ruralization" of their character. Thirty years ago hardly anybody would

have thought to dress in Vienna like a Tyrolean shepherd or a Styrian gamekeeper, yet today the situation has materially changed and the rural influence is quite considerable.

*This explains the successes of the Serb Chetnitzi against German occupation troops.

*The Swiss bourgeoisie was always an exception. *Schwytzerdütsch* was always spoken by Swiss "society" and literary German was only used in conversation with foreigners. It would sound extremely genteel to speak the literary language among the Swiss Germans. This is not true of Austria. Pangermanism had therefore an appeal for certain Austrians, none for the Swiss.

**The Emperor Francis Joseph who ascended the throne 11 years after Queen Victoria and died 15 years later than the British ruler was, like her, aristocratic in character but bourgeois in his tastes. The rule of these two monarchs saw the spectacular rise of the bourgeoisie.

***All leftists (with the paradoxical exception of the Spanish leftists) had always a teeth-gnashing hatred for dialectical differences because these disturbed the herdist uniformity to which they were all instinctively devoted. Evelyn M. Acomb writes in her scholarly work "The French Laic Laws (1879–1889)": They (the anticlericals) held that differences in religion would only divide citizens, who should be imbued with the sense of "union, concord, and fraternity which ought to exist between the children of the mère-patrie." They attacked the religious orders for not obeying the laws, for trying to elude military service, and for encouraging local dialects.

It is universally agreed in all the reports of academy inspectors that wherever a language other than French is spoken, whether it is a true language like the Breton or a simple patois, in all these districts, the religious orders, supported by the clergy, who insist that the catechism should be learned in patois, exert all their efforts to prevent the French language from being used. (*Journal Officiel de la République Française*. May 26, pp. 5690–5691.)

*"A country of only one language and one custom is foolish and fragile."

**Later we see "Counter Leagues," i.e., Catholic as well as Socialist Gymnastic Leagues. The Socialists did finally everything in their power to make good use of the collectivizing effects of sports and gymnastics—inside and outside of Russia. In all these Leagues the emphasis was always put on the subordination of the individual under the whole. Their influence and importance can never be overrated and it is surprising that no serious treatise has been written about them. (They were mentioned though in Peter Viereck's *Metapolitics.*)

**"Viel mehr wurden hinübergesungen als hinübergepredigt,"* did the Catholics complain.

**The Czechoslovak Republic, Yugoslavia and even Poland showed great recognition for the work of the Sokols after their establishment as independent states. Czechoslovakia featured the founder of the Sokols on their stamps and the *Sokol-slet's* (Falconflights: mass meetings and mass performances) were always memorable events. Yugoslavia celebrated the great *slets* with a special issue of her stamps. The Czechs also unofficially called some of their bank notes "Sokols."

The founder of the Sokols, Miroslav Tyrš, was, needless to say, a great admirer of Taine, a violent evolutionist and an enthusiastic monist preaching an odd political biologism, spiced with a romantic anticlericalism and anti-Habsburgism. His vistas were largely "Nazi" which did not prevent the invading Nazi hords from suppressing the Sokols.

*Socialism demanded labor's access to a machine to be owned by itself, and passed over the fact that all that made such propaganda plausible was that ownership of the worker had already passed to the machine (James N. Wood, *Democracy and the Will to Power*, p. 124).

**It must be kept in mind that there is no such thing as Catholic or Christian collectivism. Christianity ties man primarily to God and secondarily to his fellow man (in whom he does not like himself, but God and God's image). True religion is always "vertical" and not "horizontal."

***This would be possible in a State without social checks, as, for instance, Bolivia, which is largely owned by Señor Patiño.

*Mr. Lewis of the C.I.O., advocating the candidacy of Mr. Willkie, who was acclaimed by American Capital, assumed a truly and genuinely socialistic attitude. There is nothing more antisocialistic than the protection of a multitude of *small* enterprises.

**Conscription and militarism were vigorously attacked by Leo XIII. Though never "pacifist" in the Leftish sense and respecting the good soldier, the Church always disliked militarism and the "armed horde." The two greatest Catholic saints—St. Francis of Assisi and St. Ignatius—were soldiers before their call, but the picture of the "armed industrialist" in his far distance bomber has often little to do with the idea of the *miles Christianus*.

***It was evident from the beginning that a great *political* (not necessarily spiritual) defeat of the church would eliminate the importance of the common great enemy and thus inaugurate a period of endless mutual strife between the modern heresies. The years 1847, 1860, 1866, 1870, 1898, and 1918 were milestones of ecclesiastic defeat which opened the road to the Great Massacre.

III

WORLD WAR I

Austria-Hungary remains the cornerstone of Europe. —
Leroy-Beaulieu, in 1903.

BY 1914 we see two different types of monarchies in Europe. In some countries the king or emperor overshadows the parliament, in others again the parliament is in full control of the government and the crowned sovereign merely functions as a representative of the nation or as symbol of the state. These monarchies were to all practical purposes republics; some of them had a democratic, some an aristocratic or plutocratic character. It is important to note that it was not always the constitution which curtailed the rights and prerogatives of the monarch, but rather practice and usage. The Swedish constitution, for instance, gives more rights and powers to the king than the Belgian charter, but the king of the Belgians has far greater influence over the state affairs of his country and there is no doubt that he was, during the last war, the virtual dictator of his diminished realm.

The decline of the influence of monarchs was accompanied by the decline of the influence of the Catholic Church.[128] The male supremacy was challenged in public life and it became evident that kings, Popes, emperors, fathers, priests were facing bad times in Europe, and God Himself was ignored. France had become a republic in 1870, Portugal followed in 1910, China, the oldest monarchy in the world on the other end of the Eurasian continent, became a republic in 1912, and the ceaselessly increasing power of the American republic threw long shadows over

Europe.* The twilight of the institution of monarchy in Europe was soon at hand.

The moral and political prestige of the Church reached an all time low.[129] Even in "Catholic" countries her power amounted to almost nothing. France and Portugal had expelled most of the orders. "Freethinkers" not only guided the political destinies of these two republics but they also ruled in Italy and directed Spanish political life. The kingdom of Ferdinand and Isabel was actually governed by the liberal branch of the Bourbons while the conservative, Carlist branch lived in exile. The Second German Reich treated Catholics more favorably than France, inasmuch as it had diplomatic relations with the Vatican,* gave full financial support to the Church and had furthermore only one single order proscribed.** The Church in France went through a miserable period of transition as a mere *association cultuelle*, sustained by the charitable gifts of the faithful. It is true that France became in course of time rather lax in the enforcement of her anti-Catholic laws, but priests were always denied the right to vote, although in a truly egalitarian spirit they were made to fight in the army.

Even Austria-Hungary was not a model Catholic state if one considers the fact that the Emperor-King Francis Joseph forced his officers to fight duels if their "honor" was attacked.*** The Church continued to punish this sometimes tragic and sometimes comical practice with excommunication all the same. Catholicism in Austria and Hungary often was supine and suffered from the burden of traditionalism. The middle class with its small but ambitious and headstrong Jewish and Protestant minorities was fully imbued with ideas derived directly or indirectly from the French Revolution and worked for the disruption of the Danubian monarchy. Gladstone, the great liberal, considered her to be a medieval "survival," putting the realm of the Habsburgs on the same level as his other *bête-noire* — Turkey.

Austria-Hungary nevertheless was a great asset of the Catholic Church and the ultimate hope of all true "reactionaries," as they were then considered. "Progressive" people from all parts of Europe felt their political herd instincts outraged and insulted by the mere existence of this irrational, national mosaic. Diversity was the keynote of Austria-Hungary. Twelve nationalities lived together in comparative harmony under a monarch who enjoyed such great moral prestige because he was (besides the Church) the

truly uniting bond. It is hardly a question that this second largest European state would have survived to our very days if the World War had not offered an opportunity to the nationalistic middle classes to throw off the yoke of the benevolent Habsburgs with the help of the Allies, and to exchange it (after a short interlude) for the sweet yoke of another Austrian, a good deal less scrupulous in the methods of government.

The peasants, the aristocracy, the laboring classes, and the clergy had been perfectly happy under the old order; and they formed after all the overwhelming majority of the population. Against these historical classes remonstrated the urban populace, the semi-intellectuals, the lawyers, journalists, high school professors, gymnastic teachers, and white-collar workers. (Even the business world was rather divided.) These elements found their way to collaborate with the Allies, who helped them to break up the monarchy. In the delirium of victory few people were consciously aware of the disappearance of the Danubian monarchy. The Habsburgs themselves were of "unpleasant" memory for the progressives who felt haunted by the shadows of Philip II and the Armada, Charles V and his dreams of a universal monarchy, Ferdinand II, and Maximilian, the "Last Knight." Austria stood in their eyes for "racial" persecution, for Metternich's police system, the Counter Reformation, the Baroque style and the wars against Frederick II of Prussia.

But *in general* Austria-Hungary was not disliked. The hatred of the Seton-Watsons and Wickham Steeds was the sentiment of a powerful and influential but small group of people. Francis Joseph, the tragic old man, was more respected than William II. Places like the Tyrol and the Dolomites, old Prague, gay Vienna, Dalmatia, or the Hungarian Steppes had a slightly Ruritanian halo of glamor and romance which was remotely connected with Dracula's castle in the Carpathians and the waltzes of Johann Strauss.

And it was nevertheless Austria Hungary which was the reason for World War I and even World War II, it was Austria which was forced by circumstances to start the great massacre, and it was Austria again which was the great bait, the large, potential spoil; her destruction changed the map of Europe and thus conditioned the present struggle.[130]

The war of 1914–1918 was not in the interests of Germany. Every territorial aggrandizement of the Second Reich would have been equivalent to an increase of her Catholic and non-Germanic population and therefore would have created an intolerable and dangerous situation in the eyes of all prussianized Protestant nationalists. Germany was then still a country partly ruled by a parliament, and an increase of Ultramontanes and Franco-Slavic opposition parties would have changed the character of the government and the administration seriously. There is not the slightest evidence that Germany coveted any particular part of any neighboring country previous to the outbreak of the war. No "movements" favoring an *Anschluss* of the adjacent regions were supported by the government of the Reich; a German *"Irreddenta"* did not exist and no responsible person inside and outside the government put forward territorial claims of any nature. There are neither maps nor pamphlets demanding the extension of German (or Austro-Hungarian) domination printed before 1914; they became indeed very numerous after Hitler's advent to power but were unheard of under the imperial government.

On the other hand we had the *Italia Irreddenta* working feverishly in Triest and the Trentino. Italian geographers were expounding the theory that watersheds (continental divides) alone can be regarded as just and tenable borders.* There was the south Slav movement directed toward a separation of the Croatian and Slovenian provinces from the dual monarchy. The Rumanian nationalists carried their propaganda to Transylvania and the Bukovina. The Panslavs stirred up the feeling in Bohemia, Slovakia, and among the Ruthenes of Galicia. Czech emigrants (Masaryk and Beneš among them), spoke about the establishment of a Russian imperial protectorate in their country. There were French claims for Alsace-Lorraine, Danish claims for Northern Slesvig, and Russian claims for eastern Germany. The material for these demands, aspirations, and desires could fill whole bookstores.

The Central Powers were politically on the defensive. Germany especially, as *"das Reich der Mitte,"* had a definite inferiority complex on account of her encircled position, and William II followed the very unwise policy of shouting menaces at the top of his voice in order to frighten all potential enemies, a behavior reminding one of a child in a dark room. There is little doubt that he was, in spite of his blunt and uncontrolled word

spoken in public, deadly afraid of war.[131] It was one of the tenets of German foreign policy up till the Moroccan crisis not to antagonize France, and the fear of a French irritation caused William II to decline the offers of the British government at the end of the Boer War for close cooperation. No competent historian considers him today to be the originator of the war to end wars. Yet his partly offending rather than offensive, and partly vacillating policy contributed to the downfall of the Central Powers.

Germany and Austria-Hungary were at the end of the nineteenth century already inseparable allies. The efforts of King Edward VII to lure Austria-Hungary away from Germany were doomed to failure because nationalism had already made such inroads into the political mentality of Central Europe that the very idea of a war between Germans and Germans (37 per cent of all Austrian citizens were Germans) was out of question. The fateful events of the year 1866 should never be repeated again.

Austria-Hungary had to stick to Germany, and for the Second Reich the Danubian monarchy was the only ally they could count upon. Neither was the linguistic national tie the only one between these two countries. They had a common tradition and a common heritage. The old capital of the First Reich was in Austria, the crown of the holy Roman emperors was in Vienna, the arms as well as the dynasty of the *Sacrum Imperium* continued their existence in Austria. The legal historical successor of the Caesars was in Vienna and not in Berlin. When Francis Joseph celebrated his diamond jubilee all German princes, headed by the king of Prussia, came to Vienna to pay homage to him. The old emperor emphasized in his thanks address that he considered himself to be a German sovereign — *ein deutscher Fürst*.

Most Austrians of German extraction considered themselves to be Germans. They rather looked down at the “Prussians” as non-Germans.

Germany was, of course, more industrialized than Austria and her population was accordingly larger. Yet territorially she was smaller than Austria-Hungary.

During World War I the Germans of the Second Reich bore the brunt of the attack, the defense, and the general hatred. The Austrians were only hated by their immediate neighbors and enemies. Thus most of the propaganda of the Allies was directed against Germany and not against

Austria, which circumstance further helped to becloud the minds of many otherwise intelligent persons. *It must be said in all candor that it is impossible to make a correct historical evaluation of World War I while disregarding the fact that Austria-Hungary began the war, that she was the real issue of the war, and that the most important result of the war is the new order in the Danubian area as established in 1919*. Everybody who denies that the World War I is not "about" Austria-Hungary, understands neither history nor Europe.

Neither is it possible to continue the legend of German aggression in 1914. This legend has been thoroughly destroyed. The books of Sidney Fay, of H. E. Barnes, G. P. Gooch, Henri Pozzi, A. v. Wegerer, Bogičević, the publications of the German, Austrian, Russian archives and numerous memoirs have changed the picture completely in the eyes of everybody who has taken the time and energy to dig through these lengthy volumes.* If there is any "war guilt" on the side of the Central Powers one must admit that it was Austria-Hungary which made the fatal, but unavoidable initial steps, the most decisive ones even, without concrete knowledge of the German government. G. P. Gooch wrote in an article in *German Life and Letters* (Vol. III): "Bismarck used to say that in concluding the alliance with Austria it was understood that Germany was the rider and Austria the horse. Since the coming of Aehrenthal in 1906 to the Ballhausplatz the roles have been reversed." This remark is very much to the point.

Yet it is hopeless today, especially since September, 1939, when another Germany willfully started another war, to propagate the truth. It probably will take at least a full generation after this present struggle, decades of sobering up, thinking, reflecting, and investigating, until the wars of 1914 and 1939 will clearly be considered apart. There is little hope in the near future that the just accusations against the Germany of 1939 will not be automatically extended to the Germany of 1914. If we live by 1960 still in an ochlocratic age (i.e., in an age of mass emotions), no such distinctions will be either made or encouraged in spite of the fact that we can see now clearly the difference between a prepared and an unprepared Germany.**

The tragedy of 1914 could perhaps not have been averted. The Karagjorgjevics of Serbia, who were for three years not recognized by the British government because they had gained their throne by murder, set the

fuse by profiting from a new murder. Russia regarded herself as compelled to stand by Serbia on account of the Panslavist sentiment, and the intrigues of the military clique checkmated every imperial peace effort coming either from Berlin or St. Petersburg. The French "liberal" republic, so liberal in her loans to the eastern autocracy, was bound to help her. England, tied to France by the secret Naval Agreement of 1907, was bound to assist the Franco-Russian Entente. Constitutional tradition in England made it impossible for the king, a first cousin of William II, to intervene effectively. Italy, who had given birth to a Machiavelli, swung from the Central Powers to the Allies, in spite of the fact that her former associates could promise her far greater profits.* Yet the anti-Habsburg influences determined her to join the anti-Austrian *and only accidentally anti-German* bloc.

This war was clearly, if we exclude Russia, a war of the "modern" countries against the "survivals." Even the Balkan states, in spite of their technical industrial "backwardness," were deeply imbued with the ideas of the French Revolution. Neither Serbia nor Montenegro had a feudal background. The power of the Italian king was only nominal, and England, then liberal to the core, had an ineffective Conservative opposition. The Russian Revolution did not bring despair alone to London and Paris but also a sigh of relief. Now at last it was possible for the American Republic to join the crusade to make Europe safe for politicians, traders, and dictators. People spoke of a victory of the ideals of 1688, 1776, and 1789. Today these very ideals are effectively challenged by 1917, 1922, and 1933. It is London and Washington who are now the "survivals" with a conservative program against the revolutions.

Hardly had the war begun when an immense propaganda of hatred and calumnies enveloped the more ochlocratically inclined countries of the world. Propaganda was used to a small extent in the "backward" countries like Russia, Turkey, Serbia, Austria-Hungary, and Rumania. In Germany, Italy, and certainly in France it was felt quite strongly. But England and the United States outdid them all. Propaganda had to arouse active hatred and indignation in order to keep the modern "fighting spirit" alive. The hinterland was soon more enraged and inflamed than the front, and the female element at home was in that respect far worse than any active combatant. The conception of traditional chivalry on the Western Front survived merely in the *ci-devant* individualistic weapon of the air force.

Waves of soldiers, driven by sinister, teeth-gnashing sentiments, were hurled against each other; the more illiterates the armies contained, the lower the level of "popular education," the smaller the percentage of city-bred population, the more human was the war.

Austrian officers, referring to the Galician or Volhynian battlefields, spoke about the "gentleman front," a term that was not extended to the Isonzo Valley, while the war in the Dolomites had more personal aspects and was therefore also more affected by the spirit of chivalry and sport. Russian prisoners of war, "farmed out" to the Hungarian peasantry, had a good time; frequently they married the war widows and nobody saw anything blamable in it. English as well as French was taught in Austrian and German schools during the war. But Austria-Hungary alone, being less "progressive" than her German ally, refrained from putting enemy aliens of military age into concentration camps, a method practiced by Berlin, London, and Paris alike. Prisoners of war, especially officers, had frequently a good time in Austria and Montenegro;[132] Austrian and German craftsmen, released from military prisons by the Russian authorities, could settle down in smaller towns, and made a splendid living until Bolshevism destroyed their prospects. The Siberian camps, of course, were less pleasant.

This propaganda of hatred[133] in modern wars is of absolute necessity because of their ochlocratic character, because public opinion has to be taken into consideration, *and also because all modern wars are (for the aforementioned reasons) "holy wars."* Human nature is basically *idealistic* and it is impossible, contrary to general beliefs, to wage a modern mass war for economic or for that sake also for dynastic reasons. Only professional soldiers who love fighting for fighting's sake would cooperate in such an enterprise. Yet these are always a small minority. The mass war demands mass emotions because it is only possible to ask the average man to sacrifice his life for an emotional value and one has to admit sadly that hatred is often stronger than love.[134]

The Russian soldiers who "attacked" the enemy forty-five lines deep in the Carpathians, the first fifteen lines equipped with prayer books instead of rifles, fought perhaps without "conviction," but also without hatred. Yet

from a higher point of view it is definitely better to die *for* "Holy Russia" and the "Little Father Czar" than in a crusade *against* "Huns."

Efforts to restore peace and to stop the senseless butchering, by which big capital alone profited handsomely, were made by supranational as well as by international powers. The Socialists met in Stockholm but their efforts were in vain. The British government had not given passports to the members of the Labor Party, while the German government, eager for a peaceful settlement — in spite of such intransigents as Ludendorff and Count Stolberg-Wernigerode — had acted otherwise. President Wilson's appeal and proposals demonstrated the depressing ignorance of the ex-governor of New Jersey in the affairs of Europe, but it was received with sympathy in the capitals of all belligerent powers. Efforts of greater importance were made by the Pope, but they, too, failed miserably on account of the hostility from the side of the German Protestants, headed by Michaelis,* and the "liberal" anti-Catholics led by the fatal triumvirate, Wilson, Lloyd George, Clémenceau.[135] A moral victory of the papacy had to be avoided by all means and the indifference of these statesmen toward the death of millions of men was manifest.[136] The great task of paving the way for Adolf Hitler was not yet accomplished. Stupidity, shortsightedness, greed, prejudice, and bigotry had never reaped greater victories. The democratically elected *politicos* quickly proceeded after their sanguinary diplomatic victory over the papacy to thwart another peace effort coming this time from Charles I, the pious emperor of Austria.

While English, French, and German shareholders of the flourishing Nobel dynamite factories discussed dividends and interests in peaceful Switzerland, and German soldiers on the western front were killed by weapons for which the Krupp works continued to receive royalties during the whole war, delegates of Charles I met the emperor's brother-in-law on neutral soil. This young man, Prince Sixte of Bourbon-Parma, thanks to the intervention of the queen of the Belgians, served in the Belgian army.**

It was the intention of the Austrian ruler to use his relative as an intermediary between himself and the French government. In a later stage he sent an autographed letter to be shown to the French authorities who promptly published it in order to sow discord between Vienna and Berlin.

Through this wanton betrayal of confidence the peace efforts were frustrated.[137]

Thus the war went on; the Allies had in the meantime given binding promises to the dissatisfied elements in the dual monarchy and President Wilson proclaimed pompously that he was not willing to deal with the representatives of the "German autocracy." The hungry and desperate masses of the Central Powers revolted and exiled their monarchs in order to comply with Wilson's demands, and the drama which found its climax on September 1, 1939, took its course.

One hears frequently the argument that the Central Powers would have treated the Allies brutally if they had won the war, and the treaties of Brest-Litovsk (Brześć nad Bugiem) and Bucharest are always cited as outstanding examples of a dictatorial peace arrangement and as logical forerunners of St. Germain and Trianon. Yet in connection with these two treaties one is tempted to repeat Bowie Haggart's words in Barrie's *Auld Licht Idylls:*

I am of opeenion that the works of Burns is of an immoral tendency, I have not read them myself, but such is my opeenion.

Yet it is true that the Treaty of Brest was not fair. The Central Powers were anxious to impress the world by their moderation and a weak effort was made to apply Wilson's delirious proposal for "self-determination"; the result was a compromise in favor of the Russians. The Finns, Esthonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Poles were given borders which were far from meeting their just demands. Thus the Latvians of Latgalia were left under the communist regime. The district of Chelm, populated by Ukrainians with Polish sympathies, was given to the Ukraine and naturally the Poles were alienated in their sympathies from the Central Powers to such a degree that they instinctively turned to the Allies for help in the realization of their hopes. The Esthonians who had claims for the district of Petseri were no less disappointed than the Finns, who had expected to receive Karelia and Ingermanland. Without the possession of these two provinces they could never reasonably hope to stave off communist attacks in the future.* The Ukraine became an independent country and even after the breakdown of Skoropadsky's and Petlyura's nationalist regimes and the subsequent victory of the Bolsheviks this country was never reincorporated into

(Soviet) Russia, but became merely a member of the international Soviet Union.

Yet in spite of the actual intentions, the Treaty of Brest Litovsk was soon decried as the most brutal and dictatorial arrangement. *The fact that the newly revived nations again had to resort to arms, immediately after the final defeat of the Central Powers, in order to conquer additional territories from the Soviet Union* (to which they had perfect claims), *proves the contrary*. The Finns thus acquired Petsamo; the Latvians, Latgalia; the Esthonians, Petseri; the Poles got thousands of square miles; and even the Rumanians, the "gallant Allies in the East," did not make the slightest move to return Bessarabia, to which they had a good right according to national statistics and historical tradition. This time no voice of protest was heard and the western statesmen considered it not a crime that as many square inches as possible should be wrenched from the destructive realm of the Red Czar. And this time they were (accidentally) right. (See map, Appendix V.)

The situation at the Treaty of Bucharest was not identical. Rumania was a monarchy and her ruler a relative of the other European dynasties.* It must be remembered that the Soviet Union, although outside the category of traditional European states, was nevertheless treated as a diplomatic equal at Brest Litovsk. Its representatives, fresh from the Siberian prisons and the Ukrainian ghettos, dined solemnly with the prince regent of Bavaria, Count Czernin, General Hoffmann, and Herr von Kühlmann.** Even Ludendorff, that Machiavellian and destructive militarist who had shipped Lenin to Russia, was present and hobnobbed with Trotzky, Radek, and Yoffe. The old tradition of sportsmanship still lingered on.*** And this tradition was even stronger in the Rumanian case. A group of Rumanian politicians (under Marghiloman) suggesting that their country should be included in an Austro-Hungarian federation and their royal house exiled was — in spite of William II's wavering attitude — not listened to.

Rumania had to consent to a correction of her Hungarian border, involving the loss of a few hundred square miles of barren land in the Carpathians with a population of about 3000 people. She had also to cede 23,000 square kilometers in the southeast (the Dobrudja) to the Central Powers who turned over one third of this territory to Bulgaria.* Rumania, on the other hand, was compensated for the loss of 800,000 inhabitants in

the Dobrudja (a loss which was not final) with Bessarabia, a province of 44,000 square kilometers and almost 3,000,000 inhabitants. The "reactionary and feudal" Central Powers forced Rumania to grant full citizenship to its Jewish subjects.** Thus Rumania emerged from her defeat with an actual gain. Yet this did not prevent her from declaring war on the Central Powers three hours prior to the armistice and to seize another gigantic piece of land equivalent to about 90 per cent of her own territory.

Such were these two treaties. It is interesting to note that there were few Englishmen or Americans who acclaimed the "liquidation" of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in 1940 with great enthusiasm. When Soviet Russia knifed Poland in the back supporting Nazi aggression and started to grab Bessarabia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia in order "to redress the wrongs of Brest Litovsk" (as their press wrote), the United States State Department and the Foreign Office protested against these actions. When Russia attacked Finland in 1939 in order to swallow her up, few "democrats" exulted with joy. Even moderate Socialists felt outraged about this unprovoked assault, and yet one wonders how many of them realize that Finland's independence has been stipulated in Brest Litovsk and that her freedom was largely due to German armed intervention.

The affirmation that the Western Powers were fighting for "democracy" had gained more credibility by the end of 1917. Russia had become a "democracy" in March, but the Russian ochlocracy went through the stages of evolution quicker than even Plato had dared to dream. The young republic was already a tyranny in November, and Hungary achieved the same goal in an equally short time, while Germany, always slow and thorough, took fourteen fateful years.

Supranational monarchism was dead by 1919. A Welsh lawyer in the highest political office of Great Britain demanded publicly the hanging of the first cousin of his own king. It made an excellent slogan for elections and worked like magic. *A regime with ochlocratic tendencies which goes to war and makes full use of its skill in the art of propaganda cannot suddenly swing around and stop abruptly all artificially aroused sentiments*. It is easy to stop a small canoe within a few yards of the embankment, but a 70,000 ton ocean steamer, doing 32 knots per hour in one direction has to slow down and to put on counterspeed many miles before it reaches the harbor.

Governments under popular pressure are such large boats. Peace treaties are thus forced and concluded by the representatives of the victorious masses, who are still under the spell of mass emotion.[138] Brest Litovsk and Bucharest were not in the least influenced by the general will, and there is no doubt that Hungarian public opinion demanded a greater "punishment" for Rumania, to which the Hungarian experts and the King-Emperor did not agree.

The shortcomings of the suburban treaties of Paris — Versailles, Trianon, St. Germain, Neuilly, and Sevres — can be summed up as follows:

1. The atmosphere of mass hatred under which these treaties were concluded. (Which is largely due to nationalism and democratism.)
2. The lack of fraternal royal feeling which usually paralyzes the effects of general hatred.
3. The monumental ignorance of the political leaders and the lack of expert geographical opinion.[139]
4. The complete failure of the economic "experts" in their estimates.
5. The return to primitive "dictation" (*Vae victis!*) and the absence of the element of negotiation.
6. The social treatment of the delegates of the former Central Powers.
7. The application of impossible geopolitical dogmas.
8. The breach of promises and disregard of the original program (14 points of Wilson) due to secret commitments.
9. The humiliation inflicted through the war-guilt clauses.
10. "Punishment" of nations.[140]

The trouble is that modern countries are usually run by *politicians* and not by *statesmen*, which is a different thing altogether. The representatives of the western nations had an educational background which was certainly inferior to that of a Dutch secondary school.[141] There is little doubt that a personal meeting of European monarchs would have moved on a higher plane and that greater intimacy and understanding would have prevailed. There was not a single ruler in 1917 who did not speak three to five languages with great ease. Yet the lack of linguistic abilities alone would not have had such fateful consequences; an astounding ignorance of history

and geography prevailed among the people's representatives who had been chosen on account of their popularity, not their knowledge, and this they had little time to improve once they were in office. It is highly probable that in the subjects mentioned premier and president could never have successfully passed the entrance examination to a Continental university. To this lack of education and knowledge one has to add a lack of manners and ineradicable prejudices. Mr. David Lloyd George disliked monarchs and he didn't care for Catholic ideas. Yet Europe is, apart from its northwestern islands and peninsulas, a predominantly Catholic continent.* Whether one likes the Church or not, one cannot ignore her. Yet Mr. Lloyd-George expected more from the genuine, mutual sympathies of "free nations" than from traditional solutions.[142] But these same nations soon voted for dictatorships** and the ensuing "popular leaders" made old-fashioned liberals long for a revival of the Middle Ages. But then it was too late.

Mr. Wilson had a similar dislike for Catholics and this prejudice had fatal consequences.[143] It was a tragedy that two of the representatives of the Big Four were Protestants (the one a Calvinist, the other a Wesleyan) and that the rest consisted of lapsed Catholics. Clémenceau was even famous for his violent anticlericalism.

Thus ended in 1919 the Christian political history of Europe. This is the deeper significance of the "suburban" treaties which really were suburban from every point of view. The French Revolution had begun the work of destruction. Now it had received its official seal. In order to solidify this new disorder a League of Nations was set up. This secular dream of gentlemen in tails and top hats sitting around a table, united by some vague humanitarian mutual affection and talking shop could never become effective.[144] The lack of a common spiritual basis and a common moral code doomed the League to failure before she even settled down on the shores of Lake Geneva. What, after all, did unite these hopeless busybodies? The knowledge of God's all-compromising fatherhood or just the experience that wars were expensive and uncomfortable? Strange people could be seen in the halls of the palace of the League. Little yellow men who affirmed that their emperor descended from the sun goddess Amaterasu, delegates of loyalist Spain which persecuted religion brutally, delegates of the Soviet Union firmly believing in Marxian dialectics,

Scandinavians putting their faith in materialism and the fatherhood of the *Pithecanthropus erectus Dubois*, Austrians and Portuguese who came from countries which tried to oppose the evil spirit of the time. Their faiths divided them more than their languages. And through the windows one looked out on the town of *Jean* Cauvin and *Jean* Jacques Rousseau.[145]

This league of men who were neither noble, nor savage, nor anything else soon found its deserved end.

The Treaty of Versailles* *itself* was not the great evil which finally brought the National Socialists into power. It is not difficult to vindicate the letter of Versailles; it is the *spirit* which makes it inexcusable. It is the spirit of Versailles which brought no material advantage whatsoever to the victors but gave the National Socialists a powerful weapon into their hands. Was it necessary to copy Herr von Bismarck's bad dramatic taste in choosing the Mirror Hall of Versailles, birthplace of the Second Reich, as a stage for the scene where the German delegates were made to sign the fateful document? They signed the death warrant of the Second Reich which was a none too glorious period in German history but a mild one in comparison with the one bound to follow. Could not another day have been picked than the fifth anniversary of the assassination in Sarayevo and the four hundredth anniversary of the election of the greatest ruler of the First Reich — Charles V?** Was it necessary to celebrate in such solemn form the fact that murder *does* pay?* Could not Count Brockdorff-Rantzau be treated at least in the same way as Trotzki was treated in Brest Litovsk? Was it necessary to force the signature under the war guilt clause?**

Many similar questions could be asked in connection with that sad and silly Treaty of Versailles. But one thing can be mentioned in its defense and that is its *factual* content which was hard but not intolerable. The financial demands were anyhow so unreasonable that no intelligent person expected that the demands could be met. Yet the territorial arrangements gave sense. Alsace-Lorraine, as could be expected from French insistence, was detached from Germany. The Danes had a perfect right to northern Sleswig, and the Poles ought to have received more than they did. The plebiscites in the Upper Silesian and the East Prussian lands were unfortunately held at a much too early date. For these Reich citizens of Polish nationality the idea

to join Poland was still identical with joining Russian Poland (*"Congress Poland"*) which was maladministrated under Muscovite rule. The plebiscites were therefore in favor of Germany and added to the friction. Another mistake was made in the case of Danzig, a mistake which caused endless complications. *National* ("racial") borders in eastern Europe are utter nonsense; Danzig, together with *all* of Western Prussia (Pomorze), Posen, and Upper Silesia, should have been given to Poland. This would have included even more Germans, but from the point of view of a minority it is better to be numerous than to be suppressed as a negligible quantity which can offer no resistance. The more national minorities a state has, the less efficient, hopeful, and active will their suppression be. One has only to compare the desperate situation of the Austro-Germans in the South Tyrol, under Italian domination, with the Germans in Bohemia and Moravia under Czech rule.

A Poland with its historic borders in the west including Upper Silesia would have been a strong, well-rounded state; with the borders of Versailles it was crippled from the very beginning. The Poles are undoubtedly to blame for their excessive nationalism, but it would be very unjust to blame them alone for this suicidal policy.[146] *As long as ethnic nationalism is a potent force no reasonable political life can exist, no reasonable state can be put up, no reasonable and permanent border drawn*.

The total loss of colonies was definitely a breach of promise but practically no financial loss to Germany. In view of all these facts it is not an exaggeration to believe that, in spite of the *factual* arrangements of Versailles, the rise and victory of National Socialism has little connection with the treaty *itself*. The circumstances of the signing, the accusations, humiliations, discriminations are of a more serious nature. Yet the real root of all evil was the nature of the events of 1918–1919: the Weimar Constitution, the flight of William II to Holland, the increased centralization, socialism and socialization, the whole impetus which ochlocracy and materialism gained, thanks to the victory of the Allies. Versailles has as much to do with the reasons for the existence of National Socialism as the Boston Tea Party with American Independence. Both events were symptoms and not causes.

Germany lost the war technically on November 11, 1918, when she sued for an armistice, but she won it "back," in spite of Versailles (even materially) when Austria had to consent to the breaking up of her territory in the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye a few months later. This treaty was supplemented a year later with the *Diktat* of Trianon between Hungary and the Allies.

The procedure in all three cases was the same; for weeks the representatives of the Allies deliberated among themselves and then "informed" the delegates of the Central Powers, who were treated like dangerous criminals, of their "decision." Not a single point of the original draft was modified. Even a man like Bismarck had changed the preliminary treaty with France by returning the district of the fortress of Belfort to her. But the high-pressure salesmanship of the Western Powers had finally the opposite effect from that which they expected. Germany had already deeply impressed most Europeans with her stand for four and a half years against practically the whole world. "Morally" she had lost very little.[147] But now that the map was so radically changed, after the solid block of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy had been smothered into unrecognizable fragments, Germany was put in the most advantageous geopolitical situation. It was now only a question of time when a rejuvenated and reinforced Germany would enter into a receivership for the liquidated estates of the dual monarchy. The imaginary "road to Bagdad" was now a reality.

To illustrate the situation better one might visualize a cage (Central Europe) containing a lion and a tiger, Austria and Germany. The Allies killed the lion, carved him up, broiled his slices, and left these on a platter. Then they humiliated the tiger beyond words, clipped his tail and ears, cut his claws, wounded his back, starved him, and locked the cage. Our "democratic" simpletons were highly astonished when the tiger started to eat the remains of his former cage mate once he had finished with the job of licking his wounds.

It must be realized that the Habsburgs in exile meant the green light for Prussianized Germany. When William II arrived in Amerongen the way for Adolf Hitler was open,[148] when Charles I debarked from a British cruiser on the shores of an African island to die a bitter death in exile, the war was

lost for the Allies. The fact that it took them twenty years to become aware of this truth has no bearing on the matter.[149]

Another aspect of this great anti-Austrian victory[150] was the Balkanization of large parts of Europe. The "democrats," who always boasted of being "moderns," created fragmentary states which were against the very spirit of the time and a challenge to economic principles. Yet neither monolithic centralized mammoth states nor hopeless parcellation is the solution, but the federal, decentralized principle of organic crystallization. Now countries were invented which in history had never existed before. In vain do we try to find names like "Czechoslovakia" or "Yugoslavia" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica of 1912. The name Rumania had only been coined in the fifties in order to have a common label for Vallachia and Moldavia. But the lack of any tradition was considered an asset rather than a handicap. In vain did Hungarian propaganda emphasize that their country was an *ezeréves királyág*, a kingdom over 1000 years old;* the expression "the young republic" sounded so far better and hopeful.

These new states were nationalistic states with enormous minorities. Czechoslovakia had 52 per cent of non-Czechs,* Yugoslavia, 60 per cent non-Serbs,** Rumania, 25 per cent non-Rumanians. These new countries insisted from time to time, not without deeper justification, on being called "democracies." If their "dominating race" formed more than 50 per cent of the population or provided more than half the deputies in their parliaments, then the minorities had no hope for a revindication of their rights. Their treatment usually varied from suspicion and fiscal vexation to brutal persecution, mass execution, torture and exile. After all, they disturbed the uniform monotony of the herd, and were thus *eo ipso* troublemakers.

A rigorous application of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination is, of course, equally hopeless. The masses generally do not know what is best for themselves or the community of states. This principle, if sincerely invoked, produced such monstrosities as the Czech-German border after the Munich Conference, this sublime triumph of Wilsonism.*** The National Socialists, with their spasmodically manifested respect for the general will,

have invoked this principle very successfully when it fitted in with their plans.

It is the nationalistic uniformistic spirit which lies at the bottom of these evils. The problem will only be solved if people are able to get back to their natural delight for a diversity of languages, customs, dresses, and habits. The alternative is rather simple; it is *either* return *or* suicide.

The breaking up of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was also a heavy blow to the Church which awoke after the victory of the progressive Allies in a thoroughly bourgeois world.[151] The victory of the middle classes was almost complete.

Rump Austria was governed most of the time by a Catholic party which frequently had to compromise with a huge Socialist minority exercising an absolutistic rule over the city of Vienna. This metropolis harbored one third of the population of the small Alpine republic, which tended to become a "second Switzerland." Yet while ochlocratic and socialist influences made Vienna the heart and brain of the Second Internationale, the Alpine districts under Catholic influence developed an ardent hatred against Vienna.

Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania installed an ochlocratic and bureaucratic rule with oligarchic tendencies. Officialdom is for the etatistic bourgeois the same thing as the clergy for the people of the Middle Ages. A soulless, inorganic bureaucracy, centralizing tendencies, the middle classes, state omnipotency, and uniformity all go very well together.

Hungary after a short communist reign of terror became in name a monarchy again. In practice it is a republic run by the Calvinist gentry as the most powerful class. Hungary and Czechoslovakia were both predominantly Catholic (Hungary, 67 per cent, the Czechoslovak Republic, 78 per cent in 1937) yet most of their high officials were non-Catholic if not anti-Catholic. The Regent Horthy of Hungary, the Prime Ministers Bethlen and Gömbös, the Presidents Masaryk and Beneš of Czechoslovakia were Protestants, Agnostics, or Neo-Hussites. In spite of the hatred and tension between Hungary and Czechoslovakia the Hungarian Calvinists unceasingly cooperated with M. Beneš in his efforts to thwart a Habsburg restoration. As a rule the non-Catholic elements always were bitterly anti-Habsburg. The Neo-Hussites in Bohemia, the Moravian Brethren in

Moravia, the Lutherans in Slovakia, the Calvinists in Hungary, the Schismatics as well as the "Old Catholics" in Transylvania and Croatia opposed the Habsburgs, Vienna and Austria with the despair of hatred. The Jews were frequently in the same boat and only after the rise of National Socialism in Germany did they change their direction.* Yet men like Beneš persevered. "I rather want to see the Nazis in Prague than the Habsburgs in Vienna," he had declared in 1934. There is little evidence of an organized conspiracy; the anti-Habsburg sentiment of the evangelical and agnostic groups was an instinctive resentment* and paved Germany's way to the Balkans in the last years.

The new order — i.e., the "liberation of small oppressed nations" — found approval in the leftist circles of Paris as well as in British nonconformity. Mr. Wickham Steed and Mr. Seton-Watson (*Scotus Viator*) saw their dreams come true. The light of progress had finally come to the Danubian area which British and American** liberalism had always considered the darkest part of Europe with the possible exception of Turkey.

The man to avenge the easy murder of Austria was an Austrian who got hold for this purpose of the most deadly and precise instrument in Europe — the German people. At one time he had turned his eye south of the Alps, as all Germans traditionally do. A superficial glance seemed enough. And then he started to create a superochlocratic, superidentitarian, monotonous, and monolithic state which was a synthesis of all ideas sprung from the French Revolution, a veritable *reductio ad absurdum* of "progressive" thought, a gorgonic mirror to the West. This man is Adolf Hitler.

Involuntarily Virgil's immortal hexameter comes into one's mind: *Exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor!**** This avenger from the bones of dead Austria has come.

National Socialism, as we have pointed out before, is not the result of the Treaty of Versailles. Nor has the movement as such anything to do with St. Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly,[152] which were instrumental in laying the foundations for this *war*. Yet the present issue is, in the political and ideological sense a clear outcome of the political and ideological efforts of the victorious Allies in 1918–1919, and the result of their so-called order, which was (badly) organized disorder.*****

The fatal thing which happened twenty-two years ago was the victory of the principles of national, identitarian, ochlocracy and a spurious concept of "democracy" in Central and Eastern Europe.* There is only a very short step from national majoritarianism to National Socialism, a step as short as that from mortal disease to death.

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* The general European interpretation of the American political traditions and values was, needless to say, far off the mark.

* France re-established diplomatic relations after the war. Latvia with 400,000 Catholics was represented at the Vatican. Even Britain with barely 7 per cent Catholics has an envoy. The United States with twenty-two million Catholics still preserves her "splendid isolation" unlike pagan Japan and China and Lutheran Finland.

** It was *imperial* Germany which readmitted the Jesuits in 1917. The Jesuits are still debarred from "democratic" Switzerland (and Norway).

*** The Emperor-King Charles abolished this regulation immediately after the death of Francis Joseph.

* This theory supported Italy's claim for the Brenner border which finally put 250,000 German Austrians into Fascist servitude. Professor A. Penck, the well-known geographer wrote the best treatise against the watershed theory.

* The French have never published their archives.

** One frequently hears the talk of "well-informed historians" maintaining that Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium which she had solemnly pledged to respect. Yet Germany never signed the Belgian Neutrality Pact for the simple reason that she did not exist in the years between 1806 and 1871. The Belgian neutrality was actually violated by Austria-Hungary (who was a signatory) by sending their heavy artillery, which alone was able to crack the heavy fortifications, to Belgium in August-September, 1914.

Neither were all Englishmen so sure whether they had to defend the neutrality of Belgium prior to the secret Anglo-French "naval" alliance of 1907. During the Boulangist crisis in 1887 several papers published letters and editorials urging nonintervention in the case of French or German violation of Belgium independence. The *Standard*, semiofficial English paper, brought a letter of "Diplomaticus" on February 2 which was followed by an editorial on the fourth. There was an editorial the same day with the same tendency by Stead in the *Pall Mall Gazette* and an article representing a similar view by Sir Charles Dilke in a June number of the *Fortnightly Review*. The text of the treaty (confirmed by Prussia, Austria, England, and Russia) was actually not clear and the secret clause about the fortresses actually permitted occupation of the Belgian fortresses by a large power *other than France*. This secret clause was never formally abrogated but it can be maintained that it had lost its object by the passing of the Napoleonic danger.

The famous Belgian jurist, professor Ernest Nys, a member of the International Court of Arbitration in the Hague wrote in 1912 in his monumental work: *Le droit international, les principes, les théories, les faits* (Bruxelles, 1912, I, p. 424): "In reality Belgium obtained the guarantees of neutrality, but the Five Powers did not give her a guarantee of the integrity and inviolability of her territory. . . . This is a situation quite different from that of Switzerland."

There is no doubt that the attack on a peaceful country is not a commendable deed. But the attack on Greece by the Allies in 1917 was morally as condemnable as Germany's attack of Belgium in 1914—not less and not more so. Germany's assault on Belgium in 1940 on the other hand was a far

greater crime than either forementioned cases; it happened almost immediately after a solemn declaration of nonintervention.

Says Guglielmo Ferrero: "The Allies tore up two treaties—the Declaration of Paris of 1856 and the Declaration of London of 1909—which limited the right of blockade to material strictly necessary for armies and warfare. The nations who blockaded the central empires do not yet realize that in 1914 the wholesale blockade, as the Allies applied it, was a measure of warfare quite as expressly prohibited by treaty as the invasion of Belgium."—*Peace and War*. Trans, by Bertha Pritchard, London, 1933, p. 59.

* Austria was ready to cede to Italy all the Italian-speaking part of the South Tyrol as well as territories near Triest, which should receive the status of a free city. In the case of a victory of the Central Powers Italy could expect the return of Corsica, Nizza, Savoy, and the annexation of Tunisia in addition to the districts blackmailed from Austria.

* It must be stated here in all fairness that the German emperor, who was never a bigoted anti-Catholic, received the papal peace proposals with great sympathy. Michaelis' boycott of the peace plan is splendidly described in Friedrich Ritter von Lama's *Die Friendensvermittlung Papst Benedikt XV* (Munich, 1932).

The president of the German Protestant Union, Count Stolberg-Wernigerode wrote a flaming manifesto declaring that "the glittering, victorious sword is going to decide the issue and not dark papal intrigue," which sounds amusing in the light of the outcome of the war. Yet the funniest part of his open letter lies in his accusation that the pope purposely made his efforts in the year when all "Germany celebrated the four-hundredth anniversary of the Reformation" (1517–1917).

** As a descendant of the Bourbons, who after all had some merits in regard to France, the egalitarian French Republic, did not permit him to join the French forces. Later, as a special privilege, he was allowed to reside in France.

* There is little doubt that Finland in the possession of Ingermanland and Karelia would have been in the position militarily to take care of herself in 1939–1940. The Nyeva River, Lake Ladoga, the Zvir River, Lake Onyega, and the White Sea would have given her a perfect system of defense. In addition she would have received a Finnish-speaking population of 600,000 people.

* It is psychologically not easy for a monarchy to consider a republic as an "equal," just as there was a marked difference between a country inside and outside of the League of Nations. To have a Christian monarch was equivalent to belong to a definite covenant to which the outsider had no claim.

The supporters of the League regarded the very existence of countries outside the League as undesirable. Monarchs considered for similar reasons the existence of republics in Europe as something negative. Switzerland was always treated as an exception because of her self-declared neutrality. Her neutrality was therefore a declaration to keep out of European politics, to keep out of the whole game of alliances, treaties, wars, and diplomatic intrigues.

** See the amusing descriptions in J. Wheeler-Bennett's, *The Forgotten Peace, Brest-Litovsk*, pp. 113–115 (New York, 1939).

*** If one compares this attitude with the behavior of the Allies toward the delegates of the *democratic* Weimar Republic, who were kept behind barbed wire, one is able to make an estimate of Europe's decline since 1815. The delegates of Austria and of Hungary were similarly treated like criminals.

* Rumania gained the Southern Dobrudja in a most peculiar way. When Bulgaria was overwhelmed in the Second Balkan War by a coalition of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Turkey the Rumanians appeared on the scene and occupied the defenseless Southern Dobrudja.

Bulgaria coveted, after the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, also the central and northern part of the Dobrudja (which is largely populated by non-Rumanians) but Austria-Hungary and Germany

were determined to return this region to Rumania after the war. This produced a similar result as the cessation of Chelm to the Ukrainians. The Bulgarians cooled down in their enthusiasm for the Central Powers and concluded an early, separate armistice with the Allies after the first big reverses in autumn, 1918.

**Cf. the curious protest of D. Iancovici in *La Paix de Bucharest*, Paris, 1918, p. 201 and *Texts of the Rumanian Peace*, Washington, D. C., 1918, pp. 28–29.

* The Catholic population of the European Continent is roughly 210 millions, the Protestant, 65 millions. The Catholic birth rate lies on the average 65 per cent higher than the Protestant.

** About the superficiality of European "Liberalism," see Eugene M. Anderson's excellent article in *Social Education*, May, 1938.

* The reader is reminded that the Treaty of Versailles was concluded between the Allies and Germany only. As a treaty, that of Versailles is much less important than the treaties of St. Germain (Austria) and Trianon (Hungary and the Allies), treaties which changed the map of Europe *more* fundamentally than Versailles.

** The date was June 28. There is, of course, a possibility (taking the poor educational background of the delegates into consideration) that they were not intentionally mischievous.

* The Serbs erected promptly a monument for the murderer Gavrilo Princip. The National Socialist also found great delight in the idea of assassin worship and named many places after the murderer of Dollfuss (Planetta). The Italians preceded this noble cult by having many Piazza Oberdan(k) in their country. Oberdank was an Italian of German ancestry who attempted to assassinate Emperor Francis Joseph. Planetta (Pianetta) was probably of Italian descent. It is possible that foreign names incite individuals to a greater racial "self-assertion." (Earlier another man, with the *Czech* name of Drtil, tried to assassinate Dollfuss.)

** The reason given for the war guilt clause is that it would be impossible to make Germany pay without a "moral" justification. Neither is it moral to force a signature. If the Germans would have been told that the whole war was a mistake from both sides, that great damage was done, and that in a bout it is always the loser (not the "scoundrel") who pays the bill, much trouble could have been avoided.

* The countries of the oldest "national" continuity in Europe are Bulgaria, Croatia, and Hungary. Of these the Hungarians and Croats alone can claim also an unbroken continuity of statehood which is the more interesting because the Hungarians are not Europeans, but of Mongoloid, Finnish-Turkish descent.

* The Slovaks speak a language which is almost identical with Czech but their history, tradition, and character marks them out as a totally different people.

** The Serbs cynically listed in their statistics every Bulgarian as "Yugoslav." Neither was a difference made in their census between Serb, Croat, and Slovene.

*** Another attempt to create a "linguistic" frontier was made in the case of the new (1940) border between Rumania and Hungary which clearly shows that the National Socialist genius is always able to beat the "democratic" mind in its own game, be that even the noble competition in absolute stupidity.

These new borders fit national-socialist purposes admirably. It will help to keep Central Europe full of frictions, suspicions, and hatred. It will prevent the establishment of any state which is strong enough to serve as a crystallizing point and thus might antagonize Germany. *Divide et Impera!* has been the great catchword since 1919.

* The first sign of a change of mind was Philipp Menczel's book *Trügerische Lösungen* which was published in the early thirties. Herr Mènczel is a zionistic Jew from Czernowitz in the Bukovina (then under Rumanian rule).

* This resentment is little justified. The German line of the Habsburgs never permitted the Inquisition to work in their hereditary countries and while Protestants did suffer disadvantages (*outside* of Hungary) these were never of a penal character as for instance those imposed upon British Catholics.

** Theodore Roosevelt, not less than Mr. Wilson, was in favor of a partition of "that survival." The anti-Habsburgian tradition in the United States dates from the great Kossuth reception in New York. Yet one might doubt whether the American public would have been so overenthusiastic had it known the truth about M. Kossuth's political views, mainly in regard to national minorities.

*** *Aeneas* IV, 625.

**** The main pillar of this ludicrous "order" was besides the League of Nation the so-called "Little Entente," consisting of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, who had replaced the "ramshackle" Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was the task of this combination of Ruritanian "democracies" to prevent Germany's expansion toward the East. The total incongruity of their own power in relation to this task was manifest when we remember that the main activity of this trio consisted in securing their problematic survival. This they could only hope to carry out successfully by preserving the *status quo* — in Austria and Hungary. Neither country was permitted to restore the Habsburgs to their throne, and Budapest and Vienna were repeatedly warned that such an action would constitute a *casus belli*. (Hungarian revisionism constituted another "danger.")

Yet it must be conceded that the states of the Little Entente were so weak and artificial that a restoration in Vienna and Budapest would have made them melt away like the snow in the sun. The only crystallizing factor in the Danubian area were the Habsburgs and the Czech. Serb and Rumanian politicians were stupid enough to let themselves be used by Hitler as stooges. When the day of reckoning came Czechoslovakia and Rumania surrendered without fighting a shot. Yugoslavia almost immediately lost two thirds of her army which went over to the German side. Only the disillusioned, but brave Serbs fought on. Yet the "ramshackle" Danubian monarchy fought valiantly for four and a half years.

Today certain Czechs are agitating again for the *status quo* in Central Europe. Yet *if* the Danubian area should be solidified into a harmonious whole then Austria and Hungary must have the right to choose their rulers after their own heart. If self-determination were again to be called a *casus belli* then one can safely deduct that a restoration of "Czechoslovakia" or "Yugoslavia" in its pristine form and its previous structure must be all means be avoided. In Central Europe only solidly founded states have a right to exist, not provisional establishments which crumble at the first opportunity and serve as steppingstones to German expansion.

* The treaties of 1919 and 1920 were, significantly enough, the first major pacts between Christian powers which omitted the invocation of the Holy Trinity.

PART III

CASE HISTORIES

A. THE GERMANIES
B. THE UNITED STATES

"In reality everybody shares a guilt in everything, yet people are not aware of it. If they would know it, Paradise would come to Earth immediately." — Dostoyevski, *Brothers Karamazov*.

I

THE GERMAN SCENE

Corruptio optimi pessima.
"We all love to stray along the edge of a precipice."
— Krizhanitch.

WE WERE guided by various reasons in picking out the Germanies as a subject for a case history in our political cultural analysis. Germany is first of all as *das Reich der Mitte* (the central realm) truly central in a geographical sense; halfway between Paris and Moscow, Rome and Stockholm, London and Bucharest, Madrid and Helsingfors it is basically different from the *marginal* states in the European framework, as, for instance, Ireland, Portugal, Greece or Norway. The German people, not unlike the Russian, has furthermore the proclivity to think through to the bitter end every accepted thought, coming from within or without, and to deduct every ultimate conclusion from such an ideology. This at least is a fundamentally Catholic trait in the German character which values logical honesty higher than prudence. It similarly follows out the logic of its heresies. If we look therefore at the *reductio ad absurdum* of the great heresies in either the purely religious or the political sphere, we have to look at Germany.

This function of the Germanies may have its extremely unpleasant consequences within that country or in its environments — consequences which everybody familiar with heresies must expect, but it is a function of the utmost necessity and even "usefulness" for the world at large, notwithstanding the fact that these evolutions each time cost millions of

human lives. The greatest sufferers are after all the Germans themselves. The Anglo Saxon might gloat over such an uncompromising and extremist attitude and pride himself with his great gift for compromise, but one has nevertheless to be grateful for the existence of a country where the devil has been pictured as walking about naked, with horns on a pig's head, and a fiery tongue dangling down on his hairy chest — a devil neither subtle, nor veiled, a devil as Dürer has drawn him side by side with the wandering, pensive knight.[153]

But in order to understand the German scene more accurately we must go back in history as far as Christmas day of A.D. 800. On this feast Charlemagne, King of the Germanic Franks, was crowned Holy Roman Emperor by Pope Leo III in Rome. His realm included all nations of the Latin Rite, with the exception of the inhabitants of the British Isles. He was truly the ruler of the Occident and he planned, by marrying the daughter of the Byzantine Emperor, to unite Christendom in East and West under one crown and one sword. His secular rule would have supplemented the spiritual rule of the Pope in Rome. The schism between East and West was at that time only a menace. The Millennium of Christendom seemed even then to be waiting "just around the corner." But disillusionment was to come instead.

Two generations later we behold the Carolingian Empire consisting now of three parts: France, Germany, and a weird realm stretching from the mouths of the Rhine down to Naples, thus comprising the Netherlands, Alsace-Lorraine, Switzerland and Italy. This "Lotharingian" Empire is next divided, twenty-seven years later, between the West Franks (French) and the East Franks (Germans), in such a way that the Germans receive control over Italy. This is the reason why the German and not the French rulers become Holy Roman Emperors, successors of Caesar and the *Imperatores Augusti*. Thus we see the Holy Roman Emperor as *primus inter pares* among the other European rulers; he was the Senior Monarch in Christendom and the worldly arm of the Papacy.

The German people shared with pride and pleasure this distinction bestowed upon its ruler. In spite of the frequent wars and altercations between Pope and Emperor, and the popular hatred between Germans and Italians, the position of the Emperor remained legally unchanged. There

was nothing farcical about the institution of the Empire, as Voltaire would have it when he remarked that it was neither Holy nor Roman nor an Empire. Even when its existence became *fictional* it still served the purpose of giving to its inhabitants an appeal to a spiritual mission and bestowing on them a certain supranational character which restrained them from making efforts to germanize the French of Lorraine or the Slavs of Bohemia and Lusatia. The name Germany (*Germania*) had almost disappeared from common usage and the word *Deutschland*, propagated by Luther, hardly became popular before the end of the First Reich (1806). There was a great diversity within the boundaries of the Empire, diversity of language, dialect, customs, dresses, and traditions. It was a world in itself; it was the heart of Europe and its most respected realm. The only fixed part of the Empire was Rome and the *Urbs* was also the metropolis of Christendom.

There was no political *capital* inside its borders; the emperors, who started out being hereditary rulers and later were elected in order to revert to the initial system, moved their residence from one place to another. We find them frequently in Vienna, but also in Prague, Innsbruck, and Ghent. They were crowned in Aix-la-Chapelle, in Rome, Bologna, and Frankfurt. They were buried in Speyer, Germersheim, Wiener-Neustadt, Utrecht, and Vienna. Constantin Frantz, the great German "Federalist" (i.e., Anti-Centralist) declared bluntly: "The very idea of a German capital has to be considered as thoroughly un-German" (*Deutschland und der Föderalismus*, Stuttgart-Berlin, 1921, p. 89).

A strong tribal sentiment prevented unification. The rise of a "national" sentiment as we witness it in the West is similarly a slow process. Yet the local dukes and princes, in the beginning pillars of a healthy federalism, became victims of separatistic tendencies. The reaction against this separatism ended under the influence of the French Revolution in the most morbid centralized national uniformity.

Actually one of the most difficult things to explain to non-Continentals is the meaning of the word *Reich*. In the technical sense it means "Empire," but there is much more to it than the mere designation of considerable extension. *Reich* indicates a realm with a specified *spiritual* character involving a metaphysical function in relation to the nations within the borders of the Reich as well as to the rest of the world. This function is the

realization of the theoretical *Reichsidee (Reichsgedanke*) which historically speaking has undergone considerable change. The expression "Second Reich" or "Third Reich" hints at a change — or should one say at a loss? — of the spiritual destiny and goal of the Empire and the assumption of a new character. The name *Deutschland* (Germany) never became very widespread because even materialistic Germans hardly ever considered it to be in a line with other "ordinary" countries like Scot*land*, Fin*land*, or Russia (Russ*land*). The past embodied by the Holy Roman Empire left its traces on the German character. And Germany is thus officially still *das Deutsche Reich*, "in memory" of a past when all of Christendom honored in *the* Emperor the temporal overlord of the world.[154]

Keeping all that in mind we must again concentrate upon the complexities that involve the vaguest and least comprehensible thing in the world — the German mind, the German character.

First of all it must be remembered that the Catholic essence of the Germanies, due to their specific privileges and obligations, was extremely strong and is still far more potent than the outsider is inclined to believe. Heresy has reached the Reich only through the channel of Wycliffe and Hus. Even the character of the Germans, on account of their existence in the heart of Europe, was of a catholic, i.e., universal nature.* (The meanings of the words "catholic" and "Catholic" will always be mutually inclusive.) There are only two peoples or nations with a naturally universal and cosmopolitan character; the Germans and the Jews. Both characters show the most incredible mosaic of national characteristics, both people were called for an eminent metaphysical mission and both experienced a fall which is comparable only to that of the Angels.**

The universality*** and uniqueness of the *natural* German character — uncorrupted by political or religious heresies—may be largely due to the fact that there is no nation in all of Europe which has so many direct and indirect neighbors.[155] In the latter group we count all those nations that contain a fair and sizable amount of Germans within their borders — no mere *emigrés*, but German settlers, who have actually transmitted and accepted important cultural values. These two groups (A and B) contain the following national groups:

A

1. Dutch
2. Flemings
3. Friesians
4. Danes
5. Lithuanians
6. Poles
7. Czechs
8. Slovaks
9. Magyars
10. Slovenes
11. Italians
12. Rhaeto-Romans and Ladinians
13. French as well as French Swiss and Walloons
14. Lusatians

B

15. Latvians
16. Esthonians
17. Russians
18. Rumanians
19. Ukrainians
20. Croatians
21. Serbs
22. A great variety of minor groups in S.E. Russia and in the Caucasus.

In examining the German (or for that matter the Jewish) character we find that the German has specific traits in common with almost every other European nation; he is supposed to have the profundity and depth of the Russian, the cleanliness of the Scandinavian, the thoroughness of the French, the linguistic abilities of the Pole, the melancholy of the Magyar, the gravity of the Dutch, the engineering genius of the British, the metaphysical speculation of the Near Easterner, the loyalty of the Swiss, the brutality of the Serb and the pragmatism of the Czech. Many of these qualities stand in a certain contradiction to each other and it must be admitted that the German as well as the Jewish character are highly contradictory in themselves.[156] How could even these paradoxes be

avoided if a synthesis of the European character is to be given? And does not a collection of such varying contradictory traits indicate the lack of a harmonious and rounded character? How, one might ask, can a nation with "borrowed" characteristics be sympathetic to others? The world-wide unpopularity of Germans and Jews* is in part the result of the fact that both nations are sufficiently alike to every other race nation to evoke immediate dislike, wrath, and uneasiness.** After all one prefers to have a dog for a pet rather than a monkey (or even a cat), the latter being too nearly like human beings in certain ways to be truly attractive.***

In the multitude of forms of the different German tribal and individual characters we have to look for the reason of the puzzle of "Germany: Jekyll or Hyde?" The unification has thrown the most different tribal characters together and has brought chaos to the eternal German mosaic. The Christmas tree and *Stille Nacht* hardly harmonizes with the concentration camp. The Hofbräu of Munich is alien in spirit to the blueprint of a Messerschmitt. Yet "Germany" is a subcontinent like India where Ghandi's campaign of nonviolence differs so radically from the memories of the terrible slaughter of Lucknow. . . .

The German is thus the best case of the European as such. But just because his character is not as extreme as that of the marginal European (Spaniard, Russian, Irish, Bulgarian) he becomes more easily a victim to objective things. This service to the objects — as Keyserling already has remarked — can go to inhuman and superhuman extremes. The German puts himself "under," subordinates himself to the things and thoughts. *Ich diene* — "I serve" — the device of the German Emperors of the Luxemburg dynasty, passed on to the Princes of Wales in its German form and expressed an idea which is not only German and British, but one of the best European and Christian traditions.[157] The danger of this attitude lies in the possibility of a complete surrender to an utterly negative cause, a surrender which unfortunately did not occur recently as an isolated case in German history. For the German "causes" become almost automatically sacred; they receive almost immediately an aura of transcendental immanence, and the German will subordinate every category of his existence to the one dominant idea, never hesitating to sacrifice human lives (his own or others) for the sacred cause. This seriousness is also applicable to minor matters; if

anything is accepted as duty (*Pflicht*) or task (*Aufgabe*) it has to be served with energy and determination. This is part of the secret of German efficiency.*

This efficiency, of course, is apparent in every domain, and as the contact between the West and the German countries is made in the three most unpleasant aspects of human life — non-Catholic philosophies, commercial travelers,** and mechanized soldiers — the world has begun to look at the war machinery and militarism as something typically German. Yet even such a bellicose state as Prussia fought only three consecutive wars in the 99 years from 1815 till 1914 and they all took place between 1863 and 1871, while England in her far-flung Empire was involved in eight wars of a larger scale, France in six, Russia in seven, and the United States in three such bloody enterprizes.***

Yet efficiency is not limited to the military affairs. The German's skill in the manufacture of high-precision instruments and chemicals, cameras, telescopes, and guns; his ability to build concrete highways, skyscrapers, and other material objects or gadgets; his talent as a historian, philologist, race driver, and novelist is supplemented by metaphysical speculations, a (sometimes vague) symbolism and a depth (*Tiefe*) which frequently reminds us of Russia.[158]

We can experience this depth in so many of the great German Catholics, such as Meister Eckehardt, Suso, Tauler, Hildegarde von Bingen, Albertus Magnus, Guardini, Przywara. There is no doubt that their remoteness from Latin *clarté* harbors many dangers. Heretics in both the political and the religious sphere, have interpreted these masters in their own way. The German love for Mystery and the Mysterious — a sentiment so alien to ochlocratic culture — is in itself no evil. It may be even a promise for a better future.

The Germanic parts of the Holy Roman Empire were not infected with heretical thought before the fifteenth century. But John Wycliffe deeply influenced Jan Hus, professor at the oldest University of the Empire, with his ideas and thus Prague, for a long time Imperial Residence, became the center of revolutionary ideas. Hussitism comprised *all* elements which shaped the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Evangelical

skepticism, pragmatism, nationalism and later on ochlocratic and communist tendencies characterized this dangerous heresy, which was the sanguinary forerunner of all identitarian revolutions to come. This eruption of the Czech volcano* could be crushed only with a maximum of force and the Hussite armies, under the leadership of Žižka, a Czech Cromwell, could be defeated only after his death. Catholicism was for the first time successfully challenged, and the issue was dragged into the political field. The poison of this heresy, suppressed only by force, continued to spread in secret. It was only a question of time when a new heresy would arise, ready to sweep over the endless northern plains as an enormous tidal wave. It came less than a hundred years later in the form of Lutheranism.

The time for its coming was propitious. The Papacy was weak and Humanism had prepared the ground for a nationalist movement. The dukes craved for greater independence from the Emperor, who, in a certain measure, was a Catholic executive. The knights were impoverished as a result of the rise of the commercial cities, and the patriarchal characteristics of serfdom were on the wane. The traders and bankers were weary of the ecclesiastical restrictions on interest.

It is true that it was Calvin who accelerated the rise of an urban, bourgeois culture in the West, in the Palatinate, in Switzerland, in France, in the Netherlands, and even beyond the seas — in Scotland, England, and in America. Luther on the other hand was more successful in de-Europeanizing the Germanies (a process which unfortunately is still continuing) and in undermining the unifying power of an emperor, who like Charles V, was equally interested in driving out the Turks from Hungary, fighting the Moors in Tunisia, getting crowned by the Pope in Bologna, studying the questions of native rights in Peru and Mexico, and evangelizing the islands in the Caribbean.

Luther, imbued with a fanatical hatred against everything non-German, and with a particular dislike for Rome, intended to create a German church of a local character. This bourgeois sentimental idea of a high-strung Augustinian, enveloped in ecstatic Germanism, could never please a Catholic cosmopolitan such as Charles V. Luther’s narrowness was rather aggravated by a frantic emotionalism of which a certain German type (Wagner, Hitler, Novalis) is well capable. He was possessed of a more Slavic than Germanic grudge against Latin clarity and legalism; the

meticulous adherence to the iron laws of logic, dry and well-weighted argumentation of a gradual and conclusive nature were alien to him. His whole appearance reminds one rather of a Prussian N.C. officer or of a Slovakian butcher, than of a West German intellectual. His bulging eyes and unkempt hair; his fat neck and bellowing voice; his inordinate love for food, drink, and sex; his coarse speech and eruptive nature are characteristic of certain low-class East Europeans. When he says: "I do not admit that my doctrine can be judged by anyone, not by the angels," one could almost imagine hearing Hitler speak. His statement that "Reason is contrary to faith" strikes the same Eastern Manichaean note as the declaration that "It is impossible to harmonize faith and reason."[159] It is the same type of thinking and arguing as Ludendorff's irrational and poetical *Gotteserkenntnis im Blute*, "God known in the blood," and the never expressed but omnipresent suspicion of good National Socialists that abstract brainwork is intrinsically "Jewish."*

Within the Holy Roman Empire Lutheranism had far-reaching effects. The very essence of the empire, which was necessarily Catholic, was challenged. The spiritual link between the "Roman" emperor and the Protestant princes was naturally weakened and German federalism evolved slowly into separatism. Wars between the *Sacra Maiestas Romana* and rebellious princes increased in frequency. These provincial chieftains, after the loot of ecclesiastic property, were now considerably richer and more powerful than before, and so, too, their influence in their own countries had gained, thanks to their new role as "heads" of the evangelical churches. The rapid capitalistic development of the Protestant cities, due to the benevolent attitude of Lutheranism and Calvinism toward the taking of interests and dividends, resulted in a financial strengthening of the North and the Northeast. In consequence, defection from the Church came as a tidal wave. While the Catholic Church in England fought a long and hopeless war against the moneybag and the Whigs, lasting almost 150 years, the destruction of Catholicism in northern Germany took hardly two decades. Protestantism had swept the country like wildfire.

The Habsburg dynasty, at that time already rulers of the Empire by heredity, rather than by election, bolstered up their sinking power in Central Europe through the acquisition of two kingdoms by marriage, one within

and the other from without the Reich; the annexation of the lands of the Bohemian crown[160] (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia) strengthened the imperial influence not less than Western Hungary. These countries, together with the Austrian Alpine provinces, formed a coherent domain along the southeast border of the empire. Vienna, situated near the point where the three "hereditary countries" met, increased in importance. It was here and in the neighboring parts of southern and western Germany that German culture continued to flourish after the partial victory of the Reformation. The Northeast was barely Germanized;* even today we find Slavs still speaking their Lusatian vernacular sixty miles from Berlin.

In the North, the Reformation had an asphyxiating effect on further cultural development. But while the South and the "Habsburg hereditary countries," within and without the Empire, enjoyed the splendor of the Renaissance and the Baroque and the flourishing progress of all the arts under the banner of the Counter Reformation, the northeast section of the country focused its interest onto commerce and the military sciences. Yet the respect of the Germans for the Empire and the imperial idea, in spite even of the Reformation, was not entirely dead. It needed the cooperation of three powers to bring about the downfall of the Holy Roman Empire, the First Reich of the Germans. These powers were Sweden, France, and the traitor in the German midst: Prussia.

It is one of the major tragedies of history that France, the "Oldest Daughter of the Church," which produced so many great saints (besides many impressive heretics), became the traditional enemy of the Holy Roman Empire and therefore of the German people. France always professed a curious dualistic attitude inasmuch as she considered the spiritual and the political spheres as two distinctly different worlds which had better not mix or get near to each other. While the German delights in the fact, that one idea or ideology penetrates every domain of human activity, the French are too keenly aware of the frailties of the human flesh and despair of ever seeing the "world" completely permeated by the *lógos*. On the other hand there is little doubt that the German in his overoptimism, and especially the German Catholic, has committed great and fateful blunders which the cautious French have avoided. (*One* of these blunders,

carried out with great enthusiasm, was the establishment of a Catholic Party in the Germanies.)[161]

Their complete lack of religious loyalty in political matters explains why rulers like Francis I, Louis XIV, and later the two Napoleons, pursued a policy of brutal intrigue against the Holy Roman Empire, fostering all separatistic tendencies within its borders (which meant support for the Protestants) and forming coalitions with Calvinists, Lutherans, and Mohammedans. It is true that Francis I felt "encircled" like William II and considered his wars, waged with the aid of an energetic Pope and Algerian pirates, to be of a defensive nature; but in this game of encirclement the tables were later turned and the coalition between France, the Protestant anti-imperial powers of the North and the great power of the East — first the Islamic Turks and later the Schismatic Russians — became a permanent institution.[162]

The Electorate of Brandenburg became the classical ally of France within the borders of the Empire. This duchy was situated in the Northeastern marshes and was ruled by the Hohenzollerns; it had always been one of the least cultured regions of the imperial dominions and was only superficially Germanized.[163] The population was nevertheless industrious and laborious, brave as soldiers but lacking "backbone" in social life. The Electors of Brandenburg showed a marked tendency toward absolutism, an inclination they could not live up to because the most important element for a totalitarian state, the middle class, was extremely small and unimportant. The capital, Berlin, was even at the middle of the seventeenth century an insignificant place and nothing but the center of a happy-go-lucky, inefficient feudal state.

Yet the change of the social structure of Brandenburg was to come by the end of the seventeenth century and France was again instrumental in this evolution. Louis XIV gave every imaginable help to the rebellious North German Protestants, and mainly to the Electors of Brandenburg, in order to weaken his great hereditary enemy — the Emperor in Vienna. But in his French affairs he was of an uncompromising strictness in religious matters and his revocation of the Edict of Nantes resulted in a mass emigration of Huguenots. Some of them went to England, Holland, America, and South Africa, but the large bulk fled to Brandenburg where they were

enthusiastically welcomed by Frederick William, the "Great Elector," an uncle by marriage to William III of England.*

The influx of French Huguenots not only strengthened the country commercially but it also gave to it the long desired bourgeois element[164] and in addition a small group of noblemen with great military experience and skill. These Calvinists revolutionized Brandenburg. A powerful state rose now with almost American speed from the monotonous plains along the Polish border, an efficient and ambitious state drilling soldiers, building canals, erecting workshops; Brandenburg thus became a country of shopkeepers and tax collectors, yet it lacked music and sentiment, romance and joy. For decades to come Berlin had a pseudo-French atmosphere, like Bucharest or Belgrade. Theodor Fontane (himself of Huguenot descent) estimated that about fifty per cent of Berliners were French at the beginning of the eighteenth century. There is no doubt that Calvinism, for some time even the religion of the Hohenzollerns, was at least as important as Lutheranism in forming the "Prussian" character and the soul of Berlin.[165]

The Electors of Brandenburg not only owed fealty to the Emperor but were also vassals of the kings of Poland in their capacity of dukes of Prussia. They had inherited this duchy, which was to all practical purposes an oversea possession, from the last duke. The Teutonic knights and their grandmaster (a Hohenzollern) had apostasized by 1525, and the latter assumed the title of Duke of Prussia, after having married and founded a local dynasty. These dukes were as little independent of Poland as the grandmasters, and so when the Electors of Brandenburg inherited the duchy it still remained a Polish fief.

Yet the ambitions of Frederick III aimed higher than those of his father, the "Great Elector," who had been content to be the tyrant of a semifeudal dependency of the empire. Frederick wanted to be a king. It was out of question that a local administrator of the Empire, however important or influential he might be, could assume the royal title which clearly indicated sovereignty of power. But one man found a way out of this dilemma and one order persuaded the Emperor to accept it; the man was Leibnitz and the order, the Society of Jesus.* The solution was that the Margrave-Elector of Brandenburg became king *in* Prussia, thus unequivocally demonstrating the

fact that this title had only a courtesy value *within* the borders of the Empire.

This new kingdom of Prussia not only shared in the general material "progress" of the Protestant North, but thanks to the proportionally large, ambitious, and puritanical middle class of Calvinistic character, it achieved a leading position. "The practical, the useful, and the necessary alone mattered," said Constantin Frantz about this new "Prussia." Frederick I (as Elector Frederick III) was succeeded by King Frederick William I who is generally considered to be the founder of the Prussian bureaucracy. His administration was still largely French. The estates of the nobility were taxed, the principle of obligatory education was layed down, the standing army (supplemented by press gangs) was increased, and the development of the country in the direction of a commercial and military bureaucracy of an industrial type gained momentum. France at this time was still the classical ally. "France is one of our most powerful allies," wrote Frederick II in his *Political Testament*** in the year 1752.

The Emperor, limited more and more to his "Hereditary countries," even though frequently victorious in the numerous wars against Prussia, never definitely gained the upper hand. The Austrians had neither enough ambition nor sufficient grim determination to crush the pitiless enemy who adopted a purely Machiavellian and utilitarian policy. Under Frederick II (who was culturally all through his lifetime a Frenchman)* the old alliance with France went on the rocks, the flow of subsidies stopped, and it was now England who continued to finance and to feed the viper on her bosom. It never pays to support traitors.

Of course there was also genuine admiration for Prussia in northern Europe; Anglo Saxons, impressed by her efficiency and successes, saw in the long drawn-out struggle between the Catholic Emperor and the Protestant King a duel between the two great principles of darkness and light, superstition and enlightenment, backwardness and progress, intolerance and liberality. "Decent" people on the other side of the channel and ocean preferred to back the rotting, syphilitic friend of Voltaire, who was basically an enemy of true Germandom,[166] rather than the benevolent and humorous Empress of Schönbrunn,** and the Napoleonic wars brought a further strengthening of the Prussian position.***

The Polish partitions had in the meantime secured for Prussia the province of Pomerelia (the so-called "Corridor") and Danzig. Even prior to 1815, solid Prussian territory stretched from the river Elbe to the Lithuanian border. The army was enlarged by the adoption of general conscription, for the adulation of France and her institutions had obviously not ceased. But this army was neither as brilliant, nor as "Prussian," as some people would have us believe. It was the Archduke Charles of Austria who finally succeeded in beating Napoleon for the first time (at Aspern) and the great "Prussian" military and civil leaders like Gneisenau, Scharnhorst Hardenberg, Blücher, and Stein were *without exception* non-Prussians. Gneisenau was of Austrian origin, Stein came from Nassau, Hardenberg and Scharnhorst were Hanoverians, Blücher came from Mecklenburg and so did Moltke. The last named was originally a Dane, while Yorck was of English ancestry. Imagination and inventiveness were never great Prussian virtues.

The abdication of Francis II as Holy Roman Emperor, and his assumption of the title of an Austrian Emperor, fortified the Prussian position in spite of her great military defeats. At the Congress of Vienna Prussia was rewarded with the Catholic bishoprics on the Rhine and Austria finally renounced all rights to her possessions north of Switzerland in the vicinity of the French border. Thus the Hohenzollerns of Prussia, in place of the Habsburgs, became the new protectors of the Reich against French aggression. Their new duties involved new rights and aspirations.

The "Reich" had now ceased to exist, but the German League (an inter-German diet with its seat in Frankfort) still gave the impression of some sort of unity. Thirty-five sovereign princes and four imperial cities were represented in that assembly which met regularly under the presidency of the Austrian delegate, who alone had the privilege to smoke during the sessions. The hegemony of the Habsburgs and of Austria was gravely challenged but it was still a profound reality. The "progressive" elements of the Diet (with the exception of the extreme Left) expected the centralistic unification of the Germanies by Prussia and offered the Imperial Crown repeatedly (openly as well as in secret) to Frederick William III and Frederick William IV. The former expressed the view that he would consider it preposterous to accept the *German* crown (a Holy Roman crown

was already out of question in that age of nationalism) as long as the Habsburgs resided in Vienna, and Frederick William IV replied to the delegation headed by Eduard von Simson, that he would accept the dignity only if it would be the expressed wish of the majority of sovereign princes.

The herdist nationalists, who already regarded Austria, on account of her non-Germanic majority, as unfit to lead Germandom, were more active than ever. But historically minded people, with respect for traditions, still refused to consider the Prussians as qualified to assume such an important role. Personally the Prussians were extremely disliked by the Southerners on account of their aggressiveness and boastful character.* The casino in Baden-Baden still had, in 1840, a poster at the entrance saying: "Dogs and Prussians are not admitted." And the Austro-Bavarian hatred against Prussia is too well known to be explained in detail. Many of the jokes — jokes often not in the least of a kindly nature — against Prussians are similar to those coined in England and on the Continent against the successful *entrepreneur* type of the Western Hemisphere. Thus the Prussians were not only accused of primitive barbarism but also of possessing the unpleasant attributes of parvenues, a species equally disliked through all the world.[167] Neither did anybody consider the possibility that Austria would ever accept Prussian leadership. Thus the nationalistic herdists dreamt of a "Little German" (*kleindeutsch*) Empire which would exclude Austria, Vienna, and the Habsburgs. The "Great Germans" (*Grossdeutsche*) stood for the restoration of the First Reich under the natural domination of Vienna. Many of the conservative Protestants accepted this basically Catholic program.

The fundamental mistake of the national herdists was based upon a thorough misunderstanding of the nature and mission of the German people, whose function is to be just central European and not to form a "Nation" in the Western sense. The marginal races on the periphery may take on unequivocal forms of national existence (without, of course, becoming a prey to odious nationalism), but Germandom, just as the Church, must keep its catholic, universalist, and co-ordinating keynote. The "Prussians," hardened into an egalitarian monolith, never understood the depth and fullness of the German mission properly, and it was therefore their sad task to distract the Germanies from their true destiny and to become the terrible

instrument of the Great German Betrayal through National Socialism, for which the Germans as well as the rest of Europe are now paying so bitter a price.

The "German League" already was a step in the wrong direction. It was a definite break with the idea of the First Reich, yet even the *Bund* had its supranational aspects. The King of Great Britain was a member of the League due to the fact that he was also the King of Hanover; the Kings of Holland as sovereigns of Luxemburg and the kings of Denmark as dukes of Holstein and Lauenburg participated through their delegates in the activities of the Diet of Frankfort. But the Austrian Emperor as well as the King of Prussia had possessions which were not represented in the League such as Hungary, Galicia, Dalmatia, and on the other side, the two Prussias and Poznan.*

The struggle for supremacy — Austria in a defensive and Prussia in an offensive position — could only be decided through the sword. The fateful year of 1866 brought the decision which paved the way for the establishment of the Second Reich. The intolerable attitude of Prussia forced the German States to unite under Austrian leadership and to enact federal execution against Prussia which sabotaged the Diet of Frankfort. Yet it was the criminal, thanks to his superior armament, and not the legitimate contestant who won the engagements. Prussia defeated the Germanies, and that contrary to the Covenant of the *Deutscher Bund*, with the help of a foreign power — Italy. The Italians were beaten by the Austrians, yet the division of the Austrian armies as well as the inferiority of the Austrian muzzle loaders (in comparison to the Prussian breech loader) decided the war.

The Prussian army had, in 1866, already introduced the modern breech loader (the "needle rifle"), a technical step forward which the Austrian ministry of war had declined to adopt on account of the fact that the cartridges provided with a small ignition needle frequently exploded during practices. The Prussians, far too Machiavellian to be bothered with the injuries of innocent soldiers during maneuvers, saw the practical advantages only and as true discipline of Bentham provided their armies with this sensitive explosive. The rapid firing of the Prussian troops gave rise to the Austrian expression, *So schnell schiessen die Preussen nicht!* ("The

Prussians do not shoot that fast!"), frequently used to disparage gross exaggerations.

The armies of the other German states (Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, Saxony, Hessen-Kassel, Hanover) were far too small to resist the Prussian *Blitzkrieg*. It was not the Prussian army as such which had won the war, but — as later on — the Prussian *industrial armament*. Austria lost the war largely for the reason of being predominantly an agrarian state. (*Today* an agrarian state has no chance whatsoever against an industrial state on the battlefield.) Hanover in that war had the same experience; the battle of Langensalza against the Prussians had been almost won when unfortunately her army ran short of ammunition. Modern wars are largely won by mechanics and engineers, not by generals and warriors.

The reader ought to remember in connection with the war of 1866 that Austrians, contrary to general belief, though polite, humorous, musical, and artistic, are not less virile than the North Germans and specially the Prussians. The saying *Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube* ("Let others wage wars, but you, happy Austria, marry!") was aimed at the happy policy of the Habsburgs. But through their marital ties they established merely legal titles to foreign countries which usually had to be conquered by brutal power afterward. The marriage of Ferdinand I to the sister of the unlucky King Louis II of Hungary and Bohemia was followed 100 years later by the battle of the White Mountain and 150 years later by Slankamen and Zenta. Austria was distinctly a military — not a militaristic — monarchy, which finally could be broken up only by the spread of herdist identitarian nationalism.[168]

It must not be forgotten that many decent-minded Prussians were in 1866 morally shocked by the plans of their government. The Queen in protest against Bismarck's plans left Berlin and retired to the country. Yet one of the worst parts of the ensuing peace was its dictatorial character and the series of "incorporations."[169] We see, as in Italy six years before, small dynasties deprived of their thrones and their countries annexed against the will of the population. This was not only the case of Hanover and the Electorate Hesse, but also of Hesse-Nassau and the Free City of Frankfort, whose last burgomaster, Dr. Fellner, a Protestant, committed suicide.* The

traditional-conservative elements in the German countries saw clearly the approaching end of a great and sacred tradition,** yet the liberal and progressive circles sensed the beginning of a new dawn, the coming of a centralized "Germany" under identitarian rule.[170]

The year 1871 sees the establishment of the Second Reich in Versailles. While a "German Empire" (*Deutsches Reich*) and a German Emperor (*not:* Emperor of Germany!) are solemnly proclaimed in the former residence of the absolutistic French monarchs, France herself is on the way to become the Third Republic of moneybags and progressive identitarians.[171] From 1866 till 1871 the Church had politically suffered four major defeats: Sadova, Sedan and the establishment of the French Republic, the exclusion of Austria from the Second Reich and the loss of the Papal State. The period immediately following these exterior defeats is characterized also by an inner sterility and stagnation. There was an all-time low of Catholic influence in all spheres of life. National Liberalism (Bismarck's party too was called "national liberal"), with a distinct, bourgeois, anticlerical, progressive tinge, became the ruling political factor for all of continental Europe.[172]

Parisian France at least produced a decadent, urban culture with men of the type of Toulouse-Lautrec, Zola, Anatole France, Manet, Monet, Cézanne, Maupassant, Verlaine, Rimbaud and Baudelaire, but the Second Reich after its unification became as sterile as Italy after the *risorgimento*. The cultural production of the Second Reich declined rapidly under the growing Prussianization and actually decreased in the same ratio as the material production increased. Had it not been for Richard Wagner, who fled into the German past, thus building up a German myth which is partly the basis of the more sentimental side of National Socialism, the cultural values of Wilhelminian Germany would definitely be zero.* The mediocre writings of a Suderman and Wildenbruch are hardly worth mentioning. Nietzsche lived in a self-imposed exile in Switzerland. Only the dawn of the twentieth century could bring some improvement.[173]

This cultural sterility passed almost unnoticed on the part of the people who were busy admiring material "progress," railway stations, bathtubs, and medical laboratories. The billion dollars paid by France to Germany

after the war created a commercial boom without parallel. Capitalism begot socialism, a movement which fitted logically into the general picture of the Second Reich. Marx, together with Treitschke, was after all the logical child of Hegel, who in turn was an epigone of Kant and finally also of Descartes. But now we see an increasing worship for collective values. Nietzsche shouting himself hoarse in the solitude of Sils Maria could hardly bring relief nor start a counterrevolution.

Marxism and nationalism coexisted peacefully in the German countries and it was perhaps only a question of time and circumstances when these two ideologies with their fervent admiration for State and Society would merge into one, and National Socialism would arise as a bastard child of Marx and Wagner-Treitschke.

Identitarianism, growing on the Prussian plains, was victorious all along the line. Romanticism, tradition, and diversity were forced to beat a retreat in all sectors. Slowly the Germans assimilated to themselves these new Prussian ideals, even in the South. This assimilation was never, and will never, be complete but it is well known that butlers who spend a lifetime with their masters, accept many of their habits, and it is claimed that they finally resemble them physically. The German tragedy has its parallel in the subjection of China by the Manchus, an efficient, but barbaric people from the northeast corner of the Celestial Empire. The Prussian officials and merchants forced their manners and morals upon the other Germans just as the Manchu Emperors and mandarins forced the pigtail upon the hapless Chinese. And slowly, but assiduously, the Reich was transformed into a mere "state," into a single and very effective machine, suspicious of everything extraordinary, of everything not conforming to the rules. The *Los-von-Rom* propaganda, intended to eliminate the Catholics as obstacles in the uniform German picture, and the skillful vexation of minorities — specially the Poles — was calculated to obliterate nationally nonhomogeneous elements.[174] Yet the conservatives protested frequently against this herdist centralism.

In spite of these efforts the federalistic character of the Imperial period of the Second Reich cannot be absolutely denied. The "German Emperor" was just a *primus inter pares* and soldiers swore allegiance to their respective kings or princes and not to the Emperor. Caricaturists could make fun of the

Emperor in Bavaria or Baden, but not in Prussia where he was king. Bavaria as well as Württemberg and Baden also had their own stamps and for some time had a law which forbade the display of the former Imperial flag without the simultaneous display of the Bavarian colors. After 1919 the flying of the Reich flag was for a period altogether forbidden. The larger states (Bavaria, Saxony, Prussia) even had mutual diplomatic representation and this institution was only abolished by the furiously centralistic National Socialists.*

We have discussed the War and the treaty of Versailles before, so that we can now place the Republican Period of the Second Reich under the magnifying glass. It has characteristics similar to the Imperial Period, yet it is a slow and sly transition toward many national-socialist conceptions.[175] The republican constitution of Weimar emphasized and legalized the already existing tendencies and trends of the nineteenth century; this constitution created a Reich even more "progressive," even more subservient to the postulates of the time. Thus the word *Germany — Deutschland* — already occurs repeatedly in that pale, soulless, democratic document which later became the frame for the legality of National Socialist Germany. This sad and silly document is, as a matter of fact, still in power, even if supplemented by many "amendments." Its compiler bore — *nomen est omen* — the name Dr. Hugo Preuss.

William II went to Holland in exile, his Jewish friend, Albert Ballin, committed suicide,** but the commercial-financial-industrial character of the Reich was preserved. Centralism made further progress and it would have engulfed Germany completely, had not Alpine and royalist Bavaria defended her prerogatives most vigorously. In the cultural sense "Germany" was now most active, probably more so than any other European country at that time. But this postwar culture, a child of the inhuman suffering of the preceding years, was the most degenerate product of the large cities in the North, a real *Asphaltkultur*, as the Germans called it. This new culture and civilization, expressed in an architectonic style, in music, literature, films, plays, poems, essays and painting, was in itself a "perfect" thing. It could frequently boast of the highest artistic level. Whoever has seen the *"Beggars Opera" (Dreigroschenoper*) in the German film version or the

"Blue Angel," with Marlene Dietrich and Emil Jannings, knows, that these products of a strongly leftist culture were, in spite of their distorted ideological point of view, of the utmost perfection. The only consolation one could derive from this state of affairs was, that the Catholics were forced to abandon their traditional lethargy and to fight this really superb diabolism.

Yet from the first it was evident to everybody possessing a deeper insight that the great leftist *Kultur* of Berlin, Hamburg, and Breslau was condemned to death on account of its fundamental morbidity, its negative aspects and suicidal elements. Artistic importance alone cannot give moral justification to a culture; it has to stand for final moral and eternal values or will die. The sadness and despair of the *Asphaltkultur* was depressing to such a degree, that no *popular* enthusiasm could be aroused for this monstrous outgrowth from the depths of modern city life.

There was something sinister and menacing about these plays, dealing with abortions, sexual aberrations, and suicides. Even the drawings in the funny papers, which all stood for a definite *Weltanschauung*, were incredibly foul in their human simplicity, cynicism, and sloppiness. A considerable sector of urban Germandom accepted Leftism with a fervor and grim determination which quickly reduced this ideology to absurdity. Yet it was all done with solemn bitterness and an almost religious conviction. The products of Anglo-Saxon parlor pinks are amusing and grotesque, but the student of German cultural Leftism loses rapidly his sense of humor when looking in that gorgonic mirror. One must remember that there was still the dark shadow of a war brooding over the German scene and the Left redrew and reinterpreted this war in the gloomiest colors. There was terror and uneasiness in the cities. And in the background there was the menace of communism made into a living reality by a truly class-conscious proletariat.

The conception of a dictatorship of the proletariat never penetrated deeply into the conscience of Anglo-Saxon Leftism. *The Pinks and Reds on this side of the Channel and the Atlantic always dreamt of a proletariat elevated to the level of a genuine middle class. They were far too bourgeois to visualize anything else.*[176] Nothing of that kind existed in the Germanies. The German Communist proletarians desired to remain

proletarians forever. Genuine efforts were made to study the possibilities to create an exclusively proletarian culture which, of course, like the capitalistic culture, was intended to be based upon mass production, mass life, and mass emotion.* *The ardent desire to give up one's own personality is apparent in most urban movements*.

The flight of William II to Holland was in fact the signal for a general tiredness of personality and responsibility. People were actually prepared to hand over their fate and the shaping of their personalities to groups or group leaders.[177] The famous *Führerprinzip* — principle of leadership — as understood in the modern, national-socialist sense, is just another aspect of mass collectivism.[178] Only the very superficial spectator will see in it any traces of medieval patriarchalism.[179]

The conservative powers in the meantime were not entirely asleep. They felt subconsciously that they were fighting a losing battle against the collective tide. Their writers, essayists, and thinkers were frequently people of the highest order and their publications (today confiscated or nazified) were excellent.

Yet the German Right made the same mistake as most British Conservatives, i.e., they saw in nationalism (in any nationalism) a rightist movement. Another of their blunders was to accept militarism (and conscription) as conservative and laudible institutions, forgetful of the fact that such a great aristocrat and conservative as Leo XIII had attacked these institutions violently. The Prussian Junkers (landed gentry and aristocracy) who had provided the Prussian army with so many able officers had acted against the interests of their class, a mistake of which some of them became aware as late as 1938 or 1939.* The Prussian army had only too often fought for the interests of merchants and traders, always eager for raw materials and customers, and the aspirations of the most bloodthirsty of all classes — the urban, lower middle class, the backbone of the negative "Modern State." The Rightists are paying now, all over the world, the same heavy toll for their superstitious belief in nationalism and militarism as the liberal Leftists were paying for their blind belief in Moscow. Yet the mistake of the Rightists is more tragic because they represent the best European tradition whereas the liberal Leftists usually recruited themselves

from the ranks of the "brilliant" half educated. ("Brilliancy" and half education are indeed the hall marks of our megalopolitan civilization.)

Germany of the postwar era, though marching toward a definite doom, was somehow in limbo. It was neither fish nor flesh.[180] Yet suspense and compromise are things which Germany will never be able to bear. We have already hinted at the fact that negative western ideas have in Central Europe the same mortal effect as measles on the American Indians. The two great western revolutions — the French and the Industrial Revolution — demanded ultimate, logical conclusions and a deepening process which only Germany was able to supply.

There is a great kernel of truth in what Peter Viereck says about the German reaction toward alien ideals: "The perennial German rebel against 'French ideas' unconsciously retains many of their essentials. When he fancies he is fighting them most fiercely, he often only readjusts them to German needs. The most unbeatable German reply to a western revolution has always been not conservatism but an even more radical German revolution." (*"Metapolitics."* New York, 1941, p. 56.)

One cannot close the chapter on the Second Reich without mentioning the German Jew. The world over, Hebrews have been portrayed by their enemies as monsters of diabolical shrewdness and perspicacity, and all through history they showed themselves to be experienced schemers and organizers of small plans and to have a great ability in the achievement of immediate ends. Yet they have always upset their many little gains by gigantic blunders. The farseeing Jew is almost as rare as the happy Jew. The greatest opportunity ever given to any nation by God they let go by. *In propria venit et sui eum non receperunt*, "He came unto His own and His own received Him not," laments St. John the Evangelist.

The Jews practically always backed the wrong horse. The Jews of Russia who worked for the destruction of monarchy found themselves finally in the grips of a brutal religious persecution which hit them harder than the Christians.* Their most brilliant exponents among the Communists were exiled, slaughtered, or assassinated in exile. The fate of Trotzki is symbolic for Russian Jewry. The Jews, with their ardent sympathies for the Soviet Union, had the same grim awakening when they learned of the Stalin Hitler pacts as the Spanish Jews who had backed the Moors instead of the

Christians. Every great Jewish enterprise ended in tragedy, and they made a mistake of unparalleled magnitude when in their idealism they favored "democracy" in Central Europe after the breakdown of the Central Powers.

The strongly Christian background of European monarchy had admittedly some anti-Jewish associations of a religious, but never of a racial order.* Yet the social, not to mention the political position of the Jews in Central Europe, was far superior to that of the Jews in present-day America. No hotel in pre-Hitlerian days would have dared to display a sign "For Gentiles Only."** The discrimination against baptized Jews was negligible. Neither did Count Witte's Jewish wife ruin his career in Russia, nor did Anton Rubinstein's Jewish race prevent his being publicly embraced by the enthusiastic Emperor Nicholas I, nor yet did Prince-Archbishop Cohn's Jewish descent prevent him from getting the See of Olmütz, or Baron Samuel Hazai's ancestry render his position as General and Hungarian Minister of War untenable. Yet the (rapidly vanishing) remnants of discrimination against the Jews prompted them nevertheless to hope for more advantages from an ochlocratic order; thus they supported the "democratic" and socialist parties almost unanimously*** and were also the first to extend a peaceful hand to the Allies. Both these actions sealed their fate in the Germanies. Their tragic mistakes consisted largely in their ignoring the fact that they were a tiny minority — 0.9 per cent of the population of the Second Reich. *Since ochlocracy is basically a rule of the majority it means automatically the ruin of minorities unless a strong liberal tradition prevails*. (We have mentioned this before as the reason why the minority problem became so acute in Central Europe after the "democratization" of that area.)[181] *With William II the German Jews lost the last guarantee of their personal rights*. A hierarchic form of government is, so far as minorities are concerned, always preferable to an identitarian state. Farseeing people are fully aware of that.

Five years ago, during the Nordic Socialist Congress in Copenhagen, the Finnish delegate deplored the fact that Finland was not a monarchy, considering this type of state as the best guarantee for a stable constitution as well as for the well-being of political minorities. *The German Jews depended thus, after 1919, entirely upon the good will of millions of "individuals" with opinions almost exclusively molded by press and*

propaganda, instead, as hitherto, upon a gentleman who had sworn allegiance to a constitution. Once an anti-Jewish party with its satellites gained 51 per cent of all votes their disaster was inevitable. And this is exactly what happened.[182]

The Berliner *Asphaltkultur*, promoted by many Jews, could never have had a far-flung, popular appeal. Intellectualistic trends and ideologies without the simplicities and platitudes of an *idée claire* have few prospects in an ochlocracy which stands for the rule of the nonintellectual multitudes. The little bourgeoisie as well as the peasants disliked this new megalopolitan culture for different reasons. The hatred of the small bourgeoisie was even more intense because this layer had repeatedly to come into intimate contact with the culture of the *Neue Sachlichkeit.** They aimed at a herdism of a more suburban type.

When Marlene Dietrich sang her famous song, "Alone in a big city," expressing the whole despair and loneliness of the godless straphanger, it was apparent that the old, *déraciné* Leftism of the Lonely Intellectuals had come to an end. The shadows of the Red Flag with Hammer and Sickle, which had menaced Berlin for such a long time, disappeared, and in its place rose the Red Flag with the Crooked Cross.

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*Elections of the Holy Roman (i.e., German) Emperor were events of world-wide significance. See, for instance, Garrett Mattingly, *Catherine of Aragon*, pages 202–203.

**Yet the Jewish fall seems to be rather of a spiritual-theological than of an intellectual-characteriological nature as in the case of the Germans.

**See also: *What to Do With Germany*, by Colonel T. H. Minshall (London, 1941), where we find an excellent revindication of the original universalist German character.

*Yiddish is nothing but a form of Medieval German with additional Hebrew, Slavic, and Latin words. It shares with German a great flexibility and inner freedom. German is not in vain the richest European language, a magnificent instrument of expression standing in its *character* nearest to Russian. Nothing is easier than translating from any European language into German, nothing more difficult than translating from a rich and personal German into another idiom.

**This explains the mutual dislike of certain Britishers and Americans. Similarity (caricature!) lies at the bottom of this antagonism.

***See the witty analysis of man and dog in Thorstein Veblen's *"Theory of the Leisure Class."*

* The other part of the secret is the rare combination of imagination and organization.

** The North German commercial traveler is indeed a highly unpleasant species of the *homo germanicus*. He displays a high-pressure salesmanship which beats even his American colleague.

Max Scheler in his *Über die Ursachen des Deutschenhasses*, published in 1917, has a difficult job in defending the German *commis voyageur*.

*** Austria Hungary was engaged in seven "foreign" wars. If we do not count the War of Secession as a "war," we must equally cancel the so-called Prusso-Austrian war of 1866 which was an inter-German war on the basis of a Federal Execution of practically all German states under Austrian leadership against rebellious Prussia on account of her defiance of the Frankfort Diet.

* The Germans, who live in the Sudeten mountains and in the hills of the Böhmerwald, were not affected. The "racial" character of this Czech movement was very pronounced.

Hussitism celebrated its "revival" in October and November, 1918, when the Austro-Hungarian monarchy broke down. Czechs left the Catholic Church out of sheer patriotism and anti-Catholic propaganda had the full support of the Government. Almost half a million people joined the "democratic" Neo-Hussite Church. Even a statue of our Lady was demolished as "symbol of Austrian domination." Catholicism was accused of being a Germanic religion!

It is in connection with Hussitism that the Adamites appeared on the scene in fifteenth-century Bohemia. They were strongly communistic, practised nudity and community of women. They became finally a menace to the Taborite wing of the Hussites and Žižka had to persecute them with the same brutality as he did the Catholics.

* Luther, who seemed to be friendly toward the Jews in the earlier part of his life developed later an unmitigated antijudaism. The violence of his language reminds one strongly of Julius Streicher's writings and pamphlets.

* This has nothing to do with the Limes-theory of Mr. Hilaire Belloc or Professor Götz Briefs. The gist of this theory is roughly the following one: only countries that stood under Roman domination were able to withstand the seducing voice of the Reformers. Only the discipline of the Roman background was able to keep the flock in the sheepfold.

Yet if we study the facts we see that this theory hardly holds good. There are the Catholic Highlanders in Scotland, the Catholic Irish, the Catholic Westphalians and Ermelanders, the Catholic Czechs, Slovakians, Transylvanian Magyars, Ruthenians, Lithuanians, Latgalians, North Bavarians, and West Hanoverians. On the other hand we have the Protestant English, West and North Swiss, Wuerttembergians, the Mohammedan Albanians and Bosnians, the Huguenots, the Albigenses and Mohammedan North Africa.

** Cf. Rudolf Nadolny's *Germanisierung oder Slawisierung* (Berlin, 1928). This author, a German diplomat, repeatedly defended the thesis that the difference between Prussians and Czechs is merely accidental (linguistic) and not "racial."

* The "Great Elector" had spent his youth in Holland and when William of Orange invaded England his uncle's soldiers helped him to subdue that unfortunate island.

It is important to remember that France's (and later on England's) foreign help given to the traitorous Brandenburgians and Prussians is a matter which is not strongly emphasized in German textbooks. While English Catholics remained loyal to their non-Catholic ruler in the period of Spanish "aggression" the German Protestants never hesitated to make use of foreign assistance against their Emperor. Even the most nationalistic Protestants do not blush when they worship Gustavus Adolphus and the anniversary of his death is celebrated in Protestant Churches. On the tricentenary of the Battle of Lützen (1932) the German Army and German authorities commemorated the day of German defeat and Protestant victory in all solemnity. It would be interesting to see the reaction of the British public if Catholics would celebrate the coronation of Philip II! The popular forgery of English history is a pious little fraud in comparison to the gross, fantastic, and shameless misinterpretation — *Umdeutung* as they call it — of German history.

* The Prussian Kings were grateful to the Jesuits for their intervention. Frederick II, as it appears from his Political Testament (page 32 of the 1920 edition by Dr. Volz), feared nevertheless the

Jesuits, and considered them to be pro-Austrian. Yet *noblesse oblige*. When the order was dissolved in 1773 Prussia and Russia alone refused to proclaim the dissolution, and thus these two "provinces" of the Society were able to survive the *interregnum*. It was the privilege of the bourgeois parliamentarian German government of 1872 to exile the Jesuits. One sees that Royal Prussia was in some respects more liberal than England in the eighteenth century and the same can be said about the Russian autocracy.

** Page 44, edition of 1920, edited by Dr. G. B. Volz.

* Otto Forst de Battaglia in his *Blut und Erbe* shows that the overwhelming majority of Frederick's ancestors were French. Frederick II never spoke German properly. He used either French or a *lingua franca* containing French and German elements. His German spelling was deplorable as it was fantastic. Like Friedrich Nietzsche he hated and despised Germans and worshiped everything French. Like Nietzsche he is also one of the great Nazi heroes. Carlyle admired him without reservation.

** One witnessed frequently the most amazing reaction of "average" Anglo Saxons who were delighted by their political impressions collected in Germany. The gist of their experience was the cleanliness of public conveniences, the punctuality of trains and the quality of the super highways. French tourists who are more critical were less often fooled by the material aspects than certain American aeromechanics who cannot distinguish between material and moral issues.

Professor Brogan writes: "Britain has regarded the unification of Germany under Prussia (once it was achieved) with approval; it spread Protestant civilization over a wider area and was *in tune with the spirit of the age*. It was; but that spirit was already different from what the optimistic Victorians thought. As John Stuart Mill saw, the victory of Prussia was no matter for rejoicing among Liberals. But the illusions of 1866 were still lively in 1919." (Italics ours.) *France Under the Republic* (1870-1939), New York 1940, page 556.

*** This Kingdom of Prussia was naturally rather Brandenburgian than Prussian, rather Berlinian than Königsbergian. The *real* Prussian (frequently a South German colonist) is far more attractive than the Berlinian *petit bourgeois*, who is one of the most evil representatives of Northern Germany. (The aborigenes of Prussia, on the other side, the Pruzzi, who worshiped their gods Pompillos and Perkunos and not Wotan or Donnar, were relatives of the Latvians and Lithuanians. Their language became extinct at about the same time as Cornish.)

If we refer from now on to Prussians or to the process of Prussianization we mention these terms only in connection with the Kingdom of Prussia as a whole. Protestantism, Militarism, Bourgeoisism, Democratism, Technicism are rather Berlinian and megalopolitan than East Prussian and agrarian — apart from the fact that the whole Ermeland in East Prussia is Catholic. So is one full third of Danzig.

*This is nothing else but the advertising and propagating character of Commercial Man who has something to sell.

* The Eastern Borders of the German League were exactly those of the Holy Roman Empire.

* Not every conservative and "Great German" was a Catholic. Saxony, Württemberg, and Hanover were more or less Protestant countries. The Royal House of Saxony is also Catholic although the country is 96 per cent Protestant.

** A description of the highly social-minded character of the early German Conservative Party can be found in Dr. Oscar Stillich's *Die Politischen Parteien in Deutschland*, "I. Die Konservativen," pp. 111–125. Its great doctrinary leader in the sixties was a baptized Jew, Julius Stahl.

* Richard Wagner as well as Cosima Wagner were both violently anti-Jewish. See Ernest Newman's Wagner Biography. Vol. III, pp. 284–287. (New York, 1941.)

Wagner's son-in-law, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, was the greatest protagonist of antisemitism early in this century. (*Die Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts*). See also Richard Wagner's *Das Judentum in der Musik*.

* A fair evaluation of civil liberties in the Imperial Period of the Second Reich can be found in Alonzo Taylor's *Germany Past and Present* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart), a useful small booklet. See also Martin Gumpert, *Hölle im Paradies*, Stockholm, 1939, pp. 79–80.

** Whatever faults William II (or most other European monarchs) had, they could hardly be blamed with racial prejudices as our American middle class. Pushkin, who served in the Imperial guards as officer, would probably have been as a quarteroon a humble bootblack or a redcap in Pennsylvania station had he been born in the United States. Dumas Pére would have been in the same boat as his octoroon son.

* Yet the Socialists and Communists considered the Weimar-Republic a good period of transition. They had not forgotten that it might provide them, as their ideologists expected, with a good framework for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Friedrich Engels had written in his *Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich: "Die demokratische Republik ist die spezifische Form für die Diktatur des Proletariats."* The "usefulness" of the "democratic Republic" was emphasized in practically every *Parteitag* of the Socialists.

* This optic delusion was also the reason for the disastrous cooperation between Conservatives (*Deutschnationale*) under Hugenberg and the National Socialist. Many of the former had to pay with their lives (like Edgar Jung) for their tragic mistake. Again we see here the pathetic error of the upper classes in accepting the role of *clercs*. Often it is better and nobler to decline to serve the General Will and to perish.

The most grotesque decision was probably made when the extreme right of the benches was allotted to the National Socialists in the *Reichstag*. They should have been seated between the Communists and the Independent Social Democrats.

**Orthodox* Jews have an endless number of religious laws which renders their participation in modern, industrial life impossible without committing grave sins. Jews are forced in the USSR to eat nonkosher food in the factory canteens, to work on Saturdays, to touch money on Saturdays, etc.

* One should really speak in that connection of Anti-Judaism rather than of Anti-semitism. Anti-Judaism was religious and not racial. Its roots may be found in Rome, Vienna, and Paris. Antisemitism which is "racial" emanates from Berlin, Nuremberg, and New York. As a *biological* tendency it is far more fatal and final. *Like every other materialistic view its logical conclusion is extermination and not conversion*.

** Franz Neuman affirms rightly in his *Behemoth* (New York, 1942, p. 121) that the Germans are the least antisemitic of all people. Martin Gumperts (*Hölle im Paradies*, Stockholm, 1939, p. 38) shares his views. All this in spite of Luthers viciously antisemitic pamphlets.

*** A non-Jew like Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi prophesied that they would be the future aristocracy of Pan-Europe but intelligent Jews like Uriel Birnbaum saw clearly the coming catastrophe.

* The *Neue Sachlichkeit* (New Matter of Factness) was the self-arrogated name of the Modern German Republic Culture. It postulated that modern man live a life of simplicity. He should act according to the principles of usefulness. His existence should be carefully planned, but be neither ornamental nor romantic. Everything done should serve a definite material purpose. Neither emotions nor the supernatural should guide the "individual" who is definitely a mere fragment of the masses.

The *Neue Sachlichkeit* as well as national socialism have Jeremiah Bentham as a common ancestor. Yet while the *Neue Sachlichkeit* fought every sentimentality in the name of utilitarianism we see national socialism putting sentimental values into the service of utilitarian actions as a means to an end.

II

NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE THIRD REICH

"I demand races of orbic bards, with unconditional and uncompromising sway. Come forth, sweet democratic despots of the West! — Walt Whitman, *Democratic Vistas*, London, 1888, p. 59. *"Fascism is anything but a conservative form."*
— W. H. Chamberlin, *Confessions of an Individualist*.

TO MAKE generalizations about the Germanies is as hopeless as to make generalizations about a subcontinent like India. What holds the Germanies together are not common *denominators* (of which there are few) but a persistent sentiment of "belonging together." In spite of a few common *characteristics* there is nevertheless a feeling of common tasks, of common duties, of common memories, and the will to form a characteriological mosaic in the heart of Europe. The German lives strongly in the categories of tasks and duties (*Aufgaben und Pflichten*); in these categories "different" Germans can cooperate. If Germans would try to form a "nation" in the western sense and to become eidetically similar or identical (and National Socialism apes the West with fanatical fervor in this respect as well as in others), the end of Germandom, as we have known it, would be imminent.* This danger must not be underestimated.

Still there are not a few "generalizes" at large, and every month we see, either in Britain or in the United States, a book published which deals with

the "German Jekyll and Hyde," the "Roots of Nazism," the "German Question," or other hopeless attempts to solve the painful riddle. The mistakes in the appraisal of the German character stem from two main sources.

Our authors forget, first of all, that Germandom on account of its geographical position participates in *practically all* European intellectual currents. If they try to find the roots of the Nazi enigma they forget to look outside the borders of the Reich. They concentrate on persons like General Haushofer, who is the last bogeyman of American journalism because he developed a new science whose principles were bitterly *disregarded* by National Socialists. But the principles of *Geopolitik*, shrouded in the mystery of scientific German, which is more difficult than Chinese, created the impression that this aged savant is another professor Moriarty in wickedness. Instead of denouncing geopolitics it would have been wiser to focus the attention on the deeper, moral issues. All these miserable professors at the Sorbonne, in Leyden, in Brussels, in the London School of Economics; all these essayists, pamphleteers, stump orators, editors, and politicians who believed in morals without religion, who wrote in behalf of a humanitarian, anthropocentric philosophy of life, who lectured on progress for progress's sake, who fulminated against medievalism, broadcasted against the concept of free will, who eulogized and worshiped machinery, praised utilitarianism, ridiculed reverence and piety . . . they all are guilty, guilty, guilty . . . actively, passively, directly, indirectly . . . guilty as Hitler, as Göbbels, as Rosenberg, as Göring, and their docile followers. What are these new masters of Germany doing else than copying Émile Combes, Jeremiah Bentham, John Dewey, Robespierre, the "Imperial Wizzard"; what are they doing else than believing in the tenets of utilitarianism, environmentalism, biologism, the "survival of the fittest," and the whole catechism of unrestrained modernity. Our "progressivists" are trying out the old trick of denouncing their murderous epigones as "survivals" of a past age, but the trick is beginning to outlive its usefulness.

The second mistake the critics of National Socialism commit in their analysis is to take a *certain* sector of Germandom under the microscope (*or* only certain stratifications). Our learned analysts usually have a fairly wide knowledge about Kant, Hegel, Marx, Wagner, Treitschke, and a few other thinkers and writers who undoubtedly had their influence and importance.

But how many of the analytic investigators have taken pains to make an honest and objective evaluation of the Junker mind? How many of them are aware of the fact that 45 per cent of Germandom is Catholic?* How many of them have ever made an attempt to study Catholic Germany, to investigate the influence of the monasteries, to study the Catholic periodicals? What, after all is known to them, about Austria's share in German culture? The influence of Bohemia and the Habsburgs, the German bishops, the East Prussian Catholics? Conservative Germany is almost totally unknown to them; all they do is hash and rehash their repertoire of Bismarck, Fichte, Treitschke, and Nietzsche (never, never understanding the latter). To "explain" National Socialism with the help of Nietzsche's philosophy is as futile as to interpret French Canadian culture by means of Walt Whitman's "Leaves of Grass." How many of these benighted friends or enemies of the Germanies have ever read Przywara's analysis of the German mind . . . when it would take at least ten years residence in the country to understand (or rather, intuitively, to guess) the meaning of Przywara's language? And then there is still the broad question of the relationship between thinkers and culture, writers and masses in co-ordination with the German Scene. Do German philosophies explain the German mind? Does Hobbes, for instance, explain the Anglo-Saxon mind? All these are questions which cannot be easily answered.

We have already stressed the point that Parliamentarism in the classical sense never had a chance to survive in Germany. It is a working proposition in only such countries as have already achieved a great uniformity of thought.

This uniformity of thought has not even *now* been achieved in Germany. The brutal terror of the present rulers of the Third Reich is a clear indication that they have to cope with the same, age-old German personalism which, if coupled with a little more *Zivilcourage*,** courage of civilians in daily life — would be a very dynamic power.

It would be an interesting experiment to quiz all inmates of a large hotel in New York and of another such hotel in "identitarian" Berlin, and then to compare the political opinions of the guests as well as of the employees. There is little doubt that everybody living in the Waldorf-Astoria would declare himself for the Republican form of state and (often without being

able to define it) for "democracy" in government and society. Even the Communists would agree in so far as they consider communism to be nothing else but "streamlined democracy" (or "Twentieth-century Americanism"). In a large hotel in Berlin we would find persons who believe in National Socialism and others who don't, which fact they will confess only on condition that full secrecy is assured them. Some would be Communists, others religious Socialists, others again Catholic "Democrats" or Catholic Monarchists. Some of the latter would see a restoration of the Hohenzollerns and the revival of parlia mentarian liberalism, others again would like to go back to the Habs burgs and the First Reich. One would find adherents to the Weimar Republic, Social Democrats, Independent Socialists, Protestant Liberals of the Bismarckian type, Black Front Supporters, Stalinists, Anarchists and Trotzkyites.

One must not forget that there were about fourteen different parties in the Reichstag before Hitler, representing about four major and ten minor philosophies. On the other hand, one can invite an American Democrat to dine with a Republican, an English Laborite with a Conservative or a Liberal, and be quite sure that they will all agree on the essentials.

A *Parliamentum* is an arena for the airing of opinions which should not only show the numerical strength of group opinions, but also provide a platform for constructive discussion, persuasion, and compromise. The element of compromise is particularly necessary in parliaments which suffer from a great plurality of parties and where coalition governments are the rule. *It is therefore of the utmost necessity for an ideal parliament* that certain social conventions be kept up, that intellectual standards are alike and — and this is the most important requirement — *that the members of the house speak a basically identical "language." No fruitful discussion is possible if those engaged in a debate are miles apart, if they adopt a different terminology, if they thoroughly disagree on fundamentals. Controversies between people of extremely opposing views are, contrary to general belief, ordinarily neither interesting nor helpful*. The British Parliament[183] as well as the American Congress meet these requirements, but Continental countries, so superintellectualized by their highly selective school system, were always characterized by a great measure of ideologism in the political sphere. Their parties, like their books, films, etc., are

ordinarily based on a particular philosophy or *Weltanschauung*. This shows that the Industrial Revolution with its frantic herdism was in these parts of the Old World hitherto *relatively* ineffective and that the total uniformity of thought was, in spite of Prussian leadership, not yet achieved. The National Socialists still have in that respect a great task before them.

The German *Reichstag* of 1931 was deadly hampered by the problem of the "common language." Catholic Centrists* wanted to create conditions in Germany which would make it easier for the individuals to save their *souls;* Socialists denied the existence of souls and divided people into *classes;* the German Nationalists were interested in *language and culture;* while the National Socialists put the main stress on *race*. Whereas some looked at pocketbooks, others at the pigmentation of the skin or the index of the skull, fruitful discussions became impossible. When the speaker of one party indulged in his oratory, the others walked out. It was not worth while to listen to somebody's opinion when you knew that his premises were all wrong. The grim determination to silence the unconvincible enemy by execution or imprisonment already existed prior to 1933 in many parties. Even the "Liberals" advocated the jailing of National-Socialist leaders.[185]

Another potent reason for the breakdown of German political ochlocracy is to be found in the hatred of the German bureaucracy for the control of a Parliament, which was after all a control by laymen. Bureaucracy, which consists, or at least should consist exclusively of experts, nourishes a natural contempt for the amateur, a contempt which may turn into violent loathing if the amateur is given controlling power over the expert. We must furthermore keep in mind that only countries with great *per capita* riches can afford a government by laymen and give them a chance and leisure to experiment. Yet unsuccessful experiments in poor countries can easily turn into national disasters. The German bureaucracy with its very Germanic contempt for the lay masses, was only waiting for the end of popular representation. This liquidation of an obsolete system could only be achieved by a return to monarchy, military dictatorship, or by a sweeping victory of a single party which would not be forced to compromise with other parties in a coalition government. Such a party could even destroy or amend the constitution and give a free hand to the Civil Service, which in

turn would be able to increase the popularity of the party by running the country efficiently on utilitarian principles.*

Yet the monarchical sentiments were already too weakened and the efforts of General Schleicher to establish a military dictatorship supported by Civil Service and the trade-unions failed. The wishful dream of the bureaucracy was fulfilled in the least desirable way. By outlawing the Communist Party, the National Socialists gained 51 per cent of all votes, and the Third Reich was established to the great detriment of the Germanies and Europe.

Something similar happened in Russia and Italy where a bureaucracy works under the supervision of a party. In Russia it was obvious that the party would have the upper hand. In Italy and Germany the bureaucratic groups were bitterly disillusioned; they received a free hand in many domains but cultural affairs remained a prerogative of the party officials. And the cultural domain is the most important one in the eyes of Continentals.

All these three states — the Reich, the USSR, and Italy — are not dictatorships in the classic sense. They are one-party states and their dictators have as party bosses a "parliamentarian" past. Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini have (unlike Dionysos of Syracuse or Polycrates of Samos) a whole party machinery behind them, not just a police force. If one remembers that the word *party* comes from the Latin word *pars* (part), and that the NSDAP, the VKP(b) and the PNF** pretend to represent the *whole* nation, the paradoxical and evil aspects of the situation become apparent.

The Great Error of the Century (i.e., to consider nationalism, a *Rightist* idea) was largely due to the resentment against the destructive idea of *Internationalism*, prone to trample down every tradition, everything organically grown, eager to transform the world into a dull, uniform place without romantic variations, where everybody between Hammerfest and Capetown would wear long pants, inflammable celluloid collars and speak Esperanto.

Yet the National Socialists themselves established a "German Internationalism" by brutally persecuting all federal and centrifugal forces, by prohibiting the use of the provincial and city flags, by ridiculing local

patriotism and branding everybody who dared to criticize centralization as a "separatist traitor." *Gleichschaltung* — assimilating unification — is the sacred slogan of the National Socialists who already in their very name display *two* identitarian ideas. It must be borne in mind that nationalism and internationalism are (like capitalism and socialism — see p. 134), not antagonistic ideas but just one and the same idea, different only in the employment of means. The Internationalist wants identity over the whole world and to crush all "local" differences. The Nationalist similarly is out to eradicate all "local" (tribal, provincial) differences. But the ultimate issue is *not* between the monolithic nation of the Nationalists and the monolithic world of the Internationalist, because the true Nationalist who is always an expansionist wants to dominate the whole world and his herdist ideal is a world exclusively populated by his own race (after the extermination of all "inferior" races). The uniform world of the Internationalist, populated by a standardized race of mongrels, is only paralleled by the uniform world of the Nationalist populated by a standard race which has assimilated or exterminated all other linguistic or racial units.

There is another issue which needs elucidating: the National Socialist slogan of *Blut und Boden* (blood and soil). Soil is something personal; where I dwell and live nobody else can dwell; this is also the gist of the physical law that two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time. But "blood" (nation, race) is something we possess with other people *in common.** Soil has a personalist (romantic) value, blood has predominantly herdist aspects. In theory it is easy to reconcile these two ideals because they belong to two different categories (like "black" and "tall"), but in political practice they may frequently clash. The blood-and-soil dogma was therefore never *sincerely* accepted by the National Socialists; they were far too urban to look with reverence at the diversity of the soil, and the *Boden* part of their slogan was discarded as soon as they entered into world politics. After their sensible start with the reform of the laws of agrarian inheritance they immediately betrayed the South Tyrolean peasantry and the Baltic gentry and inaugurated a period of migratory Jewish Ahasverism such as was never witnessed before in Modern European History. Only a completely *déraciné* urbanite can rejoice in the idea of seeing people who dwelt for 500 years on the same spot being shipped, against their will, to some remote part of the Continent where they have to live as squatters in a

world with which they have nothing in common. Baltic noblemen who were put into Polish castles with another family's crest over the gate felt worse than thieves.

Blut und Boden embraces the same inner antagonism as "liberty and equality" or "patriotism and nationalism." It is obvious that blood and nationalism on one hand and soil and patriotism on the other go well together. After some reflection we will come to the conclusion that blood-nationalism matches with equality, while soil patriotism matches with liberty. The soil makes free men (the peasant and the landed nobleman *are* free), but blood is an equalizing and generalizing factor. "The Germans," "the Jews," "the Negroes," each names a species, but a plot of land is personal (property). The monarchical idea can only be reintroduced in connection with soil and patriotism, never with blood and equality which reeks of the French Revolution, of Robespierre, Hitler, Judge Lynch, and the slaughter of the modern mass wars. This whole question is of the utmost importance — not only to Germany but to the world at large. It is a burning problem in the United States where the love for the soil is almost absent among the large urban masses and the label "patriotism" actually denotes nationalism. This very war is one between liberty and soil on one side, as against equality (identity) and blood on the other. If equality and blood win over freedom and land, monotony instead of creative diversity will dominate the world and make life intolerable.

The Austrians of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, incorporated in the *Vaterländische Front* (Patriotic Front), stood for the idea of Fatherland-Home (*Vaterland-Heimat*) as against the National Socialist Folk-Nation (*Volk-Nation-Rasse*). For the supercilious foreign observers it was just one form of "fascism" against another one. They always hoped for an unholy alliance between the "clericals" and the international Socialists against the National Socialists. Yet the events of February, 1934, showed clearly that the international Socialists never hesitated to help their national colleagues by attacking the "clericals" in the most critical moment of self-defense.

Before continuing the analysis of National Socialism it will be necessary to concentrate upon the person of its originator and leader.

Hitler was born and brought up in prewar Austria. His father belonged to the lowest layer of the bourgeoisie. He himself spent his childhood in the

smaller towns of the Upper-Austrian plain, one of the very few flat parts of Austria. He never climbed mountains nor did he ever live a truly rural life. He is a purely "urban" type.

As a young man he came to Vienna, at that time a very cosmopolitan and aristocratic city with the best Catholic and European tradition around a German nucleus. This city was the synthesis of East and West. Built on the last extremities of the Hungarian plain, its western suburbs nevertheless touch the foot of the Alps. The inner city with its cathedral and the imperial palace — the *Burg* — is full of memories from the First Reich. In the *Burg* were, until recently, the crown and insignias of the Holy Roman Empire. But the boroughs outside the former walls showed eastern monotony; here many Jews, Czechs, Croats, Poles, Magyars, and Italians had their quarters. The castle of Schönbrunn reminds one somehow of the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg, for although built in the eighteenth century in imitation of Versailles, it is massive, robust, and has definitely something Eastern about it in its heaviness. The *Burg* was built at a time when the Habsburgs still remembered their having been at one time counts in Switzerland, whereas Schönbrunn distinctly belonged to a monarch who ruled over the melancholy plains of Hungary and Galicia.

Hitler was at least indifferent toward Catholicism; Europe meant for him nothing, he disliked the Habsburgs, hated the Austrian Idea, and loathed Vienna. He never understood the complex soul of the multicolored city. Like all men of a limited knowledge he had a violent, inborn hatred for things or ideas which surpassed his comprehension. He had the same dislike for Austria as all great "Liberals" of his time, and he viewed the dual monarchy in the same negative terms as Gladstone, Wickham Steed, Seton-Watson, and Mazzini, whose great objects of admiration were "enlightened" countries (like Prussia or Rumania). Hitler was shocked by the lack of homogeneity in his fatherland and its capital, and the universal character of the Habsburgs seemed to him a betrayal of the German essence of Austria. These "unpatriotic" monarchs and princes who spoke German, French, Hungarian, and Czech with equal ease, these descendants of the Holy Roman Emperors who regularly married foreigners, could not meet the approval of a young man thoroughly imbued (without knowing it) by the ideas of the French Revolution. The presence of Jews exasperated his sense of uniformity even more; how could he bear the thought that a part of the

Viennese population belonged to another race. Their black, shabby coats, their papers printed in Hebrew letters, their strange accent and even stranger features outraged the desire for symmetry and identity of the young, hungry "artist."

Prior to the outbreak of World War I Hitler gave up his domicile in Vienna and took quarters in Munich. This at least was a city after his own heart. Munich was the residence of the rulers of Bavaria who had been made kings by Napoleon's grace. This country, though largely Catholic, had often accepted material and financial help from the French who played them up against the Emperor. Yet it must be admitted in all fairness that this treacherous attitude of the court of Munich was a less frequent and less dangerous enterprise than the dubious activities of the Prussians.

Munich itself had been largely rebuilt by King Louis I, a romanticist of the mildly anticlerical, nationalistic trend.* Maximilian and Louis II had added much to his work. The latter, famous for his support given to Richard Wagner, became the victim of insanity and his architectural extravaganzas are known the world over. Vienna, in spite of its obvious darker aspects and its frivolity, was and is at least a great city of immense human value and endowed with a great dramatic and tragic past.** Munich, on the other hand, looks like the petrified scenery of some musical comedy by Offenbach. It is crammed with buildings in an imitation Greek style and full of the memory of beautiful Lola Montez, of Fafner and the steaming stage dragon, of Lohengrin and Brunhilde in shining armor. Munich represents the pseudo-dramatic dreamworld of the German *bourgeois*. Here he finds houses and palaces built in the frightful style of the *Hofbräuhaus*, a morbidly sentimental interpretation of "medieval" architecture. Munich is also an inevitable starting point for all excursions into the Bavarian Alps, never missed by chartered accountants from Berlin parading their leather shorts. It is a mixture of Atlantic City, Denver, Greenwich Village, and Beverly Hills, in which Piloty and kindred spirits painted scenes from Alpine peasant life recalling cheap prints or advertisements for different brands of cheese.[186]

Yet Munich had homogeneity and this was the thing the young starving painter was asking for. There were no Slavs, Magyars, or Eastern Jews in the Bavarian capital, and no historical break in the exterior picture of this

city. Hitler was happy. He immediately felt the Prussian influence which made for greater efficiency and cleanliness. Electrification had made more progress and there seemed to be a greater number of hospitals, bathrooms, and trained nurses than in Vienna. Trains ran on schedule and more motorcars could be seen in the streets. Hitler admired Munich very much in the same way as a semieducated Iraqi official might admire London, or a hillbilly might marvel at New York. The mutual hostility of culture and civilization was unknown to him and one must add that he never succeeded in understanding either of these phenomena properly. Yet he was so deeply impressed by this new, more progressive and efficient Western World, that he gave himself up to it with love and enthusiasm.[187] When war came he enlisted in the Bavarian (German) Army, instead of the Austrian one. He had found his home. *Ubi bene, ibi patria*. He knew instinctively that here he had a chance to succeed. Southerners, on account of their superior oratorical faculties, are seldom failures in the North. And Hitler, the Austrian, a "clerc" through and through, served the Prussianized German Reich with all the fervor of his immature youth.

Still it must be borne in mind that the virus of National Socialism as a definite political organization came from *outside* the Second Reich. A *Weltanschauung* which combines the national with the social as well as with a "religious" outlook only existed in a concrete form in the Taborite wing of Hussitism. This Taborite tradition had always survived in the soul of the Czech people and it was no wonder when a group of Czech Socialists seceded in the last decade of the nineteenth century from the *II Internationale* because they were unable to share the antinationalistic outlook of that world-wide organization. The group in question called themselves Czech National Socialist Party, and survived until the breakdown of Czechoslovakia. Doctor Edward Beneš is one of its most important exponents. The character of this party is described by Karel Hoch in the following words:

> Collectivizing by means of development; surmounting class struggle by national discipline; moral rebirth and democracy as the conditions of socialism; powerful, popular army, etc.*

The Germans of Bohemia and Moravia (the so-called "Sudeten Germans") started early in the twentieth century a countermovement which was first called *Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (German Workers Party). It was founded largely by Czech renegades who transplanted the Hussite ideas of anticlericalism, anti-Habsburgism, and "racial" mass sentiment into the Germans of the northwestern borderlands of the Austrian monarchy. Among these were men like Aloysius Cihula, Ferdinand Burschofsky, Proch, Kroy, and Dr. Walter Riehl (who became later leader of the Austrian National Socialists after the Armistice).

The Moravian local groups demanded repeatedly the adoption of the name "German National Socialist Workers Party," but the Bohemian groups resisted because such a frank adaptation of the name of their Czech "opposite number" seemed too much of a recognition of their lack of originality.** The political tendency of the *Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* was naturally "liberal" and "democratic." On their meeting in Trautenau (August 15, 1905) they declared solemnly that they were:

. . . a liberal, nationalistic party which fights with all powers at its disposal against all reactionary movements, against all feudal, clerical, and capitalistic privileges, as well as against all influences with an alien racial background.***

The efforts of the Moravian groups nevertheless bore fruit. The last great congress of the *Arbeiterpartei* before the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was held on the fifth of May, 1918, in Vienna and thus for the first time outside of Bohemia and Moravia. Then the name *Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei* was finally adopted and the new formulation of the program showed further steps in the direction which Hitler later on eagerly pursued. It was then decreed that:

. . . the German National Socialist Workers Party is not a party exclusively for laborers; it stands for the interests of every decent and honest enterprise. It is a liberal and strictly racial (*völkische*) Party fighting against all reactionary efforts, the clerical, feudal, and capitalistic privileges, but before all against the increasing influence of the Jewish commercial mentality which encroaches on public life. . . .

. . . The Party demands the introduction of plebiscites for all important laws. . . . The Party demands the abolition of the rule of Jewish banks over our economical life and the establishment of People's Banks under democratic control.*

We see here the cant of *continental* "democracy," the racialistic appeal, the plebiscitarian tendencies.

The party was naturally rather small in the beginning but it was nevertheless able to score 42,000 votes in the first elections of Czechoslovakia in June, 1919. There was a certain stagnation in the movement which watched the rise of its younger sister organization in Germany with keen interest and enthusiasm. After Hitler's release from his internment, in December, 1924, the National Socialists of the Czechoslovak Republic accepted the leadership of the numerically superior group in the German Reich. The masters had submitted to their pupils.**

The power and secret of the Third Reich lies exactly in the fact that it was never anything else but an exaggeration of the Second Reich. National Socialism hardly brought any new ideas to the Germanies. There are certain traits in the German character which might be called "eastern,"*** but National Socialism itself is not in the least eastern. It is imposed upon a background which has eastern elements, but the very ideas (not the character)* of the unfortunate Austrian lowlander, who leads the Germanies, are essentially western. They are a logical concoction of concepts of the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, biologism, Richard Wagner, and *Amerikanismus*.

In order to look them over more clearly we shall analyze in succession their various aspects:

I. *The mechanical material conception of the Reich*. The Reich, instead of being a spiritual entity with a world mission, becomes an introvert state which, for its existence, has no need of a metaphysical or supranational justification. The only and ultimate reason for its existence is the life of the German people. It feeds, nourishes, protects, and regulates the people. It is no less a utilitarian organization than the Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., or General Motors, Inc. The bigger the Reich, the better for the German people. A bigger Reich means more food, automobiles, railways, elastic garters, and radio sets. To achieve this bigger Reich a military success is necessary. The ideal Reich — the commercial industrial

Lebensraum, populated by the German people as well as their metics (Czechs) and helots (Poles) — guarantees the highest living standards in the world. The perfected Third Reich is supposed to be some sort of paradise — rather like the Soviet Millennium** or the ochlocratic Brave New World where milk and honey flow. Germany must top Europe, Europe the world. *Deutschland über Alles, über Alles in der Welt*. Germany must become the biggest, widest, cheapest, happiest country in the world. Germany must become another "America."

II. *The Third Reich will be collectivistic*. Its perfection will necessitate a terrific collective effort. The person does not count. This collective effort is not only a means but also an end. Collectivism is going to stay for good. "One German is as good as any other German," is a slogan which can be frequently heard. *National Socialism — like Communism in the eyes of the Stalinists — is the most modern form of democracy*. When Hitler and Mussolini attack the "western democracies" they insinuate that their "democracy" is not genuine. National Socialism envisages abolishing the difference in wealth, education, intellect, taste, philosophy, and habits by a leveling process which necessitates in turn a total control over the child and the adolescent. Every personal attitude will be branded — after communist pattern — as "bourgeois," and this in spite of the fact that the bourgeois is the representative of the most herdist class in the world, and that National Socialism is a basically bourgeois movement.

Hitler in *Mein Kampf* repeatedly speaks of the "masses" and the "herd" referring to the people. The German people should probably, in his view, remain a mass of identical "individuals" in an enormous sand heap or ant heap, identical even to the color of their shirts, the garment nearest to the body.

III. To achieve even greater identity the tentative effort has been made to *identify nation* — i.e., the linguistic-cultural nation — *with biological race*. The Nordic race (less represented among Germans than among Poles if the anthropological measurements and statistics are correct) was singled out to be synonymous with Germandom.*

The emphasis on race was so strong, because it is the only factor that cannot be altered by mere education, coercion, persuasion, or propaganda. A Catholic might become a Protestant, a painter turn into a dictator, a New Dealer into a Republican, but a Negro cannot become a "Caucasian," a

Semite, or a Mongol. There always was at least a certain similarity between the races and racial mixtures within the borders of the Reich, but the Jews were and are "different." The natural, romantic man, regardless of whether he liked or disliked the Jews, saw in them the representants of an interesting and ancient race, blood brothers of our Lord. Yet the true herdist resented the baptized or unbaptized sons of Abraham violently, and for the identitarian National Socialist, with his latent inferiority complex and his *petit bourgeois* lack of worldly experience, they were the worst offenders against the sacred law of uniformity. Racial laws, prohibiting the intermarriage between "Aryans" and "non-Aryans" were issued in order to achieve a more uniform breed. But the final solution of the "problem" is only extermination or emigration.

IV. *The Third Reich is fundamentally secular*. The first steps toward a secularization and despiritualization of modern culture were made by the nineteenth-century "liberals" of the etatistic brand* who started the downward trend by the institution of the obligatory civil marriage. Thus marriage became primarily a legal affair, a "free" and therefore dissolvable contract between two persons.** The omnipotent state, which "sanctified" the marital bed with revenue stamps and legal permits, did not stop at that point.*** The modern Leviathan goes even further and investigates the racial and sanitary background of those concerned and then nods approval or raises a prohibiting warning finger.****

V. *The Third Reich is not only extremely race conscious but equally health conscious. Mein Kampf* deals extensively with health problems and the doctor worshiping spirit of the "men in white" atmosphere thus finds its counterparts in the Germanies. The German "men in white" and "brown sisters" are reinforced by storm troopers, Gestapo, and the entire mighty Arm of the State. The Guillotine — adopted from the older Democracy — the castrating and sterilizing knife, the firing squad in the concentration camps are all busy creating a "New Race" full of health, vigor, and pep. Education weeds out the weaklings, the super-intellectuals, and the romantics with personal ideas. Göring's *Rechte Kerle* are nothing but the "regular guys" of America or the "ordinary decent chaps" of England. Needless to say that people like Beethoven with his ear troubles; Schiller and Novalis with pulmonary tuberculosis; Kleist suffering from cyclic melancholia; Heine, Schubert, Dostoyevski, Nietzsche, St. Augustine, St.

Thérèse of Lisieux, St. Paul, or Milton would all have come under the knife for reasons of hereditary ailments, race, or "general health."

The ideal German youth of tomorrow is the beaming boy of the soap advertisements, a young man, healthy, simple, stupid, "decent," neither good nor bad, the very subject of Ödön von Horvath's *Age of the Fish*.

VI. *The Third Reich is Machiavellian as well as utilitarian.** State abortion for the "unfit," sterilization for eugenic reasons, euthanasia for the hopelessly insane, the entire vocabulary of a progressive world which prefers to spend money on popular cars and howitzers rather than on insane asylums or hospitals for the incurable, characterize National Socialist practice.

Hitler himself has a deep and almost religious respect for science and technical "progress." In that respect he could match most American professors. In one of his speeches in Nuremberg (September, 1938) he said very clearly:

Der Nationalsozialismus ist keine kultische Religion, sondern eine auf exakter Wissenschaft aufgebaute Volksbewegung. (National socialism is not a religion founded on a cult, but a popular movement based on exact sciences.)**

The very spirit embodied in such magazines as, for instance, *Popular Science* is embodied in National Socialism. This is backed up by a strong and holy belief that we are in the maelstrom of a steadily faster moving scientific progress and that Germany must lead, in that noble competition, all other states. International statistics are carefully watched in order to keep in step. Every German should therefore not only possess the identical brown shirt and the identical education but also an identical car — the *Volkswagen*, an identical wireless set, the *Volksempfänger*, etc. Hitler wants a Germany more progressive than any other country; bigger and better factories, highways, laboratories, steamships, railways, public buildings, bicycles, and airplanes. And Germany really became more progressive and more uniform. To every unprejudiced Leftist the Third Reich must be a paradise; jealousy and envy alone for the achievement of a competing group may dampen his or her enthusiasm or generate an unwarranted dislike.

VII. *The Third Reich is majoritarian* like every true ochlocracy. The suppression of minorities is illiberal but not undemocratic (in the classical sense). Yet the Third Reich never pretended to be liberal, neither did the Soviet Union. Stalin even took pains to establish a "Finnish Democratic People's Republic" in Terijoki during the Finnish war. Thousands of Russians died in order to "increase the realm" of this "little democracy."

There is (as in all other ochlocracies) from time to time a checking up of "public opinion" in the Germanies, in the Soviet Union, and even in Italy. The results of these plebiscites or elections may be correct or faked. But the important thing is the fact that they give to the respective governments ample opportunity to boast in front of the people and the whole world that the government in these countries is supported by a *majority*.[188] Even the Soviet Union, solemnly preaching the Marxist gospel of the dictatorship of the proletariat, cannot get rid of the "democratic" idea of majority rule. We live in an age of organized hypocrisy. Dictators in antiquity freely called themselves "tyrants" or "despots." The modern usurpers crouch prudently behind the backs of the knavish, trembling masses, and the unassuming name of "leader" is thought to be more appropriate in a thorough ochlocratic age with whose traditions and principles *nobody* dares to make a final break.[189]

VIII. *The Third Reich* not only *stands* for an "inner democracy" and identity, but also *for material equality with other nations*. "The Germanies," say the National Socialists, "have to keep up with the Joneses" — not referring, of course, to the individuals, but to the inhabitants of the Reich in relation to those of other countries. Hitler repeatedly boasted that the standard of living of the German working class is superior to that of the corresponding class in England. This probably held true for the two first years of his regime. Unemployment, without doubt, was a very grave problem in the Reich, but a mere comparison between British and German industrial areas gave to the impartial observer the impression that the German standards were definitely superior. It may be true that the Germans lived largely on borrowed money, but they lived well and the proletariat was obviously on its way to reach the material level of the bourgeoisie. The middle class, on the other hand, had no reasonable hope of ever reaching or surpassing British middle-class standards. A substantial part of the German

peasantry was far better off than the English tenants. The differences were only spectacular in the high income brackets. But income differences in the upper classes merely indicate that the standards of luxuries, and not of necessities, are at variance. Thus, taking the German people as a whole, one can say (if one is permitted to generalize) that it was one of the richest in Europe, second only to the Scandinavians, Dutch, and, perhaps, the English. German standards were incomparably higher than those of France, Spain, Italy, Poland, Hungary, or the Balkans. Yet a mass spirit of collective competition, collective envy, and collective jealousy was whipped up. As if there were not greater values than banking accounts, per-capita consumption of coffee and similar capitalistic criteria!

National Socialism started as a social ideology in the national framework and developed into a socialistic ideology of nations. Today it is a political philosophy demanding a very democratic identity of wealth between the nations, just as communism puts more stress on the uniformity of the living standards of individuals. *National Socialism is therefore in a sense even more identitarian than Communism, which clamors for identical ants, whereas National Socialism demands identical ant hills*.

IX. *But even within the ant heap there is total uniformity*. At the present moment there are still privileges and "aristocracies" in existence for the mere reason that uniformity has not yet been fully achieved. If the Jews form an underprivileged (or even outlawed) class and thus interrupt the uniformity, it is only because they are literally a survival from the old "chaotic disorder." The ideal Third Reich of tomorrow has only Aryans, National Socialists, members of the unified State Church,* and perhaps, after centuries of eugenic measures, sterilizations and artificial inseminations, only Nordics of the cranial index *x*, with a light-blue colored iris and fair hair. The proposal to breed Germans like dogs or rabbits in kennels or studs has repeatedly been made before and after Hitler came to power.** It would certainly be a logical step if the axioms of National Socialism are not going to be questioned or successfully challenged from within. And there is also the problem about the "Revolution in Permanence." If Nazism should win the present war something must be done in order to keep the masses "occupied." But similar measures (from a more "eugenic" than racialist type) may be expected in the Soviet Union, or

for that sake, in very health conscious, progressive, terroristic ochlocracies without a sound, liberal tradition.*

X. Another typically ochlocratic trait (intrinsically connected with the one mentioned before) is *the emphasis on size and the reverence for quantity*. Only in a bourgeois-commercial age did countries begin to boast of the number of their inhabitants and the square miles of their surface. It became one of the characteristics of the American Republic to refer continually to the size of the country, yet these references were scanty in comparison with those of the great number worshipers, the Russian Communists, who loved to point out at every occasion that they control "one-sixth of the earth." Mayakovski's famous poem-song, *150 Millions*, reflects the same arithmetic spirit. No well-bred Englishman, Chinese, or eighteenth-century Spaniard would be permanently conscious of belonging to empires with so and so many millions of inhabitants and square miles. Neither would they use these statistics in recurrent phrases. Yet just this quantitative consciousness has been so deeply inoculated into countless Germans by the National Socialists and their forerunners.

XI. Chesterton was the first to point out the *Jewish essence of National Socialism*. The overindustrious and indiscriminate reading of books with such a strong nationalistic keynote as the Talmud, has planted many fundamentally Jewish conceptions into the heads of the present masters of Germany. A distortion of the old Jewish racialism is: *Recht ist was dem Deutschen Volke nutzt* — "Whatever is of advantage to the German people is just and lawful."** Dr. Göbbel's order in November, 1938, not to sell any more goods to the Jews reminds one of the Talmudian law not to sell anything to the Christians during the Jewish feast days. The Nuremberg laws have their parallels in the prescriptions of the Old Testament which strictly prohibited the intermarriage with non-Jews, regardless of their faith. Offspring resulting from the union between Hebrews and the Canaanites (the autochthonous population) was considered to be illegitimate. The Samaritans, who prayed to the same God as the Jews, were practically outcasts and even more despised than the Bââl worshipers because their ancestors had intermarried during the Babylonian captivity with "racially impure" Chaldeans. The conception of the Chosen People (once theologically justified) is of Jewish origin.* And it is equally true that the "Fall of the Germans" can only be compared with the tragedy of the Fall of

the Jews from their exalted position of a "Chosen People" to their Ahasveric existence since the terrible night of Golgotha. Only a very great people, like the Germans or Russians, with an imperial past, can experience such utter degradation. *Corruptio optimi pessima*. In order to produce a Lenin or a Göbbels, a Cheka or a Gestapo, one must have had a great past with an Albertus Magnus, a Dostoyevski, a Tauler, or a Solovyev. To fall deep and to crush fatally one must have jumped from a tower or a mountain.

XII. *The Third Reich is furthermore the most modern state of the world.*** *Nothing could be more incorrect than to speak about Germany putting the clock back*. This mistake has arisen due to the wrong interpretation of nationalism and to the mistreatment of Jews.*** Yet the attitude toward Jews in the Middle Ages sprung from purely religious reasons. Individual conversion completely changed their status which was in any case better than generally assumed. They enjoyed a far-reaching autonomy and very few of them objected to the institution of the Ghetto. There was no desire of the Jews to "assimilate," and a symbiosis between Jews and Gentiles is impossible for the Orthodox Jew who is not permitted by his religion to live in a Christian (*trefen*) house. Jews were treated far better than heretics and it was definitely better to be a Jew in Rome than a Jesuit in Elizabethan England.

Intelligent observers who witnessed the annexation of Austria in 1938 were impressed by the fact of a large-scale "modernization" of that country. The French Revolution was suddenly let loose on that part of the First Reich which had so far pretty successfully withstood the onslaught of the philosophy of Rousseau. Racial discrimination of American intensity was ordered by law, divorce was made possible, and civil marriage obligatory, conscription reached its high pitch, local flags were abolished, and mass arrests of members of the nobility set in. The governor of Austria, Herr Bürckel, declared solemnly that he extended a friendly hand to everybody — Socialist, Liberal, Democrat, or Communist — but not to the aristocrats, who never ceased to try to restore the Old Order by intrigues.* Religious instruction, hitherto obligatory, was made an optional subject approaching Horace Mann's ideas, monasteries were confiscated, and the general will was ascertained in a plebiscite.** Students were trained in labor camps for "honest, straight, manual work," intellectuals were assailed and great care

was given to the improvement of communications. Even the very name of Austria was abolished. The feeling was general that a great, popular revolt of the masses against the First and the Second Estate, who had conspired to sell the honest, hardworking people to the internationally minded Habsburgs, had succeeded. The government-regulated press fostered the notion that Austria had barely escaped a sinister fate.

XIII. *The people who suffer genuinely in majoritarian dictatorships are "only" minorities*. The plebiscitarian dictatorship always favors (or intends to favor) the majorities. If the herdist spirit is strong the minorities will be automatically disliked for the mere fact that they dare to be "different." The hatred of the democratic masses for the minorities is the driving force and the cement for these "democratic" dictatorships under *popular leaders* (in Greek: *δημαγογός*). Such minorities are the members of royal families, capitalists, priests, Jews, aristocrats, intellectuals, artists, highbrows, cripples, nuns, criminals, and lunatics. The persecution of the middle classes in Russia was only possible because this class was small. In Germany this class is strong. It may be educated to hate all "irregular" people without pity.

XIV. There is a very small minority in the Germanies deadly set against the *regime*. We must first of all realize that ninety-five per cent of modern people have no ideas or convictions of their own. Five per cent have views and convictions but again ninety-five per cent of these do not dare to stand up for them. There are five per cent of five per cent who have courage and convictions. These make history for good or evil. And if we ask ourselves why there is such little evidence of the three to four millions who have convictions without having the determination to stand up for them we must come to the clearcut conclusion that *the civilized and cultured Europeans** *of the Northwest have become trembling cowards*. We must never underestimate the influence of a whole century of materialism, love of comfort, and determinism which deprived us, almost all of us (Christians and materialists alike), of our personal dignity, our courage, our honor, our élan. *We are afraid of death, torture, exile, and concentration camps, but we are even more afraid of the deadliest weapon in the hands of the totalitarian state — loss of employment, poverty, destitution*. With a stroke of the pen the totalitarian state can deprive us (mainly the city dwellers) of every possibility to earn our livelihood, the grimmest damnation in urban

civilization. The menace of no employment, no salary, no food, and no roof has created in our day a dearth of great saints like Edmund Campion, St. Thomas More, or the Christians of the Arena. Only at the "periphery," in Macedonia, Spain, Finland, Russia, are things different. Only there do we witness the will to rebellion, self-sacrifice, and freedom from time to time. The "civilized" Europeans are *homines oeconomici* and the *homo oeconomicus* is born to be a slave. Only the saints are free. *Il n'y qu'une tristesse, c'est de n'être pas des saintes*, "There is but one sadness: lack of sanctity," says Leon Bloy's *Femme pauvre*. And that, exactly, is the great calamity of modern society.

One has only to compare (the more cultured and less civilized) Austrians with their northern blood brothers. While the National Socialists were able to dissolve the parties of the Reich by mere decrees, the Austrian Socialists fought bravely to the death. It was a foolish and suicidal stand which benefited only the Nazis, but it was honorable. The Austrian National Socialists instead of waiting for "elections" fought with the same insistence. The Spaniards on both sides rather wanted to die than to submit.[190] The Finns and Greeks fought like lions, while the Danes put down their arms after losing twenty-eight men. The Poles were not crushed until the Russians attacked them in the back, while the more progressive Czechs (in an equally hopeless situation) never fired a shot.

For greater convenience we shall put these fourteen points, just listed, and the elementary facts about the Germanies, in a shorter syllabus:

1. Prussia was nourished by France and England for selfish and psychological reasons into greatness. When they wanted to stop her it was too late.

2. Prussia was not a typically feudal country but a bureaucratic middle-class state. Not the *Junkers* but the Huguenot refugees became the basis of modern commercial and industrial Prussia*

3. Frederick II followed a traitorous, anti-German policy. His education, mind, and ancestry was largely French. Brutal, militaristic, agnostic, and "progressive," he had a deep admiration for the civilized West.

4. Prussian militarism is not "aristocratic." Neither is conscription a Prussian invention. Militarism and conscription are phenomena of the

French Revolution. Modern militarism is fundamentally connected with nationalism, ochlocracy, and industrialism.

5. The greatest mistake of the century — committed by certain Prussian noblemen, American columnists, and English bankers — was to see in nationalism a Rightist idea.

6. Capitalism is not less "leftish" than socialism. Capitalism as well as socialism accept technical "progress" *unreservedly*. Between excessive private capitalism and state capitalism there is a relationship as between nationalism and internationalism. This difference is one of intensity but not of essence.

7. The Austrians are Germans and probably the "best" ones. The Germanic character of the Prussians is doubtful. When the *Nibelungen Saga* was first sung in the Austro-Bavarian dialect the Old Prussians and Pomeranians still worshiped their Slavic and Baltic gods.

8. Even Francis Joseph considered himself to be a "German Prince." In 1866 he headed a German coalition against Prussians and Italians. The rule of progressive, Protestant Prussia finally affected the German character.

9. National Socialism is the bureaucratic, Germanized version of the French Revolution.**

10. Practically all ideas in National Socialism can be traced back to the following sources:

a) The French Revolution and its immediate offshoots.
b) The Old Testament (misapplied) and the Talmud (part of it).
c) The Industrial Revolution.
d) Calvinism.[191]
e) Karl Marx and Socialism.
f) Biologism (Darwin, Grant, Stoddard, Chamberlain, Gobineau).
g) Richard Wagner.

It lacks though one "modern" influence — whiggish, pre-Manchesterian liberalism.

11. There is no "putting the clock back" in the Third Reich which is the millennium of modernity.

12. World War I was a struggle concerning Austria-Hungary.

13. Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest were not brutal treaties.

14. Germany won the war when Austria-Hungary was dismembered.

15. The Treaty of Versailles *itself* is not the cause of National Socialisms, its rise and its victory. But the *circumstances* of the treaty accelerated the development.[192]

16. The Third Reich is not less a *democracy* in the classical and scholastic sense than the Soviet Union.[193]

17. The leaders of these totalitarian superdemocracies frequently acknowledge the "democratic" character of their governments, but the "Fascists" will seldom confess to be "Leftists."

18. The German character — outside of *urban* Prussia — is not in the least herdist by nature. Prussia and Austria alone have a truly military tradition. One must not forget that the Germans still preserved their individualistic separatism and federalism long after all other European nations had been united for some time into centralistic, unilingual states.

19. National Socialism is the fulfillment of *Continental* "liberalism" which stems largely from Rousseau and the ideas of Adam Smith in a collectivized version. The continental Liberals never were liberals in the English sense; their "liberalism" was nothing else but the struggle against the existing order and the old tradition. Foolishly enough the English Liberals supported their continental "coreligionists," never being fully aware of the abyss which actually divided them.

The continental Liberals were the most narrow-minded and destructive intriguers between Calais and Constantinople. With their appeal to the upper middle classes they never foresaw the day when the masses would take over their ideas (after having twisted them about to suit their own taste). The great ideas of Nazidom — utilitarianism, anticlericalism, anti-Catholicism, compulsory education, mass production, regimentation — were taken from their catechism. They had fought grimly against the great medieval heritage and they have succeeded in destroying the bulk of it, thus paving the way for the Fascists and National Socialists who did nothing but popularize the continental brand of liberalism, which in turn was nothing else than democratism in disguise.* The *modern* Anglo-Saxon type of liberalism, on the other hand, with its relativism in the matters of ideas, philosophies, and religions will hardly ever appeal to the Continental who will never be induced to believe that if A is true and B contrary to A, B

nevertheless can represent truth. If Catholicism is right then Protestantism is wrong and vice versa. Things on the Continent are white or black and if they are actually gray they are worse than black because they might cause confusion. There is a grim and inescapable logic in this attitude.

The only people who were liberal in Europe were old-fashioned Conservatives of aristocratic stock with an eighteenth-century mentality. They were not "liberal" but generous. They were far too haughty and self-confident to get excited about the propagation of untruth. They had as little personal grievance about Protestants as Dr. Johnson about Catholics. Yet even their personal generosity did not alter the fact that they considered themselves (in religious as well as political matters) dead right and their opponents dead wrong. It was always the privilege of the *bourgeois* to invoke the law and the police. It is true that "liberal" governments on the continent, though despotic because of the lack of the old liberal tradition, which countries like England and the United States enjoyed, never went as far as to execute their adversaries (with the exception of the liberal terror in Rumania a generation ago where thousands of peasants were slaughtered). Yet to see an illiberal article in a "liberal" paper, or praise bestowed upon a nonliberal book in a "liberal" literary review, was out of the question. Comparing a "liberal" editor of the nineteenth century with a Roman Cardinal of the eighteenth century it would not have been difficult to point out which of these two could be called a genuine Liberal. The followers of the "liberal" politicians and writers have had finally to drop their farcical name. They are now proud to be Nazis.

The new synthetic heresy of Germany and her ugly betrayal of the Occident will probably cause endless "scientific" investigations into the basic depravity of the German character. But all nations fall into error and sin from time to time. The Germanies are at present gravely ill and suffer from a terrific attack of herdism as no other European nation has experienced it before.[194] Ideologies are able to obscure inherent national characteristics for a long time but not forever. In relation to the Germanies with their strong tradition of political personalism, National Socialism is clearly a counter idea (*Gegenidee*). No country in Europe cared less for political uniformity, unity, and central control, and no country became a

more hopeless and helpless victim of exactly the same tendencies, forming integral aspects of a devastating identitarian totalitarianism.

One could imagine, of course, one hundred and fifty years ago, an English gentleman in Hampshire talking after dinner with his Prussian guest about the intrinsic wickedness of the French character. Let us assume for argument's sake that we are writing in the year 1794. Queen Marie Antoinette has just been beheaded and the Terror is at its worst. These two men would suddenly remember all sinister parts of French history; Louis XI, Philip the Handsome and the brutal suppression of the Templars, the Armagnacs, the atrocities of the Albigenses, the Jacquerie and the Secrets of the Bastille, the *lettres de cachet* and the *chambres ardentes*, the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, and the many shady characters in French history. Our friends, in consequence, would now definitely be tempted to attribute the hideous atrocities of the Great "Democratic" Dawn to the inherent wickedness of the French national character.

More outspoken views would have been expressed by the less educated people. The men in the pubs of Southampton and the roadmakers around Dover would have hardly bothered to explain the happenings with ideological or historical explanations. For them the French were a bad lot altogether; nothing but untrustworthy, Popish rabble with grubby faces, loud mouths, and closed purses.

The upper layer of the English population, however, keeping up contacts with the most cultured émigrés, who often stayed in their houses, would never have arrived at such summary conclusions. We have practically no printed evidence for any fundamentally *anti-French* turn of mind among educated Europeans. Neither, of course, were books and pamphlets written for the masses. Nor were educated people imbued by nationalism, racialism, or the more modern excesses of anthropology or biology. To fall as low as to make the French character responsible for the excesses or brutalities of the Revolution was almost impossible for any person of culture, education, and *savoir-vivre*.

Today the situation has entirely changed. We live in a time when even the aristocracy in the eager desire to be good *clercs* and executors of the general will goes the way of innkeepers, roadmakers, or chimney sweeps. There is Mr. Duff Cooper who, forgetting that this war is a crusade, made a start with a violent anti-German (not anti-Nazi) speech in April, 1940. Another

protagonist of the idea of racial superiorities and inferiorities is Lord Vansittart, G.C.B., G.C.M., M.V.O., author of the incredible booklet *The Black Record.*[195] He received, as chief diplomatic adviser of the foreign office, 3000 pounds a year to propagate Nazi racialism. And the same attitude can be seen in the letters of H. M. Harwood[196] or in an even more plastic way in the booklet of Mr. Theodore Kaufman, entitled *Germany Must Perish.**

All these gentlemen, wielding such a mighty pen, should remember the words of Alexander Hamilton, that the people are a great beast. There were Danes who in April, 1940, cheered the first German troops, and also Austrians who had been stanch members of the "Patriotic Front" displayed the same attitude toward their "liberators." The same Russian mob who plundered the defenseless German Embassy in 1914 out of sheer patriotism fought three years later on the barricades for International Revolution. The same people cheered Louis XVI, Robespierre, Napoleon, the rulers of the Holy Alliance, and Louis XVIII successively. Napoleon himself was loudly acclaimed by the brave Berliners after the battle of Jena. The same Londoners who cheered James II tweny-four hours later bowed to William III.[197] One sees that the ochlocratic habit of taking the masses seriously must finally lead to international hatred. The words of Christ in relation to the mob, who crucified him, still has validity for the mob all over the world: "Father forgive them for they know not what they do."

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* This is exactly the bone of contention with a Franco-American friend of mine who cannot help to deplore the fact that the Germans do not form an "ordinary nation" in the western sense. France of the Bourbons, Bonapartes as well as the Third Republic have done everything to "nationalize" the Germans. But collectivized Germany of 1940 is hardly a more amiable neighbor than the Holy Roman Empire of 1525.

* Catholicism (and its culture) is in a way a closed world. It is almost impossible for the outsider to appreciate and understate its values in the right proportion and relation. Adults have a certain ability (in varying degrees) to understand children; children can never understand old people. Neither can the fragment understand the total. Continentals can understand Anglo-Saxons, Anglo-Saxons very seldom Continentals; Catholics may understand Protestants, but Protestants in order to understand Catholics (*as* Catholics) have to cope with an obstacle of 1500 years. This is the reason why Anglo-Saxons have sometimes made quite successful interpretations of Protestant Northern Germany, but one could hardly ever expect a good Protestant monograph on a Catholic subject or

person, not even on a Catholic renegade like Hitler. The Catholic world has seven seals of which not even one can be easily broken.

** It was curiously enough Bismarck who was the first to point out the great lack of *Zivilcourage* among the Germans.

* The Catholic Centrists made a mistake similar to that committed by the Jews. They favored republicanism and political ochlocracy in Germany because they (justly) disliked the Hohenzollerns. Yet they forgot the fact that the Catholics of Germany were a minority in the Second Reich and that they could easily be crushed by an overwhelming victory of a party which rallies the majority of the country with an anti-Catholic (or anti-Christian) battle cry. The more intelligent Centrists like Brüning had more "perspective" and finally worked for the return of the monarchy.

* In the good old days, before he signed the grandiloquent demo-nazi manifesto, the *City of Man*, Herr Thomas Mann had a less beclouded vision. In his well-known book *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*, written under the impact of the First World War (Berlin, 1922, pp. 285–287), he not only recognizes the burning antithesis between lay and expert rule, but he senses also the ochlocratic danger of popular envy and the even greater danger of "democratic" (and postdemocratic) totalitarianism in the form of the "politicized" nation.

** NSDAP — Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei; VKP(b) — Vsyesoyuzni Kommunističeski Part (bol'ševiki) All-Union Communist *Party* (bolsheviks); PNF — *Partito* Nazionale Fascista. Yet the *Vaterländische Front* (Patriotic Front) of Austria, and the "Portuguese Legion" (Legião Portugueza) are not former parties.

* God is *unique*. Souls are *unique*. Rare things are precious. Hence the twofold meaning of the word *common*.

* See the excellent biography *Ludwig I*, by Caesar Conte Corti.

** There are the revolutions of 1848 and the rebellions in 1919, 1927, 1934 (February and July), the attempted assassination of Seipel, the assassination of Dollfuss, the murders of 1938, the assassination of Count Stürgkh.

* See tabulation at the end of his *The Political Parties in Czechoslovakia*. Čechoslovak Sources and Documents, No. 9. Orbis, Praha, 1936.

** It is interesting to note that Robert Hohlbaum, a leading National Socialist, in his poetic collection *Deutschland*, addressed a hymn to Hus whom he considers to be German "in spirit."

*** A. Ciller, *Vorläufer des Nationalsozialismus*, Ertl-Verlag, Wien, 1932, p. 135.

* *Ibid*., pp. 141–142.

** See also Hans Knirsch: *Aus der Geschichte der deutschen nationalsozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung Alt-Österreichs und der Tschechoslowakei,"* Aussig, 1931, and H. C. Kaesgel, *Ein Sudetendeutscher ergibt sich nicht*, Karlsbad, 1939, p. 145.

It must be emphasized that an intensive study of national socialistic "prehistory" reveals a curious lack of original thought in Hitler's concepts; Hitler's strength consists solely in the clever use of *already existing* trends, ideas, and situations. It lies in the very nature of mass leaders that they cannot be "original"; the mass leader is necessarily a *virtuoso* of commonplaces which he may or may not repeat in the guise of a "new discovery." The modern dictator is not out to contradict but to confirm already existing views (and prejudices). This is another, subtle form of flattery of the masses. Original "controversial" ideas seldom get an immediate mass response. Originality implies the (discourteous) affirmation that opinions held recently on certain subjects are wrong. Mass man (i.e., the inferior man) cannot tolerate being scolded, or laughed at.

*** Brutality and cruelty are not limited to the East. English laws at the beginning of the past century were far more brutal than those in Russia. (Hanging for every theft of 40 shillings and over.) France had in Cayenne an equivalent to the concentration camps of Germany and Russia. The treatment of civilians during the last war (see Aladàr Kuncz' *Black Monastery* and E. E. Cummings'

The Enormous Room, 1922) finds its parallel in the mistreatment of refugees during the present one. (See Arthur Koestler's *Scum of the Earth*, New York, 1941.)

* His sticking to friends (*Freunderlwirtschaft*) is no less typical an Austrian characteristic than this preference of intuition to logic. He remains for North Germany the "magic stranger."

** Hitler always repeats that he builds for "the next 1000 years."

* The craze which this Nordic mania caused had sometimes the most startling consequences. One saw, for instance, after the *Anschluss*, boys of the *Hitlerjugend* discoloring their hair with hydroxide.

* The continental "liberals" were always strongly etatistic and seldom troubled by the "prejudices" of civil liberties. After having secured the key position in society and state they used the latter to enforce their views, persecuting brutally all nonliberals and specially the "clericals." The liberal parties of Hungary, France, and Italy had sad records, yet these are widely surpassed by the atrocious horrors of Spanish and Rumanian Liberals. *Every* ideology becomes on the Continent inevitably a dogmatic, uncompromising philosophy. Professor Carlton Hayes speaks in his *A Generation of Materialism* (New York, 1941), about "General Liberalism" and "Sectarian Liberalism."

** The Church always opposed civil marriage bitterly. The state created willfully, by the introduction of civil marriage, a distorted view about the basically sacramental character of marriage. Often civil marriage is nothing else than a legalized love affair.

*** Even a so-called "conservative" state like Hungary jails a priest if he presides at the sacrament of marriage mutually administered by the contracting parties without the preceding ridiculous ceremony of civil marriage, where a miserable little scribe arrogantly declares a couple to be "husband and wife." The most intolerable aspect about this act is its intentionally *solemn and ceremonial* character.

**** The State of New York, for instance, prohibits a priest to assist at the spending of the sacrament of marriage if it does not give to the couple a certificate of health. The Church was very little aware of this fantastic encroachment upon her rights because she was at that time too intensively occupied with the defeat of the Child Labor Amendment Act.

* The utilitarian inheritance (Jeremiah Bentham) of our culture and civilization is stronger than one may admit. Utilitarianism is the cancer which has destroyed most fundamentals. The man or woman who considers his or her marriage as "inconvenient" flatly breaks the solemn oath of honor and contracts a new one. We find men and women in modern society who have given, three or four times during their lifetime, an oath of "loyalty and fidelity until death do us part" and it is amusing to see the same creatures protesting against Hitler's serialized breaches of promises. Only a regenerated world will be able to cope successfully with this Great Challenger.

** This has strongly been re-emphasized by Martin Bormann, Hess's successor. His much advertised speech against the Churches had all "scientific" arguments one could find in our Leftist Weeklies. See London *Tablet*, January 27, 1942.

* The National Socialists not only dislike the two Christian Churches in Germany because they try to escape state control and thwart the totalitarian effort but also because they *divide* the nation into [two or three] groups.

** Walter Darré, Minister of Agriculture, proposed such measures seriously in 1923.

* See Erik and Christiane von Kuehnelt-Leddihn's novel, *Moscow 1979*.

** Which, of course, is nothing but the ultimate consequence of the Manchesterian "enlightened self-interest" and the *Sacro egoismo* of pre-Fascist Italy

* On pages 349–350, Lewis Mumford drops, in his *The Culture of Cities*, New York, 1938, the hint that the National Socialists copied their racialism from the Jews. See also Esdras 9:10, and Nehemias 13:23–30.

** The word *modern* is today almost a eulogy. Once things *old* were preferred. Everything old had lasted longer. Chronologically they came nearer to eternity. Old people were nearer to the grave and

therefore nearer to God. Today the accent is on Youth.

*** It is almost touching to read the exchange of letters between the Duchess of Brabant and St. Thomas Aquinas. The Duchess inquired whether she would be justified to tax the Jews — justified morally and legally. Our modern "leaders" are less squeamish about these matters.

*The Conservatives were after all the only people who had (*a*) a *political ideology* which could not be assimilated on account of its *basic* hostility to modern ideas, and (*b*) a *definite tradition* going back to the First Reich and the hated Middle Ages.

** There is little doubt that: (*a*) a real majority voted for Hitler (under considerable pressure); (*b*) a real majority would also have voted for Schuschnigg if he would have been able to carry out his plebiscite. Only tiny minorities have real convictions.

* There is little doubt that the most untotalitarian American is not the straphanger of New York (in spite of his ubiquitous "democratic" creed) but the pioneering backwoodsman, the fishers of Cape Cod, or the Indians of the Southwest.

* As to the middle-class character of the Nazi Party, see F. Neumann, *Behemoth*, New York, 1942, p. 399.

** Guglielmo Ferrero in his recent work, *The Reconstruction of Europe* (New York, 1941), emphasizes the fact (p. 323) that the French Revolution reaped in Italy a full victory only as late as 1922 (Mussolini's March to Rome!).

* Similarly continental writers made the mistake of confusing the labels "democratic" and "liberal" entirely. German essayists coined the term "demoliberal" which was used as a label for all sorts of democrats who sailed under the liberal flag. The support given to these continental Liberals by their naive English confreres strengthened the belief on the Continent that half of England was basically "Left" and that most of the English tradition was "Left." European Conservatives coming to liberal England for the first time were puzzled to find a country far more aristocratic (and undemocratic) than any other European country with the possible exception of Poland, Hungary, and San Marino.

* Mr. Theodore Kaufman, an American resident, tries to calculate how many doctors and how much time it would take to sterilize all Germans. This idea was eagerly taken up by Mr. Ernest Hemingway who defended it in his preface to *Men at War* on pp. xxiii-xxiv. (New York, 1942.) Scratch a "democrat" and you always find a Nazi.

III

"MATER AMERICAE"

"England, England, how I prayed for England!" — St. Vincent de Paul.

ENGLISH parliamentary government was initiated in 1215 by the Magna Charta. Seven years later the Hungarian nobility extorted from their king a similar document. Neither charter has anything to do with "democracy."[198] Neither country is a democracy in the classical sense today. In both cases we observe that privileges are granted to the First and the Second Estate and in both states trends toward semirepublican forms were apparent.*

The power of the English nobility was weakened through the War of the Roses and the subsequent centralism and absolutism of Henry VII and Henry VIII. Yet a new aristocracy arose fortified by the plunder and loot of convents and monasteries. They supplanted the old families, and the seventeenth century offers us the spectacle of a gradual retreat and decrease of monarchical power before the onslaught of a plutocratic aristocracy, determined to transform England into a republic in every respect but in name.

The Whigs were the representatives of this new independently minded, vigorous aristocracy and upper class, while the Tories standing in loyalty beside the throne were the exponents of the *aulic* aristocracy.[199] In England alone do we encounter the phenomenon that the new moneyed class treads in the footsteps of the old, dynastic, rural, and independent aristocracy. One can therefore hardly be surprised to see the English monarchy succumbing to the assault of the Protestant moneybag in

combination with the medieval, *independent* aristocratic spirit. It was indeed a rare and weird combination of forces which led to the retrenchment of royal power in the British Isles.*

In the centuries between the Great Charter and World War II the English aristocracy was forced to give up many important positions. Thirty years ago there was, even in connection with the reform of the House of Lords, an antiaristocratic agitation strongly expressed in the election posters, but the sentiments which were aroused in this campaign went only skin deep. Today it is practically impossible for a peer to become Prime Minister, and thus we might speak about disabilities going together with titles. England is an amazing and paradoxical country; there are, in spite of the great emphasis upon "democracy," all indications of the existence of an aristocratic and oligarchic rule, yet this generally recognized fact caused little if any human resentment among the *lower* classes. There are actually a few dissatisfied, ambitious people among the middle classes who have a personal grudge against the old school tie and the reverses in the present war have made their protests appear louder than they are. It may be argued that these sentiments expressed are rather antiplutocratic than antiaristocratic. Yet the tacit and genuine, human *acceptance* of aristocratic or at least upper class leadership gives Britain the right to call itself a "democracy" without being one in reality. Hierarchic feelings always were very strong in England, but the extreme elasticity of the class system has always mitigated the apprehensions if aroused. Nowhere are classes more receptive to new elements, nowhere is it easier to rise socially, yet nowhere are the differences between the classes so marked as in England (with the exception of India and certain sections of the United States). Prewar Alpine Austria or Germany, Spain or even Poland were *socially* more democratic. Neither has any country in the world an Upper House made up solely of the lords and the bishops of the state Church. The Upper House of Hungary, a country notoriously "reactionary," has a large nonaristocratic majority and representatives of the Jewish faith (not to mention the Lutherans and Calvinists).**

It is worth while pondering over the fact that *England, the country with the maximum of liberty in Europe, has the greatest social inequalities, while*

Germany and Soviet Russia, the fortresses of egalitarianism, have the least liberty.

There was in England not only a tacit acceptance of the class system but also a real admiration of the upper ten — an admiration which permeated all other classes. Nowhere else in the world would socialist papers print descriptions of the dresses worn at the Royal Garden Party, and people will always prick up their ears if they hear a "strange" accent unavoidably betraying social background. Each class admires the "next higher" class and the members of the lowest classes have still the consolation that they might rise by virtue of their abilities to a higher station in life. England is a country of amazing careers; she abounds in self-made men and yet she is not and never will be ochlocratic unless her days of decline set in. The man who has risen from the gutter to the exalted position of a peer will surprisingly seldom be snubbed by his colleagues in the House of Lords, but he may not get the full recognition by those in the lower stations of life. The thought of the fabulous rise of his father or grandfather, on the other side, will cause very little distress to the present bearer of the title.*

A title does not mean everything in England. But the "blue blood" will always remain a factor in the British nobility. The Continental as well as the American frequently forget that a simple name does not always indicate, in England, a simple origin. A Herr Hitler could not possibly be a direct legitimate male descendant of a duke or prince, but Mr. Churchill counts the dukes of Marlborough as his direct ancestors.

About the public school — not to be confused with the American public school — one must show a little more healthy skepticism. In its spirit it is ordinarily herdist and bourgeois and not in vain are the Communists such fervent admirers of a collective boarding school education which separates child and adolescent from the family. Eton is one of the few schools with a personal touch where the bourgeois hatred against the boy, who dares to be different, is reasonably absent.

The public school is, in spite of its bourgeois undertone, nevertheless a class institution. Out of 615 members of the House of "Commons" over 400 are former public school boys. Of these 104 come from Eton alone. In the United States it would be an unheard of thing to see the Congress packed by one sixth of — let us say — Groton boys. Yet the papers in England

commented very favorably upon the fact that Eton contributed so heavily to the burden of popular representation and not even the *Daily Herald* attacked Baldwin when he declared, immediately after his appointment to Downing Street, that he was going to pack his cabinet almost exclusively with Old Harrovians. He did not keep his promise though. The choice of the average voter is, as one can see, frequently only between an Old Etonian, an Old Harrovian, or an Old Wickhamist — these candidates being provided by committees who pick out those most likely to attract the masses.* Even the Labor Party has an ever increasing amount of ex-public school boys among their local and national leaders.

One must yet add in all fairness that this elite — of birth rather than of intellect — is well aware of the current public opinion. They are actually *clercs* in the sense formulated by Julien Benda. Though they cannot extricate themselves completely from the prejudices and vested interests of their class, history can scarcely refrain from giving the verdict that they have honestly striven to serve the public good and the general will. But sometimes, as, for instance, in the case of Hoare-Laval** plan, one would rather have seen them following their own judgment than the general will.

We come here to the painful chapter of British foreign policy. It was always a weak spot of England. Britain's policy toward continental affairs suffered from two shortcomings: its general tendency as well as its inconsistency. The latter is the result of the Parliamentary changes which also affected the foreign policy to such an extent that Britain was called "perfidious Albion." The defects in the general tendency are largely due to psychological reasons; shortsightedness, wrong speculations, lack of intuition and phantasy, a total misunderstanding of the continental psyche are just some of the characteristics. Neither foe nor friend was ever treated in the proper way. Neither France, nor the Germanies, nor Russia, nor Spain was ever properly evaluated. And the reason for these blunders and hesitations is the lack of the thing the Germans call *Einfühlungsvermögen*, the ability to slip into the skin of somebody else and to look at the world with his eyes. The result was that England was great in feeding vipers in her bosom, while alienating her best potential friends.

The basic reason for this psychological shortcoming has to be found in England's insularity and isolation, which is *not* predominantly of a geographical nature. The Scandinavian peninsula is to all practical purposes

also an island; the fact that Scandinavia is connected with the European continent through the desolate boulders and glaciers of Lapland in the far north does not alter the necessity of approaching Sweden and Norway over a lesser or larger stretch of water. Neither was England *insular* during the Middle Ages when the channel proved to be no barrier for English thought entering the Continent or continental ideas conquering England. In spite of miserable communications European unity was never as strong as during the centuries preceding the discovery of America.

It was the fact that England of all European countries alone had a religion for itself — the Church of England. Europe resounded, after the reformers appeared, with the unending din of theological quarrels between Rome, Byzantium, Geneva, and Wittenberg. England which broke away from the Church, which had shaped the cultural and political face of the Continent, was now even spared the military and theological struggle between the Church and the heresies. England turned its face toward the seas and the very beating of England's heart, hitherto synchronized with that of the great Continent, adopted another rhythm. England, like no other European country, had its own *Shintō*, its own creed, and national messianism as well as total isolation were inevitable consequences of the willful cutting of the spiritual ties.

This "splendid," or rather not so splendid isolation engendered a destructive attitude in foreign relations which cost England very dearly.* There always were *certain aristocrats* (frequently Catholics) who had the advantage of social ties or blood relationship on the Continent, and who brought some accurate information and sound ideas to small, but usually not uninfluential circles. Yet public opinion in the past decades was largely fed by two very negative channels: semi-intellectualized Leftists, who were frantic in their admiration for Viennese and Berlin socialism, Russian Communism, Spanish "democracy," and French *laïcisme* — and a few moronic press lords of the worst reactionary type who were so unintelligent that they fell for National Socialism. Yet the latter are a recent phenomenon and the others have a certain tradition behind them. The Whigs were certainly not herdists[200] but the liberal simpletons of the nineteenth century who displayed a delirious joy about the German and Italian *risorgimento* had little in common with their more far-seeing forerunners. These poor

thinkers did not welcome the fall of Rome in 1870 less than the defeat of the Austrians at the hands of the prim, Protestant and progressive Prussians in 1866. How they had sabotaged the work of the Holy Alliance!** How they had worked with never relaxing fervor to undermine monarchical power on the Continent whenever the occasion arose![201] These sins lose nothing of their magnitude on account of the fact that they were perpetrated by a fundamentally conservative freedom loving, aristocratic, and antiherdist nation. Just the contrary.

Britain's whole record during the twentieth century in foreign affairs has been deplorable. There we have the malevolent destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy which led to the powerful expansion of the Third Reich, the substitution of the patriarchal regime of the Habsburgs by brutal, sordid little "democracies" who changed quickly into dictatorships, the idiotic neutrality toward the Communists in Spain, the dismemberment of Bulgaria which drove her finally into the arms of the Axis, the favoritism manifested toward Japan at the beginning of the century, the wrong handling of Russians and Scandinavians, the half-witted and unfortunately successful interventions against the Habsburgs,[202] Manchuria, the Italian sanctions, the dealings with Hitler; there is a whole pagoda built up of endless mistakes and *faux pas* in the past forty years.[203] In foreign affairs England has just the opposite of the Midas touch; whatever she tries to handle almost immediately turns into dross.*

If we consider with St. Thomas Aquinas aristocracy to be, together with monarchy and republic, one of the morally justified forms of government, we still have in the present form of government in Great Britain a good institution and maybe even one of the best in a rather evil world.[204] The aristocratic sentiment, surviving in spite of the surge of a formless and enormous middle class, poor in traditions, is a powerful obstacle against uniformism and identitarianism. This is of special importance at a time when Great Britain is forced by circumstances to abandon many of her great traditional values and when she also has to sacrifice so many personalistic traits to the inexorable moloch of efficiency. The anti-identitarian aristocratic tradition, even when it is represented by Colonel Blimp, will be of the utmost value in the present struggle — and after all it

is now up to the much maligned Colonel Blimp and the despised uneducated Cockney, and not to the "brilliant young men" of Bloomsbury, to save Britain as well as Europe.

England's hope and England's strength is thus diversity. This diversity is even stronger in Scotland and Ireland,** which are more mountainous, more clannish, more divided in violently antagonistic spheres of interest. Scotland, besides the Eastern Alp area, is the only region in Europe where the national dress is still worn by the upper classes who in other countries have a disdain for "peasant costumes."

There are certainly grave social injustices to be found in the United Kingdom. In certain regions conditions can be found which cry to heaven for vengeance and have to be remedied.* But all precautions should be taken lest this process of rendering social justice become an excuse for a totalitarian and identitarian transformation of British social and political life. It is decidedly not Low's asinine Colonel Blimp who is a real threat to Britain but Strube's petty bourgeois "Little George" (a ratlike edition of Mr. Milquetoast) who would not be too discriminating in choosing another color for his shirt, like his German counterpart *Herr Munkepunke* with the fat neck and the bellowing voice, of the *Fliegende Blätter. Neither the mining towns, nor the palaces or the farm yards menace the Occident, but Suburbia. And Suburbia stands for equality which destroys true society. Inequality is exactly Britain's strength and guarantee that "Britons never will be slaves."*

The end of all hierarchy is the end of Britain. If Britain would follow the lead of Mr. H. G. Wells, the great prophet of Suburbia, visualizing the ultimate victory of ants or termites over humanity, the very end of Britain would be a foregone conclusion. But Britain is not a nation of shopkeepers as it is generally assumed; the shopkeeper complex is rather the dismayed discovery of aristocrats who suddenly became aware with horror of the commercialization of their country. The surprising amount of commercial spirit in the (older) English aristocracy is also due to the determination to survive under whatever circumstances.

Such an attitude has its dangers if one keeps in mind that a class might lose its own soul. The inclusion of persons in the rank of nobility on account of their *wealth*,** through an (indirect) buying of arms and titles, is another source of the plutocratization of the aristocracy and nobility.

Apart from Britain's hierarchic structure there are even greater positive values which will always keep her afloat. A specially hopeful sign is the intellectual strength of her Christianity which is matched by a beautiful life of faith. Christian concepts have shaped the characters and minds of persons so different as the late Mr. George Lansbury and Lord Halifax. Britain's participation in the present crusade for Europe and the Christian traditions of the Occident, as well as her courageous stand in adversities are a further indication that England has not "come to an end"[205] as her enemies and apprehensive admirers alike had so often prophesied. England has left the path of splendid isolation (whether against or according to her wish is impossible to tell), an isolation which harbored the danger of self-complacency, decay, and sterility.

Britain's isolation, keeping her aloof from the Continent,[206] which was characterized by such phrases as "Dark men begin at Calais," has been terminated. Yet her reunion with the old, dark, sinister, motherly Continent will not be a joyous one. It will be bought, as every other historical achievement, by streams of blood and tears. There was something great in that gesture when England came to the defense of Poland; it was the denial of an immensely egoistic past, marred by the memories of the Opium War, and South Africa; it was the acceptance of suffering involving the risk of her very existence in order to save great final values. And it is exactly by this ordeal that England is going to expiate the sins of her past.

These include — last not least — those committed toward Ireland. It was in the case of the Evergreen Island that England's inability to understand a "foreign" psychology seemed most fatal. Ireland shared furthermore, with the Continent, the Catholic mentality, which the Protestant is practically never able to grasp, and while the Continent remained England's China, Ireland became England's Korea. Nothing would have been easier than to appease Ireland and to preserve it — not perhaps within the United Kingdom — but as an integral part of the British Commonwealth of Nations.[207]

There is always the danger that Britain's lack of intuitive understanding[208] in continental matters will prevail after her victory and that the commitments she already made will bind her to a new disorder. But

if England is in this war not with a feeling of racial superiority, like her opponents, or for the self-appointed glory of an international policeman, but guided by a sentiment of contrition, determined to *serve* the Occident and Christianity humbly and dutifully, then this war will be won by her morally and spiritually, unlike the last one which was a total loss.[209] Then all nations will look up to her and the motto on the arms of the heir to the throne will shine in new glory.

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* The Magna Charta may be a "democratic document" *if* we consider the change from monarchy to aristocratic oligarchy a step toward democracy. Such a view is nevertheless entirely unjustified. Democracy in a social sense is usually far stronger in absolute monarchies (Russia, for instance) than in aristocratic Republics (Genoa, Venice, etc.). The only "democratic" features of Magna Charta are the restrictions imposed upon the Jews.

* The greater affinity of the Tories toward Catholicism is due to their patriarchal tradition of *loyalty* and their stronger sense of *hierarchy*. Yet this is far from implying that the Whigs were by their very nature more akin to the ideas of the Reformation. Magna Charta and its libertinarian spirit antecedes that development by many centuries.

** We have no information whether the two Jewish Rabbis in the Hungarian Upper House continued their membership under the present German controlled regime.

* See the novel *Christmas Holiday*, by Somerset Maughan which describes a very typical case of the social rise of an English family from suburban gardeners to titled aristocrats.

* Thus the member of parliament is not the personification of his constituency and his voters, like the ochlocratic "leader," but a man who rather embodies a projection of aristocratic values.

** The defeat of the Hoare-Laval plan through general elections necessitated the employment of sanctions against Italy and resulted in the *total* annexation of Abyssinia by Italy. The sanctions drove Italy into the arms of Germany. Mr. Eden is thus the Father of the Axis. The establishment of the Axis was the death warrant for Austria. The fall of Austria brought the total encirclement of the Czechoslovak republic. This encirclement forced the issue at Munich. Munich deprived the purely Czech parts of the republic of natural defenses which thus led to the events of March, 1939, and to the establishment of the protectorate over Slovakia. The occupation of Slovakia made Poland defenseless, depriving her of the last section of border which might have been left without protection.

The reader is advised to check these facts on a map. The borders of 1919 were indeed drawn in such a fashion that the loss of only one single country involved the breaking down of the whole artificial building.

Sir Charles Petrie in his *twenty Years' Armistice and After* (London, 1940), expresses a similar idea and emphasizes the fact that Sir Austen Chamberlain saw clearly the danger (p. 165). Yet he traces the disastrous development back to the building of the Westwall, not to the sanctions. Both made western intervention impossible. Yet the Westwall was far from being ready in March, 1938. The real blow was struck by Eden and the peace balloteers.

* There is also such a thing as North American insularism.

** Which, of course, infected by the terroristic ideas of the French Revolution, was too blindly confiding in mere power; the Holy Alliance was doomed by the lack of a dynamic appeal and the

emphasis on “don’ts” rather than on constructive ideas.

* A similar view, though slightly less outspoken can be found in Douglas Jerrold’s excellent small book *Britain and Europe 1900–1940*, London, 1941. Proof of Britain’s miserable statesmanship (and *not* of an alleged basic immorality) is the fact that *most* decent causes in Europe have been cleverly linked up by the National Socialists directly or indirectly with their revolutionary war. The freedom of Croatia, the freedom of Slovakia, the Hungarian revision, the Bulgarian revision, the return of Bessarabia (to Rumania), the Finnish revision and territorial claims, the “liberation” of the Baltic states, the destruction of communism, the Spanish counterrevolution. Yet it is equally characteristic of the National Socialists, though adopting just causes, that they have always made them serve their own ends and this insincerity has affected all individual arrangements; thus the “liberation” of the Baltic states ended in their subjugation, the revision of Hungarian claims resulted in untenable and impossible borders, the whole Danubian solution as inaugurated by Berlin bears clearly the stamp of the *Divide et Impera*. The borders of Slovenia or the maritime share of Croatia have been allotted in a most cynical mood, the Hungarian-Slovakian relationship is perfectly hopeless. We do not even mention the disadvantages of the “New Order” for Poland because the will for destruction was here evident from the beginning.

** Scotland has the advantage of a far better educational system than England. Every good educational system is highly “democratic” in its social and financial aspects but brutally aristocratic in its scholastic standards.

Ireland suffers particularly from the fact that its Second Estate has to supplement a non-Catholic First Estate. We have there a similar situation as in feudal-clerical-democratic French Canada.

* See MacArthur and Long’s *No Mean City*, a terrifying, dramatized description of the slums in Glasgow (London, 1936).

** In most parts of Europe titles were only given for achievements in the administration, the army and navy, in arts, sciences, and education. The richest German with many civil merits was merely given a knighthood (Krupp), Maurice Maeterlinck on the other hand was made a count.

IV

THE AMERICAN SCENE

"Democracy, I do not conceyve, that God did ever ordeyne as a fitt government either for church or commonwealth. If the people be governors, who shall be governed? As for monarchy and aristocracy, they are both of them clearly approoved and directed in Scripture." — John Cotton.

THE peculiar strength of England, which is due to the fact that an upper class with numerous aristocratic elements actually directs the destinies of the country, was also characteristic of the United States of America. This becomes evident if one visits Jackson Square in Washington. There in the middle of this open space adjoining the White House one can admire Old Hickory parading on a horse, yet the effigy of the paragon of modern American "democratic" ideas is surrounded by four statues each representing a hero of the War of Independence which had taken place two generations before the presidency of Andrew Jackson. There we see Tadeusz Kościuszko the Pole of old, noble Lithuanian lineage, Baron von Steuben, the Comte de Rochambeau, and the Marquis de Lafayette. Count Kasimierz Pulaski, the only General who was killed in the Revolution, has his monument in Savannah, but Baron de Kalb on account of his undistinguished parentage was probably not considered worthy enough to be represented in the exalted society that had come to this country in order to fight and, if necessary, to die for liberty — not for equality.

American Independence, and one should never lose sight of this fact, *was not the result of a "bolshevik" conspiracy, but the outcome of the halfhearted and later more determined efforts of a group of whiggish aristocratic squires who had the support of the haute bourgeoisie in the commercial cities*.[210] This support was given in England to the Whigs of the Motherland by a corresponding group in the City. The North Americans loyal to the King, on the other hand, were automatically called "Tories."

The British King was, for our aristocratic squires (among whom we find George Washington, descendant of King John II), nothing but a stubborn and arrogant *primus inter pares*, and the republican form of government promised them an aggrandizement of their power as well as more *Liberty* — the great aristocratic ideal.* They disliked the idea of being a "royal" nobility which radiates only a secondary light like the moon.** Here was now the opportunity to become "suns" again. There were men like Alexander Hamilton, a brilliant bourgeois, who wanted to re-introduce monarchy, but the squirarchy was glad to have escaped the central control. George Washington, who had aspired to the title "Highness," found his wish frustrated. Neither had the Judges of the Supreme Court the title "Your High Mightiness" granted by the Constitution — as Benjamin Franklin proposed it in later years.

There was also an identitarian, bourgeois undercurrent hostile against liberties, while antimonarchical tendencies springing from herdist motives were not entirely lacking. The liberty-loving middle classes of New England were in a frenzy after the passing of the Quebec Act which gave religious liberty to the French Canadians. Shouts of "No King, no Popery!" became loud and added later to the revolutionary fervor.[211]

The aristocratic genius of the Revolution found only a weak and indirect expression in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution because the aristocratic sentiments of all times are seldom expressed in coherent and logistic philosophies. These two basic documents breath a spirit which is neither aristocratic nor "democratic" (the word *democracy* is not mentioned once), it has *elements* of Rousseau's philosophy and yet it is compatible with Catholic teachings, which again does not mean that it is a *typical* Catholic document. But to state that the Declaration of Independence is

based upon the philosophy of St. Robert Bellarmine is a sign of wishful thinking.[212]

Viewed against the historical background of the eighteenth century, one can risk the statement that the Declaration is a *hierarchical* document.[213] The influence of Rousseau's philosophy (which could not be short circuited) must be taken into account as well as the inordinate admiration of the classical world. Yet the republics, even the democratic republics of Ancient Greece, were not egalitarian in our modern sense. There was always a class of slaves and metics with diminished rights. Plato and Aristotle, who opposed democracy violently, were well known to all educated men at that time and educational standards were high. If one compares the intellectual crop of three million Americans in the late eighteenth century with the output of the one hundred and thirty-five million nation of today one may arrive at very interesting deductions. Even Jefferson, who cared little for birth, was certainly not an egalitarian in the modern sense; he believed strongly in a hierarchy of intellects. If one takes the attitude of Christopher Hollis,* who wrote very candidly that the Declaration of Independence was signed by a handful of slave owners who declared it to be self-evident that human beings are created equal, then one has no other choice than to consider the Founding Fathers to have been either hypocrites or lunatics. Yet they were neither if we take the circumstances as well as intentions into consideration.**

The Electorate of the United States used to be extremely small; after British pattern, only the gentry, and the well to do were enfranchized. In many states the middle classes were able to share the political life yet the "proletariat" was definitely excluded (with the exception of Vermont). Direct democracy after the Swiss model was conspicuously absent and the democratic elements of the colonial period were only strong in the framework of local administration.[214] Even the plutocratic influences were not so overpowering as in the second half of the nineteenth century.[215] The strong aristocratic control survived in the South for a long time. The Constitution of South Carolina in 1788 gave the vote only to men who had at least 50 acres of landed property. A senator had to have real estate worth at least 2000 pounds, an equivalent of about 25,000 dollars in 1942. The

Lieutenant Governor had to prove ownership of property worth at least 10,000 pounds — today the equivalent of about 150,000 dollars.[216] In spite of the disestablishment of the Anglican Church, only Protestants had full civil status. Slavery was abolished only two years after the *Ukaz* liquidating serfdom was issued in Russia, and serfdom was something far milder than slavery. Even today there are in many states defamatory laws against colored people which are as strict and brutal as the Nuremberg laws and surpass them often in rigor. These laws and regulations have furthermore *popular support* which facilitates their application.

Slavery was naturally nothing to boast of; the frequent patriarchal treatment of slaves does not alter the fact that the idea of selling and buying human beings is the outcome of a thoroughly commercialized mentality worthy of a modern baseball or football club, which so often "trade in" their declining celebrities. Yet it is difficult to decide whether the main reason for the war of secession was to be found in the egoistic economic consideration of Southerners or in the determination to oppose the centralizing efforts of the Federal Government. The fact that most southern generals and political leaders had few or no slaves seems to justify the latter assumption. We have seen it in our days that the Catholic Church in the United States assailed the "humanitarian" Child Labor Amendment for reasons which find their justification in the strongly anticentralistic tradition of the Church, a tradition, unfortunately, not always sufficiently upheld.

The United States were in 1800 or 1810 not more commercialized than France or Germany and certainly no less so than England or Belgium. The "democratic" spirit was to all outward appearances not stronger than in Holland or Norway. The Americans were at that time an ordinary, freedom-loving nation which honored traditions and could boast of a well-stratified society based on the best British and Occidental traditions. This society was hardly "Americanized," in the sense soapbox orators and tabloid papers use this name, and the romantic spirit was as strong as in Europe. "Democracy" was looked upon as a monstrosity.[217]

The calamity began through Andrew Jackson who was supported by an unstratified society of trappers, frontiers people, and wild-west pioneers.[218] They were, of course, a fine and valuable type of men who contributed

conspicuously to the greatness and growth of the United States and were far from dreaming like some of our "Progressives," of a Brave New World with human ants, guided by per capita ratios of radios and iceboxes. Thus the democratization* of the United States was begun on the "Swiss" and agrarian, not on the megalopolitan line; the climax of the democratic process was only reached with the inorganic mass immigration from Europe in the forties.

About the quality of this immigration one has to be highly skeptical. Nobody ever leaves his homeland for good if he is not to some extent *déraciné*. It is an idle illusion to think that the most courageous and enterprising Europeans came to America; the truth is that an overwhelming majority of all immigrants who crossed the Atlantic were either a *personal failure* in Europe and hoped to make riches quickly in the New World or that they belonged to a political, racial, or religious *group* which had *failed collectively* in the struggle for power and survival. It is difficult to imagine somebody leaving his fatherland because he was too happy and too successful. Neither were there such idealists who just yearned for a "harder life." Competition was far harder in Europe and there was always less elbowroom, but men like Thyssen, Lord Nuffield, Bat'a, Schneider, Krupp, and Juan March have proved that spectacular careers in the industrial, commercial sphere are not an American privilege and it is too well known that "birth" is a mere handicap in the political field of the Continent.**

Success became the great nostalgia for many Americans because they or their forefathers had written on their forehead the words *defeat* or *failure.**** We can see this well in some of the "patriotic" poems of Edgar Guest, reflecting a popular sentiment, which abound in the praise of material success.

Yet immigration proved at one and the same time to be a factor of diversity. It gave a certain variety to the big cities with their various "quarters" in which immigrants of specific races huddled together. (The smaller and medium-sized town dominated by the middle-class, not the midwestern isolated farm, became the strongest factor in the process of Americanization.) And while the poor, penniless, and prideless immigrant started automatically to imitate the established families, which were Anglo Saxon (and Dutch), these retained much of their influence by intermarrying after British pattern with the rising elements of the plutocracy.

The main emphasis was now shifted from "culture" to "civilization." This change was deplorable but almost necessary. Culture is personal and something rooted; civilization on the other hand is "international," interchangeable, and ambulant. (See Appendix IV.) There could be no melting pot, no Americanization on the basis of a new synthesis of Slovakian peasant dresses, Sicilian songs and Swedish folk dances. Only the jalopy, the overall, the ice-cream soda and the corner drugstore could serve as common denominators. In order to denationalize and to re-nationalize the "Bohunk," American society at large had to make its change from the emphasis on culture to the acclamation of depersonalized, collective, and common civilization. It was self-sacrifice for the native and often torture for the newcomer. It is difficult to see how this procedure could have been avoided. We still feel the effects of its aftermath.

The result of this inorganic mass immigration of prospective voters and the survival of historical and semihistorical classes resulted in the most curious cocktail of aristocracy and "democracy." The old aristocratic thirst for liberty, as opposed to the middle class readiness for total slavery, is still alive and is decidedly the noblest American tradition. Nowhere in the world is the impact of the identitarian and egalitarian forces of modern technicism more keenly felt, yet there are few countries that can boast of a less homogeneous population, less homogeneous in race, language, and religion. There is much lip service paid to Liberty and much lip service to Equality, but the latter has a far smaller magnetic attraction than one is wont to believe. The United States are of a unique complexity, and this complexity together with its vastness and geographical diversity have proved to be the most potent obstacles for the relentless attacks of herdism and identitarianism. There are inroads of "democracy" and inroads of aristocracy in the opposite domains, and the intricacies of the sub-Continent called the United States are such that their full description would be a good antidote for the average European's imaginary simpleton, the *"praktischer Amerikaner."* Americans are neither simple, nor practical.[219]

The *average* American may correspond to these qualifications but the average American is not the typical American. Averages are alike the world over, but extremes differ widely and it is always the extreme who is truly representative — except in the gray and inhuman world of dead statistics. In

order to compare England with America no sensible man would line up a commuter of Welvyn Garden City with a commuter from East Babylon; yet a juxtaposition of Churchill with Roosevelt or Lincoln with Gladstone would give a concrete picture. Not the megalopolitan and suburban mob, which is interchangeable because it has little "face" and personality, is "typical" and representative for a country. The "typical American" is therefore likely to be found on a ranch in Nevada or Wyoming, in the pueblos of New Mexico, in the hills of Kentucky, in an old house in Boston and in the *bayous* of Louisiana. It would be interesting to find out how much *they* care for showers, iceboxes, community life, etiquette, and bridge competitions.[220]

It is a superstition of many Europeans, and also of some Americans, to believe that the United States has a classless society. The absence of titles does not justify this view and if one mentions the existence of social stratas one is often told to go out West where such social differentiation does not exist. Yet gigantic and socially "democratic" states like Nevada have a population of less than one hundred thousand, and most Americans live in the quadrangle between Chicago, St. Louis, Washington, and Boston, and it is this part of the United States which is further ahead in the scale of material development and therefore has greater significance.

Aristocratic as well as plutocratic elements have helped here in a stratification of Society and the contribution of the plutocratic element has not always been the happiest one. It is an artificial element, but it has to be regarded as a reality.

American society, till the advent of mass immigration, was fairly static. If hypothetical speculations are permitted one may be tempted to say that without the rush after the thirties and forties the States would have developed on social lines parallel to those in England and in other parts of the Occident. It would not have become "America" with an exclamation mark but another "regular" Western country characterized merely by the absence of a Catholic medieval tradition. *Yet the mass immigration threw America back to an earlier stage of development, in the chronological sense*. America by 1810 had entirely "caught up" with Europe; America in 1890 was partly back in the seventh century A.D., when the unstratified

society of barbarians started to settle down. Even today the immigration of 1840-1924 has not been completely "digested," yet the whole American Scene, the whole American social life today is characterized by the very process of social stratification which is always, under all circumstances, and in every country a painful procedure, as painful as the pangs of birth. The dominant position of women is just another symptom of this situation.[221]

Every intelligent foreign observer will be struck by the sight of the rapid formation of classes from the shapeless fragments which were dumped on the Atlantic shores of America. There was actually never a moment of stagnation. The formative process of social stratification is one of the strongest factors of American life, and it produced phenomena which are as ridiculous, uncharitable, and weird as those we could observe in European countries in their respective formative periods — in England during the eleventh century, in early Moscovian "Russ," in the Balkans after the Turkish withdrawal, in France under the Merovingians and Carolingians.

From the forties of the past century on, social ambition was the most potent factor in American social life and the greatest incentive for the American self-immolation in hard work. The American male of the white-collar class does not work himself to death because he wants to buy more commodities or because he wants to spend lavishly his earnings in interesting travels. What he wants is the desired place in the community, the better "background" for his children. Up to the age of forty-five when he gets his nervous breakdown, or to the age of fifty-five when he dies in the Cancer Hospital, or at 60 when he is found dead over the dictaphone, he hardly gets more than a fortnight a year off from his work to enjoy life and freedom (like his wife or his daughter). There is the type of the young lawyer in downtown New York who works daily till eleven p.m. in order to "make good." And this "making good" is nothing but the flat denial of equality, so much emphasized; it means rising to a "higher station in life," to a higher *class*.

The proverbial man from Mars, free from any bias, would be struck in the United States by the aspect of a society trying madly, desperately, and with an almost religious intensity, to get rid of its primeval "democratic" and egalitarian condition. The society pages, read avidly by taxi drivers, charwomen, and waitresses, the social registers, and color distinctions, the

emphasis laid on greater or lesser "prominence" of "civic leaders," the hints at "blue blood" and "restricted neighborhoods," and the macabre earnestness and ceremonial etiquette with which social events are celebrated would remind him of a stage of Martian society when its members were not yet properly labeled and had therefore no courage to relax its rules and personal exclusiveness. Every bridge drive, every reception arranged in order to "honor" a debutante, the rivalries of glamor girls (all well born and endowed with hard cash), the snobbing of actresses, Jews, and producers (quite in step with eighteenth-century England), the advertisement of "socialites" smoking Camels, drinking wines, or pouring whiskies, as well as the endless inquiries about questions of etiquette in the dailies, plus the rising sale of Emily Post's manuals — all these phenomena show not only the youngness of a society but also the grim determination to be molded after some hierarchic pattern, to continue the aristocratic tradition of the Anglo-Saxon world, *and to put structural liberty above equality*. A competitive society knows no other equality than the equality of opportunity. To maintain that American Society is intentionally egalitarian and "democratic" is sheer folly. We can, naturally, pass a judgment over a given society, only if we compare it with others. A misjudgment may therefore be forgiven to an American who never had the occasion to go abroad and is reared in Hollywoodian conceptions about continental European society. But if a traveled man in the possession of the means of comparison repeats the cant about American egalitarianism in society matters, he can justly be accused of idiotic stubbornness or utter blindness, because never in history has a society striven so sincerely to pass quickly through its egalitarian stage of development as the American.

This process is accelerated, thanks to English traditions and English influence, as well as due to the fact that the older aristocracy, largely surviving, can be used as a "yardstick." This struggle has its tragicomical aspects, like the "social registers" published by small committees who decide who does and does not belong to "good society." Competing committees, set up by those snubbed and left out, publish other registers and "blue books," and in the end we have quarrels and antagonisms as bitter as those related by Kotoshikhin, the Russian historian, who described the hatreds and intrigues of the Boyars in connection with their seating at the

Czar's table. *Only countries with a fixed caste system like India are ignorant of the vices of snobism*.

Yet the "democratic" past and the mammonistic present oscillates in the background, and social life in the United States can thus not be dissociated from publicity which after all, costs money. No press in the world, not even the dailies of England, Hungary, or Afghanistan, devote so much space to social life. The imitative urge of the "lower" classes is almost limitless and the interest for the doings, whims, and entertainments of the Upper Ten are truly "national." America and England are in this respect so near to each other; the marriage of Princess Marina to the Duke of Kent, the marriage of a princess of a then exiled royal house of the Balkans with the younger son of a symbolic ruler, is probably still in many people's memories on account of the overwhelming publicity it received. In an "autocracy" of the type of Wilhelminian Germany or Franz Joseph's Austria, or even in Imperial Russia such a troth would not have interested anybody except a few courtiers and the *Dames des Halles*. Marriages of imperial princes or archdukes would have been reported with a few lines in the papers. Yet in the "Marina Marriage" (just as in the case of the Simpson affair) the ochlocratic tendency for publicity as well as the romantic and nostalgic curiosity for the doings of the "higher ups" cooperated harmoniously.

The colleges and universities suffer similarly from these diseases of a formative period. Sororities and fraternities are frequently hotbeds of snobism and the educational institutions themselves often vie with each other in the social field. Many young men and women merely go to college for the same reason as young Englishmen go to public school, i.e., for social "connections" and social "improvements."[222] But while all these tensions and the spirit of competition in America's formative period are in a way "healthy" and natural, there is another aspect of social life with little elasticity, little compromise, and far greater bitterness — the question of race. The Protestant attitude toward racial matters has created a multiplicity of tensions and prejudices which are only matched by those now rampant in the German superdemocracy.

Racialism as a herdist feeling always went hand in hand with ochlocracy. In Periclean Athens men with a foreign father or mother were

not considered to be full citizens. Human beings seem unfortunately to have an inborn urge to look down on somebody. Where social stratification is incomplete the contempt for the foreigner appears as a substitute for a pagan disdain for the lower classes. (No nation has a stronger dislike for foreigners than the French or the Swiss.) To this eager seeking for the "underman" one has to add the dislike for diversity, and to that identitarian sentiment may still be joined semireligious ideas about one's own superiority or messianic mission. Differences in nationality manifest themselves largely by a characteristic of speech, a "foreign accent"; differences in race are more fatal because they exclude assimilation and add the barrier of "color." The German or Irish immigrant who did not open his mouth was still a neutral entity, the Negro, the Jew, the "dirty-white" immigrant from southern Europe immediately gave away his "secret."

The idea of the Chosen People or the Chosen Race is part of America's cumbersome inheritance from Judaism through Genevan channels. Many of the Calvinist and Puritanical preachers saw in the war of extermination against the Indians a parallel of the struggle of the Israelites against Philistines, Moabites, and Amalekites. The slaying of the Red Man became almost a sacred rite. These wars of extermination were waged at a time when Suarez and Vitoria thundered from the pulpits of the University of Salamanca against the assassination of Indians and when the Spanish kings had already liquidated the regime of the murderous adventurers of the type of a Francisco Pizarro upon the imprecations of the saintly Bishop Las Casas. This is part of the reason why there are millions of Indians and Mestizos south of the Colorado River and very few north of it.[223]

Later Negroes, Chinese, Japanese, Jews, and the Mediterranean immigration came to this country. The quota laws of 1924 were already issued in the spirit of true racialism. America never lacked racial ideologists and ideologies. Those of the more popular type influenced the Ku Klux Klan or other racialist Know-Nothings, those of the more intellectual breed were read in certain German circles prior to the rise of National Socialism. Hanfstängl acquainted Hitler with American racialist ideas and usages which made a deep impression upon him. Men like Lothrop Stoddard and Madison Grant are, together with Gobineau, Darwin, Wagner, and Houston

Stewart Chamberlain (probably against their own intentions) forerunners of National Socialism.[224]

It is a well-known fact that the Negro is, in the South, a second class citizen.[225] But even in the rest of the United States, in the land of Whitman, Emerson, Lincoln, and Susan P. Anthony he has not the same recognition as in the City of the Bourbons and the Bastille, or in the benevolent autocracy of Salazar, or anywhere else in Europe except in progressive Germany. It is a fact that colored people are more respected in the Old World with its medieval memories than in the Protestant part of the New World. Paul Robeson has infinitely more trouble to get a hotel room in New York than in Madrid. It would be difficult to imagine an equivalent of a black vice-president of the Chambre des Deputes or the black French undersecretary for colonial affairs (1935) in this country where people are accustomed to think of Negroes in terms of redcaps and bootblacks. But there are aspects of the color question which are far more unpleasant than these. Even in the more hierarchic South, with its Jim Crow car and the ugly Scottsborough case, the results of a materialistic conception of man becomes apparent.[226] Evolutionism gave to the old superstitions a new "scientific" cloak and the view that the Negro stands somewhere between man and ape gains ground rather than loses it.*

Where herdist feelings can finally lead is well demonstrated by an event that happened not so long ago in the deep South. A young Catholic fell in love with a mulatto girl. No social stigma would have been attached to him had he made of this young woman his mistress. But having more respect for the law of God than for the state law he took her to the North and married her secretly. Some time after the return of the couple to the South (where the woman was considered to be the young man's lover) a child was born to them. Unfortunately it came out at the baptism that the infant was not the fruit of an illegitimate union. "General will" was outraged, the law of the herd was violated and "action" had to be taken. The populace stormed the house, murdered the mother and the baby.** No comment is necessary.

If defenders of the equal civil rights of *all* Americans voice their grievances, they are usually told that miscegenation is not desirable. This is definitely not the issue. In the knowledge of the erotic tastes and psychological tendencies of the North American it is very doubtful whether

miscegenation would never reach greater proportions than right now. Yet social intercourse with Negroes and (what is much more important) equal opportunities given to colored citizens of these United States do not mean automatically or necessarily an increase of intermarriage. Americans suffer somehow from the haunting complex of a high school romance, office romance, college romance, subway romance, resort romance, boat trip romance. Literature and the movies have filled their imagination to that extent with a love-and-marriage complex that they can hardly imagine inviting the Lincoln Whites or the Washington Dukes for a drink without starting a "romance" between the young people of the respective families.

Discrimination on the other hand is a crime. One might make a case for or against *segregation** If a Catholic Church in the South has one side reserved for Whites and the other side reserved for Negroes, one might argue about it. But to force the Negroes to sit in the last benches or to insist that they receive communion only after all white communicants had received the Body of our Lord is perhaps good Nazi custom, but it is certainly not Catholic usage. This is obviously discrimination for which we all will have some day to pay the price. May God be lenient to us in that hour of retribution!

The racial differentiation between white and black is not the only one in this great country. We have already made allusion to the "dirty white" immigration.** The Italian in the United States has frequently a definite feeling of inferiority, and it is not only the "wop" who feels the mild contempt of "Nordics," but the "Polak," the "Bohunk," the "Dago," and the "Speck" are in the same boat — not to mention the "Chinks" and "Japs." There is a club near Washington which has been established for the patronage of "Gentlemen of North European descent only" and our surprise increases when we see a hotel with the indelicate inscription "For Gentiles only." This is not due to any Nazi influence. Such hotels existed ages before Streicher and his *Stürmer** There are thousands of clubs, beaches, boarding houses, hotels, and gyms where our Lord would not have been accepted — and all that on account of an excess of herdism, the deep-rooted suspicion against people who are different in race and character. Yet "antisemitism" is definitely a middle-class tradition which was extremely weak prior to the Jacksonian period.[227] Jews were socially accepted at the beginning of the

past century but "progress" and the Great Inundation have changed the picture. In a primitive society (in *statu nascendi*) the racial characteristics are taken as a hierarchy-building element because they are "obvious." A society of archaic structure is far too sophisticated to be influenced by racial prejudices. This is the reason for the lack of racial antisemitism in the social consciousness of the Mediterranean area or of England and the United States in their prime of independence. In order to see racial tolerance in the Western Hemisphere one should rather go to Brazil which preserved its monarchical form of government until fifty-three years ago. If we are aware of the apparent fact that Christopher Columbus was a naturalized Spaniard of Italian birth and Jewish descent** the whole discriminatory attitude looks rather pathetically stupid. But young materialist cultures (and there is no such thing as an old materialist culture) have the strongest and most violent prejudices or admiration for or against certain classes, creeds, financial groups,[228] bodily perfections or imperfections. I would rather be a Negro in Lisbon than in Washington, D. C, a beggar in Madrid than in New York,[229] a Jew in Teheran than in Berlin, a bourgeois in Greece than in the Soviet Union, a Protestant minister in eighteenth-century Austria than a Jesuit in England at the same time. Primitive progressivists will always develop their peculiar herdist attitudes, but old cultures are skeptical and they are inclined not to believe in pigeonholes into which the subtlest of all things, mankind, can easily be subdivided.

(The skepticism of old cultures has naturally also its dangers. It deprives nations of their élan and when it encroaches upon Truths — not mere views — it can be devastating in the religious sphere. The skeptic of an old and mature culture is always a liberal in the pre-Manchester sense, and *there is nothing more attractive than a man who can unite in himself both elements: a total faith and a total lack of prejudice: absolute Catholicity and absolute generosity.*)

There is less differentiation in the Middle West than in the North- or Southeast. Birth and race are less, while *money* is more important. The society there is "younger" and the development slower on account of the lack of "yardsticks" in the form of blue-blooded families. Money is power and that is what counts in a primitive society. Sixty or seventy years ago the

six-shooter often spoke its mighty word west of the Mississippi. Western society was then in the same stage of development as the Herulians of Odoaker or the Saxons under Hengist and Horsa. Today far-Western society is going through an early medieval period.* Tomorrow it may experience a period of Humanism and Renaissance.

The cities in the Middle West look clean and prosperous, the soil is fertile as far as the eastern rim of the Dakotas where the dustbowl and erosion become a problem, the people are more naïve (a medieval virtue), hearty, direct, friendly, and not yet engrossed in the process of building up a hierarchy, and the stigma of a primitive, "democratic" civilization — monotony — is in full bloom. This monotony, deriving from an industrial civilization, is at the same time one of the two great handicaps under which the natural development of society is suffering. The other great identitarian factor between the Alleghenies and the Rockies is the almost complete absence of mountains with the exception of the *romantic* Black Hills and the Ozarks.

If we unfold a road map of many a midwestern state (for instance, Iowa or Kansas) we see nothing but a uniform mass of quadrangles, the counties and the roads cutting each other in right angles. Wherever the roads meet there is a town or agglomeration of houses which shows no visual difference from the one twenty miles away. The stores, chapels, banks, libraries, filling stations, and town houses are practically all the same and the uniform advertisements of oil companies, "cokes," automobiles, and cigarettes cancel whatever variety there may have been. There are no peasants but only farmers, living in "fragments of megalopolis" (as Spengler expressed himself), and not in villages. They own the ground, yet there is a curious readiness to part with it whenever it is necessary or profitable.

Farther out West one is struck by the ruins of ghost towns either of an agrarian or industrial nature. Dustbowls, depressions, aridity, dissication, careless exploitation of the soil, and exhaustion of mineral wealth have destroyed once flourishing communities. The inordinate desire to get rich quickly has depleted many a national resource. The planless destruction of timber and forests have caused not only dust but also floods. Agriculture is suffering heavily and has to be aided by the state. The deputies and senators of agrarian districts used to demand ever increasing subventions and a

planned economy is something which cannot be avoided any more. Economically America has come of age (every maturity is "tragic") and the times of an expansive economy, depriving Indians of their hunting grounds and other "limitless possibilities" are definitely over. And the sooner America realizes that, the better. The whole question of the "New Deal," made more serious by the problem of a war economy, hinges on this problem.

We have spoken about the cultural chronology of America. Economically speaking one may come to the conclusion that America in 1925 was where Europe used to be in 1880, but there is less chronological difference between the United States and the Continent of today. The *social* reforms of the New Deal remind strongly of Bismarck's reforms which were intended to take the wind out of the sails of Social Democracy in Germany. These reforms (Roosevelt's as well as Bismarck's) were timely, necessary, just, and also politically expedient. One may quarrel about their individual merits and the shortcomings in their application, but they could not be avoided. The decrease of liberties and the increase of centralism they entailed is deplorable, yet they are the price we pay for "progress." One could certainly — contrary to general views — stop "progress" but the thing one cannot do is to accept "progress" and to refuse to pay its price. This is suicidal and as catastrophic as permitting automobiles and to refuse, in the name of liberty, to set up traffic rules.

In comparison to Europe, the old abundance and the old elbowroom of America seems to continue; automobiles were long rotting away in their lugubrious graveyards, automobiles which would have done service for at least another half decade in countries of the Old World. There are still butlers in America who are paid twice as high as Bulgarian university professors and advertising managers with salaries of European cabinet ministers. Yet the fact that the times of an extensive economy are over cannot be explained away. The country may have larger per capita riches than it had sixty years ago, yet the material wants have increased in a greater proportion and the raw materials have declined considerably. *"Democracy" in the political sense is based on experimenting — the sometimes vague experimenting of laymen — and this is far too costly to countries without limitless riches*. The expert and the skilled become more

and more a necessity and the fantastic complications of modern technique, modern finance, modern economy, modern foreign policy, and modern production methods render unguided lay opinion more and more obsolete and hazardous for practical application.

In previous years we have seen people trying to paint the dangers of a Roosevelt dictatorship and a Roosevelt fascism on the wall, and still today we meet individuals who call themselves "conservatives"* and who are in reality liberalistic capitalists in the tradition of Adam Smith, expecting from the New Deal as well as from the President the end of all liberties. Yet these steps were, as we know, unavoidable and the President is certainly not the type of the democratic-fascist "leader," but perhaps a typical aristocratic country squire of the old type who is intelligent enough to draw the bitter but inevitable consequences of modern technology. Apart from that he has that genuine aristocratic sense of responsibility for the little man, the worker, the employee who has to "be cared for."** An eminent columnist with little sympathies for the President remarked once scoldingly: "Mr. Roosevelt has an innate hatred for wealth unless it has been inherited" — which is just another aspect of the aristocratic mind.[230] He has not only prevented a revolution, but through his moderation given a lease of life to exactly the same type of people — the secondary, plutocratic aristocracy — which hated him with a bitterness without parallel in the annals of American history.* We have no idea to what extent Mr. Roosevelt takes mass opinion seriously — there is no doubt that he is "demophil" — but he must be aware of the fact that his administration has definitely strong "bureaucratic" tendencies incompatible with "democracy" or even the ochlocratic trends of our time which stand for the rule of laymen *over* the experts. It is naturally quite a different question whether the expert advisers of the President are the best ones obtainable in this country and whether his administrators have all characteristics of an ideal officialdom. An ideal bureaucracy is always entirely nonochlocratic, i.e., strictly *nonpolitical* and *free of party ties*. And there are two more requirements for a perfect bureaucrat besides the aforementioned status: *high intellectual as well as high moral standards and — last not least — generosity*.

There is naturally a genuine fear abounding lest the last token of active political right left to the modern slave — his right to vote — may also be

abolished. It is a truism that *every genuine officialdom is always out to destroy or at least to decrease the control of the nonexperts, of the parliaments or congresses, and to render them powerless if an opportunity arises.*[**]

The problematic nature of lay control becomes apparent if we think about practical questions which have been put before the electorate. The elections of 1936, for instance, decided the future and continuation of the New Deal. A young historian who had majored in economics for his Ph.D. degree was particularly interested in this issue and embarked upon the venture to examine the vast project in earnest. After six weeks of intensive studies he saw that it would take him at least seven or perhaps ten months to be in the position to pass a pertinent judgment on this extremely complicated economic plan. There are probably not more than 3000 American voters (and maybe even less) who are competent critics of the New Deal, and yet we find 50,000,000 voters who have very definite opinions about it. If one would make an effort to find out how they came to their conclusions one would see that almost everybody judges the plan from a purely personal point of view; one man, for instance, will formulate his opinions according to the sales he had during a certain period and another one will use employment in his own community as a measuring rod. But no momentary or local success (or failure) can be taken as a basis for a fair judgment. A financial policy might bring enormous benefits over a period of twelve years (three Presidential terms) and end with total disaster, or it might work out the other way round.[*]

The man in the street usually knows absolutely nothing about foreign policy, economics, civil law, strategy, naval affairs, political history, and federal administration, while ochlocracy at its best is an enormous machinery of persuasion where those not well informed try to persuade with a confusing vocabulary other less informed voters to elect them.[231] (Ochlocracy at its worst can be studied in Central Europe and Russia.) The whole thing is nothing but a lottery of opinions — of opinions based upon slogans, whims, hunches, dislikes, and fragmentary incoherent shreds of information. It is quite true that experts can also make mistakes. Even doctors can make mistakes, but ailing persons who are not mental cases will seek the aid of a doctor and not of a tailor or cabinetmaker — this in spite

of the fact that medical men have committed gross and even fatal errors. The ochlocratic spokesmen of our day, on the other hand, have a superstitious belief that the masses are endowed in political questions with an "inner light" or a special gift of the Holy Ghost which enables them to solve difficult expert problems. It seems that the sinister belief in this "Inner Light" gives the ochlocrats of our time the right to call themselves "enlightened persons."

We already have mentioned the fact that the blind belief in the intelligence of the man in the street, who can solve the most difficult problems, intuitively is fundamentally Lutheran. Luther believed in the utter wretchedness of human beings in their moral sphere, but he thought at the same time that every cobbler can expound the Scriptures, which is full of passages over which learned theologians haggle for decades and even centuries. The Catholic Church, on the other side, taught the opposite doctrine; while not despairing over human nature in its moral sense she always preserved a healthy skepticism about the intellectual faculties of the average man.

This Protestant optimism and egalitarianism in intellectual matters is hostile to any form of authority or hierarchy in the field of reasoning, and thus we see in the earlier forms of popular government not only economic planning becoming impeded but every planning in general. A constructive foreign policy, even in a representative republic, is rather handicapped. One has only to remember the political testaments of kings and emperors who planned things two or three hundred years ahead. Yet in a republic or constitutional monarchy one course is followed by one government and another one by the next. Elective constitutions have an inherent dislike for a continuity of power and they rest on the assumption that four or eight years are a long time to carry out even the most elaborate program. Such views are far from reality unless we think in terms of *destruction;* the work of decades can naturally be destroyed in a few weeks time. In America we have in addition not only changing politicians but also changing administrations. This lack of equilibrium is particularly disadvantageous in foreign affairs, where "democratically" governed nations frequently lose the confidence of other nations because they cannot be trusted further than the next cabinet or the next president.

Who are today the members of the parliaments, congresses, national assemblies, or popular diets the world over? Are they all still the trustworthy experts, men of intuition, integrity, and knowledge they once used to be in the "heroic period" of parliamentarism?[232] Few people will doubt that the human material even of our Congress could stand some improvement. The ochlocratic tendencies of the past 100 years have wrought havoc everywhere and the present system of franchise was certainly not conducive toward improving popular representation anywhere in the world. Our congressman, not less than his colleagues abroad, has often been elected merely on account of his *popularity* and the confidence *people* have in him.[233] His popularity in turn is only too often due to the fact that he "embodies" his constituency, that he is a personification of the average voter* and the natural "leader" of the district. Frequently he is careful not to give the impression that he is socially or intellectually superior to the people "back home"; the "baby kisser" likes to prove that he is a "fellow like you and me." And often the confidence put in the candidate is nothing but the conviction that he will faithfully represent the views of his constituency. Yet a congressman who acts merely as a gramophone record betrays the very soul, the very essence of American government as conceived by the Founding Fathers. His passive role was to receive from his constituents a delegated power, and right here ends his relationship to his voters; his task from now on is to reach decisions *independently* from the opinions of his voters, decisions in conformity to his knowledge and conscience. The Library of Congress, after all, has been erected in order to give the senators and representatives a practical help in forming definite views about the problems their country is faced with. We do not want to discourage voters writing to their congressmen, but they have to bear in mind that it would be more than unfair of them to "menace" their public servant with the refusal not to elect him again if he doesn't act as a messenger boy of their desires.[234] Such an attitude is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution which wanted the members of the Congress to be *aristoi* in the best Jeffersonian sense, men of independent judgment, of learning and discretion.

The parliamentary situation in Europe was in this respect even a great deal worse than in America.[235] The ochlocratic tendencies were much more marked and in most European countries it was unthinkable that a deputy (elected on a party list and not as a person) ever differed from the party line. American individualism at least prevented the rise of a strict herd obedience in party matters. The candidates for Congress as well as the congressmen themselves, even if they are capable of understanding the underlying problems and issues of the day, are in a hopeless position to make them understood by the masses of voters. They have usually no other choice than to "boil them down" to a few simple catchphrases. But this process of "boiling down" means to distort the truth.[236] The truth, the world, nature, human affairs are usually by their very nature complicated. Even theological truths (contrary to Protestant conviction) are very difficult to grasp, and the individual is usually too lazy, uninterested, and not sufficiently educated to reason them out himself or to take the help of some learned and expert person.[237] The same indolence, indifferency, and crudity prevails in political matters.[238]

Popular representation in the United States (as anywhere else) faces the grave problem of quality; quality of the voters, quality of congressmen and senators. There is unfortunately little doubt that the lack of political education (which has its limits) and that an *indiscriminate* franchise have contributed a great deal to this deficiency. We have purposely written about the indiscriminate, not *general* franchise. The latter has the advantage that it gives the individual citizen a feeling of organic relationship to his country (which is effected in a more prosaic way by the income tax). But general franchise should not mean equal franchise, and the two elements of *knowledge* and *merit* should definitely be taken into consideration. Here, quite exceptionally, we will disregard the accepted system of the Founding Fathers who had taken from English usage the system of property qualifications. On account of its mammonistic implications we will not consider it any further. (Income, real estate property, taxes, etc., fall into this category.)

The proposal we make here is very tentative and should only serve as an indication as to where the solution of the problem *may* be. The idea would

be to give to certain persons *additional* votes for *each* "merit" or "competence." These votes will be accumulated. There is little doubt that it would take money and trouble to verify in each case the number of votes an individual person is entitled to, but where the question of quality enters no sacrifice should be avoided. There would have to be a permanent commission checking up each voter's status. As basis for *additional* voting rights the following qualities could serve:

1. Being 50 years of age or over.
2. The possession of a B.A. or B.S.
3. The M.A. degree, all doctor's degrees (Ph.D., M.D., etc.).
4. Active military service abroad.
5. Invalidity as a result of such service.
6. Being widowed by a war.
7. Administrative offices held for over 15 years.
8. Heads of families of 4 children or over.
9. Priesthood, ministership, etc.
10. Managing or directing of large enterprises.
11. Managership of large public organizations.

Under these circumstances a physician aged fifty, who served in the war and is providing for four children, would have the power to poll six times. The mechanical, numerical majoritism which holds such evil sway over parliamentarian institutions could thus be broken in order to preserve their existence. It would be an end of the prevalent system of merely "counting noses."

Yet a reform would also be necessary on the other end of the line. An examination commission under the direct supervision of the Supreme Court should see that certain educational standards among representatives and senators are kept. These examinations should cover subjects like ethics, geography, history, constitutional history, foreign politics, economics, etc. This would similarly help to raise standards and to increase the respect of the citizens for their representatives. The word *politician* has today unfortunately a rather derogatory connotation, and each time a paper publishes a drawing symbolic of a congressman one will find the picture of a dirty, wicked old man with bagging trousers and a slimy leer. Such

popular connotations destroy (in the very long run, it may be admitted) all confidence in representative government.

A meticulous observer could see in the years preceding America's entry into this war, in certain circles in Washington, a weariness with uninformed lay opinion in general and with Congress in particular. This impatience and anger over the delays caused by fruitless talk and filibustering in Congress are mostly notable in the departments where educational standards are high, admission is dependent upon rigorous examinations, and secrecy must necessarily be strictly observed; this is the case in the State Department as well as in the Army and Navy. An almost identical situation could be found in many European states prior to the suppression of parliamentarian institutions (see pp. 193–194).

Yet if the future belongs to expert rule because "progressive" ideas and inventions have created a permanent state of emergency the world over, then it is better to face the facts and to prevent the establishment of a party dictatorship through the cooperation of a specific political group which may lessen the strain of a furious and dissatisfied officialdom. If *the administration needs more power* (by no means all), *then one should make an honest effort to build up an intellectually and morally "perfect" officialdom with a tradition of integrity, scholarly seriousness, and a sense of great responsibility toward God (and the Nation*).[239] This "bureaucracy" may be part of a new aristocracy of thought, faith, and taste of the post plutocratic period in the development of a genuine American hierarchy. Yet these essentials of a superior national existence cannot be built overnight and it may easily take a couple of generations until this effort yields a satisfactory result.*

Such a process is naturally not ochlocratic. Already Charles Maurras has said (*De Démos à César*, Paris, 1930, p. 35): "Democracy is the rule of numbers; such a government implies equality. But organization implies inequality. Thus democracy and organization are mutually exclusive."

In the meantime America suffers greatly from the handicap of electing a large part of the nonfederal officialdom by the people; even policemen and judges are often elected by hobos, little businessmen, and migratory soda jerkers.** Under these conditions it is obvious that courts can often not afford to be independent. A few miles behind Richmond or Chattanooga the

most ochlocratic of all judiciary systems — lynching — is still in force. In a strictly ochlocratic world the only logical judiciary procedure based on general disapproval is lynching, and the democratic Athenians cooled their anger on unpopular fellow citizens in a bloodless lynching without photo cameras and blowtorches — through ostracism. Yet not less immoral than lynching is the passing of a verdict while listening with one ear to the *Vox Populi*. The judge who did not want to risk his popularity and his job has been immortalized by the Book of Books — this man, who rather obeyed the Jewish mob than his own conscience and who tried in vain to wash his hands in innocence, is Pontius Pilate.

The great enemy of the "bureaucracy" in every capitalistic country is the plutocratic-capitalistic group. An incorruptible and exclusive administration only increases the ire and hatred of the *haute finance*, which has always shown disdain and contempt for the European bureaucracy that provided the nobility with new blood.* The stubborn, proud, and puritanical officialdom with "Titles without means" irritated them highly on account of their interference with financial activities.

At least one must leave it to the American plutocracy that they understood very well how to impress the masses. The Little Man acquired, as time went on, a far greater respect and veneration for the Rockefellers, Carnegies, Morgans, Vanderbilts, and Mellons than his German equivalent for the Radziwills, Hohenlohes, Löwensteins, Schönburgs, Schwarzenbergs — names which were frequently not known to the Man in the Street.

In order to keep his prestige the plutocrat had to instill the idea into the people that his own values are the highest in the world, that material standards are of a primary importance, that nations with little enthusiasm for material progress are retrograde. Once the pioneer with his covered wagon had disappeared he was replaced by the salesman who considered himself to be a "potential millionaire." The weakness of socialistic movements in America prior to 1929 is largely due to the fact that people preferred the hope for a million to the certainty of thirty dollars a week. Like the soldier of the Napoleonic period with the proverbial baton in the knapsack, so the ambitious young American saw himself prophetically with all the glory of a million-dollar banking account.** Only after the great crash do we see the desire for more security gaining momentum.

In order to stimulate emulation and "healthy ambition" we see the plutocrats finally unfolding their private lives to the public. Success became material success and was called euphemistically "making good." The level of higher education became constantly lower and the "practical" became the main object of studies. The high cultural level of 1800 was completely abandoned. The mountains of the old American British tradition were with difficulty saved from being submerged in the deluge of mass immigration. The pioneering period was followed by an effort of social stratification and integration through money. The railroads followed the covered wagons. Now money as a crude differentiating power is slowly reaching its end. More lasting values will take its place. Yet the ochlocratic worship of numbers and quantities has caused in the meantime untold damage.[240]

It is a commonplace that the great values of life cannot be expressed in numbers and statistics, and this is partly the reason why the ideas of quality and permanence have been so neglected in the period of the *Great American Impasse*. Neither the holiness of a Santa Teresa, nor the heroism of Tone, nor yet the profundity of theological truth can be expressed in numbers. But in the technicized world numbers become involved with human or inhuman activities of every kind, which find their expression in statistical recording. The various denominations vie in their yearly revenues from whist drives and bingo parties; games are expressed in numbers which are broadcasted all over the country; human beings are said to be "worth" so and so many thousand dollars a year; Bridge has been evolved into a system of mathematical probabilities (Culbertson); houses are evaluated by their rooms and floors, and public squares by their equivalent in money. (For instance, the "Ten Million Dollar Plaza" in Washington, D. C, and the Million Dollar Highway in Colorado.) The infantile British joy in general *competition*, a Hobbesian *bellum omnium contra omnes*, has created this crazy idea of an endless humming and buzzing competition without repose.*

Everything must be measured and compared; the stop watch and the yardstick celebrate their omnipresence in horseraces, auto races, tree sitting, jumping, hurdle races, and motorboat races. All these victories and defeats can be measured. Yet the desperate desire for new measurable and "comparable" victories engenders such odd competitive efforts as, for

instance, the dancing marathons, kissing marathons, speaking marathons. America, England, and even Germany between the two revolutions, were full of people who established new records by hopping on one leg around a city, eating cabbage for ten successive years' or covering the walls of a house with cigar bands.[241] The deeper reason for this mania is not only to be found in the worship of numbers but also in the morbid desire for publicity (anthropocentrical neighborly recognition) and, what is even more important, the subconscious wish to see new records established because the breaking of old records seems to justify the fairy tale of "Progress."

If somebody drives 311 miles an hour (instead of 309) in a one-man car which consumes one gallon for every two miles on an artificial driveway then he or she has furthered the sacred cause of "progress." Even human sacrifices are made to placate the sinister god of progress. Every year about 40,000 people are squashed to death on the American highways with the help of explosive motors. If somebody would start a sect which would immolate every year about 40,000 innocent people to a god named Progressilopochtli or if a medicine were to be sold which annually cures the headache of about 20,000,000 people but kills off forty thousand men, women, and children, the police would definitely step in and the head of the sect or the manufacturer of the medicine would be confined in a prison or a psychopathic ward. Yet with our present state of mind we rather advocate the psychopathic ward for the man who would plead for the abolition of automobiles.

Things which are "measurable" are popular in a technical civilization because they can be "judged" by the masses who are thankful for the criterion of numbers. The *circenses* of today are based on "scorings." One could, if one wanted to, compare universities by taking their scorings at spelling bees or football teams as a basis for comparison. Authors may thus be compared by their literary output, the number of pages they have written or the reprintings of their books. But could one arrange a "match" between two *savants?* Hardly! It certainly would be amusing to see a race for holiness between two prospective saints. And painters? Pictures may be measured by square inches and even poems by yards.[242] All this cannot be proposed in earnest and the fact remains that spiritual and intellectual values cannot be measured as quantities. They cannot be expressed in

numerals as, for instance, the sex appeal of the film stars, which is frequently evaluated by its financial effect on the box office.

The worship of numbers, quantity, and size has also wrought havoc wherever it found little opposition. Education is, after all, something thoroughly *"aristocratic"* in the intellectual sense. Already the Ancients were aware of the fact that there are different degrees of knowledge, but ochlocracy spread the conviction that *everybody* with the proper educational facilities is able to learn *everything*. The very idea of genius or inborn talents as disequalizing factors must be repulsive to people who not only believe that we are (theologically speaking) created as equals but that we also remain equals all through our lifetime. There naturally are a fair number of scholars and educators who have protested desperately against the low standards in American higher education as well as against the view that a true education should teach *"how to make a living"* instead of helping the student to solve his problem *"how to live"* by giving him the philosophical and cultural elements for a cultured existence.

President Robert Hutchins of the University of Chicago, who advocates the study of theology and a preponderance of the liberal arts in the curriculum of colleges and universities, has been promptly branded a "Fascist," the label which "progressive" educators stick indiscriminately on people they instinctively dislike. As if Fascism would prefer an erudition in metaphysics and the *litterae humaniores* to military drill and engineering!*

The so-called high schools in the United States have the level of better French elementary schools and the students normally enter college or university with a rudimentary knowledge of spelling but often also with an inordinate desire to play football and to advance their social status (which fact incidentally proves that the general evaluation of equality is still fictional). The intellectual maturity of deserving individuals as well as of the whole nation is thus impeded in the most phantastic way. It is true that a few universities maintain high standards, but these (in imitation of the British system) are not "democratic" institutions, and the number of scholarships in these private enterprises is naturally limited. America, from a social point of view, is decidedly far less of a "democracy" than France, Germany, Spain, or Scandinavia. But intellectually — in order to assure a "higher" education for the greatest number — the ochlocratic ideas have reaped an almost total victory, and most universities have usually not even

the level of French *lycées* or German *Gymnasien*. The financial position of professors is frequently that of a foreman in an average factory or a policeman in a larger city. Neither is the professor's social position an enviable one and some may remember that this title had once been given to men with long hair who played the piano in the houses of ill fame of booming frontier towns out West.

Such an atttitude is far from being "American" in a traditional sense; it is rather the result of the immigrant's contempt for the liberal arts which do not show a handsome profit expressed in dollars and cents. The general prosperity of the nineteenth and early twentieth century have given a certain impetus to this materialistic attitude which was never shared by the best Americans. (A similar money rush could be observed in Russia from 1890 to 1914.)* Today we have to face the possibility — less so than before 1929 — that a man lecturing on window dressing is more respected than a man lecturing on philosophy or theology, which will not aid "progress."** Things which are apt to be understood only by a minority do not promote sales and therefore would possibly be branded by the mob as "stuffed shirt" articles. Yet on the other side, paradoxically enough, there is a great hunger for knowledge and education which has never been properly channeled.

Others again see in the university professor some sort of Peter Pan who never grows up; he is nothing else but a faithful student who has neither the "guts" nor the energy to leave the Alma Mater and so, instead of selling automobiles or insurance, he remains within the walls of the campus undergoing later a slow metamorphosis into an M.A., a Ph.D., an instructor, and so forth.

The Presidents of American Universities are to all practical purposes absolute monarchs. European Universities on the other hand are republics. An exception is the University of Virginia which has been modeled after a European pattern. The American professor — except for the moral influence of his professional Association, after he has reached a certain rank — can be dismissed on short notice and is far from enjoying the security of a European professor in a nonfascist state, who always had the tenure of an American Judge of the Supreme Court. Needless to say that there is no academic freedom in the classic sense. Thus our professor is often a little respected member of the community and he usually knows it. In many cases the Presidents are not much better off either. He, the lord over the

professors, trembles before the board of trustees made up often of smug businessmen who could hardly write a letter without looking up most expressions in a dictionary.* But he may be semi-illiterate himself and his appointment (as in the State Universities) may have been made for political reasons. Rarely is he a scholar himself.**

The ochlocratic statistician with his numeralist views upon vital matters likes to speak about countries in terms of "success" or "failures," always taking these terms in a material sense. There is no doubt that the Founding Fathers intended the United States to be primarily a human and only secondarily a material success. The Soviet Union may be a material success (though the readers of Manya Gordon's book*** will doubt it very much), but it certainly is not humanly a success. The American educational system is frequently defended by the statement that it is "successful" because it was instrumental in making of the United States a "success."

There is one more notion which ought to be dispelled and that is the opinion that only "progressive" countries with popular representations are able to produce great material achievements. The United States is fortunate in being an extremely large country, possessing great mineral wealth and one hundred and thirty-five million customers. Europe without interstate borders and a population of five hundred millions could easily produce automobiles twice as cheap as America. In order to draw a just comparison between the "efficiency" of the two continents one would have to fill a similar space with an identical amount of people and to surround the American equivalent with an unsurmountable custom barrier. One ought to pour, for instance, the Austrian population into Maine, i.e., seven million people into that one North Atlantic state which at present harbors only eight hundred thousand. Even though these seven million were to be sturdy straphangers from New York I doubt whether they would not starve the first winter and die during the second. The odds and handicaps in Europe are almost unbelievable. Unsuccessful experiments have the most dire consequences. It is this very danger of irresponsible experimenting (by the lay masses) which among other reasons finally led to the end of representative government in Europe.

* Seifert in his *Die Weltrevolutionäre* declares Liberty to be the ideal of the nobility, equality of the urban classes, and fraternity of the peasantry.

** There are therefore also two different conceptions about "equality." There is the idea of the Republic where everybody is a proletarian and the Republic where everybody is a king. In Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, we encounter a "Loyalist" who proposes that everybody should be addressed as "Don."

* Christopher Hollis: *The American Heresy*, London, 1931.

** The republican tendencies of aristocracies have been dealt with already on pp. 47–49. It is interesting to see how frequently aristocratic groups paid only lip service to monarchical principles. The return of their royal masters would put them in a position where they could only play second fiddle to the monarch's first. As to the antidemocratic attitude of the Founding Fathers see the explanatory note, *"What of Democracy?"*

The aristocratic, libertinarian principles of America find expression in such *apparently* trifling privileges as the freedom of bearing arms of American citizens. The freedom of bearing arms existed only in one European province by 1938 — in the Tyrol, where the National Socialists canceled quickly this last remnant of medieval liberties after the *Anschluss*.

* A definitely wicked Jacksonian reform was the introduction of the spoil system; Jackson was convinced that governmental affairs were so simple that every adult could cope with them successfully. His "reform" of the Presidential Electorate was similarly of an ochlocratic character.

** See also: H. L. Mencken, *Prejudices* III. Series. New York, 1922. A. Knopf, pp. 22–24.

*** This should not be construed as a sign of "racial inferiority" or the like.

* Many people will insist that there is something about the Negro face which is reminiscent of the monkey. That may be so but there is another side of the story; the pure blooded African has no visible hair on his body which the white male definitely has. The white race together with the Ainus and the Australian aborigines is the hairiest race in the world. And is that not rather reminiscent of apes?

In pre-Darwinian times we also find biblical explanations given for the diversity of races. The superstitious belief that the Negro descends from Cain who was guilty of "misconduct" with a female gorilla is widely accepted in the South. The Reverend La Peyrère, a Dutch preacher of Huguenot descent, published, in the middle of the seventeenth century, a book in which he affirmed that some human beings had been created on the 5th (!) day of the Creation. This preadamitic theory foreshadowed the concepts of modern racialism.

** Our racial discrimination was frequently mentioned by the more intelligent isolationists as the reason for our "staying out." They indicated that America had no right of sharing a crusade where equal rights had been made an issue. This argument is less cogent than it seems at the onset and reminds one of the objection of medieval sectarians to pay obedience to anybody who is not in the state of grace. But the man who cannot help himself may well help somebody else, and vice versa. If it is easier to extinguish the neighbor's burning house than one's own then it is better to aid where help can show results.

* It must be admitted that all statutes designed for segregation were discriminatory in their effects.

** The National Socialists were at least liberal enough to recognize officially all "Aryans" (people of "German and kindred blood") as "equals." The United States in some respects is more particular in its racial legislation. The immigration laws of 1924 gave the North Italians (those living north of the Po River) a higher quota than the South Italians. This is the only case of a European country being dissected by that regulation. The North Italians have, naturally, more "Nordic" blood than the South Italians, their white skin is "cleaner" than those of the "greasy, dirty-white wops."

An octoroon Negro in the South will similarly be considered to be a Negro, while the National Socialist will accept him as an Aryan. A negro mulatto and a quarteroon could participate in the plebiscitarian comedies of the Third Reich (as half and three-quarter "Aryans") but men from the same category would be to all practical purposes (tests!) debarred from the poll in Georgia or Mississippi.

* "Democratic" America produced in 1915 a highly successful film — the "Birth of a Nation" — in which the superiority of white people over Negroes was dealt with in a way which would impress any Nazi audience. A girl who was in danger of being raped by a Negro *"defended her Aryan birthright."* This film was made 18 years before the Reichstags fire. . . .

In parenthesis: Professor Hooton's (Harvard) statistics show that the Negro race ranks lowest in rapes. Cf. E. A. Hooton, *Crime and the Man*, Harvard University Press, 1939, p. 302.

** The circumstantial evidence published by Salvador de Madariaga in his *Christopher Columbus* proves this almost conclusively.

* There is certainly something medieval about midwestern painting which becomes strongly apparent in some pictures of Grant Wood. ("American Gothic") Yet Protestant Middle Ages are not the same thing as Catholic Middle Ages; they have an *inner* severity and seriousness which were not even shared by the most zealous Grand Inquisitors.

* The muddle in the use of political terms in America is complete. While "conservatives" are nothing but manchesterian liberals, the so-called liberals are nothing else but pro-Communists and even the New Deal is considered to be a "liberal" line of action The word *federal* stands naturally for "centralistic" and so forth.

** See the cooperation of Swedish conservatives with the Socialists against the industrial liberals in social questions. The member of the squirearchy expects the manufacturer to treat his workers as he himself treats his farm hands, mainly if they are old and sick. Social Security is actually a *conservative* and aristocratic institution.

* There were, of course, a few industrialists and capitalists like Mr. Marshall Field of Chicago who understood the signs of the time.

** The specifically American problem of a transition from lay to expert rule lies in the fact that the primary justification for bureaucratic control is in the economic field. It is unnecessary to emphasize that there is a majority of fields of human endeavor and activity where a control from above would be completely out of place and constitute an unnecessary increase of state powers. Yet in America economics play such an important role, not because there is "more" economic *activity* (which is about the same proportionately per cent in every country because with the exception of beggars and millionaires' sons everybody has to earn a livelihood), but because Americans attach such great importance to economic values. A bureaucratic control of economic life in a country where such great sentimental value is attached to the material aspects of life is — in a way — an attack against the central nerve of many an American, and the fear that *total* control may follow is thus not entirely unfounded. Economic control in the U. S. may be an equivalent to religious control in India, cultural control in Germany (the greatest present despair of Germans), or state control of sports and games in England! A control of private life or a control of the diet such as this free nation tolerated for half a generation in the form of the Volstead Act would be unthinkable in Fascist Italy. The only solution of the coming problem lies therefore in a metanoia, in the methodical relegation of business and economics to a lower sphere of human consciousness.

* It must also be borne In mind that man today is relatively *less* educated than his forefather 500 years ago; he knows *proportionately* less of the total existing knowledge and also *proportionately* less about the essentials of public affairs. Education could by no means keep up with the inventions and the growing "complicativeness" of human existence. Less and less people are therefore able to *reason* in spite of an increased education, and nothing remains to the masses but to *judge*, to go "on

hunches" and thus to contribute to the "sensate" character of our epoch. The "total result" of our intensified educational efforts and the popularization of the three R's is merely a weakening of human memory, as modern man has everything "on file."

"Common Man" is thus in reality entirely helpless and his public *apologia* by dictators who need his blood, by politicians who need his vote and by manufacturers and editors who need his pennies, lacks the ring of sincerity. Even within the ochlocratic framework he is unable to shape his own destiny. All that will not induce the Christian to have contempt or disdain for the Common Man, who is nonetheless our Fellow Man with an immortal soul. Yet this does not change the fact that there can be no "Century *for* the Common Man."

* There are exceptions and somebody rousing the latent "romantic" sentiments may be elected due to the fact that he is totally different in habitus and appearance from the electorate. The lion hunting, bearded Mr. Tinkham from Massachusetts is a typical example illustrating this exception.

* It is naturally only the well-established "bureaucracy" that can "afford" to be generous and unbureaucratic. The political appointee or the provisional official who can be dismissed at any time will always stick slavishly to the rules in order to avoid criticism or dismissal. It is the civil servant of the traditional order, holding his office for life, who (contrary to general assumption) can take the courage to judge cases by their individual merits.

(See the inefficiency of the amateurish British bureaucracy in their dealing with the stranded "enemy aliens," well described by E. Lafitte in his book, *The Internment of Aliens*, London, 1941, Penguin.)

** See the sheriff in Erskine Caldwell's masterful description of a lynching in his short novel *Trouble in July*, New York, 1940.

* If we believe that it is just to inherit material goods from our parents one has to consider it a crying injustice that there are no hereditary titles in the United States. The millionaire, who made riches unscrupulously, can leave a fortune to his son. Yet none of the *honors* of great administrators, judges, scientists, artists, or soldiers are bestowed upon their offsprings.

** "To abolish millionaires would have been to dash one's own hopes." George Santayana, *Character and Opinion in the United States*, New York, 1920, p. 198.

* The English public schools are thoroughly imbued with the spirit of competition. They could hardly be visualized without the elements of cooperation and team-spirit.

* Sinclair Lewis described with more insight than Mr. Hutchins' opponents the anti-humanistic tendency in Fascism in his *It Can't Happen Here*, New York, 1935, pp. 250–252.

* It must be kept in mind that no country in the world was so thoroughly permeated with the spirit of the nineteenth century (1814–1914) as the United States — with the possible exception of Australia and New Zealand. Only a geographical fragment of the present U. S. lived a political and cultural existence in the eighteenth century and *the imprint the nineteenth century left on the United States was therefore largely made on a blank*. The culture of the individual centuries though divided in time has to share a common space in Europe and their marks can only be found in a maze of other phenomena. America on the other hand merely spent her babyhood in the eighteenth century; childhood and adolescence are to be found in the nineteenth century which, for her, is still not terminated.

** Jacques Maritain almost created a riot at the "Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion" in autumn 1940 when he read a paper which pleaded for a hierarchy of knowledge placing theology at the top and the sciences at the bottom, thus leaving to philosophy an intermediary position. (An even greater furor was created by a paper read by Professor Mortimer Adler who charged the materialist professors with being greater enemies of civilization than Hitler.)

* A State University had a football coach who "quite naturally" had a salary far superior to that of an ordinary professor. This coach wanted a higher salary. He was told that the budget would not

permit it. He handed in his resignation and the students demonstrated. The board of trustees convened and found that the budget really did not permit such an increase in salary. But they found a solution in firing the president and appointing the football coach in his place and meeting his demands by adding up both salaries.

** The strongest condemnation of the American Universities can be found in Abraham Flexner's *Universities in America, England and Germany*, New York, 1930.

*** *Workers Before and After Lenin*, New York, 1940.

V

THE AMERICAN TRAGEDY

"A nation is not what it considers itself to be in time but what God thinks about it in eternity." — Vladimir Soloviev, cited by E. Tavernier in the preface to *Trois Entretiens*, Paris, 1916.

IN NECESSARY things, unity; in doubtful things, liberty; in all things, charity (*in necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas*), is a wonderful program, which should characterize all Christian cultures at all times. The Middle Ages were largely imbued with this spirit. The necessary element of unity was the Church and her dogmas. If a medieval prince gave a feast, he would have been extremely shocked to find that one of his guests did not believe in God or considered the crucifixion a myth. As regards the dress of his guests he would permit a far-reaching latitude and he would indeed be highly astonished if all his male friends would wear identical garments. Today we consider it quite natural that our left-hand neighbor at a banquet is an atheist, our host a heretic, and our right-hand neighbor an agnostic. Emily Post would probably severely censure anybody who would take exception to the religious views of his hosts or guests. It would be "tactless" and demonstrate a lack of good breeding. Yet it would be an even greater crime to appear at a formal dinner in sports clothes and not to don the rigorously prescribed uniforms: tuxedo or tails. So we have today disunity in the necessary things and uniformity in the "doubtful things," not to speak of charity which has been replaced by ambition.

In order to illustrate the situation even more accurately one might take the example of a tree with roots hanging in the air and the branches fixed individually on iron poles. The situation in ancient Rome and in the United States have certain parallels when we remember that both countries served as meeting places for the most different religions. The Roman chaos of Isis, Mithras, Jahveh, Zeus, Kybele, Jupiter, and Saturn has been matched by Mary Eddy-Baker, Joseph Smith, Aimée S. Macpherson, and others. This variety of forms has caused religion to be held as something merely relative (an opinion not a truth). People who dogmatize furiously about the President, the gold reserves of Fort Knox, and the New Deal become suddenly vague, "broad minded," and uncertain if they talk about religion. They look to the most abstruse laymen for "orientation," and nowhere is the distrust for the expert greater than in this domain.* Astronomers, mathematicians, biologists, electrical engineers, and movie stars expound publicly their views about God, eternity, grace, and original sin, whereas nobody would dream of asking archbishops or professors of divinity about their opinions on atom smashing, protoplasm, or short waves.

Catholicism fits very badly into this "pantheon," it fits into it only as ancient Christianity did into the multiform, liberal religious world of the first century A.D. Christendom was then considered to be an unsporting, disagreeable, exclusive, and totalitarian low-class sect, which "didn't play the game." Catholicism in the United States is frequently looked upon with similar feelings. One will find Unitarians in America who invite Episcopalian ministers to preach in their churches and — what is less surprising — Jewish rabbis delivering their sermons in Presbyterian houses of worship. This concessionalism and interdenominationalism leads to that famous nonsectarian attitude that culminates in the saying: "There's truth in every religion," which is precisely the gist of the parable of the ring in Boccaccio's *Decameron*. The true early Christians never minded being used as living torches or as crocodile fodder. Sectarians now too often forget the tradition of these heroic martyrs, and the intolerance even of their sectarian fathers. One finds Presbyterian pastors using "Luther" as their Christian name and Lutherans who are called "Calvin," oblivious of all the abysmal antagonism between the ex-monk and the dictator of Geneva, who founded their respective religions. One also wonders whether the rabbis preaching in Lutheran Churches know anything about Luther's contempt and hatred for

their race and faith. One at least can imagine how the refusal of Catholics to "play the game" adds to their unpopularity.

But apart from their unpopularity, they are in an extremely difficult and delicate position. This in spite of the fact that with their twenty-three million souls they are the largest religious community in the country.*

The relationship between the Catholic Church and the state in the United States of America is characterized by the absolute acceptance of the separation of these two domains by the Church as an "ideal condition" for all such countries. Catholics of the United States are entirely sincere in their acceptance of this allegedly "democratic" tenet of faith.[243] The result, however, of noncooperation in the educational domain (the public schools themselves give *no* instruction in the Catholic or any other religion) has caused the Church the loss of millions and millions of souls. There ought to be somewhere around thirty-five million Catholics in the states, but there are actually only twenty-three, and this leakage continues. In Central Europe children of religiously indifferent parents received, twice a week, from the age of six to the age of eighteen, *compulsory*, denominational religious instruction.** But the National Socialists in their great admiration for secular tendencies have done their best to abolish all religious instruction of the young. The continuous leakage in the United States is going to render the percentage of Catholics smaller and smaller. Today the proportion is one to six, but tomorrow it may be one to seven or one to eight. Catholics live predominantly in the large cities of the Northeast, and though they try heroically to keep the number of their children from declining, they have great difficulties in competing with the high birth rate of the rural, Protestant South. The Catholic rural movement is therefore of *cardinal importance.****

Another obstacle under the present inevitable arrangement of separation of Church and state lies in the frequent preoccupation of priests with the raising and administration of money and funds. The whole European clergy, Catholics as well as Protestants, received a salary from the *state** (which, after all, should be nothing else than the organized community). Bishops in the United States necessarily have to spend much time with the problems of financial administration, and the refusal of the states to subsidize Catholic

schools (as even Anglican England does it) adds not only a great financial burden to the expenses of the Catholics, who have to pay taxes for the state schools as well, but increases the material responsibilities of the Church. The generosity of American Catholics is therefore something really impressive and almost without parallel in the annals of the Church. Their share in the Peter's Pence and in the upkeep of the Catholic missions is more than praiseworthy. And yet it must be emphasized that the separation of Church and state does not lie in the tradition of Catholicism which is concerned with a Catholic culture. The express condemnation of the abstract principle by Pope Pius IX is understood to have no application in countries like England and the United States. In the latter instance the quota regulations of 1924 have throttled Catholic immigration almost completely; the liberal Irish quota is the exception to the rule.[244]

A serious handicap in spreading the faith in the United States (which can be effected only through a very considerable increase in conversions) is the uneasiness and crisis in the *intellectual* sphere of American Catholicism. The Church in the United States is certainly not sterile in comparison with other religious communities and it can be said without exaggeration that her intellectual and artistic activities almost double those of all other "denominations" taken together. We can only speak of a crisis (which is no new phenomenon) if we think in proportional ratios and compare the artistic intellectual achievement of Catholic America with that of the materialist intellectuals on one side and the British Catholics on the other. The proportion of Catholics in the United States of America compared with that in Britain is numerically almost ten to one, yet if one compares the splendid list of British Catholic thinkers and artists with their American equivalents then the situation looks quite different. The reasons to be assigned for this condition are many; one might blame Jansenistic Puritanical[245] trends which have found their way from St. Sulpice to Ireland and from there to the United States. But the class structure of American Catholicism, the lack of a historical background in the Northeast, the "racial" diversity and general animosity, the tradition of the Ku Klux Klan and the Know-Nothings, even a certain feeling of social inferiority have attributed to the present situation which is visibly improving. The lack of an important Catholic intellectual forum may have led to the loss of many well-known

Catholic thinkers and writers (men like Ernest Hemingway, Dos Passos, James T. Farrel, Will Durant)* who had to begin under such conditions, and thus were enticed by the superficial brilliancy of the secular "creeds."

The American Catholic, as a member of a minority, distinguishes himself by very few external traits from his fellow Protestant or fellow pagan — except by eating fish on Friday and his membership in the Knights of Columbus or other Catholic societies. He tries to keep among his coreligionists, and while he is proud of his religion there is sometimes, in spite of great zeal and uprightness, a certain despondency, timidity, and superabundance of prudence.[246] He positively suffers (even if subconsciously) from the fact that he had nowhere, with the exception of Maryland and a few districts in the Southwest, a historic upper class, and that he further lives within the cities thus equally lacking tradition and organic connection with the soil. In a country of social registers and a still potent aristocratic and hierarchic tradition, this amounts to a considerable handicap. England, with her numerous Catholic old English families, a Catholic sector of the aristocracy and numerous converts in the intellectual world, is in a far more advantageous situation.[247] And there are in addition the numerous witnesses of pre-reformation England in stone and brick, the castles and cathedrals of Catholic Britain which are only for the time being in Protestant hands.

It is therefore difficult and unjust to blame American Catholicism for not having produced an "independent" Catholic type. But if the Catholic is just a "plain American," a "fellow like you and me" or a "regular guy," then we do not deem the situation satisfactory. The "average American" is either a Catholic type or he is not. If he is not, then the Catholic has to decide whether he wants to represent the type of his Church or the (temporary) ideal of the masses. He cannot compromise on that provided he is aware of the existence of such an alternative (which he very seldom is).*

Yet if the dynamic American Catholic is aware of this issue then he must face another decision, another alternative — either he must go into some sort of Catholic ghetto (which still exists intellectually and socially to a certain extent) or go out and conquer the country for Christ. One has only to see St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York standing on a summer afternoon in the very shadow of the steel and concrete masses of Rockefeller Center to

understand the essence of the Catholic ghetto more readily. The paradoxical side of that problem is that there are so many Catholics in that ghetto *without* having decided to be *culturally* Catholics. These Catholics, living strictly after the precepts of their religion, will nevertheless be helpless victims of "progress" and the industrial civilization with its identitarian tendencies. It may be exactly their fear of total assimilation which drives them into a state of separation and seclusion.** But this again does not cancel the tendency to be a "regular guy" and we see the Catholic striving to be more American than the non-Catholic American (taking the word *American* in its contorted, late nineteenth-century sense). And here we must not forget that mimicry is *always* a sign of weakness and *defense*. Defense is the characteristic of the Church in America in spite of her striving often to take the initiative and the offensive. It is also mimicry and the spirit of self-defense which led indirectly to the establishment of the Bellarmine legend and the emphasis the American Catholic puts on his loyalty to un-American democracy.*** Here and there the American Catholic's "clericalism," a timid reliance on priestly guidance in purely *worldly* matters, breaks through (the lack of an aristocracy leaves the clergy supreme) with the danger of giving the impression for a Jansenist puritanism. In this particular guise his "attraction" and magnetism is almost zero. To expand, the Church in America needs men of the faith who are also men of the world.

Catholic education in the United States is a problem in itself. The grade schools and the high schools have a level not considerably higher than the non-Catholic schools. Yet the colleges and universities — affected by the spirit of "intellectual democracy" — are in their scholastic attainments not always as conspicuous as they should be. But Catholic institutions of higher learning have a very special task, i.e., to provide America in general and the Catholics in particular with something *new;* they have to create a Catholic *elite*. While the birth rate remains the Catholic problem of *quantity*, the *elite* remains the Catholic problem of *quality*. The future of Catholicism in the United States rests on these two pillars.

But if the intellectual standards in colleges and universities were everywhere to be raised as high as responsible Catholics would like to have it, a large exodus of the students to the non-Catholic state universities,

where they receive an education on the money of the taxpayers, is to be dreaded, seriously imperiling an educational system which has few endowments and is financially based upon tuition fees paid by the students.* Thus the competition of the secular institutions of higher learning and the lack of financial resources make the creation of a large Catholic intellectual aristocracy almost impossible. Other ways and means must be found to carry out this necessary task, and such first-rate institutions as, for instance, the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto seem to promise a brighter future.

Another problematic chapter of American Catholicism is its political affiliation with political trends popularly (but not accurately) called "democracy." Responsible Catholics (ecclesiastics and laymen alike) have by their utterances and writings created the impression that the cause of the Church and the cause of world "democracy" is one and the same. The most desperate efforts have been made to proclaim St. Thomas Aquinas, Bellarmine, and Suarez as "early democrats," while the Founding Fathers, as we know, were opposed to ochlocracy. The skeptical attitude of the Church toward political mass movements in the past centuries is little mentioned in Catholic schools, and the students seldom become aware of the fact that the Church has a basically hostile and negative attitude toward the very spirit of our time (and rightly so). There is little emphasis given to the Syllabus of Pope Pius IX which makes excellent reading (and sense). Today more than ever before it is a timely document. There are in America few Catholics who would dare to read aloud (in mixed society) such a *condemned* statement as the one contained in the Syllabus taken from the Allocution *Iamdudum cernimus* (March 18, 1861):

> The Roman Pontiff can, and ought to, reconcile himself, and come to terms with progress, liberalism, and modern civilization.*

And there is indeed little probability that Pius IX would take a more conciliatory attitude toward "modern civilization" in our present year.

A Catholic may certainly be a convinced political "democrat," i.e., a believer in popular representation. Such a conviction is not incompatible with Catholic dogma. This question moves clearly on the plane where *In dubiis libertas* is written in flaming words. But it is highly doubtful whether

"democracy," with its modern ochlocratic trends, agrees with the *parfum* of the Church which is monarchical, patriarchal, and "aristocratic" (*in the qualitative sense*). Catholic *democratic* parties could only be found in such countries where Catholics were a not fully respected minority — as, for instance, in the Second Reich. But hardly had the Center Party declared itself for "democratic" institutions (and the republican form of government) when the Bavarian deputies seceded from the party. The Catholics in Bavaria were a majority and thus they did not care for an egalitarian attitude so significant for the "underdog." The whole rapprochement between the Church and popular governments with liberal principles dates only from the rise of superdemocracies, which proved to be even greater evils than their milder forerunners. Choosing between the *ancien régime*** and the *Gironde*, the Church would always have sided with the *ancien régime;* in the choice between *Gironde* and the terror régime of Robespierre, the Church would incline toward the *Gironde*. This is not the indication of a wavering, unprincipled attitude but the Church has to strive to establish the best *possible* conditions for a Catholic life and a Catholic existence. Said Pope Pius XI, "In order to save the souls of our children We would not hesitate to negotiate with the devil in person."

Yet there is definitely the tendency in this country to *identify* Catholicism with popular representation and one must add that this attitude is represented sometimes by the best heads of the Church in America. There is Dr. Mortimer Adler who attempts to prove (not exclusively on Thomist grounds) that "democracy" is not only the best form of government but the *only* just one; there is a book called *God and Democracy*, written by a fine mind; and there are many numerous other attempts to come to conclusions which are dangerously close to an anathematization of all nondemocratic thought. Yet the most powerful argument against "democracy," i.e., its lack of the element of love, often causes nothing but endless astonishment, because the line of argument of these Catholic democratists is purely intellectual-rational.* If one mentions to them Catholic thinkers of the first order who objected to ochlocracy, they are frequently labeled as "victims of the prejudices of their time," which argument may turn out to be a boomerang.

This lack of respect for the postulate of liberty in doubtful things (*In dubiis libertas*) is similarly felt in the domain of theological thought.

Thomism, in the American branch of the Catholic Church, has an almost absolute monopoly. St. Thomas is cited as practically an infallible authority and sometimes even a Jesuit may become apologetic when the name of Molina is mentioned. The necessity for unity is overstressed; a typical characteristic of every religious group in the diaspora. The fear is that the hostile majority may interpret as disloyalty friendly criticism within the Church. Yet it is difficult to see how these shortcomings can be eliminated unless the Church is successful in achieving three tasks: the formation of a Catholic culture at least in certain parts of the United States, the creation of an *equivalent* to a Catholic "Aristocracy," and the conquest of the intellectual key positions. Unless these goals are reached the Church will necessarily have to continue to remain in the "ghetto," and in spite of the fact that she alone possesses the full truth it will be her fate to be a "sect among sects."

Catholics must not forget that their religion is far too great to be *identified with any* political trend, party, or ideology. (This does not hold in the negative sense as ideologies contradicting tenets of faith or morals are incompatible with the Church and must clearly be combated.) A Catholic supporter of the ideals of hereditary monarchy should similarly object to having *"God and Monarchy"* named in the same breath. Political parties and ideas come and go. Nations, governments, nay, even constitutions,* rise, decline, and perish. Only the Church remains. *Stat crux dum volvitur orbis*. The promise, "I will remain with you until the end of the world," had been given to us by Jesus Christ and not by Thomas Paine or Robespierre.

We have dealt with the position of Catholicism in the United States more thoroughly than with the other "denominations" for two reasons: Catholicism is first of all the only important bridge between Europe and the United States, and, secondly, it stands side by side with the old American Whiggish tradition, the great *positive* spiritual-intellectual element in the American framework. Strange as it must sound, it is also the only *uniting* faith of the religiously disunited states, connecting the missions of the Southwest with the French-Canadian immigrants in Vermont and Maine, the Boston Irish with the settlers of Maryland, the Spaniards of Tampa with the Poles of Chicago, the Croats of Montana with the French of New Orleans, the Magyars of Cleveland with the Portuguese of Rhode Island and California. No other single religion in the states has such a racial and

geographical record. There is also much less Anglo-Catholicism (or rather its equivalent) in the United States than in Britain. The Episcopalians are officially "Protestant" and many of them are tainted with modernism of the most outspoken type. The other religious communities, as, for instance, the Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians, show themselves preoccupied with material problems which seem to expose them dangerously to the magnetism of communism. The desire to be "progressive" engendered in them a fatal nostalgia for the message of the Kremlin, and the temptation to adulate communism is especially strong in the "liberal" Protestant groups.[248] During the Spanish Civil War Protestant public opinion** was entirely in favor of the Communists, Anarchists, and "Democrats" who had committed delirious atrocities against lay people, priests, and nuns. On the other hand we find a most phantastic dabbling of laymen in the domain of theological knowledge and speculation and the efforts to reconcile the modern world with integral Christianity resulting frequently in the most amusing struggles.[249]

The great crisis of Protestantism in the Anglo-Saxon as well as in the Scandinavian world is intrinsically connected with the breakdown and shrinkage of the average man's power of imagination; this is after all the loss of a faculty which is as serious as the loss of a limb or sense, or perhaps even more so. One of the most important differences between "modern" society and preindustrial society consists largely in the great antithesis between phantasism and realism, between man and machine. All fictional heroes in Europe, from Parzifal and Don Quixote to Peer Gynt and Dostoyevsky's "Idiot," are fantasist dreamers.* The "traditional" European, and especially the nonprogressive easterner and southerner, has almost always an "inner realm" of which he is king.** This is the reason why he does not feel the grim realities so keenly (as we outsiders imagine he does) and manages to retire into his realm of dreams like a tortoise into her shell. The total materialists (who are called "realists" without justification because their nonrecognition of metaphysics as well as lack of imagination makes them anything else but realists in a higher sense) have always led uncomfortable and drab lives, hurting themselves continuously, while the dreamer might live in all luxury among the creations of his phantasy. The

dreamer and fantasist is in a way invincible while the "realistic" materialist is exposed to danger by more than one Achilles heel. The fantasist and dreamer has moreover the added advantage of a greater dexterity in the interpretation of the visible world, thanks to his well-cultivated artistic vision. With transcendental perception his eye sees *through* things and happenings, and he thus uncovers and senses the deeper causalities and reasons which remain hidden to the cold and expressionless fishy eye of the "realist." Protestantism as well as technicism has contributed a great deal toward the firm entrenchment of "realism" in the modern world. The former preached an unnatural "soberness" while the latter actuated a real "desiccation" of the human mind.[250]

Already in decadent Rome, where a populace with a phantasy crippled through a megalopolitan way of life clamored for *circenses*, do we witness this decline of the imaginative and artistic faculties of a people. That process is today accelerated through the leveling tendencies in general education and the increasingly technical and collective methods of production. The average man from the nonindustrial world (South Italian, American Indian, Arabian, Persian, Ruthene, Slovakian, etc.), is often unable to read or to write, yet he is self-sufficient and can be independent of the artificial forms of megalopolitan amusement because he can sing or produce poems, carve wood, paint or compose; he is able to invent new fairy tales, to weave, to stitch, or to play an instrument; he is often a good conversationalist and his humor has roots without being derived from half a dozen funny papers; as a peasant he has a deep organic connection with nature and as a craftsman he can be a true artist, using all his personality to create objects of art. The craftsmen of Ur, Shinar, Lagash or Babylon had undoubtedly greater satisfaction with their finished products than the workers in Henry Ford's River Rouge plant — in spite of the fact that the Ford worker can read and write (in order to send telegrams and read ads). Yet the workers of Detroit contribute less to literature than the Old Karelians who in spite of their illiteracy produced the "Kalevala." *It is even highly probable that all the great European epics were composed by illiterates* and only later on recorded.[251]

The decline of phantasy naturally engenders a decrease of the manifoldness of forms, because all new combinations (inventions) are

nothing else but "Castles in Spain" brought to reality.[252] The terrifying lack of phantasy is also the reason for the imitative urge in our modern American civilization and the predominance of monotony in the industrial centers.* This decline can only be measured by comparison with phantasy (and intellectual-artistic production) prior to ochlocracy, mass immigration, and industrialization. Hardly is there anywhere in the United States a church possessing originality which has been built after 1840.** The houses of God are usually misplaced gothic or romanesque imitations squeezed in between dismal railway stations or surging skyscrapers. It is even more shocking to see the abortive efforts of town planning, or the Utopian habit of naming streets after mere numbers or letters. A cultured man cannot possibly live in room 6489 on the sixty-fourth floor of a house on the corner or 109th Street and 10th Avenue. This may be fitting for one of the unfortunate creatures in Huxley's *Brave New World* but not for man created in the image of God.

We have touched already the problem of the child of technical civilization who is unable to amuse himself alone. Most English people suffer from the same shortcoming. Conversation is almost out of question. The South or East European (or the Central and South American) on the other hand is still able to sit and to talk or even to be silent and to look for hours thoughtfully into the sky. Not so the product of the technical world; he needs his artificial clubs and his very amusement is provided by an elaborate and expensive industry; this amusement industry is of an astounding manifoldness, it comprises not only Coney Island and Play-land, but also the whole legion of trashy magazines full of sex, crime, and financial success, and — last not least — the movies, this serialized production of daydreams. Even England has an average of 17,000,000 "picture goers" weekly in peacetimes; on Albion's green island relatively good seats can be obtained for as little as fifteen cents in out of town cinemas for double-feature performances. Here the little man after the day's miseries is received by a smart-looking gentleman in a tuxedo, usherettes with naked legs, and the sweetest fake smile, who accompany the "patron" to his upholstered seat where he receives consolation and forgetfulness.* Drugged by the oscillating pictures our little man starts to identify himself with the hero. He, the little accountant in the button factory, who is

suppressed and persecuted by his boss, his wife, his daughters, and his "friends," now identifies himself with the athlete of Hollywood on the screen, who chokes the tigers with his bare fists. Similarly, the elderly working woman seated next to him identifies herself with the glamorous daughter of the millionaire who has only to give a languishing look in order to have ten men with sleek black hair and buccaneer moustaches at the beck of a finger. Then comes the awakening and the emptiness. . . .

Yet the most important result of the shrinkage of phantasy is to be found in the lack of ability for religious metaphysical visualization. The decay of the imaginative faculty has in this field the most detrimental consequences.[253] Eternal life, God and devil, the angels, the lives of the saints, Golgatha and the Resurrection, the whole theistic *Weltanschauung* surpasses completely the faculties of the technical *homunculus*, who like the unfortunate Apostle Thomas only believes what he sees.

The religious communities of the United States, in the industrial areas, who depend upon their flock financially, have therefore to interest their members in material, social, and political questions. These religious societies are in exactly the same situation as the "intellectuals" who follow public opinion instead of leading it, the press[254] or the higher institutions of learning.[255] The Catholics at least have nowhere compromised on the essentials. The "Churches" on the other hand, have followed the trend toward the left in a slavish way, trembling in their shoes lest they be accused of being old fashioned, reactionary, or uncompromising. The masses who cared more and more for security, after having lost their enthusiasm for the lottery of liberal capitalism with increasingly unfavorable odds, have induced the shrewder and more "farseeing" part of the ministry to side with Leftism, thus hoping for a longer lease of life. This involves the acceptance of socialist and pink tendencies, an enthusiasm for all humanitarian and "progressive" ideas like birth control, the surgical abortus, euthanasia, "free love," and pacifism, not to mention the numerous inroads of modern skepticism, so that little of the *depositum fidei* remains. The residue is a pale, problematic humanitarianism, which looks with greater respect to the "Men in White" than to the ministers of their faith.*[256]

The inner crisis of America — the cultural as well as the religious and the political one — cannot be overlooked, although the prophecy of de Tocqueville hardly takes into account the older American tradition and sounds therefore less convincing. America's great danger lurks at that impasse where lay government must forcibly change into an expert government.* This is the critical moment when Fascism, Nazism, or something similar might easily step in, and then all would be lost.

Fascism in the United States — where tradition is still a small, growing plant and society is forming itself under great pains, nobly struggling for organic integration — would be a thousand times more brutal, anti-cultural, and devastating than in any European country. The structure of American industrial society is far from vigorous or harmonious,[257] nor does it possess an inner happiness and balance because it is still undergoing its "troubles of adolescence,"[258] nor, finally, is it in a good position to oppose a well co-ordinated attack directed against its last shreds of liberty.[259] *No* industrial civilization, anywhere and at anytime, can resist a well-organized revolutionary identitarian onslaught, and the industrial areas of the United States are geographically too remote from its agrarian counterparts in order to profit from their "counterrevolutionary" elements.

There is an additional danger in the emptiness and monotony of "small life" in the United States, in the monotony of suburbia, in the small towns and in the agrarian plains, a monotony greatly created by uniformity. Boredom and routine could here easily make an appeal to vital energies looking for an outlet, aspiring to "action," craving for adventure. James T. Farrel in his various novels has again and again portrayed the "lost young man," in his attempts to color his barren existence by some form of violent activity. Yet there are hundreds of thousands of Studs Lonigans who do not know with what to start their lives, and that is true not only in the big cities but also in small towns and villages. What after all can the average young man, eager for action in the world of today, do? Duels, crusades, discoveries have come to an end. The "inner kingdom" of phantasy and imagination has been dried out by "sober thinking" or comics and movies. Naturally, there is religion and the Holy Folly of the Cross, there is intellectualism (the consolation of the intellect), there is alcohol and sex (the adventures of despair) or, finally, crime: the attraction of Blue Jaw

Magoon's Purple Gang, the life of a "gorilla" or of an ace trigger man. The pent up energies of young manhood needs some sort of outlet in the stone deserts of Brooklyn, Detroit, or Chicago.

The solutions suggested are naturally of an extreme character; there is little likelihood that young men in large numbers will be drunk with God because there is little of the spirit of Clairveaux, Solesmes, Assisi, Loyola, or Beuron in the United States. Nor yet do they want to be candidates for the electric chair, nor are the higher intellectual values communicable to vast numbers. Political parties of the totalitarian type on the other hand promise "everything" — faith (in a worldly millennium), intellectuality (on a sentimental basis), drunkenness (with words), crime (of the "honorable," i.e., political type). An American Fascism of tomorrow might actually attract all "better" elements leaving the scum to its pastime of drink, theft, and sex. Needless to say this is a dangerous game. It may be that these elements, having a free hand, would "save America" for the "White Man," and Christianity might thus well-nigh become a tolerated religion,[260] but the Church as such would suffer bitterly in the long run and the catacombs might be her last stage of development here in this country.*

In the sober forties there will be another generation, steeled by the war, grimmer in outlook, far more determined to have its own way. The generation of the twenties was one of despair, of despair for the "right reasons"; there is a danger that our decade will be one of wrong and false aims.[261] The issue is thus far graver. Most planning (whether it is done by ochlocrats, Fascists, Pinks, or Communists) points to a radical decrease of liberty. Yet there is no doubt that the end of liberty in America would be practically the end there of the Church.

These inner political issues of utmost gravity are now overshadowed by the grim realities of a total war in which our very existence is at stake. Conscription (and voluntary service) will absorb a large proportion of the young men who will profit from a little discipline and drill.** The hold of the experts, the presidential power, the importance of the ministries and the armed forces will increase constantly. This war may prove after all to be a great opportunity to make the necessary reforms which will reform lay power and recast party influences in a qualitative sense and thus avoid the danger of the formation of a mass party and the rise of a mass leader after

the war. To carry out this task properly, to enact this transition *without the further* (*lasting*) *loss of liberties for the individual* needs divine assistance. Nothing is more difficult than to swim against the stream and to act against the "spirit of time" short-circuiting the development from ochlocracy to tyranny and to reach over to the "next" historical period, which must be one of freedom in an order supported by law and knowledge, not one of collective tyranny based upon a sensate hysterical animalism. There is no such thing as a historical fatality; there is only a historical nemesis which punishes those who have hesitated to act when action was still possible.

The last war gave a few totalitarian teetotalers an ugly chance to pass a law which regulated the diet of Free Americans. The war is, as the Greeks have recognized it before, the father of all things. The present war may prove to be the turning point to a new era and the καιρός, the "time of opportunity and action," may be nearer than any of us believe. The moment of necessary reform will come and the new way of life (both changes intrinsically interconnected) may not be so far behind. This new way of life must be the synthesis of two great traditions; the Catholic one and the Anglo-American one, Baltimore and Boston, faith and liberty. This new-old way of life must be like a tree with roots in the past, roots in the soil and its branches and leaves must be turned to timeless, eternal truth. It must not be made of paper; it must be living and pulsating, satisfying the heart as well as the intellect.

Poor and glorious America! Never in history has a country carried such great responsibility in its formative age, in its period of growth and maturation. Never in history have men of good will all the world over looked with such great expectancy and hope toward any other land. Never in history had a nation more bitter struggles to regain its balance, to find its soul, to shape its face than America. Europe was a hard and cruel mother continent to the Americas, covering them with her amorphous surplus population, dumping these in incoherent fragments over a young country barely emerging from its childhood and adolescence.

Without wealth and without tradition, without learning and often without piety, did Europe's lost children arrive on these shores to start a new life, to help in building America. Never were men more cruelly exposed to the ravages of industry, to the temptations of money, to all heresies and aberrations of a godless century, of a faithless age. The Europeans in the

shadows of their cathedrals, under the walls of their old monasteries, had something to lean upon, reserves to draw from. And yet, it is the parent who has fallen a victim, who has become the "Apostle of her Apostasies," and it is America that has taken over the torch from her trembling hand.

Said Edmund Burke, America's great friend and advocate:

> The Western world was the seat of freedom until another, more Western, was discovered; and that other will probably be its asylum when it is hunted down in every other part. Happy it is that the worst of times may have one refuge still left for humanity.*

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* It is significant that religion and politics are the two domains where modern man manifests such a deep conviction in lay intuition. "Democracy" has indeed for the *secularized* American the same importance in these instances, as National Socialism for the secularized German, or Communism for the irreligious Russian.

* There are twenty-three million Catholics in the United States. The sum total of people claiming church membership is sixty-four millions. Fifty-two per cent of the population of the United States profess no established religion. Other estimates speak of forty-two million "potential" Catholics. It is held that the official Catholic census can take no adequate account of the "floating" and nondue-paying Catholic population which would vastly increase the figures.

** This was usually done by a temporary division of the classes in three groups — Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. This religious instruction was not given by the regular teacher but by priests, ministers, or rabbis who drew a salary from the state.

*** Theodore Maynard writes in his book *The Story of American Catholicism* (New York: Macmillan, 1941), about the menace of the city birth rate in relation to American Catholicism. Reprinted in Vol. XXXIV, No. 23 of *Commonweal* under the title "The Lost Land."

* With the exception of the Soviet Union and the Third French Republic.

* The Irish list would include such names as Liam O'Flaherty, James Joyce, Francis Hackett, and Sean O'Faolain.

* Theodore Roosevelt came out brutally against the Catholics when he said: "The Catholic Church is in no way suited to this country and can never have any permanent growth except through immigration, for its thought is Latin and entirely at variance with the dominant thought of our country and civilization." A good half of these statements are at variance with truth, yet they express a real sentiment and like all half-truths they have a kernel of truth. The Catholics will have to change America. *Omnia restaurare in Christo*, is a program for the world which excludes neither the City of Rome nor the United States.

** See the estimate of Fr. Victor Dillard, S.J., regarding the Ghetto Catholic in his article in *Etudes*, April, 1940.

*** The reader is reminded again that we distinguish (following strictly Platonic and Thomistic principles) between a republic, a legitimate form of government, and democracy, its corrupted form.

* Even in spite of tuitions the self-sacrifice of orders (Jesuits, Christian Brothers, etc.) is necessary to keep Catholic education going.

* The sense in which the propositions in the Syllabus are condemned can be learned only by searching the documents from which they have singly been taken. No Catholic should disdain the accumulated wisdom of 2000 years. “Liberalism” is here clearly the continental, Rousseauan brand, not the Anglo-American tradition in the sense in which it is employed, for instance, by Christopher Dawson.

** The Church would naturally prefer the France of St. Louis to the superficial and frivolous *ancien régime*.

* The nonrational values play a very small part (if any) in Thomist philosophy.

* Even Jefferson was a bitter enemy of the idea of constitutional immutability.

** It will take a long time until the Anti-Catholics in this country will drop the charge against Catholicism that it is “Fascist.” This illusion is based on the usual ignorance concerning Catholicism as well as Fascism. The view that Catholicism is terroristic and based on violence while Protestantism is liberal, enlightened, and mild — is almost general. Read in this connection Giuseppe Gangale *Rivoluzione Protestante* (Torino, 1925). The thesis of this book is Protestant, Fascist, and Anti-Catholic to the core.

* That explains the lack of ambition of the nonprogressive European who always would feel outraged if accused of being ambitious. A young Englishman or American would consider the same characteristic as highly flattering; in France the remark *“c’est un ambitieux”* is extremely derogatory.

** The best conservative cultural review of Germany is called *Das Innere Reich— The Inner Realm*.

* William Dean Howell in his *Criticism and Fiction* (New York, 1891) attacked phantasy as an “aristocratic” vice. “Democracy” in his opinion is bound to “realism,” i.e., *Sachlichkeit*, p. 321.

** This is typically “Protestant” limitation as the North European development of ecclesiastic styles stopped with the reformation. Neither did Catholic architects have enough courage to build modern churches. An imitation gothic church is not a sufficient or efficient challenge to pagan modernity. Modern art must be either destroyed or “baptized” and it can only be destroyed if we provide a living alternative.

* The June, 1940, number of the American monthly *Screenland* brought an article entitled: “Satisfy Your Suppressed Desires at the Movies.” Thus the cinema is acknowledged as a clearinghouse for Freudian “complexes” and a repair shop for defective personalities.

* Communism in the United States is thus largely an outgrowth of humanitarianism aggravated by the candid superstition of progress. It lacks thoroughly the interesting apocalyptic qualities of Eastern Bolshevism in its early stage.

* Which means either discrimination in franchise or ascendancy of the administration over the legislation.

* We will deal with this question (and the whole problem of American culture) more intensively and extensively in our next work.

** Neither should it be forgotten that a disillusioned generation well disciplined and skilled in the arts of war can become an even greater asset in the hands of a totalitarian leader.

* Cit. by Lord Acton, *Lectures on the French Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1910).

PART IV

THE ISSUE

"Nothing is more characteristic of the intellectuals of our generation than their failure to understand what it is that is happening to their world, and nothing explains their failure as precisely as their unwillingness to see what they have seen and to know what they do truly know. — Archibald Macleish, *The Irresponsibles*.

I

COMMUNISM*

Politics is like the legendary sphinx who devoured all those who could not solve her riddles.— Rivarol.

IT IS not a mere coincidence that almost all prominent Socialists and Communists were of middle-class descent.[262] The basic problem of middle-class life is security — in the national as well as in the personal sense.[263] The two classes which have the greatest inner affinities and likeness, the working class and the middle class, both live in the cities and the vast majorities of *both* classes are employees and not free men. There is a difference in income which is nevertheless not so startling as one is wont to believe. The middle classes are forced to spend relatively large sums for the sake of appearances (clothes, furniture, higher rents for "better neighborhood"), which makes it often more difficult for the white-collar class to save and to enjoy *personal* luxuries (as, for instance, holidays, good food, etc.). It is merely the *haute bourgeoisie* and the small enterpriser who belong sociologically (or rather typologically) to a different "class" or "group."

But if we compare the worker and the petty bourgeois we must say that the former has many bourgeois and the latter many "proletarian" traits. Of all salaried professions the officials and army men have the greatest security and there has always been in Europe a curious trend in all bourgeois groups for careers in the bureaucracy. He who had the greatest security was the most admired of all. The worker shares this admiration in all bourgeois

civilizations and thus he is not immune against the terrible, bourgeois promise of bolshevism: *"Ye shall all be state employees! Ye shall all get insurance and pensions!"*[264]

This promise of a millennium of absolute security had little effect in those countries which lacked a middle class or the bourgeois spirit,* as, for instance, Albania, Lappland, Persia, Afghanistan, or Ethiopia. Socialism and bolshevism had a strong appeal in some countries on account of their promises to the national cause (Bulgaria and partly Mexico), in others again it was the *revolutionary appeal* (Spain, Greece, Italy, Chile). In the latter case bolshevism is essentially "Revolution in Permanence," but *not* a new, bourgeois order bent on promoting material security.

In the technical-capitalistic-bourgeois world communism is even in the lowest ranks of the working or proletarian classes entirely unproletarian. This is true of communism in England, the United States, Scandinavia, and perhaps in France. *In these countries communism or communist propaganda never even made a pretense to increase human liberty or to liberate the individual from the dreadful collective slavery of the factory or the office; all the party promised was to change the management, i.e., to put state officials instead of private enterprisers behind the leather doors*, and to make every plant or office a branch of the gigantic machinery of the total as well as totalitarian state, thus giving the sacral dignity of a "state employee" even to the last night watchman. Imperial Russia had two million of *Činovniki* — state officials who have been so well portrayed by Nicholas Gogol — but thanks to the technocratic evolution of the Soviet Union we have now six and a half million of these high priests of government (who have been equally well portrayed by Katayev); the total number of all state employees, direct and indirect, must be somewhere in the vicinity of sixty and seventy millions.

Bolshevism has frequently acted as the trail blazer of bourgeois civilization and the pioneer of the middle-class mind in countries with a feudal, agrarian, or nomadic culture. Russia today is far more bourgeois than it used to be twenty-five years ago and the havoc wrought by bolshevism in central Asia can hardly be estimated. It is pretty certain that an average New York white-collar worker would feel today far more "at home" in Moscow than forty years ago. He would find that people speak his

"language." The materialistic philosophy of Lenin would be more comprehensible to him than the ideas of Vladimir Soloviev.

The impressions many travelers received in the USSR culminate in the observation that this gigantic country, with a mystical Christian past, transforms itself into an immense suburbia extending from the White to the Black Sea, a suburbia inhabited by an antlike, commuting population of straphangers and bourgeois. There is nothing more unproletarian than these dull "bourgeois" (*grazhdanini*) with their "Americanized" tastes, their enthusiasm for skyscrapers and the other manifestations of "progress," these Babbits with their nostalgia for two-room apartments, a quarter share of a motor car and improved club buildings.

It is nevertheless true that continental communism is "proletarian" inasmuch as it considers the proletariat to be the savior class and an aristocracy for the transitional stage (when there will be only one class). Yet in spite of this program it is very unlikely that an "extreme" class (the Fourth not less than the First Estate) can ever become a "common denominator." Bourgeois standards and ideas influence, on account of their teletic magnetism, the proletarian world of the USSR, and the result is the terrifying suburbanization of Russia. Communism in Great Britain and the United States immediately made the short cut to integral "bourgeoisism"; the worker in the Anglo-Saxon world would hardly be pleased to be called a proletarian or to remain one. Communism in the United States and England is indeed essentially and substantially a movement of the semi-intellectual middle class with a good sprinkling of the quarter intellectual upper class. Communism in the United States would hardly be identified with the slums of lower Manhattan, the dust bowlers of Kansas, or the miners of Pennsylvania. . . . The word *communism* rather evokes associations like professors of state colleges with thick lenses in their spectacles, parlor pinks with Harvard accents, bored Park Avenue hostesses, anemic little East Europeans in public libraries, "progressive" and "advanced" psychologists specialized in sexual disorders, and unbearably conceited "foreign" correspondents.

The gospel of the Bolsheviks has for our middle class with its materialistic outlook, its *Rentnerseele*, a truly apocalyptic strength and a satanical power of temptation. *Our materialistic society can theoretically not be saved from bolshevism by itself (or from the more "national" form of*

socialism) because these political and economical theories are nothing else but the last iron consequences of their own herdist ideologies. With a little more honesty and a little less liberal inhibitions (and these fizzle out slowly) they should have surrendered a long time ago. After the rejection of the Cross by the *homo oeconomicus* all his interest became centered around the problem of increased income. Instead of the *beatific vision*, insurance and pensions became the axis of human longing. For pensions and increased salaries the Bolsheviks slaughtered three million people and exposed twenty million people to the bitter death of starvation. The National Socialists are now on the best way to commit similar atrocities for the benefit of another millennium with superhighways and an economical *Lebensraum*. Thus we see geocentrism and the brutal craving for material welfare leading to madness, mass slaughter, and the demoniacal construction of Babylonic Towers. And one must fear that we are now only at the very beginning of a series of catastrophes. The gates of hell are wide open and the reason for the cataclysmic character of this age has never been better characterized than by Vassili Rozanov in his *Apocalypsis of Our Time* where he says:

The deeper reason for everything now happening lies in the fact that owing to the withering away of Christianity enormous cavities have originated in the European World. Everything tumbles down now into these cavernous hollows.*

Russian bolshevism has many aspects which can only be understood properly if we bring them into correlation with the Russian scene. This would require a book of its own and we must rather limit ourselves to the communist sentiment as we find it at large in the Occidental world.

It is, of course, only too natural that a young man, brought up in the bourgeois spirit which culminates in the cognition that material issues are the most important ones, finally finds his way to Communism. If the production and distribution of goods is *the* problem of humanity it is difficult to see how a sincere, *altruistic*, and logical thinker, accepting the preceding statement as axiomatic, can under present circumstances come to any other solution than that offered by Moscow. The *egoist*, on the other hand, finally lands in Manchester. An education based on £.s.d. or on

dollars and cents, inspired by the awe for technical "progress," i.e., a modern, ochlocratic education, can hardly establish other aims of existence.[265]

It is exactly this eagerness and unhesitating acceptance of bourgeois values which characterizes the Communist. What *he* usually accuses as being typically "bourgeois" is nothing else than the survival of Catholic-Christian tradition, and *not* the views conceived as true and ideal by the nineteenth-century godless, progressive, and progressing bourgeois. The intellectual exponents of the agnostic middle classes in the later part of the past century had already established norms, ideas, and ideals which the timid city dweller did not dare to accept straight away. It is true that these materialistic creeds were final, logical conclusions of ideas and trends already in existence for the past hundred years but the urban tradition of compromise and of the tame "fifty-fifty" prevailed for a long time. The urbanites act in masses and masses move slowly. There were a few men who braved the old Christian morals and traditions and plunged headlong into the realization of 100 per cent modernism, but the large bulk of the middle class *"citoyens"* looked with misgiving upon these people whom they considered partly as dissolute *bohémiens*, partly as "radicals." Yet the "radical" of the *fin-de-siècle* was no revolutionary whatsoever but simply a person — or rather an individual — who seriously believed in the gospels of Thomas Huxley, Haeckel, Nietzsche, Büchner, Fechner, Virchow, and Ibsen, and acted accordingly. Neither are the progressivists, in present-day America, revolutionaries or enemies of the order. *Being "radical" or "progressive" they merely want to continue with greater speed and determination along the established, wrong trail*.

One cannot repeat it often enough that the only true revolutionary in this world is the Church with her basic opposition to the very spirit of our modern times. The same is true, to a certain extent, of every genuine, freedom-loving tradition which is based upon the Catholic notion of human responsibility and the free will, for whose philosophical and theological defense the Society of Jesus has earned everlasting merits.*

Though bourgeois in spirit, communism (like any other ideology) can transcend its class limitations, but it will always betray its origin.[266] W. H. Auden, for instance, in his enthusiasm for Red Spain, could not refrain from

seeing the future of that country molded and shaped by the spirit of Welwyn Garden City or Bronxville in preference to that of Cervantes, Goya, or Calderón.

Yet the great consolation for the enemies of state capitalism — we are referring here to the private capitalists — is the illusion that Communism is not feasible at all because it is "against human nature." Such an argument is nothing else but Rousseauan optimism; as if "progress" has not succeeded in producing hundreds of items which are "contrary to human nature," and which nevertheless were generally accepted. But the mere allusion that communism might be successful (as successful as equally inhuman superbombs) makes our private capitalists furious beyond measure. The materialistic bourgeois world is fed with success stories, success talks, phrases like "nothing succeeds like success," and success attracts them as light attracts the moths.* In such a culture all those who have cash are beloved and the beggars are treated with suspicion.

Communism was very clever in playing up the success story, and the bulging eyes of miserable straphangers devouring pictures of gigantic tractors, barge canals, and power plants reflect the mystical attraction of massed material on the minds of the urban simpletons.

The National Socialists put forth similar propaganda, and we must not forget that the history of Leftism is one of almost endless victories, the history of Rightism one of almost endless defeats. The Stuarts, the Carlist Pretenders, the Habsburgs, the Church in Northern Europe, Austria as against Prussia, the *Sonderbund* as against Swiss centralism, the White Armies in Russia, the Bourbons in France — they all lost, were beaten, defeated, and rendered powerless. They may be *ultimately* victorious — in the sense that Christ was after the crucifixion. Yet it is always the defeat, the "Lost Cause" which attracts the noble man who is a loving man and whose heart turns instinctively toward those who suffer and not toward those who triumph.[267]

Rightist ideas on the other hand are only truly magnetic if they are absolutely pure; Leftist ideas, on account of their materialistic and heretic essence, never demand perfection. Mediocrity is the death of every Rightist movement, but it is the very air in which Leftism thrives. A totalitarian leader who betrays practically every point of his party program hardly

shakes the faith of his fanatical followers, but mediocre monarchs, Popes, and prelates have destroyed the old order.

The success of National Socialism had also an effect on many a money-bag in the City, an effect which can only be compared with the impression a boa constrictor makes on a rabbit. *With the materialists, success becomes an argument in itself and immediately disarms the opponent*. A fully successful communism in Russia would have the most devastating effect on the whole democratic-materialistic bourgeoisie, and almost nothing would stem the determination of the masses to sacrifice the little liberty they have for greater comfort and security. One is almost inclined to say that two cinema shows a day would render the Church (as "opium for the people") superfluous.

Yet Russian communism is a *reaction* against religious and political forms prevailing in Russia prior to 1917, and is in many respects a "complementary heresy" to the Eastern Schism.* Occidental communism on the other hand (and we will include here National Socialism) is ideologically a *direct and straight result* of modern mentality, based on the French and the Industrial Revolutions. *The parlor pink and the SS man did not arrive at their philosophy through an antinomistic revulsion but through logical conclusions from the wrong axiomatic premises of the nineteenth century*.

Russian bolshevism, replacing eastern Christendom by the grim religiosity of Marx, produced a caricature of the evangelical counsels with many a diabolical aspect. There is a good deal of "communism" in monasteries and convents, yet this is based upon a *voluntary* renunciation of perfect human rights. On account of our free will we can make supreme sacrifices which ennobles our very existence. Bolshevism on the other hand forces us brutally into a parody of monastic life amidst fellow monks and fellow nuns who hate their habit and sigh under the ferocious tyranny of their pseudo-abbot. This evil distortion of an otherwise Christian ideal is more satanic** than wanton, a thoroughly pagan and diabolic opposition to Christian existence. This explains also the reason why the Vatican has found stronger words against "altruistic" bolshevism than against egoistic capitalism.

Before closing the chapter on communism we shall make a short résumé of the main characteristics of "democracy," National Socialism, and communism (in its dogmatic form regardless of temporary Russian practices). Democratism, it is understood, will be treated here in its undiluted (continental) form, free of all alien (liberal Anglo-Saxon) influences.*

Continental Democratism (*Ochlocracy*)	*Communism*	*National Socialism*
	THE PERSON	
An "individual." Subordinated to the majority (general will). Rallying point "Mr. Average Man" (Mediocrity)[343]	An "individual." Subordinated to the dictatorship of the largest class. Leveling down to establish identity and equality.	An "individual." Subordinated to the general will, embodied and personified by the leader. Rallying point is the "happy medium."
	CULTURE (TYPE)	
Megalopolitan and Suburban	Megalopolitan and Suburban	Megalopolitan and Suburban
	LEADING LAYER	
Middle-middle class	Lower middle class	Lower middle class
	THE CHURCH	
"Tolerated." Separation of state and Church. Depriving the Church of any official status. (*Laicisme.*) Church in the "Ghetto"	"Persecuted." Condemnation of all religious and metaphysical doctrines. "Church in the Catacombs."	"Molested." Church suspected of disloyalty and degraded by prohibition of all cultural activities.[344] "Church in the Ghetto, on the way to Catacombs"
	MARRIAGE	
A "legal contract." State takes supreme jurisdiction. In some cases eugenic legislation (for "Health"). *Divorce.*	The same *Divorce*	The same, but state control even tighter on account of health as well as racial policy. *Divorce*

Education		
Right of state to dispose of children recognized (compulsory education). No religious education in state schools. Rights of parents curtailed.	The same. School is simultaneously a party institution.	The same. Religious education increasingly curtailed.*
Modern Technicism		
Enthusiastically accepted.	Same	Same
Aim of Society		
A utopia à la Bellamy or Aldous Huxley with a maximum of material comfort and health.	Same	Same
Social System		
Private *capitalism*	State *capitalism*	Private, state-controlled capitalism (a synthesis of both!)
Human Will		
"Conditioned" by environment	"Conditioned" by class	"Conditioned" by race
Philosophy — Weltanschauung		
Society: Utilitarian	Same	Same
Personal: Escapist or heroic pessimism	Same	Same
Human Ideal		
The "ordinary decent chap," the "regular fellow."	Same	Same (*"Rechte Kerle"*)**

* The idea that the children belong to the State and not to the parents was first expressed by the Protestant minister Wolfgang Capito in his *Responsio de miisa, matrimonio et iure magistratus in religionem*, Strassburg, 1707. But the most furious advocate of State rights over children was the notorious Marquis de Sade, member of the Convention.

** Cf. Dr. Erich Kühn, *Schafft anständige Kerle* (Berlin, 1939).

	ATTITUDE TOWARD ENVIRONMENT	
Anthropocentric	Same	Same
Geocentric	Same	Same
Herdist	Same	Same
Egalitarian and Identitarian	Same	Same
	AESTHETIC IDEAL	
Uniformity	Same	Same
	DEFENSE SYSTEM	
Uniformistic army of conscripts	Same	Same
	ASCERTAINMENT OF CURRENT OPINION	
Elections and plebiscites on the numerical majoritarian principle ("counting noses")*	Same	Same
	COMMON ENEMY	
True liberty. Diversity. Tradition. The Church. "Survivals" from the Middle Ages. Personalism.	Same	Same

* This is clearly not the Anglo-American principle which denies proportional representation. The President in the United States can actually be elected by a minority of *votes* provided he has a majority of *electors*.

(If we take into consideration that these three ideologies "grew," practically together, it is surprising that there is so much difference between them still left. Socialism is only about forty to fifty years younger than democratism, and nationalism assumed its racial character only another twenty or thirty years later. It must be conceded that ochlocratic democratism as the oldest of the three is undoubtedly the mildest.)

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* The reader is reminded that German aggression against the Soviet Union does not make her our *ideological* ally although we are bound to her *militarily*. To give military help to the Soviet Union is

not only a matter of prudence; it is also morally justifiable because we help her to get rid of the domination of a foreign power which has its own system of the suppression of personal liberties.

* Russia had a comparatively numerous lower middle class which became an easy prey of communism. We find a series of thumbnail sketches depicting the representatives of this quickly bolshevized class in E. v. Kuehnelt-Leddihn's *Gates of Hell*. The agrarian peasant bolshevism was of the anarchical type in the best tradition of Pugatshev; the suffering of the peasantry began with the introduction of collectivization imposed by the urban Communists.

* *Apokalipsis našego vremeni*, Paris, 1926.

* There is hardly a better description of a totalitarian state based upon (religious) determinism than in Stefan Zweig's admirably written book *Castellio Against Calvin* (New York, 1936). The parallels between Calvin's Geneva and the "Germany" of the racial determinists are obvious and the paradoxical brutality against a population allegedly without free will the same. (Yet the very brutality, even if itself senseless, can be excused by "Divine predestination," "Racial urge," and similar confusions.)

* The "interventionists" who got busy after every British *victory* and the isolationist who was riding high and mighty after every Allied defeat belong to the same category.

* See E. v. Kuehnelt-Leddihn, *Jesuiten, Spiesser, Bolschewiken*, Salzburg, 1933, pp. 53–54.

** National socialism has no less satanic background. The deplorable lies spread by the Allies in 1914–18 against imperial Germany were largely trumped up or faked. An image of Germany was shown to the horrified Allied citizens as it never existed in reality. An old Austrian proverb says: "Never paint the devil on the wall." It dates back to a Viennese saga about a very humorous painter whose exhuberance and fearlessness astonished everybody. One day, having had a little too much new wine — the famous *Heurigen* — he boasted that he could paint a portrait of the devil on the wall of the inn. His frightened companions tried to dissuade him from this plan, but in vain. Hardly had the unfortunate artist finished the portrait when it came to life and Satan, leaping from the wall, throttled the terrified painter to death.

Something similar happened to the Allies. The Third Reich is the propaganda picture of the Second Reich come to life.

* Democratism is here the phenomenon Christopher Dawson would call continental or Rousseauan democracy of the 1792 brand.

II

WORLD WAR II

"Humanity without Nationality is empty, nationality without humanity is blind." — Werner Sombart, *Vom Menschen*.

TODAY every war is a "Holy War." Engaging a large part of the population it necessarily becomes a crusade. It is possible, of course, that money interest brought the United States into the last war.* And yet — the thousands of Americans who volunteered for the Allies and those who were conscripted but fought with enthusiasm, believed firmly that they were fighting a crusade for the sacred ideal of "democracy" whose acceptance would be a benefit to every single nation in the world. In spite of this mistake it was nevertheless an idealism of the highest order which prompted these men and boys to offer their lives for the cause. Even if it were true that materialistic reasons were behind the declaration of war by the United States, these reasons were not the ones which fired the nation into action. There is no doubt that our time bred men pretty near to the type of the *homo oeconomicus*, but this monster exists nevertheless only as an approximation and not as a reality. Nobody wants to risk or to lay down his life for a 10 per cent increase in wages or an additional bonus along with the old-age pension.**

It is only too frequent that we see our historians laboriously engaged in research work trying to find "economic reasons" for the process of history. When John Green, Ph.D., faces the crusades he is aware that he himself

would not fight for the Holy Sepulcher. His preoccupation with his salary and unpaid gas bills render him materially minded and therefore he will continue his research until he makes the discovery that a Venetian smith, specialized in swords, was married to a woman whose brother had a mistress whose uncle in turn drank wine with the butler of a Roman Cardinal who undoubtedly persuaded Urban II to start the crusades. His discovery (which makes "sense" of an otherwise senseless chapter of history) will be heralded as sensational and influence his colleagues in continuing their efforts to find the real reasons for the different historical phenomena behind the mask of religious superstition, patriotic hypocrisy, ideological pretense, and dynastic make-believe.

Yet there is an ideological element in every total war (if not for any other reasons, then simply because there are no two nations with exactly the same philosophy of life) and this ideological element is predominant in the present struggle. The economic problems could somehow have been patched up, and it is clear that no responsible statesman plunges a country into a war merely because he owns a few armament shares. Such monsters who readily and consciously sacrifice millions of lives for hard cash exist almost exclusively in the phantasy of Bolsheviks (apart from a few individual cases which can be counted on the fingers.)

It was a very marked concession to the spirit of the twentieth century when Hitler appealed to his nation to fight (amongst other reasons) for raw materials. The reason of this appeal was to create a general impression in the German people that their country was one of the "have-nots" aspiring merely to economic *equality*. Thus we see clearly that National Socialism has already accepted the Marxian theory of class struggle by which the Proletarian strives to overthrow the rule of the "bourgeois." In order to achieve this goal, a dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary, a dictatorship made possible by a preceding revolution. The Third Reich, representing a nation of "have-nots" (or rather of "have-less"), enters now into the revolutionary phase which in its national collectivistic form is simply called "war." The conquest of Europe by Germany is nothing else but the dictatorship of the "proletariat."

Yet the economic aspirations of the Third Reich — in the very intention of its leaders — are thoroughly subordinated to the idea of *power* and *domination*, in short: to the imperialistic aims. The National Socialists only

want an economically strong and independent (autarchic) country in order to have political power, military strength and an absolute liberty of action. They do not care in the least whether the individual Herr Schmidt or Frau Krause have butter or margarine on their bread. The economic issue in relation to the individual stomach is therefore purely secondary. Private enterprisers in Germany were not in the least enthusiastic about this war. Economic reasons on the side of the Allies, though weighty, were hardly sufficient to risk the life of practically all of British and French manhood, and womanhood. The Third Reich could have organized the worst export dumping the world over and no British or French Prime Minister would have had the backing of their respective nations to engage in a war on such an issue. Even the total loss of all foreign trade would not have led to the third of September, 1939.

The imperialistic aims again were clearly the outcome of the philosophy accepted by the Third Reich. It would be a fatal mistake to believe that this order of subordination — putting economics under political imperialism under philosophy — exists in the reverse. Only that fearful imaginary savage, the *homo oeconomicus* can perceive such a perverted situation.[268]

(The *homo oeconomicus* is certainly not a "progressive" mirage in the evolutionary sense. Only the beast is economical through and through. A dog, a rat, or a hyena come nearest to this conception. They would not fight for anything else but sex, food, and shelter. It is the *homo sapiens* who dies for ideas and traditions, for religions and philosophies).

American public opinion was deeply agitated before the attack on Pearl Harbor by the issue of isolationism versus interventionism; some "isolationists" on the East coast charged that their opponents belonged predominantly to the wealthy classes of old stock and British descent, an accusation which was not entirely without foundation in the section mentioned. Yet if it is true that isolationism was stronger in the lower income brackets one can only be struck by the thoroughly uneconomical, idealistic, and "sentimental" attitude of a nation frequently accused of gross materialism. It must have been evident to the *beati possidentes* that a war would mean for them an almost disastrous taxation, death of their young men, a stronger hold of the New Deal and more curtailing state intervention in the economic life hitherto largely controlled by them. The "lower"

classes, on the other hand, could hope for more employment, bigger wages, and a higher standard of living in case of America being involved in a "foreign" war. But the hatred of the whiggish upper ten for Hitler, the attachment to the land which gave them Milton and Shakespeare and tombstones to their own ancestors made them act against their economic interest while other ties, equally sentimental, and bitter memories influenced equally large layers of the American Nation in the opposite direction.

The German case shows clearly the desire for a "bigger and better" Reich, sprung from National Socialist doctrine, and it also demonstrates that the conception of a bigger Germany is inseparable from the dogma of racial superiority due to the fact that a bigger Reich involves the domination of non-Germans by Germans[269] — for a period of transition, well understood. It would be a grave underestimate of the coercive power of ideas among (in a "closed" sense) logical and (in a broad sense) religious nations, if one would attempt to deny their priority of thought. The principle to live first and to philosophize afterward they left to the more materialistic and practical nations.

There is little if any *permanent** sacrifice of these sacred ideological principles in the German World and no greater compromise may be expected from this totally heretical ideology — National Socialism; this is so in spite of the fact that *every digression would be "justified" if it would only momentarily benefit the nation*. In this unfortunate philosophy we find incorporated the age-old, tragically German Machiavellian spirit as personified by Hagen von Tronje in the *Nibelungen Saga*. But "what profits the people is right" reminds one strongly of Jeremiah Bentham. The Communists are also convinced Benthamists and each time the Kremlin made a compromise with capitalist concepts, the whole western world considered it as a sure sign that Soviet Russia had given up its "struggle against human nature." And all these wishful thinkers were each time bitterly disappointed because the Soviet Union made, for each step in their direction, two in the other.

It is questionable whether the Russo-German pact was just one of these Benthamite escapades of the two totalitarian Empires. It may have had a far deeper sense and meaning than that of a mere act of expediency. At work,

no doubt, was also the old geopolitical law: "The neighbor of my neighbor is my friend," and we have to ask ourselves whether the disappearance of Poland was not destined to affect the peaceful cooperation of these two superdemocracies. But at that time the cooperation of the Third German and the Third Russian Reich** was a natural combination, and Peter Drucker in his *End of Economic Man* prophesied it five years ago. Only the wishful thinkers who saw the Germanies in the clutches of a "rightist" and "reactionary" ideology could not conceive this joining of hands with the "greatest democracy" in the world. The Third Reich is no less an ochlocracy than Russia. Mass man, *against all expectations and calculations*, celebrated his great victories East and not West of the Rhine.[270]

The result of the unholy alliance, at that time, between the German Republic* and the Soviet Republic has been seen. The similarity of their respective ideologies was not a sure guarantee of such a union. Communism and National Socialism are at the same time too similar (at heart) and too dogmatic not to cause the wrath of their court philosophers who will see in their opponents dangerous heretics. The popes would never have permitted schismatic bishops to reside in the Holy City, yet they hardly objected to the presence of Jewish rabbis. The desire in Berlin and in Moscow was to influence each other and this led to frictions and intrigues. And there was even more explosive material in the non-ideological (i.e., in the geopolitical) sphere. The clash between these two powers could thus be delayed but not avoided.

The ideologies of both Third Empires, arising from ochlocratic democratism, were foreseen with uncanny clearness by Alexis de Tocqueville, the great aristocratic French liberal, 110 years ago. Yet the forms of thought, life, and existence which, reversing the order, now demoniacally menace the West from their strongholds in the East, must be combated by those nations who have attained a certain immunity in this disease. Originally it was England and America (and France) who spread it, but now they know better and begin to see more clearly. These communitarian, herdist ideologies are nothing but gigantic exaggerations and distortions of their teachings, so great that the average citizen of these

countries is unable to see the connection and therefore considers them derived from their old bogeys, "reaction" and "medievalism." *This error is, in a way, a very happy one*. Otherwise a certain, very misplaced tenderness might arise in these people for their gargantuan, philosophical "grandchildren." English and a great deal of misguided (and miseducated) American public opinion would be filled with uncertainty and uneasiness should it ever become clear that "communism" has it roots firmly in doctrines preached in this country as well. The Second and Third German and Russian Empires as well as the present, terrible war would not exist if it were not for the preceding progressive excesses of such phenomena as:

1. The Lutheran and the Petrinian "reform."
2. The influence of the French and Industrial Revolutions.
3. Militarism, Nationalism, Capitalism, Socialism: all derived from No. 2.
4. The establishment of philosophical, political parties and *ideological* Parliaments.
5. The breakdown of the Christian monarchical idea and system.
6. The rise of the modern, *déraciné* megalopolis with its herdism.
7. The pseudo-scientific attitude toward man.

Needless to emphasize, all these trends were and are considered to be "progressive" and all these tendencies have always been bitterly assailed by the Church, who therefore was ridiculed and attacked by all those who now, in the West, ache under the sinister menace of the satanical synthesis of *all* their heresies. Today it is slowly dawning upon the minds of those who had misjudged the issues and, it must be said in all fairness, that there always was a minority in Continental Europe which was able to "see" or at least to "sense" the outcome. The effect of a candlelight in a dark room might be instanced in explanation of this minority of upright men of good will *and* good judgment. Under ordinary conditions such a light penetrates the darkness and can be perceived from the remotest corner of the room. In the Germanies (and in Russia) this light might be even more conspicuous, more shining, more brilliant than in other places, but the ferocious, smoky darkness is nevertheless far more impenetrable. Only if we move to the very center of the room can we touch the flame and feel its warmth on the

outstretched hand. It will be necessary for the enemies — are they really enemies? — of the Third Empires to smash the windows, let the smoke escape, and make the room habitable once more. This operation is not only necessary for Germany but for the rest of Europe and the entire world. It is a tragic fact that the country which was once the Holy Roman Empire, the great physical heart of Christendom, must be saved by the "secular" realms.[271]

The prophecy of Count de Tocqueville concerning the advent of the identitarian horrors should be read in full. It should have been a warning for all those who have been playing with the dangerous toys — identity and uniformity — ages ago. His warning was never listened to and one can almost hear the mass of *hommes médiocres* exclaim in unison 107 years before our time: *"Vous exagérez! Vous exagérez!"* He wrote:

I had remarked during my stay in the United States that a democratic state of society, similar to that of the Americans, might offer singular facilities for the establishment of despotism; and I perceive upon my return to Europe, how much use had already been made by most of our rulers of the notions, the sentiments, the wants engendered by this same social condition, for the purpose of extending the circle of their power. This led me to think that the nations of Christendom would perhaps eventually undergo some sort of oppression like that which hung over several nations of the ancient world. A more accurate examination of the subject, and five years of further meditations have not diminished my apprehensions, but they have changed the object of them. No sovereign ever lived in former ages so absolute or so powerful as to undertake to administer, by his own agency and without the assistance of intermediate powers, all the parts of a great empire; none ever attempted to subject all his subjects indiscriminately to strict uniformity of regulation, and personally to tutor and direct every member of the community. No notion of such an undertaking ever occurred to the human mind and if any man had conceived it the want of information, the imperfections of the administrative system and above all the natural obstacles caused by the inequalities of conditions, would speedily have checqued the execution of so vast a design. When the Roman emperors were at the height of their power the different nations of

the empire still preserved their manners and customs of great *diversity*. Although they were subject to the same monarch most of the provinces were separately administered; they abounded in powerful and active municipalities and although the whole government of the empire was centered in the hands of the emperor alone and he always remained, upon occasions, the supreme arbiter in all matters, yet the details of social life and private occupations lay for the most part beyond his control. The Emperors possessed, it is true, an immense and unchecked power which allowed them to gratify all their whimsical tastes and to employ for that purpose the whole strength of the state. They frequently abused that power arbitrarily to deprive their subjects of property or life; their tyranny was extremely onerous to the few, but it did not reach the greater number; it was fixed to some few main objects and neglected the rest; it was violent but its range was limited.

But it would seem that, if despotism were to be established among the democratic nations of our days, it might assume a different character; it would be more extensive and more mild; it would degrade men without tormenting them. I do not question that in an age of instruction and equality like our own, sovereigns might more easily succeed in collecting all political power into their own hands, and might interfere more habitually and decidedly within the sphere of private interests, than any sovereigns of the antiquity ever could do. . . .

I think then, that the species of oppression by which democratic nations are menaced is unlike anything which ever before existed in the world; our contemporaries will find no prototype of it in their memories. I am trying myself to choose an expression which will accurately convey the whole of the idea I have formed of it, but in vain; the old words despotism and tyranny are inappropriate; the thing itself is new; and since I can not name it, I must attempt to define it.

I seek to trace the novel features under which despotism may appear in the world. The first thing that strikes the observation is an innumerable multitude of men all equal and alike, incessantly endeavoring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives. . . . Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications, and to watch over their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, and mild. It would be like the

authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood; it is well content that the people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but rejoicing. For their happiness such a government willingly labors, but it chooses to be the sole agent and arbiter of that happiness: it provides for their security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides their inheritances — what remains but to spare them all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living? Thus it every day renders the exercise of the free agency of man less useful and less frequent; it circumscribes the will within a narrower range and gradually robs a man of all the uses of himself. *The principle of equality has prepared men for these things: it has predisposed men to endure them and often to look on them as benefits*.

After having successfully taken each member of the community in its powerful grasp and fashioned them at will the supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community. It covers the network of society with a network of small, complicated rules, minute and uniform, through which the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided: men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting: such a power does not destroy but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize but it compresses, ennervates, extinguishes, and stupifies people, till each nation is reduced to be nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals of which the government is the shepherd. . . .

. . . I believe that it is easier to establish a despotic government among a people in which the conditions of society are equal than among any other; and I think that if such a government were once established among such a people, it would not only oppress men, but would eventually strip each of them of several of the highest qualities of humanity. *Despotism therefore appears to me peculiarly to be dreaded in democratic ages*. I should have loved freedom, I believe, at all times, but in the time in which we live I am ready to worship it. — (*Democracy in America*, "Influence of democratic opinions and sentiments upon political society," Trans. by Henry Reeve, New York, 1899.)[272]

This gives, in short, a characteristic of the enemy against whom the United Nations have to wage a war, an enemy who is slightly less subtle in his methods than M. de Tocqueville dared dream. He refers twice to the mildness of that coming regime and at first this seems to impair the value of this astonishing prophecy. Neither Moscow nor Berlin excel in mildness, and yet de Tocqueville's "mistake" is only due to a different timing. He envisages the advent of the efficient ant state at a period when the nations of the Christian world are already thoroughly uniformistic and identitarian. Such a state can — in his opinion — only come into existence when everybody follows the same political creed and shares the same taste, the same outlook on life, etc. Such conditions in absolute perfection are still rare and they are even more unlikely in historical countries with divergent traditions and class distinctions. We have referred to the example of the plebiscites in the hotels of Berlin and New York. Yet countries like the Germanies or Russia are still far from the perfect political uniformity of New York and therefore brutal force has to be applied. There is no reason why one should hesitate to believe that once the total uniformity of political thought has been achieved, the de Tocquevillian mildness will also come to the fore. It is quite possible that we shall see in thirty years a Nazi Parliament with ten different Nazi parties all believing in the Nazi essentials. A gentle, soft pressure from above, as it has been so well described in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*, and a thoroughly Nazified society would keep all "restless" elements in line.[273]

The Anglo-Saxon powers thus have to fight an enemy still in the process of transformation. This is certainly an advantage in wartime. And the only real potential ally in the Germanies at a time when the hardships of war are not strongly and generally felt will be exactly the "exceptional" people, those who on account of their intelligence, personality, faith, or tradition could not have been assimilated or leveled. These are a minority and the sooner the belligerents realize that it is not the herdist, the mass man, who suffers in a superdemocratic ochlocracy, but the "outstanding man," the better for them. It must be kept in mind that it is not the railroad conductor and the employee of the gas works who in a plebiscitarian dictatorship goes slowly to pieces but the philosopher, the writer, the

sensitive, creative artist, the educator, the priest, who have to stand the strain, who feel the chains. It is for the better and braver part of these that the present crusade should be waged. The masses are often satisfied if they can eat, work, and sleep. Intellectual freedom has little meaning for them one way or the other.

The question must clearly be faced whether this is an aristocratic or a democratic war; whether one should shoulder arms in order to give freedom to an aristocracy of intellect, conviction, and spirit or whether one has decided to die for the ballot of Herr Kunz or Herr Kraus, who may vote another Hitler into power if they fear for their pocketbook or regular employment. America may be far quicker in understanding these issues than the outsider is ready to believe. It is of little importance that America at present has less of a *visible* tradition than Europe and a smaller intellectual aristocracy, but in no country in the world is there such furious hunger for cultural and intellectual values, such craving for true personality and the dignity of the human person, such worshipful seeking for the beautiful things of life. America will understand. . . .

This present war is not fought between one group of countries which is "enlightened" and another one which wants to "put the clock back" but between a coalition which stands for Liberty (and Soil) and another one which proclaims Equality-Identity (and Blood). It is a struggle between Patriotism (represented by the United Nations) and Nationalism-Racialism (represented by the Axis).

Such a world-wide issue can nevertheless hardly manifest itself in absolute, unequivocal purity. The Allied Nations in the last war fought against the Central Powers in the name of "Progress" versus "Reaction"; today this chronological order has been reversed. It is Washington and London who represent the conservative trend, it is Berlin which became the synthesis of unbridled and uninhibited technical and biological "modernity." Where then stands Russia? The USSR stands on exactly the same spot as Imperial Russia in 1914. The Russian Emperor was, in World War I, the ally of the Third French Republic and of Liberal England. No ideological affinity then united the Winter Palace with the Pantheon; and today there is hardly a rainbow bridge between the Kremlin, the Liberty Bell and Buckingham Palace. The war between the Germans and Russians was and is a people's war; the war between the Axis and the Anglo-Saxons

was and is a deep ideological "discussion" fought out by arms. There are not two, but *three* wars going on: one in the Pacific, one in the Atlantic, and a third one in the Sarmathian Plains.

Yet while it is none too easy to understand the issues at stake in the present war, it is even more difficult to envisage the future if the powers of good will are victors in the struggle. What sort of political order should be established in Europe and especially in Central Europe? And again, what kind of higher political order should be established with the purpose of conferring at least a minimum of peace and comfort on the desperate, confused, bewildered, and misguided peoples of Europe? These are two separate problems, yet they are closely interrelated. The coming order in Central Europe is of the utmost importance to the entire Continent for the very simple reason that it is the heart of the western section of the Old World, of the European peninsula of Eurasia. *And as long as we continue to consider the Atlantic rim of Europe as the only true and integral part of Christian civilization, and all countries east of the Rhine merely as an approximation to Asiatic "barbarism," no lasting and constructive reorientation and reorganization of the war-torn Continent is feasible or possible*.

It will be absolutely necessary to go back courageously to old, very old, patterns and take at the same time precautions that a process of disintegration and wrong herdist reconstruction, as we have witnessed it in the past 300 years, will be avoided. It is a solid First Reich or something similar to it which must be revived.

Yet there seems to be one school among western "statesmen" which wants to make good the mistakes of 1919 by re-creating the Austro-Hungarian monarchy of old and carving up the Germanies. The dangerous aspect of such an enterprise lies in the fact that this arrangement could easily be carried out once the Third Reich has broken down. There would be then, more than ever, an extreme dislike for the Prussianized Germans in Austria, and German national sentiments would be at a low ebb in Vienna and the Alps. The Germans themselves, after a crushing defeat, would become the victims of one of their typical fits of bitter melancholy, self-denunciation, self-hatred, and apathy. All those who would come under the rule of indigenous princes and princelets would be happy to be at least not

under Polish or direct Allied control. Yet what would happen in another twenty or thirty years? We know from experience that no peace arrangement is lasting if it relies on brutal force except, of course, in the case of total extirpation of the conquered race.

The time would come when the individual German rulers — or petty parliaments — would be looked at as servile agents of a hated group of alien enemies; a new wave of hitherto unknown nationalistic ideologies would sweep the Germanies, a new Hitler might arise and unite the separated countries in a new, terrible, centralistic, and herdist concentration. There is little one could do against such a process short of new bloodshed; and the military help granted by the Allies to their helpmates inside the Germanies would change the contempt for the petty monarchs and other representatives of the bad cause to boiling hatred resulting in perpetual tension. A similar situation might even arise in Austria, where some uneasiness for the suffering of the once so hated blood brothers in the divided Germanies would revive the always latent German sentiment.

It would be quite incorrect to attribute German sentiment in Austria to a frantic herdism on account of the *common language* — which, after all, is also the "uniting bond" between Yorkshire and Liberia. There are undoubtedly such primitive Austrians who base their German feelings on herdist principles only. There are others — equally shortsighted — who oppose this herdism by just another one, emphasizing the *"dividing* differences" in the cultural and sentimental domain. But there is also a minority — and minorities often are "aristocracies" — which still cultivates the tradition of the First Reich. These do not respect in the Habsburgs the rulers of Austria but the descendants of *the* emperors, who did not develop that amazing inferiority complex toward the Prussians that some "Little Austrians" have nursed. Nor could it be a difficult task to dominate these fiery, German-speaking Slavs who are such excellent fighters in uniform but such docile subjects in mufti.

The tradition of the First Reich is far older, greater, and nobler than the Imperial Austrian tradition dating back only to 1806, and although not derived from the French Revolution, yet still of the same age if not younger. To compare the First Reich with the Austrian Imperial idea means to compare the dry and worn-out bureaucratism of Francis Joseph with the

universality and knightly grandeur of Maximilian I, Charles V, Ferdinand II, or Maria Theresa.

The main argument for a one-sided revival of the Danubian Monarchy, or a South-German "Catholic" solution, is usually based upon a deep mistrust toward the Prussians (who, incidentally, must be re-educated in the European manner and tradition). Uniting Southern Germany with little Austria or even with a greater Austrian empire, leaving the North independent under the leadership of Berlin, a city with less cultural tradition than Baltimore or Charleston, would establish a focus for herdism, an almost purely Protestant platform for the basest phenomena of technicism, nationalism, militarism, or perhaps even an extremely apt steppingstone for a new type of Bolshevism in Central Europe. Yet northeastern Germany must be placed under the benevolent but nevertheless methodical control by the rest of Germany. People in the northeast (and this would include Saxony and Thuringia) must be trained again to enjoy their meager personalities and to value originality above uniformity.

The New-Old Reich has to be a realm with a Catholic majority and a Catholic leadership.[274] American and British non-Catholics must remember that Protestantism in the Germanies stood for all the ideas which they so intensely dislike. Even such a severe and implacable critic of Catholicism as Dean Inge had to acknowledge — in an article written seven years ago in the *Evening Standard* — that the British get on best with the Bavarians and the Austrians on account of their "Gothic" spirit. There is very little of this spirit in the military training fields of Tempelhof or the factories of Herr Krupp von Bohlen. What cultured Britisher, American, or Netherlander did not feel more at home in Vienna than in Berlin, in the Tyrol than in Pomerania, in Cologne than in Stettin? It is exactly the cultured spirit of the Catholic Germanies which must be helped by the Allies to regain its old and dominating position. One must pray to God (and hope against hope, cynics would say) that the men of Washington and London in responsible positions will know what they have to do when they have an opportunity to act and to decide.

Modern wars end *necessarily* with some sort of revolution on the side of the defeated; a government which has emphasized over a long period that it was fighting a righteous crusade cannot possibly sit down at the same table

with the enemy, who during the hostilities was depicted as the very personification of Satan. It must either abdicate or will be swept away by a revolt — a revolt of the masses, a revolt of the army, or a rebellion of the upper classes, in order to make peace arrangements possible.* No Nazi and no member of the British parties, as we know them, could ever sit together in conference. Francis Joseph could say in 1859, "I lost a battle and I pay with a province." Such a "traitorous" attitude would be unthinkable today. Progressive nations have to bleed to death in their wars. *Rulers* felt that they had to be sparing with the lives of their subjects, but *leaders* have the marvelous excuse that they are nothing but executors of the general will.

If and when the Third Reich goes the way of all flesh, it may be that the revolt will be engineered by the upper classes or the army. If the rising comes from the lower classes, then it will be inspired by none of the better known leftist ideologies. It will be a revolution with anarchistic leanings, a revolution for revolution's sake. Such a situation cannot last forever. There is no such thing as a revolution in permanence. Order will be asked for and we stand under no illusion that a revival of the First Reich will be extremely popular from the outset. The lower classes may even ignore the very meaning of a *Sacrum Imperium*, yet a country after a defeat, tired of a war, is like wax and it depends largely upon those who enact the great historic return whether they will make a success of the restoration or a failure like the Stuarts and Bourbons.

Any revival of nineteenth-century Parliamentarianism should also be out of the question. It would merely give the mob another chance to vote for another Holy Roller with a Chaplin moustache. The New First Reich must also be necessarily based on monarchical principles. This is the only way we can avoid the dangers of parliamentarianism without anchored safeguards in the heart of Europe, the danger whose real name is "party dictatorship."[275] Neither, of course, should the absolutistic monarchy of the seventeenth century be revived. In some respects the governmental forms have to be taken from medieval patterns *without its feudal elements*. An opinionating body of a corporative character freely elected is not less necessary than a first-rate administrative officialdom. But all these externals will work only if society itself is transformed on personalistic and

hierarchical lines by a revolution from above. Personality, person, and personalism must again become the keynote of European culture and quality triumph over quantity.[276] But all this is possible only if a fundamental change, a real μετάνοια. of all Europe takes place. The love for the "nearer home," the *engere Heimat*, must again be cultivated and supplant the senseless worship of impressive "national" statistics. It is self-evident that these changes cannot be imposed without a far-reaching re-education of the masses and a true revolution "from above." Already Constantin Frantz, the apostle of German federalism, emphasized that true federalism presupposed a change of culture, of education, of mentality.*

There is nothing inferior or degrading in "local patriotism," so much frowned upon or ridiculed by the mammoth nationalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. All these revolutionary changes (revolutionary only for the urban elements and not the peasantry) must be based upon the right answer of the great, fundamental question: *"What is man?"*

It is also the very order of "consciences" and allegiances which must be reversed in a revolutionary way. (Without this revolution no fundamental reconstruction of the Old World is possible.) Today to belong to a people of eighty millions means "everything"; to be a member of a community, "little"; to be a human being — "nothing." Our worship of quantity subordinates man to society, state, nation, race, which, after all, must all remain abstractions which may or may not be legitimate.

It cannot be emphasized often enough that the abolition of parliamentary government does not mean that the dignity of man will not be respected any more. Neither can it be maintained that the insipid counting of noses, which degraded the human person to a mere voting animal,* was a personalist feature of the past one hundred years. A freer atmosphere should liberate the people from the control of their neighbors, and laws will be enacted guaranteeing the *civil liberties*. The defense of these essential liberties (*whose importance for the well-being of a self-respecting nation cannot be overemphasized*) should be vested in the person of the monarch who is also the guardian of the constitution. In the religious ceremony of the coronation the monarch will have to promise to watch over the constitution, the civil rights, and liberties under an oath given to God and the nation.

The constitution also provides for an independent judiciary system and for a supreme court. There will be all due liberty of the press, of speech, and organization. Everybody will be free to criticize the political decisions, the legislation, the administration. The intolerance toward criticism is the certain sign of characteriological inferiority.** It is the masses and the mass man that cannot bear contradiction. (Hitler is a very good example of the monologizing "one way" mobmaster.) The idea of "His Majesty's most loyal opposition" is as old as monarchy itself. The leader of the opposition in the British parliament does not receive a salary for nothing. The first paid (artificial) opposition were the jesters at the royal courts of Europe. Their cruel criticisms were borne with equanimity. But on the other hand, the laymen, the masses of innocent ignorants, will have to come to terms with the experts. Everybody has a moral right to criticize a house, but the building of a house can nevertheless be trusted only to an architect. *And politics are an art as difficult, and as public, as architecture*.

Provisions will also have to be taken to prevent the bureaucracy from becoming a soulless, arrogant caste. The officials remain, in spite of the fact that they are *not* executors of the "general will," but independent experts, basically servants of the people and advisers of the monarch. The opinionating, corporative parliament which represents naked *interests* and not parties can protest the cast and proposals of the legislative-administrative officialdom; dependent upon the nature of the protested object, it is either the supreme court or the monarch with his crown council (the government) that are going to act as arbiters and to decide to what extent public opinion or group interests should be taken into consideration *or* overruled.

The parliaments of yesterday represented vague agglomerations of political *"persuasions"* and the very system is based upon the belief that administration and legislation are easily separable elements. Yet they are not. Still there are many people who will not agree with this statement.[277*a*] Legislation and administration are like architect and contractor. Yet the architect is the learned expert, while the contractor is only a skilled foreman of workers. The old parliamentary system put the experts in the administration and the foreman in the designing job. It is an order which in Europe could not last.

The preceding statements seem to betray an extraordinary faith in the Germans.* Yet all these questions are not questions of faith but of feasibility and expediency. It is a geographical fact that the Germans live in the heart of Europe and there is every indication that they have a "central" character. The Nazi claim that Germany alone can be the point of gravity of Europe is perfectly justified, but it is equally true that their ideology is the very last which could facilitate this mission. It is one of the *fausses idées claires* that Europe can be united only by conquest and the National Socialists fell for it. Yet it is equally true that Europe cannot "escape" the Germans and the Germans will never and can never give up to formulate a *Reichsidee*, an imperial idea. If this idea is spiritual, Europe may benefit from it, if the idea is materialistic, Europe will suffer atrociously. One cannot be happy and healthy if one's heart is diseased.

The Germans (like the Jews) are in their ubiquity everywhere in Europe. The thrones of England, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, Holland,** Belgium, Russia,*** Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, Hungary have been occupied by Germans. Fragments of Germans live as far as Reval and the Alsace, Heligoland and the Lower Volga. One cannot escape them. To omit them in calculations is folly. And to think that they will calm down and become "ordinary people" betrays ignorance. They must have a mission which is not materialistic and a spiritual mission cannot be invented on a green table. It can only be a revival or a continuation from past memories. The Fourth Reich will be the continuation of the First Reich or it will be thoroughly and restlessly diabolic.****

Against these proposals most progressive people will bring up the objection that one cannot "turn the clock back." This is only partly true. A photographic copy of the past is impossible. Nobody would advise a woman to dress in the style of 1926, but it is nowadays quite smart to imitate the fashions of 1860. If one turns the clock back it must be done in a dynamic, spectacular, and breath-taking way. What is true of sartorial vogues is equally true of political fashions. Nothing could be more childish than to turn Europe's clock back to 1926. *The supine effort to oppose National Socialism* (*or communism*) *with "democracy" is as hopeless as it would have been 150 years ago to combat the radical Jacobins with some sort of flabby Girondism*. In a struggle against a revolutionary idea it is only possible to use ideological elements which are a thousand times more

radical, or adopt principles which represent a total reaction against them. (Every effort to fight a certain stage of a revolution with its elements of a previous stage would be thoroughly abortive.) Yet neither Washington nor London can, ought, and will be more progressive than Berlin (by advocating, for instance, the sterilization of all men and women with dark eyes), and thus the only alternative remaining is to have recourse to a sound and courageous medievalism.[277b].

We have to give thanks to the Holy Ghost that the Atlantic Charter did not repeat the Wilsonian nonsense of a world safe for democracy, and that the two aristocrats who met off Newfoundland pledged their countries merely to the defeat of National Socialism and the establishment of forms of government appealing to the nobler sides of human nature. A definite danger lurks in the possibility of the "progressive" elements of England and America increasing unduly their influence mainly at the time of the peace conferences. It will then be the Girondists of London, Washington (and Paris) who will win this war technically, yet a *revolutionary* war technically won and morally lost is in reality a total defeat and nothing else but a preparation for World War III.

The present war is a revolutionary war, more so than World War I. European history since the French Revolution is largely a series of revolutions, reactions, counterrevolutions, and counterreactions, where naked and veiled ideologies clash in furious attacks. The tragic aspect of the present situation lies in the fact that in spite of the many valuable ideas afloat in Anglo-Saxon countries there is very little of the Catholic and Continental tradition, very little of pure spirituality and conservative mentality. In the Catholic countries themselves the positive tradition is far richer and personal culture more Catholic, but the respective political machineries are either hopelessly pagan or even more hopelessly compromised from the (not yet entirely unimportant) point of view of honor. Catholic government in Europe is confined to the *balcão aberto sôbre o infinito** — Portugal. Franco's foreign policy has until now kept neutral. Everything else has been crushed, destroyed, wiped out. Thus all the hope rests with a mixture of Canterbury, Wall Street, the London *Times*, Serbian guerrillas, the foreign office, the Eight Points of the Atlantic Charter, and the Moderator of the Free Churches in Britain. In such a

situation the Catholic's duty is primarily to pray to the Holy Ghost that he may enlighten those who will be responsible for the order in Europe after an Allied victory.

Not only a new order in Central Europe but also a new order in Christendom is necessary. It would be a waste of time to discuss any real order *outside* of Christendom, because such a thing is genuinely inconceivable. We have spoken already about the defects of the old League of Nations (p. 152 ff.). It is evident that only nations accepting the basic theistic principles can be members. A League of Nations without a common positive creed could never accomplish anything worth while — just like a parliament divided by basic philosophies. The only uniting bond in the old league was the vague philosophizing of "modern man" — the "good pagan" — who dislikes wars because they are expensive and spread death — and death, we must not forget, is the supreme catastrophe for the atheist. A new League of Nations should be a regular congress of the Christian monarchs and heads of nations with their ministers in a place of great and ancient Christian tradition — in Aix-la-Chapelle, in Rome, in Canterbury, in Jerusalem. A league of the very heads of the states will also be more efficient than a league of mere representatives of easily changeable parliamentary governments. The conventions of the kings, the emperor, and the presidents of the few republics would also have a greater symbolic effect upon the nations who will increasingly feel the uniting power of Christendom.

Last not least — the most important feature of a well-established and (nationally as well as internationally) recognized monarchy should not be forgotten — legitimacy. Without legitimacy it is impossible to imagine the binding power of agreements, of stability, and peace.[278]

It will be possible that a few flag-waving mob masters will protest against their "unpatriotic" monarchs and the "new clericalism." But outside the *terra firma* of Christian principles we are nothing else but a pack of hungry and greedy wolves who devour each other in times of hunger and emergency; no "Sunday meditation" of any modern "Ethical Society" will be able to change that. Europe as a coherent and cooperating continent can only be rebuilt on the same philosophical and religious doctrine, and the

Cross is, after all, the sole uniting reality between Iceland and Sicily, between Portugal and Finland. The blood relationship of monarchs in that union is simply an additional material ligament, and their status of anointed Christian monarchs a further spiritual bond.[279]

There are yet still a few dreamers who want to restore a human order along the old lines of ochlocracy, mass terror, anthropocentrism, and a humanitarian pan-Fascism. In 1940 a book was put on the market, written by a few charlatans and a couple of men who, one would be tempted to say, should know better — the *City of Man*. The title itself betrayed the anthropocentricity of the whole program and there is little doubt that the title meant it to be in contradiction to St. Augustine's *Civitas Dei*. The confusion in some pages should not mislead the reader in underestimating the symptomatic significance of that slender volume. If the writers say that: "Democracy is nothing more and nothing less than humanism in theocracy and rational theocracy in universal humanism,"* they only testify to the fact that they overhastily consulted Webster's dictionary. But slogans like "Everything within humanity, nothing against humanity, nothing outside humanity"** show where the sources of their ideas lie; here we find a shameless adaptation of Mussolini's "Everything within the state, nothing outside the state, everything for the state." When the writers permit the existence of religious teachings in so far as they represent "Vernaculars of the democratic religion" they imitate Hitler, who dreams of making Christianity subservient to the state and its dynamic ideology, or Napoleon, who regretted his "concessions" to the Church not less than his illustrious epigone.[280] The sacred conviction that man is the center of the cosmos will always lead to the creation of ideologies which may differ in name yet show the same characteristics, the same tendencies, the same inhuman humanitarianism. The *City of Man* proves this without the slightest doubt.[281]

It certainly will not be easy to demand from victorious nations, as well as from those who have suffered at the hands of the Germans in the most ignominious way, that they conclude a peace without material gains and without the element of revenge. When the next peace will have to be signed, the great western cities may lie in ashes and the masses of the

people will be imbued with a terrific hatred against a nation which had spread or provoked such horrible destruction.

Grant God that the Anglo-Saxon nations will be led at that time by statesmen, and not by politicians, who will have the honesty and the will power to dissociate themselves from that great anonymous monster, Public Opinion.[282] They will be asked nothing more, nothing less than to assist the German people in finding their better self again, and with Christian charity to aid them in building a lasting house.

In this specific case we have to remember the Latin proverb: *fiat iustitia pereat mundus*. It is not naked justice in a legalistic sense or righteousness only which can help Europe, but wisdom, knowledge, and charity.[283] If a rigid and formal justice be applied, the doom of Europe would actually be sealed.*

Yet here we cannot omit a consideration of the moral order. We have to ask ourselves whether the Atlantic nations would have acted more bravely under similar circumstances than the Germans. Would they have offered more determined resistance if they had fallen into the hands of powerful ochlocratic dictators — or would they have kept their mouths shut, trembling for their individual, physical, and financial security? It is highly probable that the fear of poverty, the fear of death and of physical torture would have prevented any active resistance in the great urban centers. Courage is, at any rate, a rare virtue.[284] Yet determined small minorities can easily overpower the modern state and the modern city. Five thousand determined men could completely paralyze the ten million inhabitants of New York by blasting the gas works, electricity plants, and the water supply. There is, under such circumstances, no other "hope" for the straphanger than to get a mild, charitable master instead of a brutal tyrant.

Yet the demands on the victors unquestionably remain extreme in their nature. The alternatives are either an angelic charity or final doom in World War III. There is no other choice. Situations where a human person can choose only between two extremes sometimes do arise. A crusader caught by the "Assassins" and asked to renounce his faith or to die under the most terrible tortures had of a sudden the sole choice of either becoming a great saint-martyr or else offending God beyond imagination. In such a case there

is no medium between mortal sin and supreme sanctity. And if the United Nations win they will be faced by a similar alternative.

There is also the problem of the arrangements to be made outside of the Germanies. It matters very little what the local majorities of the Central and Eastern Europeans think at the present moment or at the time of the termination of the war. Of all fantasmagories ever invented, the "self-determination of nations" is one of the most fatal propositions. "Self-determination" led to National Socialism, "self-determination" was responsible for the most fantastic borders ever conceived in Europe. Plebiscites are, after all, nothing but lay opinions based on mere likes and dislikes. They rarely bring happy solutions.

Neither will it be easy to engineer a lasting restoration, even if it is based on a great tradition. Restorations were singularly unsuccessful in history, yet there is no reason why one should succumb to a historical fatalism. The memory of Hitler will doubtless cause certain difficulties. It is the impending great tragedy written all over his face which partly explains the magnetism of his personality. It would be a dangerous illusion to underestimate his present popularity even among people who heartily detest the system he represents. There is little doubt that the downfall of National Socialism will bring about a low in the Hitler cult, but nevertheless, after his death, his person will be surrounded by the same strange, mystic glory which was spun around the great Corsican. Ignorant people probably will continue to see in him their hero, who was finally betrayed, sold, overpowered by his enemies. Hitler will become another Michael Kohlhaas, a German Pugatshov, the dreamer and schemer surging from the depths of the nation and reaching madly for the sun. . . .

One should certainly not have too many illusions about the results of the changes brought by a new-old order; it will never bring a millennium of perfect human happiness. Human life is always and under all circumstances a march through a valley of tears. Bossuet's words, *"La vie d'un chrétien n'est qu'un pélérinage; notre domicile est ailleurs,"* should always be borne in mind. Yet the *traditional* order may be instrumental in restoring the dignity of the human beings that have suffered so bitterly under all sorts of "progressive" systems, from Robespierre to Dewey. History since the Crucifixion has become predominantly the record of a chain of attacks and defenses against and for human dignity and personality. This human dignity

is fundamentally connected with the God-man who suffered the most humiliating death on the martyr-instrument for common criminals, but who rose triumphantly from the grave. Thus the cross became the joyful symbol for man, that image of God. Whosoever attacks the Cross also attacks mankind. The powers of darkness who attack and degrade the human personality and its sacred uniqueness, are also out to deny and to eradicate the Cross.

There are forces engaged in this war which have adopted the diabolical plan to put the docile ant in place of the Image of God possessing free will. These forces must be defeated. Yet the issue and the goal must be clearly before all our eyes. There is not only an external front in this war — a front with trenches, a front in the air, on the sea, in the deserts of Africa, and the jungles of Asia, but also an inner front. We must not forget that for every right-thinking man or woman on the wrong side, there is a wrong-thinking person on this side. Thoughts, ideas, philosophies, religions have no clearly defined geographical borders.

If those with the wrong conceptions already living in a pre-Nazi stage of development will get the upper hand, then the war will be morally lost as a foregone conclusion. If the goal of Britain and America would actually be a conglomeration of "making Europe safe for democracy," "economical competition," "decent business dealing," "more colonies, cash, and a return to Geneva," then we better all go to bed, switch out the light, and pull the sheets over our heads. Neither with such "democracy" nor with nationalism or any other herdism can we survive. A supranational order with material safeguards must be established. The words of Myerezhkovski, written after the last war, must be constantly remembered:

> What is the meaning of the world-wide catastrophe, by which mankind is now affected, the political, economical, social and cultural destruction of Europe? Why are there after the world war no victors and no vanquished? Why is even victory worse than defeat?

Russian Bolshevism and Polish Messianism answers these questions in a seemingly identical way; from the category of nationalistic existence mankind, to save itself, must evolve inevitably into a form of supranational existence. Once the nations lived freely in the national form of their existence and developed their nationality; now they die and suffocate in

them. These forms were once diapers, but now they have become shrouds. Mankind will either be buried in them in order to decay or it will throw them off like Lazarus rising from the dead.

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* Yet even the argument used by Ferdinand Lundberg in *America's Sixty Families*, is not conclusive.

** As to World War I and its supposedly economic background see Sidney Fay, *Origins of the World War*, New York, 1938, p. 46.

* *Temporary* betrayals of tenets of the National Socialist ideology should surprise nobody; a materialistic (and utilitarian) philosophy has not the same sense of honor as a religion or a metaphysical *Weltanschauung*. Communism also indulged in compromises like the N.E.P. under Lenin or the Russo-German military alliance against Poland; arrangements *ad hoc*.

** Many Russians, among them Dimitri Myerezhkovski, speak about the Third Russian Empire. The First Empire they consider to be the Kievian and early Muscovite Russia (Svyataya Russ); the Second Empire the Westernized, shallow Russia of Peter the Great (Rossiya); and the Third Empire the Soviet Union (Sovyetzkiy Soyuz). The first Empire was (as in Germany) primarily religious, whereas the third one is merely a gross exaggeration of the second one which already had departed from the right way.

The Second Empire is a break with the tradition (on account of the petrinian reformation), yet the third one is an almost inevitable consequence of western, identitarian "isms" of which Panslavism was the most spectacular preparation.

* Germany is officially still a *Republic;* the Weimar Constitution has, in spite of numerous "amendments," never been formally abrogated.

* Guglielmo Ferrero describes the necessity for a revolution as a terminating point of a war in his volume *Peace and War*, New York, 1933, pp. 60–61.

* *Deutschland und der Föderalismus*, Stuttgart-Berlin, 1921, pp. 36–37.

* The Germans call him *Stimmvieh*.

** The greatest mistakes ecclesiastic authorities committed at various times were prompted by a wrong evaluation of the liberty of thought. They naturally never committed the monumental error of "liberal" relativists to despair in the respective existence of truth and untruth; if Catholicism is right Protestantism must be wrong and vice versa. The reason why untruth can ever be tolerated (tolerated, not accepted) must be found in the mysterious laws of thoughts and ideas, not in the relativism of complacent agnostics; neither is Truth able to take care of herself (as some optimists invariably believe) nor does Truth thrive under eternal vigilance, protection, and a system of enforcement. Truth then degenerates to commonplace, it loses its appeal, its inner dynamism, its luster and brilliancy (for which it needs a dark background). Human beings are then finally brought to resent truth and the forbidden fruits of untruth begin to taste sweeter than ever.

Uremy is the result of the degeneration of the *glomeruli*, tiny agents which transports the poisons of the body to the kidneys whence they are eliminated. Once the glomeruli cease to function the body dies of an inner poisoning. The Middle Ages died from such a uremic process. People remained *intra muros* through indifference or out of fear, heretical ideas spread because they had the mystical magnetism of the appeal from the tree in paradise. Error has certainly no *right* to exist; if it is tolerated it should certainly not be for its own sake, but for the sake of its poor bearer and for the sake

of Truth which will shine in a light more brilliant if its sinister counterpart has not been meticulously eradicated.

* It is interesting to see where a consequential belief in "democratic" principles finally led to. Professor Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, an ardent German "democrat," arrived at an almost complete denial of his own nation, a blank despair about its misdeeds, and a furious denunciation of its recent aberrations. He is today not only an exile from Germany but even a voluntary exile of the German people. No German Conservative, however, anti-Nazi, will share his opinion; for a Christian Conservative, the masses of every country are made up by more or less goodhearted and more or less well-intentioned people without any sense of political responsibility and a total ignorance of political facts. To accuse *nations* (*not* leaders or governments) is the hallmark of the demo-nationalist of the nineteenth or twentieth centuries; it leads to endless hatreds, feelings of revenge, misunderstandings, and frictions. It is the surest guarantee for perpetual mass wars.

** House of Nassau-Oranje; Princess Juliana's father was Prince of Mecklenburg.

*** House of Holstein-Gottorp (not Romanov) since the days of Peter III.

**** The relatively soundest proposition of what to do with Germany after the war had been given by Captain Alan Graham, M.P., in *After the War* (a symposium of peace aims edited by William Teeling, London, 1940). Captain Graham knows at least all the premises, but his deductions are influenced by the fact that he had to reckon with France as a partner on the conference table at the time when he wrote his essay.

* "The balcony opening on the infinite," overlooking the sea.

* Page 33.

** Page 34.

* Cf. Gábor de Rónay's article in the *Catholic World*, September, 1941.

III

ODDS AND ENDS

"The genuine Whig was a conservative, for he rested his claims on the ancient Constitution of the Kingdom."
— A. Carthill, *The Legacy of Liberalism*.

POLITICAL concepts do often have paradoxical elements in them. In the realm of pure logic two contradictory statements have no place side by side if they claim both to conform to the truth. Yet nations have paradoxical characters and survive; constitutions have paradoxical and contradictory provisions and harmonize if not in theory yet in practice. The rigidity of a powerful officialdom and liberty (relative liberty, of course) are not incompatible. Neither is it true that a power unchecked has a "natural" tendency to ask for more and more prerogatives until it develops into absolute tyranny. Fathers, for instance, do not *increase* (or try to increase) their hold upon their children from year to year, neither do teachers or professors become more tyrannical with advancing age. The automatic desire for more power is only apparent in children, primitives, people of low character or intellect; for the superior man, power is like a cross, duty a burden, responsibility an obligation. And it is usually the *uncertainty* of power which creates in the people wielding it, the desire to increase it. The man who has his powers guaranteed will more rarely abuse them than the man to whom prerogatives are given only for a short while. The psychological reasons for such an attitude are obvious. We need not discuss them.

As we have accepted the machine age with its implications we must also accede to the most important implication: regulation — regulation by a "bureaucracy." Technicism is a monster like a tiger which one might keep like a pet as long as it is young, but when this beast comes of age a muzzle is necessary, if not a cage. There is not the slightest doubt that social legislation is an insidious thing and a further step toward artificiality and dependency,[285] but what can one do in the dangerous stone and brick deserts of the big cities, what can one do in this age of birth control, when old people can hardly rely on a numerous progeny for support. The "organic" alternative of enforced conception through coercive laws will scarcely bring more liberty.

The bright side in the establishment of a good civil service would be the establishment of a new (and if we are lucky) competent and clean-handed aristocracy.[286] One must not believe with Carthill that an aristocracy, once dead, cannot be revived again.[287] But one thing seems quite certain that there is not great hope in the United States of a revitalization of the present aristocracy which is, with a few noble exceptions, too deeply imbued with the mammonistic spirit. The post 1850 element is too strong. This new administrative aristocracy must be carefully built up from new elements which ought to be integrated regardless of their social background. Quality should be the only criterion. And all precautions should be taken that this new class retains its elasticity which distinguished the aristocracy of Britain and America, always so willing to absorb deserving, valuable new elements.*

A "bureaucracy" (an officialdom of high accomplishment) is naturally disliked by an ochlocratic society which prefers to believe in the success of the amateur and the divine inspirations of the "average man."[288] But the process of (organically co-ordinated) specialization and the final victory of quality over quantity can only be postponed but not delayed forever. It is one of the great ironies of modern, ochlocratic civilization that it annihilates its own primeval forms. Banking, manufacturing, trading, and industrialism which helped to destroy the privileges of the nobility and clergy and furthered the cause of leveling and collectivization finally created a small "managerial" group which may be the aristocracy of tomorrow.**

It is then natural that the nation should look *up* to their legislators and administrators who are part of the nation yet should have risen to their positions, thanks to their intelligence, industry, and achievements, and not due to their popularity.* There should be a certain *pietas* (respectful love, in the Latin sense) which should exist between those in power and office and those profiting from his efforts. This feeling must be *mutual*. It is more easily developed in monarchies where one and the same family rules a country for centuries and traditions are added to a personal sentiment. There is something slightly shocking and undignified in seeing the people in the cinema booing their President; one feels there must be something wrong with the popular concept of the office. It is odd that every servant who had served well and faithfully can hope to be retained, and every employee would be outraged if on principle one would "give him the sack" after a couple of years. Not so the President. He is suspected *eo ipso* of becoming, after a couple of years, a potential tyrant and the absolute belief in the absolute corrupting effect of power or of the public office is apparent. But as only the inferior man is corrupted by power (the Church elects for life the Supreme Vicar of Christ), the suspicion is implicitly expressed that the President is a man of minor character. One of the main reasons for the lowering of the general respect for the office of the President may lie in the fact that the modus of his election has been considerably "democratized." We have still the fiction of electors and it is still possible that a *minority* of votes determines who is going to be President; but since the days of Andrew Jackson the electors have ceased to function like an independent conclave and today they feel themselves bound to vote for the candidate.** A monarch on the other hand is not chosen or created; he is born into his office. He is a king, begotten so by his parents (*cum auxilio Dei*), and thus a "fatality" and nobody's free choice. He may be popular or unpopular; nobody is responsible for him.

It is humanly often more agreeable to be under a completely unpopular king than under a man who is the neighbor's choice and the representative of a hostile political philosophy. Thus a President represents legally the nation, i.e., the citizens. A traditional king represented a *country* and not a nation. The king of France was "France" and the king of Denmark just "Denmark." Only at a later historical period do we get such plebiscitarian dynasties as the "kings of the Belgians" or the "czars of the Bulgars." Hitler

is similarly the "leader of the German people" and that makes it worse. *Paradoxically as it sounds, liberties are always more threatened by "leaders" than by "rulers."*

If the proverbial man of the planet Mars would come to this earth and inquire about the difference between "leader" and "ruler" he would learn that "rulers" are strange people who dressed in ermine, wore crowns, married foreign women, kept strictly to themselves, and had the inclination to administer the country without asking the people about their wishes. A "leader," on the other hand, he would be told, is a regular fellow in a simple uniform who embodies his nation, who tries desperately to create by propaganda complete unison between his ideas and the people. A leader, he might hear, was a local boy who made good, who spoke everybody's language, who never traveled abroad and disliked titles and royal paraphernalia. Our man from Mars would probably utter his delight with the institution of leaders but in practice, he would soon learn, the individual's advantage lay the other way round. If somebody had a quarrel during the Middle Ages with a monarch it was an affair between him and his ruler. If one has a "fight" with a president one not only opposes him personally but more than 50 per cent of one's fellow citizens who voted for him and are — politically — his kinsmen. It is even worse, and more dangerous, if one attacks a leader[289] who is the very personification of the masses;[290] in that case one is up against the whole mob and becomes automatically a "traitor"; not only the police will be on one's heels, but the organized and enthusiastic masses and that is the end of all individuality and of all liberty.[291]

The European tradition in government demanded a separate head of the state and another one for the government. The head of the government was always exposed to criticism. The head of the state was sacrosanct. In republics he was elected by the parliaments,* in monarchies it was the ruler himself. And the strength of the ruler lay in the fact that he belonged to no party, no race, no class.[292] He was, as we emphasized it, of mixed racial descent. He might favor temporarily one party or the other but he owed allegiance to none. A president, even an ideal one, is usually the member of a party, the representative of a mere majority, a definite member of a

definite class. All that hampers, destroys, and cancels the element of *pietas*. A monarchy has the advantage that it contains *pietas* as well as love. To make such postulates is not ridiculous sentimentality; there is no worthwhile thing in this world (or the other) without love and to build our existence and our society upon mere laws and regulations is inhuman. Only an explosive motor or a locomotive functions under physical and chemical laws. Society and state should be much more than a functional institution. . . .

The man who can sway the masses is ordinarily their embodiment. The enthusiasm of the masses for him is then in most cases only a love of themselves. In the framework of a megalopolitan civilization such a man ought to belong to the middle classes. He should be a symbol of averageness, joviality, strength, and success. If America would have been really as ochlocratic as some people maintain, President Roosevelt would not have had a chance to defeat Mr. Willkie in the last elections. But the romantic sentiment as well as the craving for security of the helpless urban masses worked the miracle; the Hudson Valley Squire triumphed over the "local boy who made good." (And it may be that the southern votes for Mr. Roosevelt had a deeper symbolic value than just the age-old protest against northern Republicanism.)

Yet the case of Hitler is more complicated than all that. He is not only an "embodiment" or a "personification," but he has also a demoniacal quality which is lacking either in Mussolini or Stalin.*

Goethe in his *Dichtung und Wahrheit* (Book XX) described with various exaggerations a man of his type when he wrote:

The demoniacal element has the most terrifying aspects if it is strongly represented in a human being. I had during my lifetime the occasion to observe such men partly from a distance partly from an immediate nearness. These men are not always brilliant persons and they distinguish themselves neither by their intellectual capacities, nor by their talents and least by their kindness, yet they emanate a terrific magnetic force and they exert an incredible power over all creatures and even over the elements [!]. Who can tell how far their influence goes? All the united moral forces are powerless against them and the more intelligent part of humanity tries in vain to unmask them as simpletons or as frauds; the masses will always be attracted by them. Seldom or never one finds several men of that type as

contemporaries and nothing is able to overpower them except the Universe itself [!] against which they have picked their fight; and from such observations and remarks the terrible sentence might well-nigh had found its origin: *Nemo contra deum nisi deus ipse*.

This is the same human-inhuman type which Jean Paul had in mind when he wrote in his *Quintus Fixlein:* "The Almighty provides each century with an evil genius who is its greatest temptation." But why blame "the Almighty" where man is responsible?

It is curious how often one encounters people who are genuinely afraid of a *strong* government, fearing for their liberties. But a strong government will always be generous, a weak government will either commit atrocities to bolster its tottering powers or surrender to small, brutal groups. The exterior effort is not a sign of strength; an inner, voluntary acceptance of the nation is strength. The plebiscitarian autocracies of Europe are not really strong, because they possess bitter, and utterly hostile minorities that are diametrically opposed to *everything* emanating from these governments. As long as such minorities exist no generosity can be expected from the totalitarian "leaders," who need the protection of a well-organized police force to keep them in power, to keep them alive. It is the nemesis of the superorganized, supercentralized, super-technicized modern state that one pistol shot, one explosion, one betrayal can bring it to the brink of an abyss.

The structure of old-fashioned popular representation on the other hand was such that it worked under the supposition that "No man is indispensable." This is a practicable attitude in a primitive world when the average man understands the problems which do not yet surpass his comprehension. All that changed during the past 150 years. *It is the tragedy of representative government, as an idea, that it came into fashion when its practicality and feasibility were rapidly vanishing. "Democracy" rose contemporaneously with the industrial development which made lay opinion so obsolete*. European "democracy" has probably no *inner* reason for its sudden revitalization. It was not a movement bound by an inner necessity to burst into blossom; it was primarily a smoke screen for the Third and later on the Fourth Estate in their fight against a depatriarchalized, and therefore rotten, caste system, a temporary egalitarian weapon which served its purpose in their struggle against an

aristocracy or a monarchical ruler forgetful of their duties. Accepted and embraced as an *ad hoc* measure and institution this egalitarian smoke screen* became a *res per se*, a fatality which had to run its course, forming the spirit of the time and formed by the *Zeitgeist*, until it assumed in its *reductio ad absurdum* the forms of communism and National Socialism.

Such a conception — the idea of a historical development at the "wrong time" — may sound strange, but one should not forget that there are novels published at the wrong time, men dying at the wrong moment, people born in a "wrong age." There is no reason why a political philosophy should not become popular under conditions which make it an increasingly unworkable proposition.

In reviewing the European scene we must recognize that monarchy, hierarchy, and patriarchalism do not, on the other hand, match well with the spirit of the Machine Age, but they agree with it in a political-technical sense. We have to ask ourselves the question whether workshops, offices, department stores, and communication services could be run better on democratic or on patriarchal or on dictatorial lines. The answer is obvious; either patriarchalism or dictatorialism will do and this is the very choice of our time in the old world. The layman has to abdicate,[293] and it is for us to make our choice. An ochlocratic conception of "democracy" has unfortunately prepared the masses to make the wrong choice.

Even in spite of the fact that it is technical development which finally devours ochlocracy[294] one has little reason to league together with Beelzebub to drive out Satan. The technical inventions cannot all be forgotten, canceled, or destroyed from one day to the other. Yet a healthy skepticism toward "progress" and a sound self-control in regard to the acceptance of technical "improvements" are absolutely necessary. Technics may exist and continue but we must bury our excessive enthusiasm for technics (and the sciences) and save it for worthier objects. To invent is a human tendency and inclination, to put inventions into actual existence is another thing. We have also an innate desire to drink, to eat, to shirk work, to amuse ourselves, to be selfish and yet — we must tame and control all these desires. The limitless indulging in technical progress is as suicidal and destructive as limitless drinking or limitless loafing.[295]

This is, of course, only a pious hope because the suicidal, self-liquidating aspects of modern civilization are not manifest to the masses, and it is significant of our times that the leaders follow the masses and not vice versa. The masses see only the "bigger and better" and never the reverse side of the medallion. We can observe in the political development of the past 150 years an almost deterministic and coercive sequence of phenomena, leading us with an ever increasing speed to the downfall of western civilization. We witness a seemingly unavoidable doom expressed in the terms of enslavement, coldness, ossification — a return not only to the animal world, but to the helpless, motionless, deaf, dumb, and insensitive realm of minerals.

Abyssus abyssum vocat. Yet the abysses get wider every time. We saw since the sixteenth century not only the spectacle of heresies provoking counterheresies but also such political forms as compelled directly or indirectly geographical neighbors to copy and imitate these forms, often very much against their own will and desire. One country using party regimentation, totalitarian forms of government, compulsory military service, poison gas, military planes or tanks coerces all the rest of the world to adopt similar means of warfare — or to surrender.

Even the great victories of the "democracies" over the semifeudal, semibureaucratic, semiparliamentarian monarchies were largely due to the fact that the "democracies" (still mitigated by their strange, liberal tradition) could rally a mass enthusiasm which could not possibly be "organized" by the states with a predominantly hierarchic tradition. Quantity defeated quality. The Prussian State in particular, and the different Fascisms (and socialisms) in general, worked toward a synthesis of mass enthusiasm and efficient, cold-blooded (nonpatriarchal) bureaucracy, an arousing of the hatred of the mob and the mechanical planning of a state machinery working on precision. This lies at the bottom of Nazi, and even of Fascist, efficiency. There is, after all, nothing deadlier than the combination of the spirit of Chicago and Pots-dam, or a mixture of Bentham, Frederick of Prussia,* and Henry Ford.

Yet modern anthropocentrism in spite of its dynamic appearances, its constant flux, and its seemingly manifold forms of expression, is extremely poor in alternatives. There is usually only the choice between the *chronologically different forms and stages* of one and the same thing.

The choice of the anthropocentrist, rejecting all "political" forms congenial to medieval theocentrism, is therefore an extremely limited and unhappy one; he either chooses to be "modern" and to be a slave of a Leviathan state and society under a totalitarian plebiscitarian "leader" or he prefers to cling to a more old-fashioned ochlocracy with a limited liberal tradition. Life in this form of "democracy" is infinitely more human, agreeable, and desirable; but the sword of Damocles under which he lives is prospective military defeat on account of amateurish incompetence and this means a life under an alien tyrant in an alien setup. For him there exists no other choice.

The only way the "democrat" can meet the challenge of the "fascist" is by discarding gradually his liberal heritage and becoming more and more authoritarian. (Such a metamorphosis could clearly be seen in the Baltic countries, between 1930 and 1938, effected by the fear of communism menacing them politically and in a military way.) In war the military emergency completes this process of "modernization" and the last shreds of liberty have soon gone with the wind.[296]

There is something apocalyptic in this ever increasing speed of development which even optimists have ceased to call "progress." Whoever has observed a big stream approaching a fall will be impressed by the constantly increasing rapidity of the waters as they come nearer and nearer to the brim of the cascade. Here is a point at which a boat would seem to have no chance to reach the security of the shore. A mile further up a landing might still have been feasible, but not fifty yards before the threatened cataclysm occurs. The Occident has now fairly well reached the dangerous point. A "return" to the medieval values has its sworn enemies everywhere and the final catastrophe is a menacing possibility. There is still a faint possibility of salvation but without action, without a fundamental change of direction, the boat loaded with the thoughts and inventions of the past 150 years will continue its suicidal course and speed to its doom.

Looking back it seems paradoxical at first thought that the anthropocentric trend was initiated by men who denied the greatest dignity of man — free will. This denial of the greatest of all our qualities is the common stigma of all heresies from Calvin to Marx, Rosenberg, and Freud. This denial created generations of "drifters" as well as irresponsible

fanatical activists. And neither of them is now able to act freely any more. They are *subject* to history.

Liberal democracy in Europe had still the advantage that it offered a freedom (to those who believed in it) and permitted also the dissemination of theocentrical, cultural values. Totalitarian ochlocracy on the other hand is watertight. It kills where its predecessor only sneered. When Walt Whitman exclaimed:

> One's self I sing — a simple, separate Person;
> Yet utter the word Democratic, the word *en masse*,

he had also extolled totalitarianism without knowing it. Yet now when the great hour for America has struck it is not the formless mass, the phantasmagoria of artificially leveled equality, the illusion of progress which stirs her to action but the eternal ideal of the dignity of the person and his liberty. She knows that sacrifices await her, sacrifices without material reward, without recompensation. She is ready to take the other way, not the easy and dark one of the unhappy East, but the steep and glorious one of the West. She knows and senses with Milton, whose work belongs not less to America than to England, the old truth of his immortal lines:

> But what more oft, in nations grown corrupt
> And by their vices brought to servitude,
> Than to love bondage more than liberty —
> Bondage with ease than strenuous liberty.

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* In the next volume we will discuss the functions and *limitations* of such a "bureaucracy." There is a constant danger that control and co-ordinated planning degenerates into a form closely resembling State socialism. The final result is totalitarianism, State omnipotency and the total loss of individual liberty and independence. This trend finds curiously enough many supporters among the professional anti-Fascists who see in Fascism and Nazism not an enemy but heretical *competitors*. It would be pathetic if the United Nations would defeat German national socialism and become victims of various homemade forms of the same malady. This danger is greater in Britain than here. (Cf. P. F. Drucker, *The Future of Industrial Man* (New York, 1942.)

** See James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution* (New York, 1941).

* "Party and reason are incompatible," says Geoffrey Bourne courageously in his small book *War, Politics and Emotion* (New York, 1941). The same work contains a perspicacious analysis of expert

knowledge and the democratic process, but it suffers from the usual misconceptions about Germany which impair its value.

** Here is in many other respects it would be wise to consider the intentions of the Founding Fathers.

* Germany was the only country in Europe after 1919 where the President was elected by the *whole* people. There is little doubt that Hindenburg would not have been elected if the question would have been put before the Reichstag instead of before the masses.

* The very best representation of his evil strength can be found in one of the most demoniacal books of our time — in Ernst Jünger's *Auf den Marmorklippen* (Hamburg, 1939), the most incredible and daring symbolic novel ever published in Nazi Germany by an army officer.

* The Bourgeoisie actually wanted *domination*, not equality. Yet the clamor for equality was morally more justifiable. Marx dropped the mask when he spoke about the *dictatorship* of the proletariat. Even Ernest Renan, by no means an admirer of conservative values and an outspoken enemy of the Church, warned against the confusion of American and European "democracy." From a European democracy he expected nothing but a series of disasters. (Cf. his *La Réforme Intellectuelle et Morale*, Paris, 1884, pp. 66-67, 79, 103–104, 114.)

* Yet he was at least a *statesman* and not a *politician* like those ignorants who dug the graves of their own countries in 1919 at the Peace Conference or that sublime myopic idiot Ludendorff (by no means a *Junker*) who for immediate "gains" organized bolshevism in Russia. A statesman makes history, a politician "politics."

APPENDIX I

WHILE the citations and comments offered here are presented by way of notes, they really are intended to serve as supplementary readings, arranged according to the various chapter headings of the text itself. They further illustrate and complement the author's viewpoint, or exemplify the trends of opposing schools of thought. Gratitude is herewith expressed to the several publishers who have so kindly granted their permissions for quotations from their publications.

PART I

THE CULT OF SAMENESS

I

IDENTITY VERSUS DIVERSITY

[1] "Eternity is a reminder of his (the Leftist's) own limited existence and the unavoidable end. To escape this *memento mori*, the Leftist seeks the great cities, as far away as possible from real life and its significations of age and death. Hence his gregariousness. The meaning of the phrase *O sola beatitudo, o beata solitudo* will ever remain unknown to him. He needs not only human echoes to reaffirm and bolster up his faith, but also "distractions" in order not to be alone, for to be alone is to see death. Solitude is for him a complete waste of time — a reminder of death and a flirtation with madness." — E. v. Kuehnelt–Leddihn, "The Anatomy of the Leftist." *The Examiner*, Vol. II, No. 2. Cf. also, William Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* (New York, 1919), p. 31, who prophesies, "Loneliness will be a real terror, unsurmountable by reason."

[2] "It is only by such external functions as the millions have in common, their uniform and simultaneous movements, that the many can be united into a higher unity: marching, keeping in step, shouting 'Hurrah' in unison, festival singing in chorus, united attacks on the enemy. These are the manifestations of life which are to give birth to the new and superior type of humanity. Everything that divides the many from the one, that fosters the illusion of the individual importance of man, especially the 'soul,' hinders the higher evolution and must consequently be destroyed." — René Fülöp-Miller, *The Mind and Face of Bolshevism*.

[3] "The Mediocre Man is the natural enemy of the man of genius and conviction: an enemy at the same time most cruel and ferocious. He opposes to the man of genius that most cruel and redoubtable of forces: the power of inertia. The Mediocre Man is much more evil than he appears. His basic wickedness is hidden beneath his external frigidity. He peddles against the enthusiasts his endless little infamies, which, because they are little, are never taken for infamies. He is fearless, knowing he has behind him the *multitudes of his similars*. He never fights, knowing he has gained the victory in advance." — Ernest Hello, *The Mediocre Man*, trans, by David Gordon. *America*, Oct. 17, 1937.

This tallies with a curious confession based upon the confusion of liberalism and democracy. Denis de Rougemont and Charlotte Muret in their book *The Heart of Europe* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1941) write on p. 114: "It must be admitted that if Switzerland is a land of liberty it is also a land of intolerance towards the best and the worst — the head and the tail of the class. Perhaps democratic liberty must be paid for at this price."

[4] "The process of success consists in marching with the others; the process of glory consists in marching against the others." — Ernest Hello, *The Mediocre Man*.

[5] Georg Simmel, *Philosophische Kultur*, Leipzig, 1911, pp. 30–31.

[6] Statistics furnished by Dr. Katherine B. Davis in *Factors in the Sex-Life of Twenty Two Hundred College-Women:* of 1200 unmarried women the following replies came concerning the question whether during their lives they had strong *emotional* relations with other women of a homoerotic character: Yes — 605, 50.4 per cent; No — 576, 48 per cent; No answer — 19, 1.6 per cent. Of these 605 who confessed to have had an emotional love to other women the following proportion admitted purely platonic sentiments — 293; Lesbian *practices* — 234; clear recognition of the sexual character of their infatuation — 312.

[7] "Equality as it is currently pursued is incompatible with true liberty; for liberty involves an inner working with reference to standards, the right subordination, in other words, of man's ordinary will to a higher will. There is an inevitable clash, in short, between equality and humility." — Irving Babbitt, *Democracy and Leadership*.

[8] Passage from the speech of Comte de Montalembert at the public meeting of the French Academy, Feb. 5, 1852, on taking the fauteuil of M. Droz:

". . . Not having known how to read the history of this world which demonstrates that everywhere democracy has degenerated into despotism, it [the French Revolution] undertook to found democracy in France . . . it dared to condemn itself to fight against the two basic principles of society in whatever form they might express themselves, authority and inequality: I say inequality, which is the obvious condition for all activity and fertility in social life; which is at the same time the mother and the daughter of liberty, whereas equality is only conceivable through despotism. This certainly does not apply to Christian equality, the proper name for which is equity, but to that democratic and social equality which is only the exaltation of envy, the mirage of jealous incapacity, which was never anything but a mask and which could become a reality only after the destruction of all merit, of all virtue."

[9] "Shigalyov is a man of genius. He invented equality. In his copybook it is well described. He provides for a mutual espionage. Each member of the society has to supervise the others and to denounce them. Everybody belongs to all and all belong to each individually. All are slaves and are equal in their serfdom. In the extreme case there is calumny and murder, but the most important thing is equality." — F. M. Dostoyevski, *The Possessed*.

[10] Maritain wrote in the autumn number of the *Études Carmélitaines* 1939: "The term Unity of Mankind (*Unité du genre humain*) is the truest name for the natural equality amongst men. It helps to purify the notion of that equality from all erroneous connotative associations originating either in geometrical imagination or levelling vindication. Arithmetical equality between two numbers excludes all inequality between them, but natural equality amongst men, or the unity of mankind, strives toward a dissolution into individual inequalities."

[11] Alexis Carrel says:

"Another error, due to the confusion of the concepts of human being and individual, is democratic equality. This dogma is now breaking down under the blows of the experience of nations. It is, therefore, unnecessary to insist upon its falseness. But its success has been astonishingly long. How could humanity accept such a faith for so many years? The democratic creed does not take account of the constitution of our body and of our consciousness. It does not apply to the concrete fact which the individual is. Indeed, human beings are equal. But individuals are not. The equality of their right is an illusion. The feeble-minded and the man of genius should not be equal before the law. The stupid, the unintelligent, those who are dispersed, incapable of attention, of effort, have no right to a higher education. It is absurd to give them the same electoral power as the fully developed individuals.

Sexes are not equal. To disregard all their inequalities is dangerous. The democratic principle has contributed to the collapse of civilization in opposing the development of an elite." — *Man the Unknown* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935), p. 271.

12 "For him the very image of beauty was inseparable from diversity. A society can be beautiful only if founded on truth, inequality and dissemblance. That was the axiom of the social philosophy of Leontieff." — Nicolas Berdiaeff, *Constantin Leontief*, Paris, 1937.

13 Cf. Gustave Thibon, *L'Inégalité, Facteur D'Harmonie Études Carmélitaines*, autumn, 1939.

14 Professor A. T. Hadley of Yale in his book *The Conflict Between Liberty and Equality* writes:

"In fact the signers of the Declaration of Independence can hardly have meant what they said to be taken literally. Most of them were aristocrats, many of them were slave-holders, some of them defended human slavery on principle. They were simply stating a theory of democratic government as it was understood in their time and as it had been expounded by the great prophet of modern democracy — Rousseau. In this theory great stress was laid on the contrast between the natural status of man as God had created him and the legal status which other men had imposed upon him. . . . Whether such a state of nature had ever actually existed was a question about which neither Rousseau nor Jefferson nor Franklin greatly troubled themselves. The emphasis on historic fact as distinct from historic fiction is something quite modern."

15 The summary below is taken from Dr. Geoffrey O'Connell's *Naturalism in American Education*. He describes the underlying philosophy of Teachers College, Columbia — the philosophy of Professor John Dewey — as follows:

"We live in a universe without final ends, forms or assignable limits, either internally or externally, of which continuous evolutionary change is all that can be predicted.

"Man is as much a product of this process as are all other visible things, and is strictly continuous with nature. There is nothing transcendent to the visible universe and man's home is within it. His thinking is a pure product of experience and cannot transcend it. There is no such thing as metaphysics, which is merely a collection of empty dreams and idle fancies. Man has no soul, mind or reason as metaphysicians understand those words. Ideas are merely plans of operations to be performed, not statements of what is or has been. They are merely hypotheses. Experience evolves new standards and values. All human affairs whether personal or associative are merely projections, continuations or complications of the nature which exists in the physical and pre-human world.

"God as a being does not exist; He is merely that unification of Ideal values that is essentially imaginative in origin when the imagination supervenes in conduct. There is no such thing as religion in any sense of relation to God. Faith in the sense in which the Western civilization understood it is impossible for the 'cultivated mind' of the Western world today.

"There is no enduring moral law of fixed principles. Morals are purely social. The question of 'ought' is merely one of better or worse in social affairs. The only moral end is an abundant life shared by all, achieved by growth itself. There are no absolute moral standards; the moral and the social quality of conduct are identical. There is no abiding truth; truths change in experience and can become false. There is absolutely nothing absolutely and unchangingly good."

This relativistic spirit is, in the United States, not something entirely new. Professor Louis Mercier of Harvard leads it partially back to Unitarian agnosticism and relativism. Ralph Waldo Emerson was one of its protagonists. On the southern walls of Hunter College in New York City we find the following "immortal words" chiseled in stone: "We are of different opinions at different hours but we always may be said to be at heart on the side of truth." Only Nazis have completed successfully with such a contempt for the laws of logic.

16 "But, one would say, where then is justice?

"It is not in egalitarianism. Egalitarianism is only the counterfeit of justice; it can be the exact opposite, we have seen that. Neither are all inequalities injust. Which means that equality or inequality are one thing and justice is another. Justice consists in giving everybody his due." — Agénor de Gasparin, *L'Égalité*, Paris.

17 Dean Inge in his *Protestantism* admits that the calvinistic belief in predestination drove many people into suicide. Yet everybody who reads Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio* will be impressed by the fact that this reformer was, not less than Calvin, a bitter enemy of the concept of free will which he considered to be more or less some sort of optical delusion.

"Ah, Lord! Why should we boast of our free will as if we were able to do anything, ever so small, in divine and spiritual matters." CCLXII. *Table Talks of Martin Luther*, trans, and ed. by William Hazlitt, Esq., London, 1857.

18 "If one goes through the streets of St. Petersburg looking at the expressions of the passers-by it is easy to guess who is a Communist. Their faces are not characterized by a luscious or a beastly satiety but by boredom, the transcendental boredom of the 'Paradise on Earth,' the 'Realm of Antichrist.'"—Myerezhkovski, *The Realm of Antichrist*.

19 In his encyclical *Iamdudum Cernimus* (March 18, 1861), Pope Pius IX *condemned* the following thesis:

"The Roman Pontiff can, and ought, to reconcile himself, and come to terms with progress, liberalism and modern civilization." These words are here understood in the wrongful meaning which modern secular society gives to them. Similarly, in *Quanta Cura*, the following teaching was branded as an error: "Popular will expressed in so-called public opinion or any other manner constitutes the supreme law independent of either divine or human authority." And the Syllabus, issued in the same year and added to the encyclical, condemns the following teaching: "Authority is nothing but the sum of numbers and material forces." On "Majoritism," see Max Adler, *Démocratic Politique et Démocratic Sociale*, Bruxelles, 1930, p. 117.

20 "To declare that authority resides in the whole multitude as in its proper subject and without being able to emerge from it and to exist in such or such responsible men — this is a trick permitting irresponsible mechanisms to exercise power over men, without having authority over them. Thus considered, power (the power of the State) masks anarchy. But, as in every case where nature is violated, such power tends to become infinite. Concentrating all their attention on the question of the origin of power, and reassured by the idea that in the democratic regime the power of the State emanates from the people, democracies of the Rousseauist type not only grant the State all the usurpations of power, but they tend toward these very usurpations. Proudhon admirably described and predicted this process. Moreover, the mass as such is by hypothesis the subject proper of sovereignty and yet lacks political discernment, except in quite simple and fundamental matters where human instinct is surer than reason. This results in an original equivocation, because those delegated by the multitude will actually direct it, but only *as if* the multitude were directing itself. Above all, the exercise of sovereignty under such conditions will require *myths*. Now, to dispense myths and collective images, can anything be more useful than a dictatorship — a dictatorship where the entire sovereign multitude is reabsorbed in the unique person of a half-god, sprung forth from this multitude? Thus, through an inevitable dialectic, and so long as a new fundamental principle has not been found, democracies of the bourgeois liberal type tend to engender their contrary, the totalitarian State." — Jacques Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics*, Trans, ed. by Mort. Adler.

N.B. But is the totalitarian state really a "contrary"?

Further reference material:

On the nature of sex:

E. I. Watkin, *The Bow in the Clouds*, London, 1931, p. 108.

On uniformism and social differentiation:

George Santayana, *The Life of Reason* (Reason in Society), New York, 1932, pp. 91, 127–128.

About political-racial-ethnic herdism:

A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Munich, 1939, p. 433.

(Hostility toward the learning of foreign languages), pp. 465 ff.

(Authority and "Popularity"), p. 579.

Donoso Cortés, *Oeuvres*, published by his family, Paris, 1858, pp. 520 ff.

About the spirit of average man:

Ralph Borsodi, *This Ugly Civilization*, New York, 1933, specially pp. 223 ff.

II

OCHLOCRACY AND DEMOCRATISM

[21] About the modern, nonantique character of democracy, see Woodrow Wilson, cited by Christian Gauss in *Democracy Today*.

[22] The Hollywoodian happy end and the idea that the good ones are rewarded and the wrongdoers are punished here on this earth had already been foreshadowed by such Puritans as the Rev. Richard Baxter in his *Christian Directory*, Ch. I.

[23] The first to point out the danger of seeing in Christianity a mere social panacea was Compton Mackenzie in the closing chapter of *Sinister Street* (London, 1914).

[24] About the "liberal" materialistic optimism of Gladstone, see Kerr Boyse Tupper, cited in *Modern Eloquence*, ed. Thomas B. Reed, Vol. X.

[25] About the relativity of Progress, see, Constantin Leontieff, quoted by Nicolas Berdiaeff in *Constantin Leontieff*, Paris, 1937.

[26] Even Aristotle says (*Politics*, 1338 b): "To be always seeking after the useful does not become free and exalted souls."

[27] "I do not look upon equal voting as among the things which are good in themselves, provided they can be guarded against inconveniences. I look upon it as only relatively good; less objectionable than inequality of privileges grounded on irrelevant or adventitious circumstances, but in principle wrong, because recognizing a wrong standard, and exercising a bad influence on the voter's mind. It is not useful, but hurtful, that the constitution of a country should declare ignorance to be entitled to as much political power as knowledge." — John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, New York, 1882, p. 188.

[28] Without much logic the proposal to make democracy "real" by giving the franchise to children has been attacked by Professor Ph. Kohnstamm in his *Democratie* (Haarlem, 1914).

[29]The common longing is to be similar. Garb conforms to mass conceptions; divergence from the standard is resented. The mind derives its conclusions around it. Individual discrimination almost disappears; the desire is to be of the mass; *for numbers indicate authority and certitude*. In numbers there is strength; the man who stands apart must be wrong. He is suspected, and he suspects himself. It is better to yield to the general pressure. He follows the mob; he acts with the mob; his mind is the mob mind.

"To secure action from him the mass must be moved; he can be depended on to follow. It is more important to show him that he is with the larger number than to prove to him that he is right. He

avoids forlorn hopes; they excite his derision. In the political world he desires more to be with the winning side than to stand firmly by a principle, and every fresh attempt to attract him has this as a fundamental handicap." — James N. Wood, *Democracy and the Will to Power*, New York, 1921, pp. 82, 83.

30 The masses in "democratic" countries are often convinced that their representatives should be nothing else but gramophones of their opinions. Jacques Maritain does not share this view. He writes in *Scholasticism and Politics* (trans, ed. by M. Adler):

"In his famous address delivered in 1863, Abraham Lincoln declared that 'government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.' Let us observe, in this formula, that the words *by the people* need comment in order to avoid all ambiguities and to prevent Rousseauist interpretations. Taken in their genuinely concrete sense, I do not think, that these words mean a government exercised by the people, whose elected representatives would then serve as a pure instrument, but rather a government exercised by the *representatives* of the people, or by the people in the person of its representatives."

31 Rousseau's concept of liberty is utterly democratic. He wrote: "To the end, therefore, that the social contract should not prove an empty form, it tacitly includes this engagement, which only can enforce the rest, viz., that whoever refuses to pay obedience to the general will, shall be liable to be compelled to it by the force of the whole body. And this is in effect nothing more than that they may be compelled to be free." — *Contrat Social*, I, 7; cf. Nicholas Berdyaev, *The End of Our Time*, New York, 1933, pp. 174–178.

32 H. L. Mencken in his *Notes on Democracy* observes that: "The doctrine that a man who stands in contempt of the prevailing ideology has no rights under the law is so thoroughly democratic that in the United States it is seldom questioned save by romantic fanatics, robbed of their wits by an uncritical reading of the Fathers."

33 Cf. Friedrich Naumann, *Demokratie und Kaisertum* (Berlin: Schöneberg, 1904), p. 92.

34 "As surely as the Nobility is *the* Estate, so surely the nobility fails to feel as a party, though it may organize itself as one. It has in fact no choice but to do so. All modern constitutions repudiate the Estates and are built on the Party as self-evidently the basic form of politics. The nineteenth century is the heyday of party politics. Its democratic character compels the formation of counterparties, and whereas formerly, as late even as the eighteenth century, the *Tiers* constituted itself in imitation of the nobility as an Estate, now there arises the *defensive* figure of the Conservative Party, copied from the Liberal, dominated completely by the latter's forms, bourgeois-ized without being bourgeois, and obliged to fight with rules and methods that liberalism has laid down. It has a choice of handling these means better than its adversary *or* of perishing." — Spengler, *Decline of the Occident*, II. The decay and hopeless struggle of the conservative and clerical parties all over the European Continent only confirms the fact that one cannot expect a fish to win a fight on land, outside of its natural element. The temporal and spiritual aristocracies have never had a real chance to cope successfully on the base of majoritism with the masses endowed with political power and imbued by the *fausses idées claires*.

35 The old Aragonese nobles, *ricos hombres de natura*, were always particularly turbulent, reserving to themselves the right to make war individually, and to throw off allegiance to the king — their peer — when it suited. The well-known oath to their monarch is a classic of independence: "We who are as good as you swear to you who are not better than we, to accept you as our king and sovereign lord, provided you observe all our statutes and laws; and if not, no." (*Si no, no*). — Allison Peers, *Spain*.

36 “Real kingship — hard as it may be to get this idea into the heads of our narrow-minded democrats — seems to be created by God for the special purpose of protecting the vast masses of a people against the possibility of violation by a popular elite.

“. . . The popular elite, be it a cultural, a social or an economic one does not want, under ordinary, normal circumstances to recognize a master or at least only the semblance of one, a fact which is forgotten again and again or which is purposely kept quiet. Only in extreme danger and distress this elite suffers a master and king, should one be at hand. But for the masses a king standing above all classes and parties is under all circumstances necessary and desirable.” — Dr. Schmidt-Gibichenfels, *Die demokratische Lüge und der Krieg*. Berlin, 1915.

37 Money, money, always money — that is the essence of democracy. Democracy is more expensive than monarchy; it is incompatible with liberty.” — P. J. Proudhon, *Solution Du Problême Social*.

III

THE BOURGEOIS AND CAPITALISM

38 “The bourgeois lacks piety. The first battle in which he engages to establish his superiority is that against the priests. In repeated minor engagements with the servants of the Church he prepares himself for the great conquests. In rallying the priests who do not know how to answer these rallies, he becomes conscious of what he is worth. He had been told not to meddle in matters of religion, to submit himself to what his pastors told him. But are the servants of God any better, any more intelligent than he himself? One is told that a preacher has to be a saint; but how many of that type are there to be found? And the bourgeois will insist that it is better to be an honest man than to try to become a saint.” — Bernard Groethuysen, *Origines de L’Esprit Bourgeois en France*, Vol. I.

39 “So we can understand how Calvinism helped to create that curious product, the modern business man, who works like a slave, and sometimes rules like a slave driver, in accumulating money, which his tastes and principles forbid him to enjoy, and about the value of which to himself or to others he asks no questions. It has been said that the successful money-maker of today is either a child of the Ghetto or a grandchild of John Calvin. No system was ever so effectual in promoting that kind of progress which is measured by statistics. If you can convince a nation that steady industry in profitable enterprise is eminently pleasing to God, but that almost all ways of spending money unproductively are wrong, that nation is likely to become very rich.

“We can study the working of this system best in America and Scotland.” — Dean Inge, *Protestantism*.

40 “The Protestants, having established the sacrament of the word and thereby killed the Eucharist, proceeded to chain it to the letter. They started teaching the people not to listen but to read.” — Miguel de Unamuno, *La Agonia Del Cristianismo*, Buenos-Aires, 1938, p. 43.

41 Advertising seems to add a specific *value* to goods in the American public opinion, otherwise advertisers would not point out that their merchandise is “nationally advertised.” People are sometimes even inclined to prefer inferior advertised goods (suspecting their inferiority) to better nonadvertised brands out of a deep fear to be in the possession of things “not *generally* known or valued.” What they possess they want to have (at least in their *form) in common* with others. This picture ought to be supplemented by those freakish human beings who read publications for the sake of their advertisements without an intention of buying. The general optimism spread by clever

advertisement is probably only part of their magnetic attraction. On suggestibility and herdism, cf. Boris Sidis, *The Psychology of Suggestion*, Preface by William James, New York, 1903.

42 "Civilization is by its nature bourgeois in the deepest spiritual sense of the word. 'Bourgeois' is synonymous precisely with the civilized kingdom of this world and the civilized will to organized power and enjoyment of life. The spirit of civilization is that of the middle classes; it is attached and clings to corrupt and transitory things; and it fears eternity. To be a bourgeois is therefore to be a slave of matter and an enemy of eternity. The perfected European and American civilizations gave rise to the industrial-capitalist system, which represents not only a mighty economic development but the spiritual phenomenon of the annihilation of spirituality." — Nicolas Berdyaev, *The Meaning of History*, trans. George Reavey, New York, 1936.

43 Six years ago the socialist writer Naomi Mitchison demanded in an article in the *New Statesman and Nation*, that all nuns should be excluded from the right to vote. A young Catholic writer, James Oliver, wrote a very appropriate answer but according to the spirit of true "democracy" it was never published by that paper. The *Colosseum* printed it later. It ran as follows:

"Sir — There have been some very interesting criticisms of the electorate. The most profound was that of Miss Naomi Mitchison, who points out how unfitted are nuns for the onerous responsibilities of voting. People should certainly be disqualified from voting, if they hold any form of religious belief; since this necessarily implies that they are not giving their whole minds to politics. To give anything less is to make a farce of Democracy.

"There is another type of voter, who should also be disqualified, he who persistently votes perversely. Miss Naomi Mitchison has shown very clearly that nuns are among the worst offenders in this voting for the Right. They should certainly be disqualified; also colonels, public-house-keepers and music-hall comedians, all of whom are notoriously Right-minded. I apologize for this unfortunate phrase. The electorate should be pruned still further. Indeed, democracy cannot really be said to have triumphed until voting is confined to the readers of your paper. Herr Hitler has been working along these lines, and very clearly, we live in a new age of democracy, of which he is the *New Statesman*.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

James Oliver.

44 "A deist is a man who in the short time of his existence has not had the time to become an atheist." — H. de Bonald, *Collected Works*, VI, 253, Paris, 1817.

45 "1. Individualist liberalism is of the flora of the eighteenth century; it inspired, in part, the legislation of the French Revolution, but it died with that event.

"2. The characteristic creation of the nineteenth century was precisely collectivism. It was the first idea invented by that century, almost at birth, and it grew throughout its hundred years to the point of flooding the entire horizon." — José Ortega y Gasset, *Toward a Philosophy of History*, New York, 1941.

46 "I am a Materialist," was a statement made by Jefferson. The Founding Fathers were far from being a homogeneous group. There was a great latitude of thought ranging from a Caroll to a Jefferson. We must bear in mind that Jefferson's Religious views were *not* typical for the Founding Fathers. He was an extremist, a "radical," deeply suspected by most of his collaborators.

47 "A nobleman is not only a subject, he is the most subordinate of all." — H. de Bonald, VI, 84.

48 "Absolute bourgeoisie is absolute swinishness." — D. Myerezhkovski, *The Blossom of the Bourgeois*.

49 Freedom from vanity is an absolute requirement for a good teacher.

The leftist leanings of the teacher is also to be found in such countries where the level of secondary and "college" education as well is traditionally low. American high school teachers show most of the characteristics of Continental grade school teachers and it must be said in all candor that their colleagues in colleges show frequently very similar inclinations. — The author. As to Nazism among teachers cf. Franz Neumann, *Behemoth*, New York, 1942, pp. 377 and 379.

50 "To observe processes and to construct means is science; to criticize and to co-ordinate ends is philosophy: and because in these days our means and instruments have multiplied beyond our interpretation and synthesis of ideals and ends, our life is full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. For a fact is nothing except in relation to desire; it is not complete except in relation to a purpose and a whole. Science without philosophy, facts without perspective and valuation, cannot save us from havoc and despair. Science gives us knowledge, but only philosophy can give us wisdom." — Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy*, p. 3, New York, 1926.

On the concept of "progress" see also René Guénon, *East and West*, London, 1941, pp. 23 ff., 44–45.

51 "He who in science progresses
And in morals regresses
One step forward makes
And two backward takes."
Nevaira, *Gazetta Ladina*, July 21, 1939.

52 An excellent comparison between a Catholic "backward" and a Protestant "progressive" culture can be found in E. I. Watkin's "Introduction to the Philosophy of Peter Wust," *Essays in Order*, No. 2. (British edition).

53 The General: "Speaking of saints it puzzles me how so many soldiers could find a place on the same plane as monks and see their profession preferred to all peaceful, civilian professions if at all times war had been considered a necessary evil such as the liquor trade or perhaps something even worse. Evidently those Christian nations who recognize saints (not only the Russian ones but approximately also the others) have not only honored the military career but honored it in a very special manner; and of all professions it was the one which alone had the reputation of instructing its best representatives in the practice of sanctity. Such an opinion is contrary to the present movement against wars." — Vladimir Soloviev, *Tri razgovora*, Munich, 1920.

54 "It may be plausibly argued that the faults of the bourgeois are no greater than those of the leading classes in other ages, while his virtues are all his own. But the fact remains that the typical leaders of bourgeois society do not arouse the same respect as that which is felt for the corresponding figures in the old regime. We instinctively feel that there is something honourable about a king, a noble, or a knight which the banker, the stockbroker or the democratic politician does not possess. A king may be a bad king, but our very condemnation of him is a tribute to the prestige of his office. Nobody speaks of a bad bourgeois; the Socialist may indeed call him a 'bloody bourgeois,' but that is a set formula that has nothing to do with his personal vices or virtues.

"This distrust of the bourgeois is no modern phenomenon. It has its roots in a much older tradition than that of socialism. It is equally typical of the mediaeval noble and peasant, the romantic Bohemian and the modern Proletarian. The fact is that the bourgeoisie has always stood somewhat apart from the main structure of European society, save in Italy and in the Low Countries. While the temporal power was in the hands of the kings and the nobles and the spiritual power was in the hands of the Church, the bourgeois, the Third Estate, occupied a position of privileged inferiority which allowed them to amass wealth and to develop considerable intellectual culture and freedom of thought without acquiring direct responsibility or power. Consequently, when the French Revolution

and the fall of the old regime made the bourgeoisie the ruling class in the West, it retained its inherited characteristics, its attitude of hostile criticism towards the traditional order and its enlightened selfishness in the pursuit of its interest. But although the bourgeois now possessed the substance of power he never really accepted social responsibility as the old rulers had done. He remained a private individual — an *idiot* in the Greek sense — with a strong sense of social conventions and personal rights, but with little sense of social solidarity and no recognition of his responsibility as the servant and representative of a super-personal order. In fact, he did not realize the necessity of such an order, since it had always been provided for him by others, and he had taken it for granted.

"This, I think, is the fundamental reason for the unpopularity and lack of prestige of the bourgeois civilization. It lacks the vital human relationship which the older order with all its faults never denied. To the bourgeois politician the electorate is an accidental collection of voters; to the bourgeois industrialist his employees are an accidental collection of wage earners. The king and the priest, on the other hand, were united to their people by a bond of organic solidarity. They were not individuals standing against other individuals but parts of a common social organism and representatives of a common spiritual order.

"The bourgeois upset the throne and the altar, but they put in their place nothing but themselves. Hence their regime cannot appeal to any higher sanction than that of self-interest. It is continually in a state of disintegration and flux. It is not a permanent form of social organism, but a transitional phase between two orders." — Christopher Dawson, *Enquiries Into Religion and Culture*.

Further reading material:

On "slavery" and technicism:

Ernst Jünger, *Der Arbeiter*, Hamburg, 1932, p. 160.

On the problem of liberty and real liberty:

P. A. Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age*, New York, 1941, pp. 173–174.

(On "Colossalism"), *Ibidem*, p. 255.

Nicholas Berdyaev, *The End of Our Time*, New York, 1933, p. 178.

On Liberty, Nationalism and Democracy:

William Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty*, New York, 1896, pp. 66–67, 256, 257, 258, 259–260, 479.

Sir Henry Maine, *Popular Government*, London, 1885, pp. 27, 28, 36.

Sir James Stephens, *Liberty, Fraternity, Equality*, London, 1873, p. 239.

IV

OCHLOCRATIC CULTURE

55 "This country has for its honour code the rules and loyalties of the Dear Old School, and the Dear-Old-School theory dates from Doctor Arnold in the 1830's. . . . The Gentleman today is the Public School Gentleman pattern, not the man of taste, arrogance, and power of his counterpart in the seventeenth and eighteenth century." Cf. Robert Westerby, *Voice From England*, New York, 1940. A similar view is expressed by Arthur Bryant in his *Pageant of England*, New York, 1941, p. 155.

56 A violent resentment against modern egalitarian progressivism has been voiced by the Russian thinker, Constantin Leontieff, (Quoted by Berdiaeff, *Constantin Leontieff*, Paris, 1937, p. 122.)

A similar outcry could be heard from Coventry Patmore, Catholic convert and poet, who wrote: "Democracy is only a continually shifting aristocracy of money, impudence, animal energy and cunning, in which the best grub gets the best of the carrion; and the level to which it tends to bring all

things is not a mountain tableland, as its promoters would have their victims think, but the unwholesome platitude of the fen and the morass, of which black envy would enjoy the malaria as long as all others share it."

57 "In every country and in every age the priest has been hostile to liberty; he is always in alliance with the despot, abetting his abuses in return for protection to his own. *It is error alone that needs the support of government. Truth can stand by itself."* — Jefferson.

58 "The dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution is one of those pleasant falsehoods, which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience refutes. History teems with instances of truth put down by persecution. If not suppressed forever, it may be thrown back for centuries. It is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error, of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake." — John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*.

59 Somebody wrote in the *Patterson News* (New Jersey): "Thank goodness we live in a free country, where a man may say what he thinks if he isn't afraid his wife, his neighbors or his boss will criticize him, and if he's sure it won't hurt his business or his reputation."

60 Eugen Diesel in *Die Deutsche Wandlung* analyzes the antagonism between town and country.

61 God prefers naturally one soul in heaven to sixty million in hell. This divine priority of quality over quantity is brilliantly expressed by Newman who wrote in his *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (V): "The Catholic Church holds it better for the sun and the moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions on it to die of starvation in extremest agony, as far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say, should be lost, but should commit one single venial sin, should tell one wilful untruth, or should steal one poor farthing without excuse."

62 The myth of the existence of progress, this great consolation of the earth-bound neopagan, has been already exploded by Prince Nikolay Ssergeyevitch Trubetzkoy in his *Europe and Humanity*, 1920.

Says Lucien Romier in his *Explication de notre temps:* "Finally democratic ideology was and remains encumbered by a primary dogma, which affects the intelligence like opium: it is the beatifically optimistic and falsely scientific illusion of an indefinite progress of humanity."

63 Already Franz Grillparzer saw clearly that there can be no true liberty within the framework of mass production. He wrote mockingly in 1854:

"To England:

"With rapturous enthusiasm in your eyes you rave of liberty in countries without factories."

An England:

Ihr schwärmt entzückt mit begeisterten Blicken
Für die Freiheit der Länder, die ohne Fabriken.

64 Cf. Irving Babbitt, *Democracy and Leadership*, p. 144.

65 "The reasons for putting humanistic truth above scientific truth are not metaphysical but very practical: the discipline that helps man to self-mastery is found to have a more important bearing on his happiness than the discipline that helps him to a mastery of physical nature. If scientific discipline is not supplemented by a truly humanistic or religious discipline the result is unethical science, and unethical science is perhaps the worst monster that has yet been turned loose on the race. Man in spite of what I have termed his stupidity, his persistent evasion of the main issue, the issue of his own happiness, will awaken sooner or later to the fearful evil he has already suffered from a science that has arrogated to itself what does not properly belong to it; and then science may be as unduly depreciated as it has, for the past century or two, been unduly magnified; so that in the long run it is

in the interest of science itself to keep in its proper place, which is below both humanism and religion." — Irving Babbitt, *Rousseau and Romanticism*.

66 Irving Babbitt, *Democracy and Leadership*, p. 213.

67 "The tension between work of leadership and work of execution has reached the level of a catastrophe. The importance of the former, the economic value of every real personality in it, has become so great that it is invisible and incomprehensible to the majority of the underlings. In the latter, the work of the underlings. In the latter, the work of the hands, the individual is now *entirely* without significance. Only numbers matter. In the consciousness of this unalterable state of things, aggravated, poisoned, and financially exploited by egoistic orators and journalists, men are so forlorn that it is mere human nature to revolt against the role for which the machine (not, as they imagine, its possessors) earmarks most of them. There is beginning in numberless forms — from sabotage, by way of strike, to suicide — *the mutiny of the hands against their destiny*, against the machine, against the organized life, against anything and everything. The organization of work, as it has existed for thousands of years, based on the idea of "collective doing" and the subsequent division of labor between leaders and led, heads and hands, is being disintegrated from below. But "mass" is no more than a negation (specially a negation of the concept of organization) and not something viable in itself. An army without officers is only a superfluous and forlorn herd of men. A chaos of brickbats and scrap iron is a building no more. This mutiny, world wide, threatens to put an end to the *possibility* of technical economic work. The leaders may take flight, but the led become superfluous are lost. Their numbers are their death." — Oswald Spengler, *Man and Technics*, trans, by Atkinson (New York, 1934); cf. also A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York, 1937), p. 34.

68 Only the city, the πόλιS makes *politics* in the modern sense. Only the urban man is politically minded. The idea of a modern nation is basically urban. Territorial changes are felt in the cities first and last. When Austria was dismembered in 1919, Vienna was the main sufferer, Prague boomed, Bucharest changed its face not less than Belgrade. Forty miles from these cities life went on practically unchanged. Thus the cities profit or lose from the wars and their very hope for profit makes these great democratic centers sometimes extremely warlike and aggressive (though the lessons of the present war may finally dampen their spirits).

James Bryce in his *Holy Roman Empire* wrote seventy years ago: "The racial or commercial antagonisms of democracies are as fertile in menaces to peace as were ever the dynastic interests of princes."

69 Cf. the article of Bernard Wall in *Colosseum*, June, 1937.

70 Mention must be made of the fact that a strong and violent anticlericalism is unthinkable in a Protestant country.

Bernard Wall wrote in *Colosseum:* "The persecution of Christianity is the lasting threat in those countries where the tension between Christianity and the established disorder has been greater owing to its persistence of a more living form of Christianity. Christianity has had a safe conduct in the bourgeois world of England and America because it has compromised with the commercial ethos and sanctified it; and has substituted 'decent business dealing' for the folly of the cross."

Further reading material:

On political egalitarianism:

Lucien Romier, *Explication de notre temps*, Paris, 1925, p. 163.

On the problem of culture and civilization:

Andrew Krzesiński, Ph.D., S.T.D., *Is Modern Culture Doomed?*, New York, 1942, pp. 2–11.

Eugen Diesel, *Der Weg durch das Wirrsal*, 1930, footnote, p. 174.

On mass production:

Theodor Haecker, *Was ist der Mensch?*, Leipzig, 1933, pp. 36–38. *The uniting power of anticlericalism:*

Georges Sorel, *De l'église et de l'état*, Paris, 1920.

On uniformism in the American scene:

Sinclair Lewis, *Main Street*, New York, 1920, p. 268.

V

WOMAN

[71] Cf. the letter of P. J. Proudhon dated Apr. 26, 1852.

[72] Cf. the revealing letter in the *New Statesman and Nation*, May 5, 1934, by Clare Harvey and L. A. Harvey.

[73] The political citizen with his commercialized mentality will look at the country or state as a business enterprise in which he shares actively through the taxes. In letters of protest sent to the papers the fact that the writer is a taxpayer will frequently be emphasized. There is also a tendency to pass a law that the unemployed (who does not pay taxes) should be deprived of his right to vote like a shareholder in a company who has sold his stock.

Said Mr. Paul Garrett, Executive of General Motors speaking at the Congress of American Industry in 1940: "Democracy rests not on supermen, but on the good sense of many. Our American democracy's success is the sum total of millions of individual achievements. *Ours is a business civilization*. Ours is a hundred-year plan."

[74] Cf. Georg Simmel, *Philosophische Kultur*, Leipzig, 1911, p. 95.

[75] The Dutch psychologist Heymans, once professor of the university of Groningen, seems to have had a glimpse of the main issue although he does not make as much of a case out of it as one should. He draws the following conclusions from the results of an inquest comprising several thousand people: spontaneously a woman is only interested in individual cases, not in the law, the generalizations, in formula based on conception (which is one of the most characteristic traits of masculine mentality). It is our opinion that this formula requires a slight modification. This is the way we should put it: Woman's mind is directed primarily toward persons, man's mind is directed toward things. — Dr. Rudolf Allers, *L'Amour et l'Instinct, Études Carmélitaines*, April, 1936.

[76] Cf. Leon Samson's criticism of female "superiority" in America (*The American Mind*).

[77] "Snobbery is indeed a feminine rather than a masculine vice; it appears to show itself among women in a more positive and rabid form." — Gideon Clark, *Democracy in the Dock*.

[78] About the "hero" (or saint) in relation to his fellow men, see Hermann Swoboda, *Otto Weiningers Tod*, Vienna, 1923.

[79] "In substituting the love of man for the love of God the humanitarian is working in a vicious circle, for unless man has in him the equivalent of the love of God he is not lovely. Furthermore, it is important that man should not only love but fear the right things. The question was recently raised in Paris why medical men were tending to usurp the influence that formerly belonged to the clergy. The obvious reply is that men once lived in the fear of God, whereas now they live in the fear of microbes." — Irving Babbitt, *Democracy and Leadership*.

[80] The pledge of obedience in the marriage ceremony has naturally been abolished by "progressive" Protestant church communities.

Further reference material:

On genius in women:

Sylvia Kopald, “Where Are the Female Geniuses” in *Our Changing Morality*, ed. by Freda Kirchwey, New York, 1930. See the “Statistics” on p. 107.

PART II

IDENTITARIANISM IN TIME AND SPACE

I

MONARCHY

81 "Democracy or the democratic state is the natural state for a primitive society where the diversity of conditions is not very distinct; or maybe in an arbitrary state of cells where social conditions are considered having no report to political functions. . . . We therefore find democracy sometimes at the origins of a society or in their decline but rarely at the height of their historic development." — Le Marquis de la Tour-du-Pin la Charce, *Aphorismes de politique sociale*.

82 Gunnar Landtman, professor of sociology at the University of Helsinfors, writes in his book *The Origin of the Inequality of the Social Classes*, London, 1938, rich in personal anthropological observations as well as in bibliographic data as follows:

"Among the most primitive races tribal authority is exercised almost universally in the democratic form of general council, while governments representing the monarchical principle are almost entirely absent among peoples usually relegated to the lowest group. We regard this as a very remarkable fact concerning primitive social organization, and it has in most cases only been mentioned in passing in theoretical literature."

Sir Harry Johnston in his *The Uganda Protectorate* emphasizes the democratic, majoritarian, nonmonarchical structure of the social setup of Central African Pygmees and Dr. S. T. van der Bij in his carefully prepared *Onstaan en eerste ontwikkeling van den oorlog* comes implicitly to similar conclusions.

The democratic character of early, primitive civilizations has also been acknowledged by Sylvester A. Sieber, S.V.D., and Franz H. Mueller, M.C.S., in their standard work *The Social Life of Primitive Man* (St. Louis: Herder, 1941), on pp. 38–42.

It is not in vain that Disraeli called Monarchy in *Coningsby* (Book V, Ch. 8) a government which "requires a high degree of civilization." "It needs the support of the free laws and manners, and of a widely diffused intelligence. . . . An educated nation recoils from the imperfect vicariate of what is called a representative government," he wrote.

83 "The persistence of the democratic faith in an age of science is a phenomenon of significance. The essence of the formula is faith. Not one of its doctrines can be proved in any scientific sense." — Ralph Henry Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought*.

84 Cf. Otto Ammon, *Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natürlichen Grundlagen*, Jena, 1896, p. 36.

[85] In spite of William II's domineering spirit he could be told the bitter truth. The Conservative Party ("committee of eleven") could very well afford to make, in 1908, their famous protesting resolutions against his foreign policy.

[86] Professor F. A. Woods of Harvard who made the royal families of Europe a special subject of his studies wrote as follows:

"I made the assertion that there is no doubt but that modern royalty as a whole has been decidedly superior to the average European in capacity; and we may say without danger of refutation, that the royal breed, considered as a unit, is superior to any other one family, be it that of noble or commoner. I have no wish to modify this extreme statement." (From: *The Influence of Monarchs*, 1913.)

He continues later on in the same book: "The best argument in favor of the real and inherent nature of the intellectual gifts of royalty and their average superiority when judged as a single breed comes from thinking in proportion ratios. If all questions are set aside except the total within a group, a striking fact is brought out. In *Heredity in Royalty* I showed that out of a total of 823 royal persons there were about twenty of the intellectual eminence of Frederick the Great, Peter the Great, Gustavus Adolphus, William the Silent, Eugene of Savoy, etc. Let this proportion (1 to 40) be compared with the number of great men who arise out of a total population at any period or in any country and the contrast is astonishing. There have not been at most more than 200 men of such unquestioned genius born in any of the nations, England, France, Germany or America, during their entire history. Each has had a population of 20, 5O, or 100 million or more, yet only a 100 or 200 of such great geniuses have been produced. The differences are overwhelming. The chances in favor of royalty are several 100,000 times as great. In other words, the average prince throughout modern times has a small chance of becoming a man of genius. There has only been one chance in 40, but this is more than a 100,000 times as good as the chances for an average child of average parents."

Professor Woods was rather critical and narrow in using the term "genius." He seems to have a certain antipathy for the great Catholic rulers. He also adds quite rightly that the percentage of mental cases among royalty is higher than the average. (4 per cent instead of 2 per cent — the same proportion as among the closer relatives of geniuses.)

[87] "But it must be emphasized that the warrior spirit is one thing and the military spirit quite another. Militarism was unknown in the Middle Ages. The soldier signifies the degeneration of the warrior, corrupted by the industrialist. The soldier is an armed industrialist, a bourgeois who has invented gunpowder. He was organized by the state to make war on the castles. With his coming, long-distance warfare appeared, the abstract war waged by cannon and machine gun." — José Ortega y Gasset, *España Invertebrada*, trans, by Mildred Adams (American Edition), New York, 1937.

[88] "The maintenance of a continuous policy is a difficulty in all popular governments." — Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, I, 301.

[89] "Among superior societies let us limit ourselves to the consideration of a single one, that of old France; here the hierarchy of birth was considered but one notion among many others; besides imposing duties on those favored by it, it was balanced everywhere by the hierarchy of merits and that of virtues; and in the foundations of a constitutional society religion annulled the inequality which it respected on the surface. In an organization whose most precious quality consisted precisely in the fact that it is not built up systematically but results from an established compromise throughout the centuries between forces of different order, power is much more apparent in its majesty than in its exigence, in this authority rather than in its domination, and august as this organization may seem it deserves to be called benign, discrete and even modest considering the liberty which it gives to man to know and fulfill himself outside of its bounds. Everybody developed his personality without leaving behind his life. The artisan in employing the tools for his work was seizing the instruments

for his own perfection. Whoever did his duty was working at the perfection of his soul. To every lord in society there was a master craftsman in a workshop, on a farm. *The king was the father of his people only because every father was king in his family."* — Abel Bonnard, *Les Modérés*. About monarchy and fatherhood see: Dr. Paul Federn, *Die Vaterlose Gesellschaft*, Vienna, 1919, pp. 27 ff.

90 Vladimir Soloviev, *La Russie et L'Église Universelle*, Paris, 1906, pp. 314, 315.

About the interrelationship between Catholic Church and Monarchy, see, "On the Monarchical character of the Church," Tanquerey, *Synopsis Totius Theologiae dogmaticae*, Vol. I, *Tournay, 1899*, pp. 463, 464.

91 "Say then, my friend, in what manner does tyranny arise? — that it has democratic origin is evident."

"Clearly."

"And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as democracy from oligarchy — I mean, after a sort?" — Plato, *Republic*, Book VIII, trans, by Jowett.

92 The reason why we do not deal more profoundly with the state of antiquity is because we believe that the influence of the antique pattern on modern conditions is less intensive than usually assumed. This does not mean that one has to go as far as Gonzague de Reynold who says in his *L'Europe Tragique:*

"It has been attempted to give ancestors to modern democracy: ancient democracies, the urban or peasant democracies of the Middle Ages. These are only pictures acquired by a newly rich to adorn his château; he may take on the name but he is not of the same house."

Yet the influence of the Antique Republic was undoubtedly very strong in the case of the American Republic of the Founding Fathers, less so in the case of modern America.

93 "Now, if an unjust government is carried on by one man alone who seeks his own benefit from his rule, and not the good of the multitude subject to him, such a ruler is called a tyrant — a word derived from strength, because he oppresses by might instead of ruling by justice. Thus among the ancients, all powerful men were called tyrants. But if the unjust government is carried on, not by one but by several, especially if they be few, it is called an oligarchy, that is, the rule of the few. This occurs when a few, who differ from the tyrant only by the fact that they are more than one, oppress the people by means of their wealth. If, however, the bad government is carried on by the multitude it is called a democracy, that is, control by the populace. This comes about when the plebeian populace by force of numbers oppress the wealthy. In this way the whole people will be as one tyrant." — St. Thomas Aquinas, *On the Government of Rulers*, trans, by Gerald B. Phelan, Ph.D., St. Michael's College Philosophical texts, pp. 37–38.

94 "If therefore the government by a king is the best, the government by a tyrant is the worst." — St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Regimine Principum*, I, 3.

95 "We are not justified in concluding that St. Thomas was an early exponent of democracy. This particular form of government was for him only one of several possible forms, all of which, to be legitimate, must possess the characteristics which I have outlined. In fact, democracy was for him the least valuable form of all, as a pure form, though his ideal monarchy has the democratic element of requiring the election of both the supreme and subordinate rulers. It is only by identifying the democratic form of government with popular sovereignty that we can draw the conclusion of his supposed democratic teachings. That is an unnecessary and unjustified conclusion." Cf. Closing sentences of Wilfred Parson, S.J., "Aquinas and Popular Sovereignty," September number of *Thought*, 1941.

[96] It cannot be repeated often enough that the traditional (medieval, patriarchal) type of monarchy is thoroughly compatible with (and truly necessitates) the atmosphere of liberty. Dante, the great Catholic and medieval panegyrist of the universal monarchy says expressively in his *De Monarchia:* "The human race is most happy when it is free. This becomes manifest when the principle of liberty is applied. In that connection one must remember that the first principle of our liberty is the freedom of will. Many talk about it but so few keep it in mind" (I, 12). Cf. the article of Drieu la Rochelle in the *Revue de Paris*, June 1, 1939, in which he emphasizes that a true and "manly" liberal must be a monarchist. *"Apropos des 150 ans de la Révolution."*

[97] St. Robert Bellarmine says in his *De Officio Principis:* "Kings must not grow insolent or contemn private men; but they should carry their scepter, not in pride, but as a cross. . . . A good ruler will regard his subjects as children, not as servants; as brethren, not as strangers" (Cap. XXII and VII).

In an ideal monarchy there must be a real mutual affection between monarch and people, an affection similar to that between parents and children. Durability is another characteristic of this affection in an ideal form. When Queen Astrid of Belgium died in 1935 the people cried in the streets of Brussels.

[98] Calvin did not go as far as that but in his letter to the Protector Somerset in 1548 his theocratic republicanism does not seem to have restrained him from acknowledging the Divine Rights of Kings.

[99] "By the way, Shatov declares, that if there's to be a rising in Russia we must begin with atheism. Maybe it's true. One grizzled old stager of a captain sat mum, not saying a word. All at once he stands up in the middle of the room and says aloud, as though speaking to himself: 'If there's no God, how can I be a captain then?' He took up his cap and went out, flinging up his hands." — F. M. Dostoyevski, *The Possessed*.

"Terrible is the Czar-Animal, but even more terrible is the Animal-People." — Myerezhkovski, *The 14, December*.

[100] "As individualists we are subject to the stars, as persons we rule them. . . . In the social order the modern city sacrifices the *person* to the *individual;* it gives universal suffrage, equal rights, liberty of opinion to the *individual* and delivers the *person*, isolated, naked, with no social framework to support and protect it, to all the devouring powers which threaten the soul's life, to the pitiless actions and reactions of conflicting interests and appetites, to the infinite demands of matter to manufacture and use. To all the greeds and all the wounds which every man has by nature it adds incessant stimuli, and the countless horde of all kinds of errors, sparkling and sharpened, to which it gives the free circulation in the sky of intelligence. And it says to each of the poor children of men set in the midst of this turmoil: 'You are a free individual; defend yourself, save yourself, all by yourself.' It is a homicidal civilization.

"Moreover, if a State is to be built out of this dust of individuals, then — and most logically, as the individual as such is, as I have said, only a part — the individual will be completely annexed to the social whole, will no longer exist except for the city, and we shall see individualism culminate quite naturally in the monarchic tyranny of a Hobbes, the democratic tyranny of a Rousseau, or the tyranny of the 'Providence State' and the 'God State' of a Hegel and his disciples.

"Let us say that the Christian City is as fundamentally anti-individualist as it is fundamentally personalist." — Jacques Maritain, *Three Reformers*.

N.B. "Person" comes from *per se!* The word "individual" signifies the last indivisible fragment of a whole.

[101] "But liberty and equality are incompatible. One can only achieve equality by restraining liberty, by eliminating individual differences. Democracy proclaims popular sovereignty, the

sovereignty of the number." — Gonzague de Reynold, *L'Europe Tragique*.

102 It is interesting to note that the violently anthropocentric humanitarian has usually the tendency to indulge in an excessive and morbid devotion for animals. Atheism breeds either a severe and hairsplitting biologism which is based on racial differences and speaks of superraces and supermen *or* it invokes a broad materialism which lumps all "animals" from the amoeba to the glamour girl together. The atrocities committed in the name of the former brand are of an obvious nature; yet the infamies perpetrated by the latter are not less conspicuous; if the ant is as good as a human being there is no reason why man should not be treated as an insect (and frequently as an obnoxious insect).

The efforts of Leftists of the "humanitarian" wing to abolish legislation against sodomy come from the same ideological background. (F.S.C.)

103 The prediction of Mazzini, quoted by Smith and Elder, in their biography of his *Life and Letters*, was not fulfilled. He is supposed to have said: "The indisputable tendency of our epoch is toward a reconstruction of Europe into a certain number of *homogeneous* national states as nearly as possible equal in population and in extent."

104 Regarding the distinction between British and Continental liberalism, cf. The Earl of Beaconsfield (Benjamin Disraeli), *Endymion*, London, 1920, p. 7.

105 Gonzague de Reynold, while seeing in liberalism the minor evil of the two, continues in his *L'Europe Tragique* to express the traditional Catholic attitude toward the thing labeled "Liberalism." He sees in liberalism as in democracy ultraoptimistic philosophies of heretical origin. He says: "Prosperity is a postulate of liberalism and democracy. These are, as we have seen, optimistic doctrines which, in order to appear genuine, need a great deal of prosperity, happiness, and in any case, of confidence."

Democracy is for him the child of liberalism, the French Revolution, the Glorious Revolution transplanted to Paris. The Platonic idea that democracy develops from oligarchy which in its turn derives from aristocracy has probably influenced him deeply. Liberalism is for Gonzague de Reynold doomed to end in democracy: "Democracy therefore will devour liberalism, whose child it is. Liberalism from the beginning on felt that it would have to be the victim. Liberalism is generous and therefore weak. Democracy is jealous and therefore strong. Socialism is tyrannical and therefore powerful."

Yet he adds later on: "Liberalism is instinctively opposed to the system of majority." The same idea can be found in Professor Louis Rougier's *La Mystique démocratique*, Paris, 1929.

How can we account for such a relatively considerable difference of opinion between him and Dawson, two contemporary European Catholic thinkers? Dawson has probably before his mind the aristocratic libertinarianism originating from the Magna Charta. ("Liberty has always been an aristocratic ideal," he says in Beyond *Politics*). Thus he puts less stress on the later, additional element of bourgeois, Manchesterian liberalism with its strong materialistic aspects and its *Diesseitsoptimismus* inspired by the French Philosophers. This optimism in regard to *this* word and to human nature is the reaction against the Lutheran despair about the alleged total wretchedness of man and the Calvinistic despair about man's helplessness in the grip of predestination. There is nothing more truly Catholic than the healthy thirst for liberty blended with piety and real humility. (Otherwise it degenerates into some form of anarchy.) Gonzague de Reynold sees liberalism as the *ism or organized philosophy* of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, while Dawson turns his eye to the deep-rooted British *sentiment*. From their own points of view one can say that both are right. It is merely surprising that two such Continentals like Ortega y Gasset and the Bulgar Petko Staïnov take the Dawsonian view about the issue.

Petko Staïnov wrote his *Competence and Democracy* (Kompetentnost i Narodovlastië) in 1923. He came to his conclusions independently from Ortega y Gasset who distinguishes between Liberalism and Democracy.

Something similar had been expressed by Montesquieu almost 200 years ago in his *De l'esprit des lois* (Book XI, Ch. II).

W. H. Chamberlin in his *The World's Iron Age*, New York, 1941, pp. 46–47, joins the ranks of those who resisted the confusing of the terms liberalism and democracy valiantly.

Gonzague de Reynold also makes the very necessary distinction between democracy and *demophily* (the love and respect of the rulers and "higher" classes for the "lower" social layers). Émile Faguet in his *Cult of Incompetence* emphasized this before him.

106 If only one country adopts conscription it automatically forces the rest of the world to imitate its practice. The "abyss calls to the abyss." The United States has been so forced, against her best tradition, to adopt conscription and so becomes a victim of circumstances. Yet, though the *majority* dislike conscription, still the *majority* recognize it as a grim necessity of these times.

107 "During the past century and a half civilization has re-created the armed horde. Previously a rarity, it has become the accepted instrument of any great military effort. It has not however come alone. Exactly a hundred and fifty years ago, in 1789 — shortly after the United States had sought to protect themselves against democracy by their federal constitution — the French Revolution began. From that time to our own day democratic ideas have come to dominate politics just as the mass army has dominated war. It is the thesis of this book that the two are inseparably connected with each other and with a third thing, barbarism." — Hoffman Nickerson, *The Armed Horde*, New York, 1940.

A similar idea has been expressed by Guglielmo Ferrero: "Before the French Revolution, wars scarcely affected the masses. They were fought out between sovereigns — the emperor, the kings, or the aristocratic republics which were still numerous in the eighteenth century — between ruling classes few in numbers, homogeneous, cultured, and refined. These classes could fight each other without excessive animosity; they could recognize that the enemy's cause was as righteous as their own; they could wage war as a game, respecting its rules even when it would be more advantageous to break them; and admit defeat as soon as it became too dangerous to keep on. Today it is the people who fight. . . . This mass cannot keep up the efforts of a war unless it is fired by some passion common to it all. A nation at war must therefore *hate* the enemy, which means that it must be convinced that it is defending the most righteous of causes against the most infamous aggression; that it represents innocent Right fighting against Evil armed with the most diabolical of long-premeditated designs." — Guglielmo Ferrero, *Peace and War* (London: Macmillan, 1933), pp. 57–58, trans, by Bertha Pritchard.

108 In fact democracy is essentially militaristic. Cf. P. J. Proudhon, *Le Principe Federatif*. See also Lucien Romier, *Explication de notre temps*, Paris, 1925, p. 163.

109 About the objectivity of the "strange," cf. Georg Simmel, *Soziologie*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 687.

110 "The very support which republican doctrine finds in "democracy" has been handed down directly from the royal tradition: the king, ever since the eary Middle Ages has ruled against the privileged classes, allying himself with the common people, later on with the third estate. And it is precisely the rupture of this alliance which brought about the fall of the monarchy." — Lucien Romier, *"Explication De Notre Temps*, Paris, 1925, p. 195.

111 Joseph Leo Seifert, a disciple of P. Wilhelm Schmidt, S.V.D., the eminent cofounder of the Theory of the Cultural Circles (*Kulturkreislehre*) writes about the "totemistic man" (the modern city dweller) in his book *Die Weltrevolutionäre* (Vienna, 1930), an indispensable work for the understanding of Europe, as follows: "Totemistic man is from the very beginning on international,

since he is made to be mediator between the peoples. Being tied neither to the soil nor to the family he is the typical individualist, the man without tradition. He therefore has no respect for either the organically grown or the intellectually acquired but tries to eliminate all differences because they only create expenses. Only when this fanatic egalitarianism spreads into national life, modern, i.e., *calvinistic* nationalism is born [Chauvinism]."

112 Christopher Dawson says in his *Beyond Politics:* "In reality the existing tendency toward social uniformity is far from solving the problem of social organization; it merely provides the material, the unorganized mass, which has to be informed by living spirits and ordered to some higher end. Without this, social uniformity can mean no more than a reversion to barbarism, and democracy nothing more than the rule of the herd.

"Obviously there is no room in such a society for liberty, as it has been understood in the past. For liberty is not the right of the mass to power, but the right of the individual and the group to achieve the highest possible degree of self-development. Hence liberty has always been an aristocratic ideal and it is no accident that England, the home of parliamentary institutions and political liberties, should also have been the European state which possessed the strongest and most unbroken tradition of aristocratic government.

"It is a survival of the vestiges of this aristocratic tradition which, in spite of the progress of democracy and social uniformity, renders English society so recalcitrant to totalitarian ideas. A pure democracy which sets equality above every other social value can adapt itself to a totalitarian organisation as easily as a pure autocracy; but a totalitarian aristocracy has never existed, and though the English state may well lose what remains of its aristocratic institutions, it cannot divest itself of the values and ideas that were developed by this political tradition without a loss of national character, in other words, without losing its own soul."

And later he adds: "What the nondictatorial states stand for today is not liberalism but democracy, a very different thing, as the old liberals themselves recognized and as their last representative Croce still points out today. Liberalism stands for the rights of the individual and the freedom of private opinion and private interests while democracy stands for the rights of majority and the sovereignty of public opinion and the common interest."

113 "Caesarism is the concentration of all social power inside a state in one single person or one single body. It is therefore the only form of government convenient to nations in a state of social dissolution. . . . Also caesarism is one of the phases through which a revolution necessarily passes if the multitude, having broken up the social organisms becomes conscious of the ensuing anarchy and instinctively tries to save itself without recognizing its error and turning back from it." — La-Tour-du-Pin de la Charce, *Aphorismes de Politique Sociale*. Another view about the sequence of forms of government can be found in Polybius (*Works*, London, 1923), Vol. III, Bk. IV, pp. 2–10.

114 "These facts have been lost sight of, on account of the merciless propaganda of the French revolutionists, who desired to blacken as much as they could the system they were bent on destroying. But no intelligent man now can see anything more in that period of philosophical madness than the summit of a movement that finally broke down feudalism, not to liberate man, but to force him into the arms of a rising factory system. He became free — but only to sell his toil at a sacrifice of privilege, and for a bare subsistence wage. It is notorious that at the time the factory system arose, when France and England were warring for commercial supremacy, wages were lower than they had been for centuries, considering their purchasing power. It was only after prolonged labor conflicts that conditions again approximated ancient levels. The story of the state of English labor at the close of the eighteenth century is almost incredible, and yet the ancestors of this wretched class had been the yeomanry of Merrie England." — James H. Wood, *Democracy and the Will to Power* (New York: Knopf, 1921), pp. 164-165.

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On liberty, the Constitution and majoritism: Ibidem, p. 60.

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On monarchy and Aristocracy: Ibidem, p. 82.

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On the antithesis between liberty and equality (*or democracy*).

Luis Legaz y Lacambra, *Introducción a la teoria del Estado Nacionalsindicalista*, Barcelona, 1940, p. 49.

Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1924, p. 745.

Radbruch, *Rechtsphilosophie*, Leipzig, 1932, pp. 66 ff.

About the "democratic" and libertinarian aspects of monarchy:

Salvador de Madariaga, *Hernán Cortés*, New York, 1941, pp. 40–41.

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Carlton Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism* (1871–1900), New York, 1941, pp. 279–280.

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W. H. Chamberlin, "Who Are the Japanese," *American Mercury*, No. 218, Feb., 1942.

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Cf. Ernest O. Hauser, "Are Japanese People?" in *Saturday Evening Post*, Nov. 16, 1940.

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On nationalism and patriotism:

Miguel de Unamuno, *Vérités arbitraires*, Paris, pp. 190–191.

On monarchy, aristocracy, and republic:

Lucien Romier, *Explication de notre temps*, Paris, 1925, pp. 195, 241–242.

An exact prophecy of the present war: Ibidem, p. 275.

About Francis II of Austria and Napoléon:

Guglielmo Ferrero, *Pouvoir*, New York, 1942, p. 122.

On a typical seventeenth-century opinion on monarchy:

Bossuet, *Oeuvres Completes*, Paris, 1836, Töme X, pp. 328–335.

On the values of even an absolute monarchy:

Guglielmo Ferrero, *Pouvoir*, New York, 1942, p. 52.

On "federalism" from a Christian point of view:

Dr. Eugen Stamm, citing Constantin Frantz in his preface to Constantin Frantz' *Deutschland und der Föderalismus*, Stuttgart-Berlin, 1921, p. x.

On the antagonism between liberty and centralism:

M. Bakounin, *Oeuvres*, Tôme I, Paris, 1907, pp. 11–12.

On the insincere socialism of the Poles:

Ibidem. Tôme II, Paris, 1907, p. 172.

On the "international" outlook of monarchs:

Professor Albert Guérard cites in his *The France of Tomorrow* the advisers of Alexander I of Russia (p. 34): Nesselrode, a German born in Portugal, baptized an Anglican, Stackelberg, a Baltic-German, Stein, a West-German, Kotzebue, a Central-German, Capo-d'Istria, a Greek-born in Austria, Czartoryski, a Pole, La Harpe (Swiss), Pozzo di Borgo, a French of Italian-Corsican origin, the Due de Richelieu (a Frenchman), Madame de Krüdener (German-Swiss), and Madame de Staël (French-Swiss).

II

PARLIAMENTARISM AND REPUBLICANISM

115 Walter Starkie in his *Spanish Raggle-Taggle* reports a rather original conversation between himself, Unamuno, and Pio Baroja on this subject. He writes: "After hearing Unamuno's long enconium on St. Ignatius, the great Captain of the Basques, Baroja would shrug his shoulders and grunt his dissent as follows: "Great states, great captains, great kings, great gods leave me cold. They are for the people who dwell in plains watered by rich rivers, for Egyptians, Chinese, Germans, and French. We Europeans of the Pyrenees and Alps love small states, small rivers and small gods whom we may address familiarly."

"But Don Pio," I should ask timidly, "whom do you understand by Europeans?"

"Then Baroja would answer gravely: 'At times I think that the Alps and the Pyrenees are the only European parts of Europe. Above them I see Asia and below them Africa.'"

"To which Unamuno would murmur dreamily: 'And I should not be ashamed to be African, yes, as African as Tertullian and Augustine.'"

116 "Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities." — John St. Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, New York, 1882, p. 310.

117 "In a struggle one must have both legs firmly planted on the earth. The Party taught one how to do it. The infinite was a politically suspect quantity, the 'I' a suspect quality. The Party did not recognize its existence. The definition of the individual was: a multitude of one million divided by one million.

"The Party denied the free will of the individual — and at the same time it exacted his willing self-sacrifice. It denied his capacity to choose between two alternatives — and at the same time it demanded that he should constantly choose the right one. It denied his power to distinguish good and evil — and at the same time it spoke pathetically of guilt and treachery. The individual stood under the sign of economic fatality, a wheel in a clockwork which had been wound up for all eternity and could not be stopped or influenced — and the Party demanded that the wheel should revolt against the clockwork and change its course. There was somewhere an error in the calculation; the equation did not work out." — Arthur Koestler, *Darkness at Noon*, trans. Daphne Hardy (Macmillan: New York, 1941), pp. 257–258.

118 In regards to the craving for safety and the golden age of collective security one can quote H. L. Mencken who says in his *Notes on Democracy:* "The truth is that the common man's love of liberty, like his love of sense, justice, and truth, is almost wholly imaginary. As I have argued, he is not actually happy when free; he is uncomfortable, a bit alarmed, and intolerably lonely. He longs for the warm, reassuring smell of the herd and is willing to take the herdsmen with it. . . . The average man doesn't want to be free. He simply wants to be safe."

119 See Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*, on the political influence of evolutionism in the nineteenth century. Also C. J. H. Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism* (New York: Harper's, 1941).

120 Moritz Busch wrote in his diaries in 1870: "The enlightened ones are not tolerant either. They persecute the faithful, though not with the stake — that would be impossible — but with sarcasm and arrogance in the press and among the nonbelieving people; in this we have made no progress." (This Professor Hayes would call "sectarian liberalism.")

The popularity which the theory of evolution soon enjoyed on the Continent as well as in England is amply explained by Werner Sombart in his last work, *Vom Menschen*. He writes: "Don't let us be

surprised with Uncle Eberhard in Fontane's book when he says: 'I can well remember the times, when the monkey business came into fashion, when some people declared, that a certain Orang-Utang was our grandfather. You should have seen it, how everybody seemed delighted. When we were still convinced to have been created by God, no fuss was made, but when the monkeys got in vogue, they danced as the Jews of old before the Ark of Covenant.'"

The inroads made by atheism were only possible after the Protestant prelude. The Protestant religions besides their inherent "protest" are mainly characterized by their decreasing *depositum fidei*. This decrease is an important element in the bourgeois attitude toward integral Christianity. Bernhard Groethuysen in his *"Origines de l'esprit bourgeois en France"* (Vol. I), gave a brilliant analysis of this process.

121 "I am thoroughly convinced that the social instinct of an ant, stored up little by little in its heredity memory and co-ordinated by that memory, is far wiser than that of *Homo Sapiens."* — Auguste Forel, *L'homme et la fourmi*.

122 One of the most notorious democratists of all times, the Marquis de Sade, attacked the human "arrogance" in putting humanity above the animal kingdom. (Cf. Armand, Treni, and Hood in *Le symbolisme sexuel des Utopistes*, Paris, 1935.)

123 Alexis de Tocqueville, in his *De La Democracie en Amerique*, saw, 110 years ago, the inherent connection between determinism and democracy when he wrote: "The historians of a democratic age therefore deny not only to a few citizens the power to act upon the destiny of their people, they also deny the peoples themselves the faculty of shaping their own destinies and in that way either place them under an *inflexible providence or a kind of blind fatality*. According to them every nation is invincibly attached, by its position, its origin, its antecedents, its nature, to a specific destiny which none of their efforts can ever change. They render the generations jointly answerable to each other, they proceed in this manner from age to age and from the necessary events to the origin of the world, they fabricate an immense, tight chain which surrounds and ties together all mankind."

Friedrich Nietzsche follows the same idea in *Beyond Good and Evil* when he says: "The democratic idea proceeds toward the fabrication of a human type fit for slavery in the most delicate sense of the word. Every democracy is simultaneously an involuntary institution for the breeding of tyrants in every sense of the word, even in the spiritual sense."

124 About the end of privacy and private life in the modern city see also Lewis Mum-ford, *The Culture of Cities*, New York, 1938, p. 27.

125 "The physical change in the thickness of walls since the Middle Ages could be shown in a diagram. In the fourteenth century each house was a fortress. [Today each many storied house is a beehive. It is a city in itself, and its walls are thin partitions which barely shut us off from the street.] Man spent the major portion of his day in them, in secret and well-defended solitude. That solitude, working on the soul hour after hour, forged it, like a transcendent blacksmith, into a compact and forceful character. Under its treatment, man consolidated his individual destiny and sallied forth with impunity, never yielding to the contamination from the public. It is only in isolation that we gain, almost automatically, a certain discrimination in ideas, desires, longings, that we learn which are ours, and which are anonymous, floating in the air, falling on us like dust in the street." — José Ortega y Gasset, *España Invertebrada*, American Edition, trans, by Mildred Adams, New York, 1937, p. 168.

126 The Prussian mind of Clausewitz had also duly contributed to the modern chaos: "In his [Clausewitz'] eyes the main object of the state was to manufacture war power instead of merely insuring itself against war. What Clausewitz really did was to democratize war, and when the spirit of his doctrines was coupled with that of Darwin's *"The Origin of Species"* (1859), they produced the

Prussian Military System; and when united with that of Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* (1867), they produced the Russian Military System. All three writers based their theories upon *'mass* struggle' — in war, in life and in economics." — Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, *War and Western Civilization*, 1832–1932. "A Study of War as a Political Instrument and the Expression of Mass Democracy" (London: Duckworth, 1932), p. 48.

127 "If it be true . . . that an aristocracy distinguished merely by wealth must perish from satiety, so I hold it equally true that a people who recognise no higher aim than physical enjoyment must become selfish and enervated. Under such circumstances the supremacy of race which is the key of history will assert itself. Some human progeny, distinguished by their bodily vigour or their masculine intelligence . . . will assert their superiority and conquer a world which deserves to be enslaved. It will then be found that our boasted progress has only been an advancement in a circle, and that our new philosophy has brought us back to that old serfdom which it has taken ages to extirpate." — Disraeli (*Monypenny and Buckle*), quoted by Arthur Bryant in *A Pageant of England*, New York, 1941.

Further reference material:

On party rule:

Orestes Brownson, *Works*, Volume XVIII, p. 141.

Bede Jarrett, O.P., *Social Theories of the Middle Ages*, Boston, 1926, p. 28. (Partyrule being considered as hostile to liberty.)

On the pseudo-socialistic implications of Darwinism:

Émile Zola, *Germinal*, Paris, II Vol., p. 179.

III

WORLD WAR I

128 G. P. Gooch makes, in his "English democratic ideas in the seventeenth century," allusion to Montesquieu's observation about the innate affinity of Catholicism with monarchy and Protestantism with republicanism (Montesquieu, *L'esprit des lois*, xxiv, 5) and remarks: "The idea that underlies the exaggeration is to some extent correct."

This observation has to be taken *cum grano salis*. A commentator and columnist once expounded the theory that every Protestant nation has an innate demand for political liberties while Catholic nations stand for authority, discipline, and suppression. Somebody mentioned Prussia and Belgium and the conversation drifted quickly to other subjects.

129 The common denominator of European movements was the hostile attitude of the masses against the Church. See Georges Sorel, *L'Église et L'État*.

130 Austria-Hungary: "The final dissolution of this venerable, but decayed structure will be regarded by the historian of the future as the inner explanation of the Great War." — Richard von Kühlmann, *Thoughts on Germany* (London: Macmillan, 1932), p. 108.

131 "It is now generally recognized that William II was at heart a man of peace." — G. P. Gooch, *German Life and Letters*, Vol. 3. See also the works of Poultney Bigelow, Daniel Chamier, Sidney Fay, and others.

There is a very good and short summing up of the arguments against Germany's (and William II's) war guilt in the excellent book of the German Socialist Dr. Arthur Rosenberg: *Die Entstehung der deutschen Republik*, Berlin, 1930, pp. 66–67. (Published under the title, *The Birth of the German*

Republic, in a translation by Ian Morrow by the Oxford University Press, London, 1931.) The catastrophical policy of Ludendorff during the war is brilliantly described.

132 The prisoners of war in Austria-Hungary usually went hungry but so did the entire population.

Hoffman Nickerson writes in the *Armed Horde* about civilians in enemy countries during the wars prior to the French Revolution: "While the professional troops were performing their miracles of endurance and valor, civilians went to and fro freely between their own country and the one with which it happened to be at war. During the Seven Years' War, a man of letters like Sterne could go from England to Paris, frequent Diderot and Holbach, be cheered by admirers of his character of Uncle Toby, and attend theatricals at Frontignac among an English colony there without troubling in the least over his citizenship in a hostile state. So little was Europe then troubled by the existence of war."

133 The Calvinistic forerunners of organized bourgeois hate could hardly be outdone by their more "democratic" epigones. Sayous in his *Études littéraires sur les écrivains français de la Reformation* cites a poem of the Calvinist Théodore Agrippa d'Aubigne against the French Catholics which would outdo any modern hate song.

134 This violent propaganda of hatred is well described by S. E. Morison and H. S. Commager in the *Growth of the American Republic*. These authors write: "Artists, advertisers, poets, historians, photographers, educators, actors were enlisted in the campaign and the country was inundated with a flood of propaganda pamphlets, posters, magazines and newspapers. Altogether over one hundred million pieces of 'literature' were distributed by the indefatigable Creel, while some seventy-five thousand 'four-minute men' let loose a barrage of oratory at movie houses and public gatherings which prostrated the intelligence of the country. Motion pictures displayed to horrified audiences the barbarities of the "Hun"; pamphlets written by learned professors proved to the more skeptical that the Germans had always been a depraved people; and thousands of canned editorials taught the average man what to think about the war. In this campaign of education none was neglected; school children learned to lisp the vocabulary of hatred; women's clubs titillated to atrocity stories; and foreigners were taught to be ashamed that they had not been born in America. Nor were the delights of education confined to the United States; in the spirit of Garrison's 'our country is the world; our countrymen all mankind' Creel launched out to conquer the world with the spirit instead of the sword. No people was safe from his zeal, no country too remote for his concern. Three hundred Chinese newspapers supplied the palpitating celestials with "The Truth About the War," and pictures of the American President and the American Flag hung on walls of cottages of Russian peasants and Peruvian *mestizos*. It was such a triumph of the spirit as the world has never known, and brought about an intellectual uniformity and a social conformity from the effects of which the generation never fully recovered" (New York: Oxford University Press, 1937), Vol. II, pp. 475, 476.

135 The *Times* wrote in August, 1917: "The document — (the papal peace proposals) — bears plain and large the marks of German inspiration."

About Germany's reaction to the peace proposals see *Kühlmann und die päpstliche Friendensaktion von 1917*, by Friedrich Meinecke, Berlin, 1928. (On R. v. Kühlmann's ideas about the peace cf. *op cit*., p. 21.)

136 Cf. Adam de Villiers, quotation in *Clémenceau parle*, Paris, 1931, p. 39.

Cf. also Philippe Amiguet, *Zita, Princesse de la Paix;* and *La Vie du Prince Sixte de Bourbon*.

137 Anatole France, who remained always very outspoken during that critical period said openly: "No one will ever persuade me that the war could not have been ended long ago. The Emperor Charles offered peace. There is the only honest man who occupied an important position during the war, but he was not listened to. In my opinion his offer ought to have been accepted. The Emperor

Charles had a sincere desire for peace, so everybody hates him. Ribot is an old scoundrel to have neglected such an occasion. A King of France, yes, a King would have taken pity on our poor people, bled white, attenuated, at the end of their strength. But democracy is without heart, without bowels. A slave of the powers of money, it is pitiless and inhuman." — Quoted by Sir Charles Petrie, *Twenty Years Armistice and After*, London, 1940, p. 12.

138 See the brilliant description of Lloyd George's attitude at the time of the "Khaki elections" in J. M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace 1919* (London, 1919).

139 "The great 'arbitrators of the Peace' — with the exception of André Tardieu, Lord Balfour, and Nitti — were entirely ignorant of the geography, history and ethnography of the peoples and countries whose destinies they were about to decide. Wilson for instance constantly mixed up Slovaks and Slovenes and he could not believe his ears when Orlando told him that a Polish king had led the Hungarian and Croat armies against the Turks and that Venice at one time owned all the territory along the Adriatic shores in the Balkans." — Nitti, *La Pace*.

Lloyd George was not better informed. All had been said about Clémenceau, his prodigious ignorance and about everything else which did not concern romantic history or interior French politics. — Cf. Henri Pozzi, *Les Coupables*.

"Nevertheless there is a real distinction between professional and temporary fighting men. The professional form a guild or corporation of their own, distinct from other citizens. They fight from disciplined habit. Their esprit de corps is not unlike a strongly developed school or college spirit. Their sense of honour of arms has much in common with that of a clergyman who will not disgrace his cloth or a good workman who would be ashamed to do a bad job. Thus they are ordinarily obedient instruments of the governments which pay them. The French Foreign Legion or the United States Marines have fought in many quarrels about the merits of which their individual members cared little. They need no violent emotions to make them fight. It has been well said that the grenadiers of Maria Theresa did not have to be told that Frederick the Great was a Sodomite, or those of Frederick that Maria Theresa, ate babies." — Hoffman Nickerson, *The Armed Horde*, New York, 1940.

140 About the "Just War and Peace," see Franciscus de Vitoria, Second *Relectio*, trans. by John Pawley Bate, LL.D. (*Relectiones Theologicae XII*), ed. by Ernest Nys (*The Classics of International Law*, edited by James Brown Scott).

141 About the diplomatic, political, and linguistic abilities of President Wilson and the other participants of the Peace Conference, see J. M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace 1919*, London, 1919.

142 The following illustrates Mr. David Lloyd George's mind: London, September 21, 1936, Associated Press. David Lloyd George returned from a trip to Germany, told the press association in an interview today: "Germany does not want war, but she is afraid of an attack by Russia and is suspicious of the Franco-Russian mutual assistance pact."

The wartime Prime Minister who visited Adolph Hitler added: "I have never seen a happier people than the Germans. Hitler is one of the greatest of the many great men I have ever met."

Yet Mr. Lloyd George spoke on October 28, 1937, on Spanish "Democracy" in favor of the "loyalists."

"The author has tried in vain to get from Mr. Lloyd George an authentic statement whether he had uttered the view that Germany could not possibly be dismembered like Austria-Hungary because she was a 'Protestant' power. Mr. Lloyd George declared through his secretary that he was too busy to answer the question with a straight affirmation or denial."

(Lloyd George, asked why he was so violent a partisan of the Spanish Republic . . . replied with a twinkle: "I always line up on the side against the priests." — Virginia Cowles in her "Looking for Trouble," London, 1941 (Hamish Hamilton), p. 107.

143 If the principle of self-determination had been adhered to Austria would have joined Germany right back in 1919. (The Austrian republican constitution says that the German-Austrian Republic is a part of the Great German Republic.) The result of such an early *Anschluss* would have been an enormous strengthening of the Catholic element in Germany which would have impaired her Protestant character.

Mr. Wilson had an excuse for not permitting such a thing. In the *Letters of Franklin Lane* (ed. by A. W. Lane and L. H. Hall), we find the following passage: "Theoretically, the President said, German-Austria should go to Germany, as all were of one language and one race, but this would mean the establishment of a great central Roman-Catholic nation which would be under the control of the Papacy, and would be particularly objectionable to Italy."

If the Catholic element of the Germanies would have been thus strengthened a victory of the National Socialist at the elections would have been spared. The history of Europe would have taken another course.

This is also the view of F. A. Hermens in *Democracy or Anarchy*, Notre Dame, South Bend, 1941. As to British anti-Austrian sentiments we have to refer largely to the "liberal" tradition. (Cf. Gladstone's election speech on March 17, 1880.)

144 "The League of Nations is no better than a half-hearted compromise with the ideals of Catholicism — a typist's dream of the Holy Roman Empire, for politicians, a new hypocrisy, for diplomats a sitting on addled eggs." — Compton Mackenzie, *My Religion* (New York: Appleton and Co., 1926), p. 52.

145 About the Calvinistic character of the Allies in World War I, cf. Émile Doumergue, professor of Calvinistic theology, "Calvin et L'Entente de Wilson à Calvin," *Revue de metaphysique et de morale*, Paris, February, 1918, and É. Doumergue "Les vraies origines de la démocratie moderne," Paris, 1919.

146 The Danzigers, for instance, once used to be the most loyal subjects of the Polish kings, who in turn respected the privileges of the city. When Danzig became Prussian, in 1795, the Danzigers defended themselves like lions against their German blood brothers. Today the situation has naturally changed.

147 Many keen observers are inclined to believe that Germany's prestige had increased even in spite of her defeat in 1918.

René Schickelé in his *Die Grenze* (Berlin, 1932, p. 146) quotes Anatole France saying in the summer of 1918: "Well, yes. we are going to defeat Germany. Yet for that purpose we will have made use of the whole world. Even if Germany is beaten she will be proud of having withstood the whole world and never is there going to be a people feeling so drunk and exalted by its own defeat.

"If the coming peace is not going to give birth to the United States of Europe it will remain a mere armistice and everything is going to start all over again."

This increase of prestige was mainly notable in Southern and Eastern Europe. The present war will have a further effect in that direction — whatever its outcome.

148 The German Socialist Karl Liebknecht visited, in autumn, 1914, the charred ruins of Louvain and summed up his impressions with the words "Eine Nationale Schande" — a national shame — for Germany. Jacques Bainville who always maintained that the Germans are not a nation (and herein he is largely right) wrote in the *Action Française* on September 29, 1914, with prophetic insight: "On the contrary, a German republic, as the revealing words of Liebknecht indicate so well, would

necessarily be accompanied by a strong nationalistic movement. It would be cracking a whip at a monster. The German revolutionaries of 1914 or 1915 (Bainville expected the breakdown as early as that) would be fanatic and belligerent patriots, as were our conventionalists, because the first obligation imposed upon them would be to maintain, in the face of the world, a Germany 'one and indivisible.'"

And when more than three years later the *Frankfurter Zeitung* menaced the Czechs with German supremacy and domination if they dared to destroy the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, he wrote in the *Action Française* with equal clear-sightedness: "In these few lines is contained an entire philosophy of history. It is obvious therefrom that the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy would improve nothing in Europe because it would only result in the transposing of the national fights from one territory to another. In the name of the same principle, which up to now permitted them to form their own national unity, and which other peoples invoked in turn, the German people will complain of being persecuted and will come back to demand its rights. It would simply be the beginning of endless conflicts."

149 J. M. Keynes wrote in his *Economic Consequences of the Peace 1919*, the following lines: "My purpose in this book is to show that the Carthaginian peace is not practically right or possible. Although the school of thought from which it springs is aware of the economic factor, it overlooks nevertheless, the deeper economic tendencies which are to govern the future. The clock cannot be set back. You cannot restore Central Europe to 1870 without setting up such strains in the European structure and letting loose such human and spiritual forces as, pushing beyond frontiers and races, will overwhelm not only you and your 'guarantees,' but your institutions, and the existing order of your Society" (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1920, pp. 36–37).

Keynes makes here a mistake. Central Europe of 1920 resembled far more the status of that region in A.D. 660 than in 1870. The tribal regions of "noble savages" was obviously the pattern.

150 "It was toward Austria that Clémenceau seemed to have the strongest grudge." — Raymond Poincaré, *L'Invasion*.

The old Tiger knew obviously better than our historians who take their cues from the columnists what it "was all about."

151 Dr. Edward Beneš is certainly one of the most enigmatic statesmen of our times. He is undoubtedly a Czech patriot strongly imbued by the Hussite tradition and a member of the Czech National Socialist party. As a convinced "democrat" (of the continental pattern) he always preferred Hitler to the Habsburgs and had played deliberately into the hands of the great mob master by violently opposing the restoration of the Habsburgs in Vienna and Budapest. He probably hoped by keeping away the Habsburgs from the Danube to earn the everlasting gratitude of his fellow National Socialists in Berlin.

152 Thanks to the Treaty of Trianon Hungary was made completely defenseless against any possible German threat. Neuilly as well as Trianon made effective armaments impossible. (Even gas masks could only be used *per nefas* in the Hungarian and Bulgar armies.) Tank and airplanes were prohibited. The size of the armies was restricted to 35,000 and 30,000 men respectively. Yet there are still a few nitwits in responsible positions in London and Washington who speak with contempt about these two nations who did not oppose German pressure, German occupation, German cooperation. Have not these two nations implored the League of Nations for years and years to avail itself of the provision to revise the peace treaties? Have they not clamored for equality in armament? Did they not campaign for two solid decades for the redress of the injustices inflicted on them? Yet they never received the slightest encouragement from London, Paris, or Washington. Hungary was vilified when

it reoccupied territory which was solidly Magyar and had been in Hungarian possession for over 1000 years, but in Czech possession for only 19 years.

These mistakes cost England very dearly. Czechoslovakia and Rumania, pampered for years with money and privileges, surrendered without firing a shot. Yugoslavia crumbled from inner dissent; even the Serbs who are good fighters had to give up because the Germans were able to attack from the flank, via Bulgaria. If Bulgaria would not have been driven into the enemy camp a line could have been established along the Danube and the Carst (always excluding Croatia) which could have been successfully defended. Yet blunder followed blunder and these can be traced back solidly to the arrangements of 1919 and 1920.

(Criticism of the peace arrangement, in a short outline, can be found in Algernon Cecil's pertinent *Facing the Facts in Foreign Policy*, London, 1941—a brilliant short study of Britain's disastrous dealings with the Continent.)

Further reference material:

On Italy in the First World War:

Guglielmo Ferrero, *Pouvoir*, New York, 1942, pp. 289, 297.

About the legal position of the ethnic groups in Austria-Hungary:

Das Nationalitätenrecht des Alten Österreich, edited by K. G. Hugelmann, Vienna, 1934.

About mass mentality in the war (First World War):

Caroline F. Playne, *Society at War (1914–1916*), London, 1931.

Gert Schreiner, *Die Republik der 14 Jahre*, Bilthoven, 1938, p. 114.

H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, London, 1927.

On the treatment of the German peace delegation 1919:

Sisley Huddleston, *Peacemaking at Paris*, London, 1919, p. 226.

"Allied" anti-German war literature paralleling Bernhardi's book in aggressiveness:

Homer Lea, *The Day of the Saxon*, London, 1912. Specially pp. 204, 213, 226, 233, 241, 10, 15, 146. (This book was dedicated to Field Marshall Roberts.)

The anonymous anti-German article in the *Saturday Review*, September, 1897.

La France victorieuse dans la guerre de demain, by Colonel Arthur Boucher.

La guerre de demain, by M. Keller.

On the war propaganda of Italian freemasonry prior to 1915:

Gino Bandini, *La Massoneria per la guerra nazionale*, Discorso detto a Palazzo Giustiniani il 24 maggio, 1924. (Pubished by the freemasons as a defense against the accusation of lacking patriotism.) Cf. p. 97. (Roma, a cura della Massoneria Romana, 1924.)

On the prowar attitude of certain leading Americans in 1915:

Dr. Eliot of Harvard to a meeting of Baptist ministers: "Do not pray for peace now.

I cannot conceive a worse catastrophe for the human race than peace in Europe now." (*The Nation*, April 17, 1915.)

On Germany and the Papal peace plan and the Papal peace effort:

Reverend Henry G. E. Rope, M.A., *Benedict XV*, London, 1941.

The article of L. J. S. Wood in the *Dublin Review*, April, 1922, gives, on p. 199, the details of Sonnino's clause XV of the London Protocol (stipulating that the Vatican should be excluded from a participation in the peace conference).

On a French protest against the Treaty of Versailles:

Édouard Dujardin (Professor of the Sorbonne) in *Les Cahiers idéalistes*, May-June-July, 1919.

On the myth of the economic origin of wars:

Sidney Fay, *Origins of the World War*, New York, 1938, p. 46.

Albert Guérard, *The France of Tomorrow*, Cambridge, 1942, p. 31.

On the character of a good peace treaty cf.

Fénélon, *Oeuvres*, Paris, 1787, Tôme III, p. 489.

On the peace treaties and Austria-Hungary:

Algernon Cecil, *Facing Facts in Foreign Policy*, London, 1941, p. 69.

Sir Charles Petrie, *20 Years Armistice and After*, London, 1940, pp. 10–11, 12, 126, 21, 165, 285.

Austria-Hungary as "run by Jews" decried by:

H. Wickham Steed, *A Programme for Peace*, Reprint from the *Edinburgh Review*, 1916, p. 19.

T. G. Masaryk, *The Making of a State* (edited by H. Wickham Steed), p. 439.

PART III

CASE HISTORIES

A) The Germanies B) The United States

I

THE GERMAN SCENE

153 Keyserling thinks that the Germanies have, on account of their nuclear "Centerness" no "national" character. He cites in his *Das Spektrum Europa's* ("Europe," London, 1927), the Russian ambassador in London, Count Benckendorff, who said: "Ne dites pas *les* Allemands; il n'ya que *des* Allemands." (Do not speak of *the* Germans, there are only Germans.) And he adds (making an allusion to Leibnitz): "Every German is truly a monad without windows; it seems therefore only reasonable that the inventor of monadology should be a German."

154 The relationship between Emperor and Pope was described by Dante in the following terms: "Yet the truth of this latter question must not be received so narrowly as to deny that in certain matters the Roman prince is subject to the Roman Pontiff. For that happiness which is subject to mortality, in a sense, is ordered with a view to the happiness which shall not taste of death. Let therefore, Caesar be reverent to Peter, as the first-born son should be reverent to his father, that he may be illuminated with the light of his father's grace and so may be stronger to lighten the world over which he has been placed by Him alone, who is the ruler of all things spiritual as well as temporal." — Dante, *De Monarchia*, III, 16.

Spiritual interests were here concerned. Neither Dante (nor Nicholas of Cusa) envisaged an absolute monarchy in the terms of James I or Louis XIV. Dante says: Upright governments have liberty as their aim, that men may live for themselves; citizens do not exist for the sake of the consuls, nor a people for a king, but conversely consuls for the sake of citizens and a king for his people (*De Monarchia*, I, 12). Nicholas of Cusa takes the same stand. Tyranny was abhorrent to both of them.

Yet just as the Pope was not a purely spiritual ruler the office of the Holy Roman Emperor had also its spiritual aspects. The Church has never officially abolished the prayer in the Good Friday "Mass" for the Holy Roman Emperor, a prayer, which would also be found in missals printed in the United States, China, or Ireland. It runs as follows:

"Let us also pray for our Most Christian Emperor *N.N.* that God, Our Lord may give him power over all barbaric nations so that we may live in peace.

"All powerful, eternal God, in thy hands are the powers of all and the laws of all kingdoms; look down with benevolence on the Roman Empire so that the Heathens confident in their violence may be suppressed by Thy right hand."

The legal as well as the physical descendant of the Roman Emperors is Otto, Archduke of Austria.

155 Cf. Edgar Jung (murdered by the Nazis on June 30, 1934), *Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen*.

Another revindication of the universal and all-European character of the Germanies can be found in Constantin Frantz' *Deutschland und der Föderalismus* (Stuttgart-Berlin, 1921), the great standard work of German anti-centralism. Frantz emphasized not unduly the absolute interconnection of German inner politics (and the structural struggles of the Germanies) with the fate of the rest of Europe. This interdependence, he writes, has "been demonstrated by history *ad nauseam."* The events after 1933 (and specially after 1938) have not disproved the views of the Great Seer.

156 "No fixed center point stands out but Germany as a whole presents itself as the center of Europe. . . . The Germans are a people without a pattern, for their country does not seem to be ordered according to a clear will or timing, it cannot be compared with any other people. Sweden has more in common with Norway and Finland, England more with France and Holland, Italy with Spain than Germany with any other country." — Eugen Diesel, *Die Deutsche Wandlung*.

157 "To live as one likes is plebeian; the noble man aspires to order and law," says Goethe. Yet one has to add that the blind, sour acceptance of brutally imposed chains are by themselves not "nobility." Any servitude must be accepted by free will as a voluntary sacrifice. This has to be borne in mind, otherwise one may fall into the error of putting a Carmelite monastery and a GPU lumber camp on the same moral level.

158 This complexity of the German character was the thing Nietzsche had in mind when he wrote: "As a people of the most phantastic mixture of races, perhaps even with a preponderance of the non-arian element, as the 'people of the Middle' in every sense of the word, the Germans are more unconceivable, vaster, more contradictory, less known, less reliable, more surprising, even more terrible than other peoples are to themselves; they escape any definition and for that reason alone they drive the French to desperation. . . . It is characteristic of the Germans that one is rarely entirely wrong about them. The German soul contains corridors and passages, caves, hideouts and dungeons; its chaos has the charm of the mysterious; the German is expert in finding secret paths to chaos. And as everything is attracted by its similar so the German loves the clouds and all that is vague, becoming, moist and veiled: the uncertain, the shapeless, the shifting, the growing, all this he senses as 'deep.' . . ." — *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* ("Beyond Good and Evil").

159 The same thought is expressed by Luther in exclamations like the following:

"Reason is directly opposed to faith and one ought to let it be; in believers it should be killed and buried" (Erlanger Ausgabe, XLIV, 158).

"You must abandon your reason, know nothing of it, annihilate it completely or you will never enter heaven. You must leave reason to itself, for it is the born enemy of faith. . . .

"There is nothing so contrary to faith as law and reason. You must conquer them if you would reach beatitude" (Tischreden. Weimarer Ausgabe, VI, 6718).

160 "Out of German and Slave blood, German and Slave character, German and Slave culture the giant retort which this zone resembles, produces a new brand of peoples, German in its general coloring and species and yet very different in its structure and individual organism, a new species, a new, East-Elbian race.

"So the Bohemian should be a relative of the Prussian? — Yes, that is so. Masaryk can go on anathemizing the Prussian, can go on condemning and discarding the Prussian Spirit and Prussian way of thinking. The East-Elbian Prussian is blood of his blood and even in his innermost being very nearly related to him." — Rudolf Nadolny, *Germanisierung Oder Slawisierung* (Berlin: 1928), Otto Stollberg Verlag, pp. 203–204.

[161] The French always played with the idea of carving Germany up into impotent little states (preferably under their tutelage). Against these French separatistic tendencies an equally hideous centralism arose endangering German federalism which alone is congenial to Germandom. This French folly is clearly seen by such a good friend of France as Professor D. W. Brogan who writes: "No genuine, dignified, worthy resistance to Prussianism, no anti-Bismarckian movement in Germany could survive under French patronage."

[162] Cf. D. W. Brogan, *France Under the Republic* (1870–1939) (New York and London: Harper and Bros., 1940), p. 566.

[163] Carl Dyrssen in his book *Die Botschaft des Ostens* ("The Message of the East," Breslau, 1932), defends warmly an alliance between National Socialism and Communism. This young Prussian National Socialist expresses hatred for the West, admiration for the East and contempt for Italian Fascism as a "Catholic" and Occidental phenomenon. One must not forget that this book was written before Hitler's advent to power and the destructive influence of National Socialism over (the then relatively innocent) forms of Fascism. Yet Prussia, Russia, Communism and National Socialism are one in Herr Dyrssen's eyes.

[164] Dr. Helmut Erbe in his work *Die Hugenotten in Deutschland* (1938) informs us that after the Edict of Potsdam (the official invitation and compilation of privileges for the Huguenots issued on October 29, 1685) about 30,000 Frenchmen came to the Protestant Districts of the Germanies. About 20,000 came to Brandenburg. To these about 6000 Walloons and 3000 "Waldensians" must be added. There were 4000 French among 11,000 Berlinians in 1699.

"The Huguenots, already in the first generation presented 14.4 per cent of the government officials (not counting employees) and in the second generation 22.5 per cent. This increase continued. . . . In the sphere of defense an influence can therefore hardly be denied. Generally this influence was unavoidable — the Huguenots soon formed one third of the Prussian officers corps." The descendants of these Huguenots, he adds, today number several millions. Frederick the Great alludes to their part in transforming Prussia into a commercial-industrial-bureaucratic state (cf. his *Denkwürdigkeiten*).

[165] Lutheranism had an almost equally deteriorating effect upon the development of liberties and human dignity.

Werner Hegemann writes in *Entlarvte Geschichte:* "It was Luther who turned the princes into popes and made coarse tools for the state out of the delicate bonds of religion" and later: "Luther declared: Authorities have been given by God the power to drive, beat, throttle, hang, burn, behead and torture the mob in order to be feared. As pigs and wild animals have to be driven and forced so authority has to enforce the fulfillment of its laws."

Treitschke wrote in *Historische und Politische Aufsätze* (Dresden, 1933): "The immoral teaching of long-suffering obedience sucked the marrow of will from the bones of the Lutherans." Which is not surprising if we remember how Luther worshiped princely authority when he wrote in his notorious: *Wider the räuberischen und mörderischen Rotten der Bauern* ("Against the robbing and murderous hords of the peasants"): "So strange are these times that a prince can gain heaven by shedding blood more than by praying."

These words could have been written on June 30, 1934, by the *Völkischer Beobachter*.

[166] On Frederic II.

"We Germans, regarding ourselves as a people, could derive little pleasure from this king, none has done us so much harm not only apparently but in reality." — Ernst Moritz Arndt, *Geist der Zeit*.

[167] It is only the successful Prussian bourgeois which is so generally disliked. The much maligned member of the gentry (the *Junker*) has his great qualities. He profited far less from the artificial aggrandizement of Prussia than the city dweller. Even Gonzague de Reynold in his *L'Europe Tragique* has much to say in his favor.

[168] Charles I, unpopular through no fault of his, after his fall left the Viennese Social Democracy and its bourgeois appendix, Austria, about the same size as it had been when his ancestors Rudolf I took it over from the Babenbergs. The Austrian people once more sat in the Danube basin and on the slopes of the Alps, starving, freezing, singing, dancing and generally muddling through. — Hanns Sassmann, *Das Reich der Träumer*, Berlin, 1932, Verlag für Kulturpolitik, pp. 411–412.

[169] "The theorists of our time who seem to be able to see only the large and get emotional over words like "humanity" (no one knows what it really means and why one should die for it) call the very idea of creating more instead of fewer states medieval backwardness. They are all out for unionism and colossalism, though unionism is nothing really but another expression for totalitarianism, even if it is thought to be a guarantee for peace. It is the one-party system transplanted into the international field. . . . Unionism . . . is a deadly serious scheme without humor, meant for men as a collectivity and as social animals of lower order; and it reminds me constantly, in all its earnest elaborateness of the German Professor who submitted to Satan a new plan for organizing Hell. Whereupon Satan answered with rock shaking laughter: "Organize Hell? My dear Professor, organization, that *is* Hell." — Hans Kohr, "Disunion Now," *Commonweal*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 23.

[170] Donoso Cortés, the famous Spanish Conservative, who acted for several years as Spanish Envoy in Berlin, never liked Prussia. His Catholic instincts told him that there was a power of evil. He once said: "I am neither a Friend of Prussia, nor of her politics, nor of her increase, nor of her existence; I believe that she is in league with the Devil since her existence, and I am still convinced that this situation is going to continue on account of some sort of historical fatality." — (Cited by Edmund Schramm in *Donoso Cortés*, Hamburg, 1935.)

The conservative Prussian Constantin Frantz was deeply shocked and perturbed by Bismarck's policy. He wrote in his *Abfertigung der nationalliberalen Presse nebst einer höchst nöthigen Belehrung über den Ultramontanismus* (Leipzig, 1873, pp. 54–55) that never has so fatal a blow been dealt against the monarchical principle since 1789 as the Prussian action of 1866. Its consequences, he prophesized, would first be felt in Germany, but later in the whole world.

An excellent modern book on this subject is S. D. Stirk, *The Prussian Spirit*, London, 1941.

[171] The men of the fourth of September had not wakened to the fact that Prussia had adopted, sixty years ago, and rendered perfect the French invention of the mass uprising. — Daniel Halévy, *Histoire d'une histoire*.

German centralism and herdism generated and enforced by the French Revolution slowly crushed German personalism and federalism, which were after all closely interrelated manifestations of the traditional German spirit. Says Denis de Rougemont in an article "Gedanken über den Föderalismus" in the Swiss bimonthly *Mass und Wert* (Zürich, March-April, 1940): "The Philosophy of the 'Person' is the only one which can be taken seriously into consideration by the federalist idea. . . . Both, individualism and collectivism, result finally in the adoption and veneration of the centralistic *Einheitsstaat* (uniformistic State). . . . If one lets the masses act as masses then they will inevitably establish totalitarian systems. But 'persons' (such as we have defined them) will necessarily favor the federalistic types of political organizations."

[172] "The French Revolution was the generating factor in the idea of a German unity." — Renan, *Reforme Intellectuelle Et Morale*.

173 The mechanical process of unification destroyed traditions and natural conditions with amazing results. The small central-German states west of Saxony, which were lumped together by the centralistic Weimar Republic into an artificial unit called "Thuringia," became the breeding place first of Communism and afterwards of national socialism. Once the local pride and loyalty is destroyed, man is more prone to become an identitarian *déraciné*.

The connection between Catholicism, Federalism (in the European sense which has a connotation *opposite* to the American concept) and the Habsburgian tradition in the Germanies, is set forth in the book of the German Socialist Dr. Arthur Rosenberg, *Die Entstehung der Deutschen Republik*, 1871–1918, Berlin, 1930, pp. 18–20. (Trans, by Ian Morrow, London-New York, 1931.)

Uniformity is postulated by Hitler in *Mein Kampf* (Munich, 1939, p. 44) and attacked by Donoso Cortés in his *Oeuvres* (III, Paris, 1858, p. 540).

See also the connection between anticentralism and monarchism in France under the third republic as described by Carlton J. H. Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism* (New York, 1941, pp. 279, 280).

174 "Finally the following principle of organic life has to be regarded everywhere: every particle and every system inside the organism has to be as perfect as possible, that is to say it has to develop an independent faculty for living and shaping itself to be able to raise the entire organism to sublime perfection and plenipotence.

"Therefore the centralization of economic and political forces which absorbs local life and develops in the wake of the doctrinary liberal policy can hardly lead to a healthy national and liberal life."

From the Manifesto of the Prussian Conservatives, 1856, contained in *Grundzüge der konservativen Politik*, Berlin, 1856.

175 Cf. Liberal centralism is well described by Carlton J. H. Hayes in his *A Generation of Materialism*, New York, 1941, pp. 82–83.

175 Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn describes the differences between the First and the Second Reich with the following words in *Jesuiten, Spiesser, Bolschewiken* (Salzburg, 1933): "The First Reich built the Marienburg, St. Stephen's in Vienna, Beuron, the cathedral of Speyer, the dome in Ulm; the First Reich spread from Sicily to the Belt, from Kaschau to Cambrai, where the Cathedral still bears its symbol — the double-headed eagle. The First Reich brought us gothic and baroque styles, the sun never set within its boundaries, it fought Swedish, Turkish and French robbery.

"But the foundation stone of the Second Reich was laid by frenchified princelets, accepting French subsidies, and stolid, merry *petits bourgeois* who for the sake of practical advantages broke up German unity. The Second Reich could not boast of Nördlingen, Zenta, St. Gotthard or Aspern, it only had the shame of Königgätz and the tragedy of the Marne. The Second Reich had an Emperor who allowed his hands to be kissed while Francis Joseph washed the feet of twelve old beggars every Maundy Thursday. The Second Reich had no minstrels, no Nibelungen saga, no Rembrandt or Angelus Silesius, it only had Wildenbruch, Sudermann, flannel underwear and leg-of-mutton sleeves. It had no Roswitha von Gandersheim, Abraham a Sancta Clara, no Seuse, no Tauler, Albertus Magnus or Eckehardt, no mysticism and no depth — it was a country of commercial advisers, banks, barracks, stickups and the Hofbräu-style, it was ungodly and dusty, un-German and middle-class, tense and trashy to the nth degree. For culture can only be born from the whole, not from the partial, divided and heretical lumps; whatever German culture there is has grown inside or very near to the Church. Even Schiller and Goethe, Wagner and Bach, Lucas Cranach and Max Scheler worked in the shadow of the Church. The German spirit is occidental, the occidental spirit is Catholic — everything else is an imposture on German culture."

We have seen clearly what sort of decision National Socialism made. The Nazi character of the Weimar Republic has been clearly recognized by Sir Charles Petrie who writes: "As for the Treaty of Versailles itself, one of its greatest weaknesses was that the Allies, in opposition to their own interests, carried the work of Bismarck to its logical conclusion and completed the unification of Germany. The strongest centrifugal force which ruled the various kingdoms and duchies, and which were always restive under the tutelage of Berlin were the local dynasties; yet, as we have seen, the German people were deliberately encouraged to overthrow their ruling houses, to many of which they were deeply attached, as the price of peace, and so the last obstacle to a unified Reich was removed by those most concerned in its retention. Once the dynasties had gone there was no reason for the continued existence of their former dominions as separate units, and so the way was cleared for that complete Prussianization of Germany, which was to be the outstanding accomplishment of the Nazi regime." — *Twenty Years' Armistice and After*, London, 1940, p. 21.

That the nineteenth century with its "progressive" ideas wrought havoc in the Germanies is also admitted by Peter Viereck who accuses nationalism and capitalism for the decadence and suicide of true German culture. He writes: "Under these 360 semi-independent princelings [of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806] life was easy-going, static, unadventurous. A cultured aristocracy flourished with gentlemanly inefficiency. The economic standards of living were low from our viewpoint, but really high compared with those of the earlier seventeenth century. From this mellow atmosphere, so rich with accumulated tradition, ripened the very finest fruits of German culture. Even the pettiest courts vied at attracting creative intellects. The court of the tiny Duchy of Weimar was simultaneously graced by Goethe, Schiller, Wieland, Jean Paul, and Herder. This is more cultural greatness in a feeble state of a few square miles than the whole modern German state and most modern power states can boast.

"This fruitful but overripe culture was the product of the creative idleness of upper-middle-class humanists dependent on aristocratic patronage from above. The patronage was forthcoming because some of the courts — enough of them to keep any Goethe or Humboldt from being slave to economic needs — were models of taste and urbane discrimination. All this was swept away by the awakening of nationalism and capitalism in the new bourgeoisie. The Germanies, the land of musicians and poets, was step by step replaced by a unified centralized Germany, a land of far greater political power and far greater economic prosperity and yet in one sense far less great." — Peter Viereck, *Metapolitics*, New York, 1941, pp. 54–55.

176 Continental Socialism had a more "religious" vision of the things to come. Christopher Dawson points out that: "Behind the hard rational surface of Karl Marx's materialist and socialist interpretation of history, there burns the flame of an apocalyptic vision. For what was that social revolution in which he put his hope but a nineteenth century version of the Day of the Lord, in which the rich and the powerful of the earth should be consumed, and the princes of the Gentiles brought low, and the poor and disinherited should reign in a regenerated universe?" — *Enquiries in Religion and Culture*.

There is a Nazi version to that in the vision of *Die Nacht der langen Messer*.

177 The craving for a leader in the masses is well described by Robert Michels, in *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der Modernen Democratie*, Leipzig, 1911, pp. 53–55.

178 "But often the attraction of rhetorical art is only the overture for a long period of disappointments for the masses because of its ensuing lack of action or the coarseness of the speaker's character. But in most cases the audience becomes a victim to the speaker's ability to intoxicate them, making them see him as a magnifying mirror of their own personalities. Their admiration and enthusiasm for the speaker finally is nothing but admiration and enthusiasm for their own personalities. This sentiment is encouraged by the speaker when he professes to speak and act in

the name of the masses, that is to say of every single individual. Unconscious inspirations of egotism are the reason for the obedient following of the masses."

Cf. Robert Michels, *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der Modernen Democratie*, Leipzig, 1911, p. 86.

Needless to say that the "leader" is not a trained expert.

179 "Probably the origin of this anti-individual fury lies in the fact that in their innermost hearts the masses feel themselves weak and defenseless in the face of their destiny. On a bitter and terrible page Nietzsche notes how, in primitive societies which were weak when confronted with the difficulties of existence, every individual and original act was a crime, and the man who tried to lead a solitary life was a malefactor. He must in everything comport himself according to the fashions of the tribe.

"Now, apparently, many men are again feeling homesick for the herd. They devote themselves passionately to whatever there is left in them of the sheep. They want to march through life together, along the collective path, shoulder to shoulder, wool rubbing wool, and the head down. This is the reason why so many European peoples are looking for a shepherd and a sheep dog." — José Ortega y Gasset, *Invertebrate Spain* (Amer. edit.), trans, by Mildred Adams, New York, 1937, p. 170.

180 The Weimar Republic drove democratically minded men like Count Keyserling back to the fold of aristocratism. In his *Spektrum Europas*, he confessed openly, seven years after the Weimar assembly: "When the old order of estates had grown obsolete democratism became a factor of progress. Since the World War (No. I) it has become a factor of regress, for a rule of quality alone can save Europe; the idea of quantity in its good sense has outlived itself."

181 "As long as the democratic, nationalistic State of French casting remains the predominant form of State in Europe, striving for unity and equality, approving the forceful remodeling of heterogeneous citizens and tending toward cultural and economical exploitation of alien races . . . this difficulty (the problem of minorities) will continue. It is typical for nationalistic States that they attempt to wipe out the characteristics of their 'minorities,' and it is equally typical for the supra-individualistic trend of thought that it protects individual life and character and therefore brings out the value of the character of a people. Formal democracy with its elections and counting of votes is in itself a constant source of disaster: the majority decides some injustice which becomes a law, sanctified by the majority of votes." — Edgar Jung, *Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen*.

182 "It may be that the Jews, often the victims of their own idealism, have always been instrumental in bringing about the events they most heartily disapprove of; that maybe is the curse of the Wandering Jew." — George Pitt-Rivers, *The World Significance of the Prussian Revolution*.

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John J. Wheeler-Bennett, *Hindenburg, the Wooden Titan*, London, 1936, pp. 339, 335–368.

II

NATIONAL SOCIALISM

183 "Our whole political machinery presupposes a people so fundamentally as one that they can safely afford to bicker; and so sure of their own moderation that they are not dangerously disturbed by the never ending din of political conflict." — Lord Balfour, cit. by Harold Laski, *Parliamentary Government in England*.

"Since 1689 we have had, for all effective purposes, a single party in control of the state. It has been divided, no doubt, into two wings. It has differed within itself upon matters like the pace of change and the direction of change. Its quarrels . . . have always, so to say, been family quarrels in which there has been ample room for compromise. . . . Members of either wing could cross to the other without any alteration of the fundamental doctrine." — Harold Laski, *op. cit*., p. 83.

184 The situation in America is similar yet the conditions on the Continent are radically different.

"In order to have a parliamentary government the supposition is that the parties, in spite of their differences, are quite closely related. In America this is true of the democratic and republican parties. As the two names show, there is no essential difference between them. The one is more unionistic, the other more federalistic. In England we have the Whigs and the Tories, now called the Liberals and the Conservatives. The differences are so slight that very frequently one party has adopted a plank from the other party platform. Both parties together once banished the Stuart kings and the election reform of 1867 was made by the Conservatives. Such parties can easily alternate in the administration of the state without throwing it out of equilibrium.

"It is not possible, however, to have parties alternate which are so diametrically opposed to one another that the one is monarchical and the other republican. If France were again to have a monarchically disposed majority which should reintroduce a kingdom, and then after a succession of years a republican majority should come and introduce a republic again, and so on in changing alternations, the state would be ruined." — Hans Delbrück, *Government and the Will of the People*, trans. by Roy S. MacElwee (New York: Oxford U. Press, 1923), p. 101.

185

ELECTIONS FOR THE REICHSTAG
(Representatives: One for 60,000 Votes)

Reichstag Party		5/20/28	14/9/30	6/11/32	3/5/33
Nazis	National Socialists	12	107	196	288
Conservative Catholic & Socialist Parties	Deutschnationale	78	44	54	53
	Volkspartei (Cons.) Bayrische Volkspartei (Cath. Bavar.)	17	19	19	19
	Zentrum (Catholics)	61	68	70	73
	Social-Democrats and Ind. Soc.	153	143	121	120
	Communists	54	77	100	(81)
	Total of that group....	363	351	364	346
Lutheran, Liberal & Democratic Parties	Deutsches Landvolk Christlich-Nationale Bauern-Partei (Rural-agrarian) (Luth.)	9	19	—	—
	Christlichsozialer Volksdienst (Lutheran)	—	14	5	4
	Wirtschaftspartei (Middle-Class)	23	23	2	—
	German-Hanoverian Party (Opposit.)	4	3	1	—
	Deutsche Bauernpartei (Peasant)	8	6	3	2
	Deutsche Volkspartei (Industr. Bourgeoisie)	45	30	11	2
	German Democratic Party (D. Staatspartei)	25	14	2	5
	Others:	2	10	—	—
	Total of that group....	116	119	24	13

This tabulation makes it quite evident that the large bulk of the democratic and liberal voters became successively National Socialists while the other non-Nazi parties were able to preserve the loyalty of their voters as late as March, 1933. The downfall of German parties was prophesied by Constantin Frantz in his *Die Quelle alles Übels* (1863).

186 For description of Munich, see Thomas Wolfe's *The Web and the Rock*.

187 "Both emotional nationalism and emotional internationalism go back to Rousseau, but in his final emphasis he is an emotional nationalist; and that is because he saw that patriotic 'virtue' is a more potent intoxicant than the love of humanity. The demonstration came in the French Revolution which began as a great international movement and ended in imperialism and Napoleon Bonaparte. It is here that the terrible peril of a science that is pursued as an end in itself becomes manifest. It disciplines man and makes him efficient on the naturalistic level, but leaves him ethically

undisciplined. Now in the absence of ethical discipline the lust for knowledge and the lust for feeling count very little, at least practically, compared with the third main lust of human nature — the lust for power. Hence the emergence of that most sinister of all types — *the efficient megalomaniac*. The final use of a science that has thus become a tool of the lust for power is in Burke's phrase to 'improve the mystery of murder.'"—Irving Babbitt, *Rousseau and Romanticism*.

188 Guglielmo Ferrerò in his article *"La Vague Dictatoriale" (Illustration*, Jan. 20, 1923), says explicitly: "Even a dictator, if he does not intend to copy the Russian model, has nowadays to appear as a representative of the people's will. We have seen it in Italy. How did the recent revolution attempt to justify itself? By declaring that it represented the true will of the nation which had been falsified by parliament. Now even the revolution dared pronounce that sheer force could violate the will of the nation and that a legitimate power exists outside of this will.

"The kings of old felt their responsible power to have been received from God, whereas the modern plebiscitarian dictator rules by the grace of the people. Their responsibility is toward the people which one has to treat alternatively with sugar and whip, with shrewdness and brutality. The 'contract' with God is of another nature."

189 "Napoleon III, in 1868, when he discovered that his rights to rule were being vigorously contested, had a book written, or wrote it himself, *Les Titres de la Dynastie Napoléonienne*. The motto prefixed to the book is *Vox Populi, Vox Dei*. Here it is shown historically that the French constitution of 1799, which called General Bonaparte as First Consul to the head of the French Government, was adopted with more than 3,000,000 votes against 1500. The vote was repeated in 1848 when the Consul had himself proclaimed Emperor, and the result was 4,500,000 "ayes" to 2500 "nays." On December 10, 1848, Napoleon III was elected President with 5,430,000 votes against Cavaignac, who had 1,448,000 votes. On December 2, 1851, he was elected President for 10 years with 7,500,000 against 6,500,000; on December 2, 1852, when he was chosen as Emperor, the 'nays' had sunk to 253,000. Has history, and more especially democratic history, recognized here the expression of the will of the French people, which as such must be respected? On the contrary, the reign of both Napoleons has not been regarded in the least as the expression of popular will, but as despotism, 'sword rule,' 'tyranny.'"—Hans Delbrück, *Government and Witt of the People*, trans, by Roy S. McElwee, New York, 1923, pp. 7–8.

190 Years before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, Miguel de Unamuno, disgusted with the compromising spirit of some Spaniards, wrote in his *Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho:* "Yes, that is what we need: a new civil war. It is urgent to declare that the basins are and ought to be helmets, and to start a row like that which occurred at the inn; a new civil war. Can you not hear those poor fellows of dry and shrivelled heart insisting that there are certain topics that ought to be avoided, saying over and over that these and other disputes lead to nothing practical? What do they mean by 'practical'?

"Pusillanimous whiners and howlers! Avoid religious questions! Give first attention to getting rich and powerful! The cowards cannot see that if we do not solve our more intimate problems, we are not powerful and rich and cannot become so. I repeat it: our country will have no agriculture, no industries, no commerce, no roads that would lead whither it were well to go, until we attain and hold to our own Christianity, our quixotic kind of Christianity. We shall not have a rich exterior life, until we kindle in the hearts of our people the fires of eternal disquietudes. It is impossible to be rich while living a lie, and the lie is, for our spirit, our daily bread." — Miguel de Unamuno, *The Life of Don Quixote and Sancho*, trans, by Homer P. Earle (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), p. 293.

191 Walter Lippmann writes in the *Good Society:* "It would require another Erasmus to depict the confusion engendered by this disorientation of the human mind. With man degraded to a bundle of

conditioned reflexes, there was no measure of anything in human affairs: all the landmarks of judgment were gone and there remained only an aimless and turbulent moral relativity. Thus our contemporary culture has vacillated between a doctrine of human providence, holding at one moment that man's destiny is inexorably fixed and at another that it can be planned and managed. Such is the moral bewilderment that the historical determinists, who have nothing but scorn for the idea of free will, have become the protagonists of a consciously planned society in Russia, and the mystical collectivists who announced the manifest destiny of nations and tribes as corporate Leviathans have become the exponents of arbitrary personal leadership in Italy and Germany. Yet they are unabashed by their contradictions. For the denial of the human soul was the perfect preparation for these rivals of tyranny. Materialistic determinism is nothing but a secularization of religious determinism brought into the Occident by the sinister Genevan. Yet determinism permits different practical attitudes; it either leads to a shallow humanitarianism or to brutal terror. The former attitude is due to the denial of personal guilt, the latter is the result of the will to extermination which is the only way to deal with obnoxious and untractable animals."

192 Leftists naturally *hate* ideological explanations. Thus in the *New Republic*, Oct. 28, 1940, Sidney Hook wrote: "I am acquainted with no *scientific* historian who has asserted that the rise of Hitlerism is due to a philosophic doctrine rather than to the conjunctions of economic depression, the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles, the errors in policy of the democratic parties within Germany and of the democratic governments without." — Reply to Mortimer Adler's paper against the "professors."

193 Totalitarianism can retain the terms "freedom" and "democracy" and give them its own meaning.

See T. S. Eliot in "The Idea of a Christian Society." New York, 1940, p. 69.

194 Jacob Burckhardt saw the coming menace which in his opinion would evolve from democracy and republicanism. He wrote in a letter to his friend Fredrich von Preen: "But it is as you say; the people are to be educated for mass meetings in good time. We shall get to the point where people will begin to howl if there are not at least 100 of them together."

And on April 13 he wrote to Preen: "It has for some time been clear to me that the world is driving toward an alternative between complete democracy and absolute, lawless despotism; the latter, of course, would not be exercised by dynasties which are much too soft-hearted but by professedly republican military commands. But one does not yet like to picture a world whose rulers entirely disregard law, comfort, enriching labor and industry, credit, etc., and therefore can rule brutally."

195 A few high lights from Lord Vansittart's *Black Record:*

"The German is often a moral creature, the Germans never; and it is the Germans who count."

"Within a short while from the time of Tacitus two further facts about the Germans became notorious, and have never varied since. The first was that they were out for ever more and more living space — the unlimited *Lebensraum* that they claim today For example, seventeen hundred years ago they were busy occupying Rumania (*sic*).

"These fierce characteristics showed themselves to the full in the Thirty Years' war of the seventeenth century in the first phase of which Bohemia was overrun, and the Czech population subjected to a persecution almost equal to that of 1939. In this war the German commander Tilly distinguished himself by the sack of Magdeburg in which 30,000 people were butchered, rather less than were butchered at Rotterdam this year."

(Czechs and Germans alike were persecuted. Victors were Austrians. Tilly never ordered the sack of Magdeburg. Tilly was Fleming. Tilly's army was largely non-German. Magdeburgians were all Germans.)

Catherine the Great was a Prussian.

There are frequent citations of Latin authors. His Lordship always forgets that the Saxons and Angles left the Germanies 600 years *after* Caesar and Tacitus, in quest of more *Lebensraum*. The comic aspect of the booklet lies in the fact that Lord Vansittart (von Sittart) is of German origin. (See Burke's *Landed Gentry.*)

196 "The fact is that for one hundred and fifty years these people have been a cancer in the world, and it is time they were removed. . . . The only decent reason for fighting is that there is something in the world you *hate* so much you can no longer live with it." — H. M. Harwood, "Playwright and Producer," in *London Front*, 1941.

197 Hitler characterizes the soul of the masses (he had so efficiently misled) as "female": "Similar to women . . . the mass wants to be mastered and not implored and in its innermost is gratified by a teaching which does not suffer any other beside it more than by the granting of liberal freedom; the mass does not know how to use that freedom and feels slightly abandoned. It feels the unabashed spiritual terror no more than it senses the revolting violation of its human liberty."— *Mein Kampf*.

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Max Weber, *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik III*, Tübingen, 1922, p. 156.

On National Socialism and Prussiandom:

Carl Dyrssen, *Die Botschaft des Ostens*, Breslau, 1932, p. 186. ("Der National-sozialismus 1st die Urform des Preussentums.")

Rosenberg and the "Syllabus" of Pope Pius IX:

Alfred Rosenberg. *Mythus des XX. Jahrhunderts*, München, 1932, p. 467. ("Die entehrendste Urkunde aller Zeiten.")

On National Socialism and Scientism:

See: the great attack of Martin Bormann (the successor of Hess as deputy leader against Christianity as an unscientific superstition, recorded by the (London) *Tablet*, February 28, 1942, p. 110.

On the impossibility of a sound, modern parliamentarian life:

Carl Schmitt, *Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus*, 1926, p. 9.

On the menace of a coming totalitarian terror:

Jacob Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, Berlin, 1905, pp. 171, 181.

On the evolution of "liberalism" to totalitarianism:

Styepan Trophimovitch, the old "liberal" reading a nihilistic book:

"It's true that the author's basic idea is correct, but that only makes the situation worse. It's our own idea, no doubt; we were those who first sowed the seed and watched over it; indeed, they could have hardly said something new, after we had spoken. But, good Lord! Just look how they express themselves, how they distort and mutilate the truth! Were these really the final conclusions we were striving for? One can hardly recognize the original idea in that stuff!" (F. M. Dostoyevski, *The Possessed.*)

III

MATER AMERICAE

198 Modern historians, however, are not convinced that Magna Charta meant much to the mass of the English people of 1215 or since. The tradition seems to have begun rather more than four centuries later. Professor A. F. Pollard, the historian, appears to have little sympathy with the customary ideas on the subject. The liberty which the barons extracted from the king, was, he says "liberty to every lord of the manor to try suits relating to property and possession in his own manorial court or to be punished by his fellow barons instead of by the judges of the king's court.

"This is what the barons meant by their famous demand in Magna Charta for every man to be judged by his peers. They insisted that the royal judges were not their peers but only servants of the crown, and their demands in this respect were reactionary proposals which might have been fatal to liberty as we conceive it.

"There is nothing about trial by jury or no taxation without representation in Magna Charta. Legally, the villeins, who were the bulk of the nation, remained after Magna Charta as before in the position of a man's ox or his horse, except that there was no law for the prevention of cruelty to animals."

It would appear from this that the case for Magna Charta as the basis of democracy breaks down. — Gideon Clark, *Democracy in the Dock*.

199 "Who are these Tories and Whigs? Essentially they both belong to the same social layer, that today is agreed upon; the ones are aristocrats as much as the others." — Hans Delbrück, *Historische und Politische Aufsätze*, Berlin, 1907.

200 Burke said in his *Appeal From the New to the Old Whigs:* "As in the abstract it is perfectly clear, that, out of a state of civil society, majority and minority are relations, which can have no existence, and that, in civil society, its own specific conventions in each corporation determine what it is that constitutes the people, so as to make their act the signification of the general will — to come to particulars it is equally clear that neither in France nor in England has the original or any subsequent compact of the state, expressed or implied, constituted a majority of men, told by the head, to be acting people of their several communities. And I see little of policy or utility as there is

of right, in laying down on principle that a majority of men told by the head are to be considered as the people, and that as such their will is to be law."

201 "Strange as it may seem, England, monarchistic and conservative to the marrow at home, has in her foreign relations always acted as the protector of the most demagogical tendencies, invariably encouraging all popular movements aiming at the weakening of the monarchical principle." — Durnovo's Memorandum, February, 1914. From *Documents of Russian History*, by F. A. Golder, Stanford University Press, 1927.

Durnovo, an ultraconservative, was hostile to the panslavist, herdist war party. The Russian Conservatives did not in the least cherish the idea of a holy war in favor of the Karagjorgjevićs and the French democracy.

202 It is grimly amusing to read the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, February, 1920, and April, 1921:

"The Principal Allied Powers consider that the restoration of a dynasty which represented in the eyes of its subjects a system of oppression and domination over other races, in alliance with Germany, would be incompatible with the achievements of the war in liberating peoples hitherto enslaved, as well with the principle for which the war was engaged." — From C. A. Macartney's *Hungary*.

The same illiterate crowd reversed its whole policy one hour before the *Anschluss;* too late, of course, to influence the inexorable flux of events. The Progressivists had then the privilege to wage another war in order to create a Europe either resembling their fatal error of 1919 or even to "undo" all treaties of 1919 and to go back to 1914.

203 Even the vision of Catholic historians becomes clouded if they once look beyond the Rhine into "darkest" Europe. Mr. Hilaire Belloc's repetition of the old accusation embodied in article 231 of the Versailles Treaty in his *Short English History* makes painful reading. His treatment of the Austro-Serbian conflict is perfectly ridiculous. The words of Kaunitz come to one's mind: "It is prodigious how much the English do not know of Europe." — (Cited by Seton-Watson in his *Britain and the Dictators*.)

204 It is well to remember here the words of Edmund Burke in his "Appeal from the New to the Old Whig." One sees here clearly that even traditional Whiggism and modern party liberalism were not one and the same and that the monarchical principle used to be stronger among the old Whigs than among the Neo-Conservatives today. Burke wrote (about himself): "He has studied the form and spirit of republics — but the result in his mind from that investigation has been and is, that neither England nor France, without infinite detriment to them, as well in the event as in the experiment, could be brought into a republican form; but that everything republican which can be introduced with safety, into either of them, must be built upon a monarchy — *built upon a real, not a nominal monarchy*, as its essential basis." (Italics ours.)

Yet as we see the republican-aristocratic-plutocratic principles carried the more conservative whigs further than they intended. Hilaire Belloc sees in monarchy a bulwark against plutocracy and that theme is well presented by Robert MacNair Wilson in his *Monarchy or Money-Power*.

205 It is not only probable but even certain that the present war will have a lasting effect upon the plutocratic structure of the moneyed part of the British aristocracy. Yet the current indignation about the pluto-aristocratic leadership in the past has always been exaggerated by foreigners.

206 G. M. Turnell's statement that St. Thomas More and St. John Fisher were the last Europeans in England was somehow premature. His criticisms are somehow justified for the immediate past but hardly for the present and future. He wrote: "When we come to consider life in concrete, we cannot help being struck by the divergencies between the English way and the Catholic way. Fisher and

More are far less representative of English life than Hobbes and Locke, or in the practical sphere than pirates and colonists like Drake and Clive, or record breakers like Sir Malcolm Campbell or Mrs. Mollison. To turn the two saints into national heroes, or rather champions of English nationalism, is tantamount to make them the spiritual forefathers of empire builders and record breakers when in fact they stood for a way of life that was finally destroyed by imperialism and record breaking. It is, of course, a fundamental misunderstanding of their true significance. The significance of Fisher and More was that they were almost the last two great Europeans produced by these islands. They lost their heads because they stood for a faith which transcended boundaries of nationalism, because they would not let it degenerate into a national faith. In other words, they refused categorically to accept all that we understand by the English way. They were great because they were Europeans, not because they were Englishmen. Rather in spite of it. In the case of Drake and Clive, the fault lies precisely in the fact that they were English without being anything besides." — "The Real English Way," *Colosseum*.

207 So, too, republicanism is untraditional in Ireland in the sense that for the first hundred years or so of the modern Irish democracy — 1800 to 1916, when the Irish Republican Brotherhood stole Sinn Fein — the sole expressed and supported idea of the vast mass of the Irish people was for a hierarchical form of society, based on the *status quo;* for the fullest freedom of action and opinion; and for a native government of that order in peaceful union with Great Britain under the symbol of the Crown. — Seán O'Faoláin, *King of the Beggars* (The Life of Daniel O'Connell) (New York, 1938), p. 107.

208 Britishers speak actually about "Europe," when they mean the Continent. John Maynard Keynes in his *Economic Consequences of the Peace 1919* describes very aptly the differences between the continental and the British atmosphere twenty-two years ago:

"For one who spent in Paris the greater part of his six months which succeeded the armistice an occasional visit to London was a strange experience. England still stands outside Europe. Europe's voiceless tremors do not reach her. Europe is apart and England is not of her flesh and body. But Europe is solid with herself. France, Germany, Italy, Austria, and Holland, Rumania and Russia and Poland throb together, they have rocked together in a war, which we, in spite of our enormous contributions and sacrifices (like though in a less degree than America), economically stood outside, and they may fall together.

209 Gideon Clark in his *Democracy in the Dock*, takes a very pessimistic attitude toward his own nation by saying: "The British . . . have a profound and never-failing gift of being deceived by specious humbug. . . . A recent Prime Minister accounted a great success in his day, worked steadily against their interests throughout his period of power, made the most amazing errors of judgment, was proved wrong by events again and again, yet remained with most of them trusted and liked because he seldom made a speech without telling them he was just a common Englishman like themselves, a hater of frills, pomp, and pretense, one who would infinitely rather spend his life in the fields of his native Worcestershire than in the seat of the mighty. The trick never failed; is there any reason to suppose it will fail the next time it is played? Are other nations so simple, so easily beguiled? It is difficult to know. Certain it is that healthy skepticism has no root in the English mind."

IV

THE AMERICAN SCENE

210 "The social forces behind the American movement were aristocratic and mercantile. The merchants of New England joined hands with the landed proprietors of the South, both confident

there was room for each in a world new and unscarred by European traditions. Both were oblivious of the coming manufacturing caste that was to make them implacable enemies. Nothing can be less true than the popular idea that the American Republic was the product of men longing for radical democracy." — James N Wood, *Democracy and the Will to Power*, New York, 1921, pp. 50–51.

211 "This feeling remained so strong through the early part of the Revolution that the President of Princeton University (John Witherspoon) believed the common hatred of Popery caused by the Quebec Act the only thing which cemented the divergent religious groups in the colonies together sufficiently to allow them to make war, an opinion which was shared by English observers." — Ray Allen Billington, quoting Daniel Barber's *History of My Own Times* (Washington, 1827) in his *The Protestant Crusade*, 1800–1860 (New York: Macmillan, 1938).

On page 17 of this work are the following lines, sung during the Revolution:

If Gallic Papists have the right
To worship their own way
Then farewell to the liberties
Of poor America.

Also a part of John Trumbull's "McFingal" is quoted where George III is accused in the following terms:

Struck bargains with the Romish churches
Infallibility to purchase.
Set wide for Popery the door.
Made friends with Babel's scarlet whore.

212 One hears sometimes in American Catholic circles the cryptic remark that the American Constitution is finally based on St. Robert Bellarmine's "democratic" ideology. In support of this theory, the fact is mentioned that one found the collected works of the Great Saint in Jefferson's library. Yet the truth boils down to the fact that one discovered merely a volume of Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha or the Natural Power of Kings*, an apology of absolute monarchy containing slighting remarks on Bellarmine (on pp. 8, 9). There is practically no evidence that Jefferson read this book with great attention, except a pencil stroke. (See also David S. Schaff, *The Bellarmine-Jefferson Legend and the Declaration of Independence.*)

St. Robert Bellarmine's political thought differs strongly from modern or classic democratic ideas. His attack against the absolutistic tendencies of James I do not make him a "democrat." He concedes that a people without government has the right to choose a government: the best form of government in his eyes is nevertheless a monarchy with certain checks. The people has surrendered its sovereignty and transferred it to the king. (*Potestas populi . . . donec eam in regem aliquem transtulit.*) See also his *Apologia 13, op. t*, XII. The monarchy is thus for him "the best and outstanding form of government (*Optimum et praestantisimum regimen*). Democracy on the other hand is *deterrimum regimen*. He attacked Calvin bitterly for his republican tendencies. The check on a monarch he considered merely *utilius* (more expedient). The ideal monarch for him was a person *qui omnibus imperat ac nulli subiiciatur*.

See also Père Joseph de la Servière, S.J., "Les idées politiques du Cardinal Bellarmin." Revue des questions historiques. Tôme xxxvii–xxxviii, who calls St. Robert Bellarmine: *"résolumment Monarchiste."*

St. Robert Bellarmine said very clearly in *De Ecclesiastica Monarchia I*, that:

Propter naturae humanae corruptionem utilius esse censemus hominibus hoc tempore (!) monarchiam temperatam ex aristocratia et democratia.

Hoc tempore clearly means the period in which he lived and which still stood under the deep impression of the reformation and its caesaropapism. When the saint extolls the "democratic"

element in the *election* of crowned heads he cites immediately the modus of election of the Holy Roman Emperors by the princely electors, a process which can hardly be called "democratic" (in *Recognitio Libri Tertii de Laicis*). He also says explicitly in *De Laicis VII:*

"To be ruled by a superior is not contrary however to human liberty, dignity and equality. Only the despot offends thus . . . even in the state of innocence there would have been political subjection, there would have been a difference of sexes, faculties and power; therefore an order of precedence and subjection. Among the angels there is a hierarchy of order with precedence and succession; why not among men? Therefore it is not contrary to liberty, nor humiliating to the dignity of man to be ruled by his legitimate superiors. . . . There is a difference between political subjection and servile subjection.

St. Robert Bellarmine's *Apologia* was finally dedicated to the Emperor Rudolf II. and the idea expressed in Chapter XIII of his *De Potestate Papae in Rebus Temporalibus*, that the Pope might depose a Catholic "prince" (Emperor, King, President) for grave reasons and order the people to elect somebody else would surely not gain the full admiration of, let us say, Mexican, Peruvian, or Chilean progressive democrats.

Thomas Jefferson had furthermore nothing but bitter contempt for the Society of Jesus as such, of which Bellarmine was a member. In a letter to John Adams, replying to his predecessor's charges against the Society ("If there ever was a body of men who merited eternal damnation on earth and in hell, it is this Society of Loyola's"), he wrote: "Like you I disapprove of the restauration of the Jesuits, for it means a step backwards from light into darkness." (Quot. by René Fülöp-Miller, *The Power and Secret of the Jesuits.*)

Thus we can hardly expect Jefferson to have willfully copied the basis of the American Constitution from one of the representants of Darkness. The efforts to prove the contrary remind one of the painful impression which the copy of the Magna Charta at the New York World's Fair left in one's mind. According to eyewitnesses it was exhibited under a transparent inscription "Democracy."

213 "The basis of the American system is a written constitution, a paper formulated by men of an extreme conservativism and plainly distrustful of the people. This is shown by the carefully developed checks to spontaneous action; the method of balancing one branch against another." — James N. Wood, *Democracy and the Will Power*, New York, 1921, pp. 48, 49.

214 "Now the basis upon which the Puritan political system was founded was that the Church members alone could have political rights. This ensured that the Puritan commonwealth could be nothing but an oligarchy. As wealth was one of the criteria (though by no means the only one) on the basis of which it was determined whether one belonged to the 'elect,' the commonwealth was necessarily controlled by the wealthy. Puritan rule was the rule of an economic and religious elite. This explains why typical Puritans in America, such as Winthrop and Cotton, denounced democracy. Winthrop declared that democracy was 'the meanest and worst of all forms of government,' inasmuch as there was 'no such government in Israel,' and he objected to 'referring matter of council and judiciature to the body of the people, quia the best part is always the least, and of that best part the wiser part is always the lesser.' Since the 'elect,' the 'saints' were necessarily a minority, it was obvious to Puritans that political rights could be exercised only by a minority." — P. Kecskeméti, *Political Thought in America*, in J. P. Mayer's, *Political Thought*, New York, 1940.

215 "I know no country where public esteem is so attached to worth, regardless of wealth, as it is in America." — Jefferson to Mrs. Church, 1793.

216 "Throughout the Union property qualifications were required for the suffrage as well as for holding office. In New York, in a population of about 30,000, according to the census of 1790, there

were only 1209 freemen valued at $100 or more, 1221 valued at $20, and 2661 *'Forty Shilling Freeholders.'"* — P. Kecskeméti, *Political Thought in Ameriça*.

217 "Democracy has never been and never can be so desirable as aristocracy or monarchy, but while it lasts it is more bloody than either. Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts and murders itself. There never was a democracy that did not commit suicide." — John Adams, quoted by W. E. Woodward, *A New American History,"* p. 253.

218 Both Rousseau and Jefferson are more clearly Republicans, or constitutionalists, than they are democrats; although it might be argued from Rousseau's attack on slavery that he might have urged the justice of universal suffrage; and there is some positive evidence, both from Jefferson's opposition to negro slavery and to his remarks on suffrage, that Jefferson was much more of a democrat than was John Adams and the New England aristocrats on the one hand, or Hamilton, Madison and Jay, the protectors of the propertied minority, on the other. *But the dawn of American democracy really begins with Jackson."* — Mortimer Adler, "In Terms of What Moral Principle Is Democracy the Best Government?" in *Philosophy of the State*. Reprinted, by permission, from the Fifteenth Annual Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Washington, D. C, December 28 and 29, 1939, page 163.

219 ". . . But the great thing about it is equality. To begin with, the level of education, science and talent is lowered. A high level of education and science is only possible for great intellects, and they are not wanted. The great intellects have always seized the power and been despots. Great intellects can not help being despots and they've always done more harm than good. They will be banished or put to death. Cicero will have his tongue cut out, Copernicus will have his eyes put out, Shakespeare will be stoned — that's Shigalovism. Hahaha! Do you think it's strange? I am for Shigalovism." — F. M. Dostoyevski, *The Possessed*, trans, by Constance Garnett, Modern Library, 1936, New York.

220 Rigorous in his condemnation of the educational system is Dr. Caspar Kraemer, Professor of New York University, as quoted in the New York *Times*, Mar. 12, 1939:

"We spend more money than any other nation in the world to get an inferior product. The democracy of our education consists of the regimentation of all students, no matter what their degree of proficiency, upon a single level, which must of necessity be low if it concerns itself only with those needs of the best students which are common to the worst."

Professor Virginius Dabney (University of Virginia) in an essay on "Spurious Democracy" states:

"The malady is doubtless due to numerous causes. But perhaps a certain conception of 'democracy' underlies more than one of them. The notion that one man is just as good as another and perhaps a little better has something to do with it. . . . One curse of American life is the subordination of quality to quantity. Our educational system would be much better if there were fewer but better schools and colleges, fewer but better paid teachers in the schools, fewer but better paid professors in the universities with only half the number of students."

Not less outspoken is President Robert Maynard Hutchins of the University of Chicago who wrote the following cruel words:

"Since our students have lived up to our expectations, we have succeeded in postponing maturity to a date undreamed of in the Middle Ages, or ever in Europe today. The American college senior is two or three years less grown up than his French or British contemporary. In ability to use his mother tongue and the other instruments of intellectual operation he does not at all compare with them. — "Education for Freedom," *Harpers Magazine*, October, 1941. On the educational crisis in the modern world see P. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, IV, pp. 259 ff.

221 Cf. James N. Wood, *Democracy and the Will to Power*, New York, 1921, pp. 175, 176.

[222] Professor Willard Waller has called this the "rating and dating complex" and describes how it works in one college. Every student should read this article.

"The students in many colleges, such as the one described by Waller, are motivated by a strong desire to rise in their social status. That is the only reason some of them are in college. It is therefore important to 'date' with students of the opposite sex who stand as high as possible in the social scale. Fraternities and sororities add explicitness to this scale and intensity to the struggle. Students near the 'top' have more invitations and social opportunities than they can handle. Those near the 'bottom' are often deprived of companionship, because, if they still have hopes of climbing, they dare not too often or openly admit their low status by dating with someone recognized as inferior. The misfits, the unattractive, the unpopular do not pair off as easily or frequently as do the attractive and popular." — *Plan for Marriage*, by Joseph Kirk Folsom, Editor.

See also: Willard Waller, "The Rating and Dating Complex," *American Sociological Review*, 22:727–734 (1937).

[223] "In Spain — and this is another paradox about Spain — the national holiday called *fiesta de la raza* is really a *fiesta de la non-raza*, a celebration of the international mixture of races among Hispanic nations in the best Spanish, antiracial tradition. It considers the distinction between races a sin. This tradition is essentially Christian. It is a genius of fraternal enthusiasm. The Spaniard of old had no inhibition toward marriage with colored women and the procreation of mestizos.

"For the Spaniards the Jewish problem has never been a racial one and will never be. It is an exclusively religious question." — Ernesto Ximenez Caballero, in an article in *Anti-Europea*, specially devoted to the race question.

[224] "The American mob's grim reputation for sheer anthropoid savagery is equaled only by that of the revolutionary mobs of Paris. At the outset of the German Government's movement against the Jews, an American visitor asked Herr Hitler why he was making it so ruthless. The Reichskanzler replied that he had got the idea from us. Americans, he said, are the great rope and lamppost artists of the world, known of all men as such. He was using the same methods against the Jews that we used against the loyalists of '76, the Indians, the Chinese on the Western coast, the Negroes, the Mexicans, the Filipinos — every helpless people in fact whom we had ever chanced to find underfoot." — A. J. Nock, "The Jewish Problem in America," *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1941.

[225] Cf. Henry Belcher, *The First American Civil War*, London, 1911. I, p. 56.

[226] A nice little sketch about the iniquities of Negro life by a correspondent, "V.S.Y.," can be found in *The New Republic*, January 13, 1941.

A fuller account about the history of lynching can be found in Frank Shay's excellent book: *Judge Lynch, his first 100 years* (New York, 1938). The unspeakable horror these pages conjure bear hardly the printer's ink. The details of the lynching are of an obscenity which surpass human imagination (pp. 96, pp. 104–116). Three cases deserve special mentioning; the expectant Negro mother who was "carved up," Dan Davis the Texan Negro who shouted from the stake: "I wish some of you gentlemen would be Christian enough to cut my throat" (p. 118) and the attorney of Colorado County (Texas) who declared: "I don't call the citizens who executed the Negroes (aged 15 and 16) a mob. I consider their act an expression of the will of the people." Ochlocratic sentiments are seldom expressed so neatly!

[227] About the lack of anti-Jewish sentiment in the young American Republic see: Dixon Wecter, *The Saga of American Society* (A Record of Social Aspiration, 1607–1937) (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), pp. 152, 153.

228 “Business is religion and religion is business” preached the Reverend Maltbie D. Babcock of the Brick Presbyterian Church in New York in 1900.” — Dixon Wecter, *The Saga of American Society*, New York, 1937, p. 481.

229 Professor A. Peers once was addressed by a beggar in Madrid in the following words: “An aim, for the love of God, who in the bloom of my youth deprived me of the love for work.” (“Una limosna por el amor de Dios, que en la plenitud de mi juventud me ha quitado la gana de trabajar.”) — From A. Peers, *Spain*.

This could certainly not happen in a progressive, Calvinistic country.

230 “Turn now to Germany, a country lately delivered from despotism by the arms of altruistic heroes. The social legislation of that country for more than half a century, afforded a model to all other countries. All the workingmen’s insurance, minimum wage, child labor and other such acts of the United States are bald imitations of it, and in England before the war, the mountebank Lloyd George borrowed his whole bag of tricks from it. Well, Dr. Hans Delbrück, in his *Regierung und Volkswille*, tells us that this legislation was fought step by step at home, and with the utmost ferocity, by the beneficiaries of it. When Bismarck formulated it and essayed to get it through the Reichstag he was opposed by every mob-master in the Empire, save only his kept Socialist, Ferdinand Lasalle. The common people were so heavily against him for several years that he had to carry on the government without the consent of the Reichstag — that is, unconstitutionally, and at the rick of his head.” — H. L. Mencken, *Notes on Democracy*.

231 Herbert Spencer in his essay: “The Coming Slavery” has aptly described the viciousness of “popular” representation in Germany in its quest for “popularity.”

232 “In the world of politics, the chances of getting imbecile leaders under an elective system could be considerably reduced by applying to politicians a few of those tests for intellectual, physical and moral fitness which we apply to the candidates for almost every other kind of job. Imagine the outcry if hotelkeepers were to engage servants without demanding a ‘character’ from their previous employers; or if sea-captains were chosen from homes for inebriates; or if railway companies entrusted their trains to locomotive engineers with arterio-sclerosis and prostrate trouble; or if civil servants were appointed and doctors allowed to practice without passing an examination! And yet, where the destinies of whole nations are at stake, we do not hesitate to entrust the direction affairs to men of notoriously bad character; to men sodden with alcohol; to men so old and infirm that they can’t do their work or even understand what it is about; to men without ability or even education.” — Aldous Huxley, *Ends and Means*, Chatto and Windus (London), 1937, p. 174.

233 Cf. Georg Simmel, *Soziologie*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 138.

234 Cf. Moises Yakovlevitch Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, trans, by F. Clarke, New York, 1902.

235 *“Espèce de depute* was the last word of abuse which a French cabdriver could find from a vocabulary of invective unrivaled in any language except American.” — Douglas Jerrold, *Britain and Europe: 1900–1940* (London: Collins, 1941), p. 25.

236 In St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk. I, Ch. IV, we find an excellent account of why man endowed with an intelligent reason seldom makes full use of it. He cites lack of interest, lack of time and lack of energy as main reasons for this inertia.

237 “What we need in every executive department in Washington is a solid body of permanent undersecretaries, clerks, and other employees, well and broadly trained and irremovable, except for cause — and change in administration is not an adequate cause. We want ‘careermen’ not alone in

the diplomatic and consular service, but in every department of Government." — Ralph Adams Cram, *The End of Democracy* (Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1937), pp. 216–217.

Cf. also *Letters from a Chinese Official*, Anonymous, New York, 1912, p. 45.

238 "The experience of thousands of years teaches that the overwhelming majority of peoples does not take sufficient interest in the state to be able to form well-founded opinions concerning either persons or bills to cast its vote accordingly. . . . In most elections, except those of rare popular interests, the party that succeeds through some means or other in hauling a crowd of absolutely indifferent men to the polls is the party that wins. Is it then the people's will that has become manifest through this election? We find ourselves in an evident dilemma. If no parties existed, the vote would be so small that there could be no question of an action of the people. If we have parties, it is true, they drag the people onto the stage, but the verdict is pronounced by the powers, who understand how to induce those who have no opinion of their own to vote in the way desired." — Hans Delbrück, *Government and Will of the People*, trans, by Roy S. MacElwee (New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 14.

239 About the type of bureaucratic "manager" and his increasing importance see James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, New York, 1941, pp. 254, 255.

240 About the thirst for "Success" and the competitive spirit in their relation to crime see: Morris Ploscowe, "Crime in a Competitive Society," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, September, 1941.

241 A record in preaching was established eight years ago by the Reverend S. Brown of Mount Zion Baptist Church in Washington, D. C. The learned pastor spoke 88,794 words in 12 hours and 10 minutes. This record was beaten by the Reverend N. Lee in his little Emmanuel Temple in Los Angeles, who spoke over 200,000 words in 21 hours, 20 minutes.

242 There is naturally also another angle to this problem which has been well brought out by Professor John U. Nef, in "Civilization at the Crossroads, II," *The Review of Politics*, October, 1941, p. 463.

V

THE AMERICAN TRAGEDY

243 "For the Liberal the spiritual center of gravity was in the individual, and the realm of private opinion and private interests was the ideal world. Hence, when the Liberal spoke of religion as a purely private matter it was in compliment rather than in derogation. To separate the Church from the State — to keep religion out of politics, was to elevate it to a higher sphere of spiritual values. But today in the democratic world, these values have been reversed. The individual life has lost its spiritual primacy, and it is social life which has now the higher prestige, so that to treat religion as a purely individual and personal matter is to deprive it of actuality and to degrade it to a lower level of value and potency. To keep religion out of public life is to shut it up in a stuffy Victorian back drawing room with the aspidistras and antimacassars, when the streets are full of life and youth. And the result is that the religion of the Church becomes increasingly alienated from real life while democratic society creates a new religion of the street and the forum to take its place." — Christopher Dawson, *Beyond Politics* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1938).

244 Paragraph VI, Thesis 55, Syllabus of Pope Pius IX, *condemned* the following assertion: "The Church ought to be separated from the State, and the State from the Church."— (Allocution *Acerbissimam* of Sept. 27, 1852.)

245 "The curious Jansenist condition of modern Catholic Ireland" and the low-Church mentality of America is well discussed by Sean O'Faolain, in *King of the Beggars* (The Life of Daniel O'Connell), New York, 1938, p. 14.

Sigrid Undset, herself a Catholic convert is even more outspoken in her condemnation of Catholic Puritanism in America. Cf. her *Men, Women and Places*, New York, 1939, p. 108.

246 The American version or application of that culture [i.e., Catholic culture] has set the novelist an almost impossible task. This can be seen, I think, if we turn to an examination of the attitude of Catholic readers. That attitude has reflected all too often a Catholic social consciousness that is tinged with excessive touchiness, with readiness to see offense and insults everywhere, with puritanism, which all spring, I fear, from an inferiority complex. Willy-nilly, our authors have bent to these cramping winds, to the detriment of their art. — Harold C. Gardiner, S.J., in "Reader-Hazard," *America*, Vol. LXV, No. 22.

A valid criticism of Catholic-American *étroitesse* has been made by Father Victor Dillard, S.J., in *"Jeunesse Catholique en Amérique," Études*, April 5, 1940.

247 To give only a few names of leading British Catholics in the past 60 years (converts italicized):

Cardinal Newman	*Fr. W. Orchard*	*Alfred Noyes*
Cardinal Wiseman	*T. S. Gregory*	A. J. Cronin
Cardinal Manning	Douglas Jerrold	Francis Thompson
Baron von Hügel	Bernard Wall	Coventry Patmore
Lord Acton	*Christopher Dawson*	*D. B. Wyndham Lewis*
G. K. Chesterton	*Christopher Hollis*	J. B. Morton
Maurice Baring	Douglas Woodruff	Bede Jarrett, O.P.
Evelyn Waugh	*Eric Gill*	*Algernon Cecil*
R. H. Benson	*Arnold Lunn*	*Deathbed converts:*
Sheila Kaye-Smith	Hilaire Belloc	*Oscar Wilde*
Compton Mackenzie	Wilfrid Ward	*Frank Harris*
Graham Greene	*C. C. Martindale, S.J.*	
E. I. Watkin	*Ronald Knox*	

248 The Reverend William Ayer, himself a Baptist, complained in a sermon (Mar. 21, 1937) about the attitude of liberal Protestantism which is organized within the framework of the Federal Council of Churches. He said: "Liberal Protestantism is in many instances taking on itself the cloak and spirit of a mild communism. And the Federal Council more often speaks the communist shibboleth than the Gospel one. Liberal Protestantism, or Modernism, is far from defenseless. It has not only the capable organization backing of the Federal Council and affiliated organizations and movements, but it has the financial backing of the Rockefeller millions and other wealth not to mention the extreme socialist group throughout the land." (Cf. *New York Times*, March 22, 1937.)

A characteristic representative of this group is the bimonthly *The Protestant* (formerly *Protestant Digest*) which combines enthusiastic pro-Bolshevism with furious anti-Catholicism.

249 See the outstanding excerpts from "The Bible up to date" by Dr. William L. Bailey, Northwestern University professor, *Newsweek*, Dec. 4, 1939.

250 As late as the year 1777 the city of Birmingham refused to have a theater as it would encourage 'laziness' and therefore impede trade." Max Weber, *Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*.

The hostility of the Puritans and Protestant extremists, all forerunners of our capitalistic system against phantasy and its products, was simply unbelievable. Not only did they view with mistrust the theater but also the novel and 'fiction' in general had to suffer. (There is still a fair amount of contempt for the writer and reader of 'fiction,' which the German calls *Romane* — implying the romantic element in that product of art.) The Reverend Richard Baxter (middle of the seventeenth century) wrote in his *Christian Directory*, Ch. VIII, Part 6, a passionate attack against novels.

Even Orestes Brownson was affected by his Protestant environment. See *Works* XIX, pp. 225, 226.

251 "The pride of caste is becoming the pride of taste; but, as before, it is averse to the mass of men; it consents to know them only in some conventionalized and artificial guise. It seeks to withdraw itself, to stand aloof; to be distinguished and not to be identified. Democracy in literature is the reverse of this all." — William Dean Howells, *Criticism and Fiction*, New York, 1891, p. 180.

This tallies with Anatole France's criticism of the aesthetic deficiencies of the Third Republic. (See J. J. Brousson, *Anatole France en pantouffles*, Paris, 1924, p. 67.)

252 ". . . All the great things on this Earth begin with a dream. 'Woe to him who has never dreamt,' it has been written. One does not rise to heaven without passing through the clouds." — Gustave Thibon, *Études Carmélitaines*.

253 "*To* romanticise is to give a higher sense to the common, to give the dignity of the unknown to the known, to touch with a ray of eternity all that is limited in time." — Novalis.

254 Cf. Just Havelaar, *Democratie*, Arnhem, 1920.

255 "Our unemployed millions are endemic. Our cities strictly built for a profit of a minority have for the majority banished relaxation and peace. Our mechanized and commercialized pleasures have shrunk the individual human being and created a mass mind as dangerously prone to demagogic doctrine in our terms as the oppressed Italians and Germans. Does anyone believe that the American millions think straighter than Europe's millions — or are being taught to think straight on a regimen of movies, radios, and popular novels — with the schools and universities taking their cues from the columnists?" — Waldo Frank, *Chart for Rough Water*, New York, 1940.

256 Similar phenomena can be witnessed in England where the speaker of the Con gregationalist Convention declared in October, 1935, in the presence of Bishop Barnes of the Church of England that he expects to see the day when "His Majesty's Communist Government" will be established in the British Isles. One of the most active members of the "Friends of the Soviet Union," the Dean of Canterbury, declared solemnly that the Soviet Union is the *greatest Christian experiment of all times*.

257 The infantilism of the American masses is well analyzed by John U. Nef's, "On the Future of American Civilization," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. II, No. 3.

258 Cf. Lewis Mumford, "The Passive Barbarian," in *Atlantic Monthly*, September, 1940.

259 Peter Viereck sees the danger in America very clearly. "Germany was historically ahead of us," he writes in his *Metapolitics* (New York, 1941), "in being ripe for Fascism. We in America can expect similar developments from similar causes. These causes are more basic and world-wide than Versailles; an overmechanized and overspecialized industrial society is spawning mass men, instead of responsible, self-disciplined *individuals* rooted in the universal moral values."

Cf. Alain Locke from Howard University in a lecture: "Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy" at the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, September, 1941.

260 I am not concerned with the problem of Christians as a persecuted minority. When the Christian is treated as an enemy of the State, his course is very much harder, but it is simpler. I am

concerned with the dangers to the tolerated minority; and in the modern world it may turn out that the most intolerable thing for Christians is to be tolerated. — T. S. Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society*.

261 Aristotle, like Plato, has clearly foreseen the dangerous developments from democracy as well as the ultimate danger itself. Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, V, vii, 18; also V, ix.

PART IV

THE ISSUE

I

COMMUNISM

262 *Socialists and Communists of middle-class or Plutocratic background:*

Karl Marx	Karl Radek	Largo Caballero
Lasalle	Krassin	I. Prieto
Robert Blum	Zinovyev	Engels
Léon Blum	Kamyenev	Romain Rolland
Plyekhanov	Litvinov	Sir Stafford Cripps
Lenin	Molotov	Yoffe
Trotzki	Dovgalyevski	Karl Liebknecht
Earl Browder	Otto Bauer	Rakovsky
Bukharin	Karl Seitz	Naomi Mitchison
Rykov	Julius Deutsch	Stephen Spender
Béla Kún	Willi Münzenberg	Charles Fourier
Kurt Eisner	Barbusse	Corliss Lamont
Léviné	Malraux	

Socialists and Communists of the nobility: (Gentry).

John Strachey	Tukhatchevsky	Bakunin (Anarchist)
Dzerzyński	Chicherin	St. Simon

263 Cf. Analysis of *Work* in Christian and bourgeois perspectives by P. *Lafargue* in *L'Origine ed evoluzione della proprietà*, Palermo, 1896.

264 Bolshevism actually promises to make *everybody* a state employee and thus to assure the maximum of social security. That tendency was always strong in the European bourgeoisie. Even Herbert Spencer complained about it in his essay "The Coming Slavery." Yet he made the mistake of considering this craving for government jobs as a desire for an increased dignity. Primarily it was something else — the nostalgia for security; the added dignity of a state priesthood was of secondary value. Spencer writes: "And in Russia where that universality of State-regulation which characterizes the militant type of society has been carried furthest, we see this ambition pushed to its extreme. Says Mr. Wallace, quoting a passage from a play: 'All men, even shopkeepers and cobblers, aim at

becoming officers, and the man who has passed his whole life without official rank seems to be not a human being.'"

To be financially secure, to wear the uniform and to have a safe position; this bourgeois idea of the West grew on eastern soil in tropical richness and splendor. A similar evolution could be observed in Hungary where the *biztos kis állás* (the secure little position) is valued by the bourgeoisie beyond anything else. Count Keyserling in his *Europe* overrates the aristocratic essence of *modern* East Central Europe considerably.

265 Dr. Waldemar Gurian is therefore entirely correct when he writes: "Bolshevism is at once the product of the bourgeois society and the judgment upon it. It reveals the goal to which the secret philosophy of that society leads, if accepted with unflinching logic," *Bolshevism — Theory and Practice* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 237–238.

This statement is also well illustrated by E. v. Kuehnelt-Leddihn in an article "We're All Marxists Now," *Colosseum*, April–June, 1939.

Christopher Dawson describes the interrelationship of the modern bourgeois ochlocratic world in his *Enquiries Into Religion and Culture* with the following unmistakable words: "The Bolshevik philosophy is simply the *reductio ad absurdum* of the principles implicit in bourgeois culture and consequently it provides no real answer to the weaknesses and deficiencies of the latter. It takes the nadir of the European spiritual development for the zenith of the new order."

266 "If one walks through the streets of St. Petersburg and scrutinizes the faces it is easy to guess who is a communist. These faces are not characterized by lecherous satisfaction or animalistic callousness but by boredom, the truly transcendental boredom of the "Paradise on Earth," of the "Empire of the Antichrist." — Dimitri Myerezhkovsky, *The Realm of the Antichrist*.

267 "For men love one another with a spiritual love only when they have suffered the same sorrow together, when through long days they have ploughed the stony ground bowed beneath the common yoke of a common grief. It is then that they know one another and feel one another, and feel with one another. In their common anguish, they pity one another and they love one another. For to love goes with pity and if bodies are united by pleasure, souls are united by pain." — Miguel de Unamuno, *Tragic Sense of Life*, trans, by Crawford Fitch, London, 1921.

268 "If any one requires to be convinced that speculative thought is one of the chief elements of social power, let him bethink himself of the age in which there was scarcely a throne in Europe which was not filled by a liberal and reforming king, a liberal and reforming Emperor, or, strangest of all, a liberal and reforming pope; the age of Frederick the Great, of Catherine II, of Joseph II, of Peter Leopold, of Benedict XIV, of Ganganelli, of Pombal, of d'Aranda; when the very Bourbons of Naples were liberals and reformers, and all the active minds among the noblesse of France were filled with the ideas which were soon after to cost them so dear. Surely a conclusive example how far mere physical and economic power is not being the whole of social power." — John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (New York, 1882), p. 24. (This is a good refutation of environmentalism and the marxist overestimation of self-interest.)

II

WORLD WAR II

269 Genuine German conservatism abhorred the idea of the domination of one nation over the other. Cf. Eugen Diesel, *Vom Verhängnis der Völker*, 1934, p. 113.

270 "Burkhardt in his first great historical work, devoted to the period of Constantine the Great (1852), saw this coming era of *terribles simplificateurs* as one in which some 'great handsome fellow with the talents of a subordinate officer' would introduce barbarism. Then naked power alone would rule and the whole culture of Europe — religion, morals, education — would be overwhelmed in its mighty waves." — J. P. Mayer, *Political Thought*.

271 Cf. Robert Michels, *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie*, Leipzig, 1911, pp. 67, 68.

272 "For Tocqueville was a liberal of the purest breed — a Liberal and nothing else, deeply suspicious of democracy and its kindred, equality, centralization and utilitarianism." — Lord Acton, *Lectures on the French Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1910), p. 357.

Views similar to those expressed by de Tocqueville can be found in Donoso Cortès famous "Discurso" (Jan. 4, 1849, in *Oeuvres*, I, Paris, 1858).

273 "The proposition that the people are the best keepers of their own liberties is not true. They are the worst conceivable, they are not keepers at all; they can neither judge, act, think, or will, as a political body. Individuals have conquered themselves; nations and large bodies never." — John Adams, "Defence of the Constitution," etc., as well as Vol. IV of *Works*.

274 The present Third Reich (June, 1941, minus Alsace and the "General Government," South Styria and Slovakia) has a population of 96 millions of whom 45 millions are Protestants, 48 million Catholics and 3 million non-Christian. If we add the above mentioned territories we have 45 million Protestants against 60 million Catholics. Protestant to Catholic birth rate is in the relation of 10 to 18.

275 We find a good case for a German monarchy in the successful book of one of the collaborators of the liberal *Manchester Guardian*, He wrote in 1934: "By fastening the main responsibility for war on the Kaiser, the Allied and Associated Powers instilled into the German people the belief that if this brilliant but irascible and flighty person (who with different advisers, might have been a very good monarch) were eliminated, they would obtain more tolerable peace terms, and that reconciliation between victors and vanquished would be made much easier. The Kaiser was chiefly dethroned by Anglo-American propaganda, and, his son being depicted as only second to himself as a monster of wickedness by that same propaganda, the succession was also made difficult. . . . By promoting the overthrow of the monarchy, the Allied and Associated Powers helped to destroy the political form that was most suited to the genius of the German people. A constitutional monarchy, with the color and ceremonial that are as dear to the Germans as to the English, would have given the German State a certain majesty and fascination that was denied to the Republic, largely by reason of the complete aridity of the Marxian Myth (dialectical materialism does not lend itself to picturesquely, symbolical representation). . . . The solution for Germany's internal dissentions might have been found in a popular monarchy, a *Volkskaisertum*. Besides, as we shall see later on, the monarchic principle was conducive to decentralization and favorable to that federal spirit which has added such variety, richness, and freedom to German life. The monarchy contained the menace of reaction, but no reaction and no despotism under a restored monarch would have been as tyrannical as the dictatorship established by the National Socialist revolution of 1933." — F. A. Voigt, *Unto Caesar*.

When the National Socialist danger increased beyond proportion in 1931 and 1932, Dr. Heinrich Brüning himself thought about winning the Left and the Conservatives (who were unfortunately under the leadership of an uncapable industrialist — Dr. Hugenberg) to forestall their victory by a monarchical restoration. The Left with the exception of the Nazis and Communists was quite willing to follow him, but Hindenburg, the great *Cunctator* hesitated. An excellent account of these intrigues

and negotiations can be found in J. Wheeler-Bennett's *Hindenburg, the Wooden Titan*, London, 1936, pp. 339, 353–368.

276 "In a republic and in a parliamentary monarchy on English lines, it is almost impossible for any outstanding genius to seize the reigns of government, for the mediocrity of the people from whom power has to be derived will always bar his way." — Guglielmo Ferrero, *Peace and War*, 1933.

277a Mr. Walter Lippmann contests in his *Good Society* the statement of Mr. Lewis Mumford that "as industry advances in mechanization a greater weight of political authority must develop outside than was necessary in the past" (*Technics and Civilization*). Unfortunately we cannot share Mr. Lippmann's optimism. He is convinced that the changes in techniques are so rapid that a rigid control and planning are out of place. The reply is that the control must be as flexible as its object. The difficulty is to have a well-adapted economical control without an increase in political control and a further destruction of civil liberties. This will not be altogether easy to achieve yet we gain a better perspective of our task if we regard industrial development as an "evil" which has to be policed.

277b Here, so many Anglo-Saxons, make a basic mistake in judgment. It must be borne in mind that the plan for peace and the war effort are intrinsically interconnected. It depends upon the peace proposals (of the United Nations not yet made) how long the Axis resistance is going to last. Professor Harold Laski of the London School of Economics thinks that the European Continent will only rise if it sees that England and America go sincerely "left," i.e., that private capitalism be supplanted by state capitalism. (See his letter to the *New York Times*, Sept. 30, 1942.) Howard Smith, who has written an otherwise excellent book on Germany (*Last Train from Berlin*) believes the same nonsense. It is depressing that an American who has lived for years in Nazi Germany still believes that there is any enthusiasm left in Europe for State omnipotency. He argues that if England would have kept her promise to nationalize the Welsh mines, things would be different in Germany (!). The German public would become restless if the armament factories and the ammunition industry of the United States would be nationalized (!). This would be the way to revolutionize the masses (!) in the sign of *Total Democracy*, which should become the slogan.

All that is a dangerous walking in circles. The Europeans inside and outside of Germany are fed up with State and Statism, with any manifestation of colossalism and Pan-ism, with private or state capitalism. If German workers hear that the Welsh mines have been nationalized they visualize merely a mining manager in uniform and police *support* instead of a mining manager in a business suit and a police *"connection." Total* nationalization is communism. One wonders whether there is really a group of professors in the London School of Economics which thinks that Dutch saboteurs die with the name of one of the Gollancz books on their lips, whether the Chetniks of General Mihajlović make shrines with pictures of Miss Naomi Mitchison or of Mr. Stephen Spender. I can assure Mr. Smith and Professor Laski that Europeans are not going to die on barricades for 10 per cent increases in salary, for the aggravated evil of State capitalism, for birth control clinics, cheap gadgets or election campaigns. The only form of leftism which will be popular in Europe after the war is Anarchism, total liberty, not a spurious "Total Democracy" which is halfway to total communism. (Cf. "A Conservative's Reflections on the Future of Europe" by F. S. Campbell, *Thought*, September, 1942.) These proposals all stem from the same psychological source; the basically erroneous interpretation of Fascism and Nazism by Marxists and Crypto-Marxists deeming it to be a capitalistic, semimedieval aristocratic-clerical conspiracy by non-Marxists ochlocrats. All remedies proposed on the basis of this wrong diagnosis are bound to fail and are going to cost oceans of blood. (See also Professor Laski's article in the London *Observer*, July 5, 1942, p. 3.)

278 "Then, after the destruction of the Roman Empire and the French Revolution, began the third great crisis of western civilization. The fundamental reason was the same for all three: in the case of Rome, the downfall of the imperial government; in that of the Revolution, the downfall of the French monarchy; and today, the downfall of the monarchic system in Europe during 1918 and 1919. The war which began on September 1, 1939, was not born of a conflict of political interests between the great powers, as was the first World War; it was born, like all the wars of the French Revolution, of the intellectual, moral, and political disorder to which Europe after 1919 was subjected by the collapse of the monarchic system, by the universal cult of revolution, and by the phrenetic subversion of all the laws." — Guglielmo Ferrero, *The Reconstruction of Europe* (Talleyrand and the Congress of Vienna, 1814–1815), trans, by Theodore R. Jaeckel (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941), pp. 347–348.

279 "Contemporary Europe is dominated by two fears; fear of Germany, and fear of anarchy as a consequence of social revolution. As a logical consequence, Europe will return, as she always returned, to her traditional civilization, which is neither urban democratic nor dictatorial, but agricultural and hierarchical; neither theocratic nor atheist, but Christian, yet rendering to Caesar the things that are Caesar's." — Douglas Jerrold, *Britain and Europe, 1900–1940* (London: Collins, 1941).

280 Cf. Armand de Caulaincourt, *With Napoleon in Russia*, trans, and edited by George Libaire (New York: 1935), p. 391.

281 As an illustration of an inhuman humanitarianism, here is a sampling of some of the "finest" passages from the *City of Man* (New York: The Viking Press, 1941), issued by Herbert Agar, Frank Aydelotte, G. A. Borgese, Hermann Broch, Van Wyck Brooks, Ada L. Comstock, William Yandell Elliott, Dorothy Canfield Fisher, Christian Gauss, Oscar Jászi, Alvin Johnson, Hans Kohn, Thomas Mann, Lewis Mumford, William Allan Neilson, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Gaetano Salvemini.

"Democracy is nothing more and nothing less than humanism in theocracy and rational theocracy in universal humanism" (p. 33).

"Democracy teaches that everything must be within humanity, nothing against humanity, nothing outside humanity" (p. 34).

"But the fundamental principle is that the democratic concept of freedom can never include the freedom to destroy democracy and freedom. . . . This is — in an interpretation suited to the modern mind —the spirit which Christ called the Holy Ghost" (pp. 34–35).

"The Protestant insurrection overrode all obstacles to the direct communication of the individual with God, thus fundamentally asserting the freedom of man's spirit" (p. 37) — (within the framework of predestination . . .).

"Jesus, highest of Jewish prophets" (p. 40).

"Democracy, in the catholicity of its language, interprets and justifies the separate creeds as its own vernaculars."

"It follows then, that none of these vernaculars, however venerable and lovable, and whatever their right to citizenship, can take the place of the universal language which expresses the common belief of man. The latter explains and annexes all dogmas as symbols; the churches, in the fetters of literalism, anathemize as heresy and error the symbolical meaning that is the dogma's innermost truth" (p. 45).

"A constitutional reform of democracy cannot be founded but on the spirit of a new religion" (p. 80).

"An inquiry into the religious heritage of the western world should try to discover which of its elements are more apt to co-operate with the democratic community and consequently more

deserving of protection and help by it, and whether other elements, conversely, are by nature and content so committed to the support of Fascist and other autocratic philosophies and intrinsically so inimical to democracy, or at least so ambiguous, as to become the source of additional danger in the hour of peril" (pp. 81–82).

"Colleges and universities have even developed, almost spontaneously, in their chapel services and exercises a provisional model for an unsectarian liturgy — virtually adequate to a new religion outside the literal fences of each separate faith and embracing the spiritual substance of all" (p. 85).

Walter Farrell, O.P., summed this book up in his extensive review in the *Thomist* (October, 1941) with the following phrase: "This book represents one of the earliest and most concrete conquests of Hitlerism in America."

282 "A further reason (for the disastrous results of the modern treaties) — of which the full effects are seen for the first time in history in the Treaty of Versailles — was the purely democratic organisation of the more prominent victorious States. In the earlier and more absolutistic world that had been responsible for the great peace settlements of the past few centuries, monarchs, and ministers, who often saw further than the public opinion of their time, could take account of future possibilities, and, out of regard for political considerations, place a check on any immoderate demands. The terrible suffering which a modern war of long duration inflicts on the population, the exhausting sacrifices for which it calls, makes it imperiously necessary to inflame the nation to a white heat of fury so that it may hold out. All the arts of the subtlest propaganda were for the first time, in this war, directed to the achievement of that end. When the end came, it was obvious that the terrible momentum of an enraged public opinion could not be switched off by the twist of a lever. Much, therefore, that figures in the treaty of peace was inserted against the better judgment of the leading statesmen, to satisfy an excited public." — Richard von Kühlmann, *Thoughts on Germany*, trans, by Eric Sutton (New York: Macmillan), 1932, pp. 89–90.

283 Compare the attitude of the Allies at the end of World War I with the words of Frederic William III, addressing the Mayor of Berlin on the day of the victorious return of the troops in 1814: "The reception-festivities are exquisitely arranged and I honour them as expressions of good intention; but they are too pompous. I am displeased with the accumulation of trophies, canons, and banners in front of the armory and directly opposite my lodgings. One does not have to and indeed one must never jeer at the vanquished enemy. That is despicable boasting and don't let us continue in our good luck the arrogance which brought us misery. It is against all manners to hurt the feelings of peoples with whom one has just concluded a peace, by frivolously exhibiting cannons and banners. . . . The magnificent victory-columns, the showy trophies in the windows of the arsenal must be removed, tomorrow's feast shall be one of Christian gratitude and humbleness before God. It is He who has done great things for Prussia; to Him alone all the honor is due." — Quoted by Fr. Eylert, *Charakterzüge und Historische Fragmente aus dem Leben des Königs von Preussen, Friedrich Wilhelm III,"* Magdeburg, 1846, Verlag der Heinrichshofen'schen Buchhandlung.

284 Godoy, the much maligned minister of Charles IV, said 120 years ago: "Yo soy uno de los pocos hombres de Europa que, a través de vicisitudes tan violentes y frecuentes como han sufrido los gobiernos y los naciones, no han prestado más que un juramento, uno solo: el que hice a mi rey y he mantenido hasta su muerte y despues de ella." How many officials in central Europe can show today a similar record? The decay of morality after a century of materialistic tradition in Europe is best characterized by the exclamations of an Austrian National Socialist leader during the Schuschnigg-regime which imposed a special oath of allegiance upon the government officials. He said: "Na gut, so schwör'n mer halt a bisserl!" (O.K., then let's have a little oath giving!) Neither can I forget a German gentleman who emphasized his promise by the remark: "I give you my pre-war word of honor" (*Vorkriegsehrenwort*).

Further reference material:
On the origins of World War I and II:
Professor Sidney Fay, in *Events*, Vol. 6, No. 34, October, 1939, p. 241.

III

ODDS AND ENDS

285 *Étatisme* (statism) first of all manifests itself in a scholarly form, in the establishment of gratuitous and obligatory education with the aim of the liberation of the individual; next it appears in the social form, in measures destined to protect health and to shelter it from the risqués of life: insurances against accidents, illness, old age, invalidity, and protection of survivors. Finally it exerts itself in the economic field through the creation of a national bank, equipped with the monopoly on issues. — Louis Rougier, *Les Mystiques Economiques*, 1938.

286 Cf. Louis Rougier, *Les Mystique Economiques*, 1938.

287 "And that race which has once lost the seed of aristocracy can never again recover it. For that seed is produced only in the garden of God, and when God purposes the destruction of a nation He destroys its Lords, and does not renew the sacred stock. Thus the nation deprived of leaders may not progress. It cannot even stay where it is, but must sink back to the marsh and the forest whence it has painfully and under guidance emerged." —A. Carthill.

288 Cf. Wilhelm Hasbach, *Die Moderne Demokratie*, Jena, 1921, p. 200. See also Orestes Brownson's judgment on this subject quoted by Doran Whalen *Granite for God's House* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1941), p. 161.

289 "As opposed to the ancient authoritarian state (*Obrigkeitsstaat*) however, the people are not despised, but highly honored in the new *Führerstaat*. If I were the 'People' I should protest that I prefer contempt and disregard to having my will absorbed and my feelings prescribed for me. I would rather be despised as a social inferior than be robbed of my ego as an infra-personal being." — Aurél Kolnai, *The War Against the West*.

290 "The typical leader by no means influences the masses in one direction, he finds the undercurrent and is himself a possessed among the possessed. The typical mass-leader is not a 'demagogue,' he does not consciously and with a cool brain direct the masses in one way, he most of all is gripped by the ecstasy of mass-experience, he is himself among the most unconscious of all." — Theodor Geiger, *Die Masse und Ihre Action*.

291 The ideal monarch is certainly *not* an aristocrat. This is the deeper reason why, for instance, the laws of the House of Habsburg do not consider ladies of even the oldest aristocratic families as fit to be the wives of future emperors. The humiliating attitude of Francis Joseph toward his nephew Francis Ferdinand who married the Countess Chotek is explainable by the tendency to keep the dynasty aloof from any class connection. It is truly essential for the sake of the very functions of the Christian monarchical system in Europe that rulers have: (*a*) international connections and (*b*) no class affiliations.

292 ". . . He is the petit bourgeois, the man of bourgeois liberalism. How from our point of view is he to be characterized? He is seen to be the pharisaic and decadent product born of the spirit of Puritanism or Jansenism and that of rationalism. *He prefers juridical fictions to love* (*as Sombart says, he is not 'erotic'*); and he prefers psychological figments to being (which is why one can say that he has no ontological being)." — Jacques Maritain, *L'Humanisme integral* (True Humanism).

[293] cf The demoniacal representation of Hitler as *Oberförster* in Ernst Jünger's courageous symbolical tale *Auf den Marmorklippen* (Hamburg, 1939).

[294] Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, III, vi.

[295] "In the sphere of economics, covering nine-tenths of man's daily life, the test of every activity, increasingly came to be not 'Is it just?' but 'Does it pay?' There was only one check on that rule — the human conscience. With the gradual concentration of business in the hands of limited liability companies, even that check was removed. A limited liability company has no conscience. A priesthood of figures cannot consider claims of morality and justice that conflict with its mathematical formulas: it must live by its own rules. Man, who had once tried to model his life on the divine, came to take his orders from the lender of money and the chartered accountant acting in their purely professional capacity. That has been the story of the last century of civilization. The age of enlightened selfishness begot plutocracy, and plutocracy begot the monstrous materialistic and pagan tyrannies we are now fighting to destroy. It was England that first unconsciously led the world in this morass. It is England — wisest and gentlest of the nations — that has now to discover the way out." — Arthur Bryant, *Pageant of England 1840–1940* (New York and London: Harper and Bros., 1941), pp. 323, 324.

[296] Cf. J. H. Wood, *Democracy and the Will to Power*, p. 221.

Further reading material:

On "democracy's" hopeless antitotalitarianism:

Georges Bernanos, *Lettre aux Anglais*, Rio de Janeiro, 1942, specially, pp. 234, 299–300. On Europe's anti-bourgeois character, pp. 210 ff.

On the "democratic" persecution of the Catholic Church:

Ronald Knox, *Nazi and Nazarene*, London, 1940, p. 7.

On the factual background of totalitarianism (1) communications and (2) "democratization of the masses":

Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, New York, 1940, p. 108.

A conservative criticism of National Socialism:

Hermann Rauschning, *Make and Break With the Nazis*, London, 1941.

On the prospects of "democracy" in the United States:

A letter from Lord Macauley to Henry S. Randall, Esq., dated Kensington, London, May 23, 1857.

On the "democratic" aspects of totalitarian "leaders":

Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution*, New York, 1942, pp. 3–4, 45.

APPENDIX II

THE TWOFOLD ASPECT OF MAN



APPENDIX III

CHART OF "MODERN CIVILIZATION"



APPENDIX III

A Tentative Tabulation of Herdist Civilization and Culture

This is not a pedigree in the ordinary sense of the word, but rather a tabulation of different cultural and political items which influenced the European and American life during the past 100 years. The older, traditional values have been purposely excluded and the reader is invited to make a parallel tabulation with the opposite terms (supranationalism for nationalism, dualism for monism, etc.). There are naturally a series of items which do not have a term of contrary meaning. (For instance, "Luther" or "Hegelianism.")

There are about 72 items in this table. Most of these are connected with a large number of the other items. There are only a few connecting lines drawn and the reader is encouraged to draw further connections. He will probably have to give up not because his (or her) ingenuity comes to a standstill and no new combinations will be detected, but because the sheet will be covered by such a thick net of lines that no new ones can be traced without resulting in total confusion. Our modern civilization and culture is actually a closely interwoven fabric; phenomena like democratism, communism, or national socialism are not ideologies "hanging in the air" but popular philosophies supported by the most important and poignant aspects of our present civilization and culture. Walt Whitman, Lenin, and Hitler were not *bombinantes in vacuo*. Catholicism has therefore to reject modern civilization almost in its totality. It is indeed difficult to see how Catholicism would live in harmony with the items listed on this tabulation except as a survival in the spirit of resignation or as an energetic negation fired by the enthusiasm of a revolutionary force. *Quod erat demonstrandum*. The Communists sing: "Let us make a clean slate of the past," but they never meant honestly to break with the (immediate) past.

The Catholic Church has no other alternative but to negate the Great Negation — our Modern Civilization.

APPENDIX IV A

A CATHOLIC GERMANY AND THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY
(by Wahlkreise.)



This map shows the election of July, 1932, as well as the areas inhabited predominantly by Catholics. It shows to the great sorrow of the economical determinist that there is a very concrete connection between political views

and religion. A more elaborate map (showing the returns of the individual *Kreise*) would have demonstrated the fact that there is an even conformity between National Socialism and Protestantism (Lutheranism as well as Calvinism). The reader will now probably appreciate the fateful mistake in Wilson's attitude toward the Anschluss which in all probability would have prevented the National Socialists' rise to power.

APPENDIX IV B

CATHOLICS IN EAST PRUSSIA AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM



Elections July 31, 1932, by “Kreise.” (National Socialist votes.)



Catholics in Eastern Prussia (census of 1933).

The whole southern region of Eastern Prussia is Polish in language but Lutheran in religion. These *Mazurs*, as it can be seen on the map, voted overwhelmingly for the Nazis, while the German Ermelanders (Varmians) who are Catholics voted against them. Religion, not “race” is a paramount factor in political and ideological matters.

APPENDIX V

THE TREATY OF BREST LITOVSK



The Ukraine which has never been reincorporated into Russia proper has been left out. Neither were the borders between Russia (RSFSR) and the *national* Ukraine ever fixed. After the conquest of the Communists the

Soviet Ukraine (USSR) became part of the Soviet Union (SSSR) but never of Russia (RSFSR).

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The true "herdist" will carefully avoid acting or thinking originally, in order not to destroy the uniformity which is so dear to him, and he is also ready to rise immediately against anybody who dares to act independently and thus destroy the sacred unity of the uniform group to which he belongs. The loyal herdist will not rise alone against the sacrilegious offender; he will have the support of the rest of the circumscribed society and thus a mass action of collective protest will take place, forcing the "lonely individual" to conform or to withdraw. It must be fully borne in mind that no one of us is completely free from the influence of the herdist instinct and even the noblest among us yield to its dark appeal in one form or the other.

The herdist instinct is furthermore not only personal, in the sense that it clamors for a personal collectivism; it creates also a longing and desire for the visual or acoustic contemplation of identitarian or uniformistic phenomena. The true herdist, the man truly dominated by that inferior instinct, will not only rejoice in marching amongst twenty thousand uniformly clad soldiers, all stepping rhythmically in one direction, but he will find an almost equal gratification in contemplating the show from a balcony.

—Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn

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